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**About This Publication**

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document contains the October 2011 through December 2011 issues of *The Africa Watch*. *The Africa Watch* is a twice-monthly report on trends and developments that might contribute to discontinuous change and instability in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The October 2011 issue contains the following articles – Senegal’s 2012 Elections; Guinea-Bissau: Prospects for Military Interference in Politics; Boko Haram and Nigerian Stability: A Clash of Identities; Opposition Politics: Zimbabwe’s Movement for Democratic Change; Food Security and Instability in Africa; Land Grabs in Africa: Beneficial to Africans; Malian Elections 2012, Prospects for the Presidency; Mauritania: Protestors Clash with Police; Conditions in Eastern DRC; and Instability in the Central African Republic.

The first December 2011 issue contains the following articles – Protests and Violence in West Africa Over Land Acquisition by Foreign Firms; Zambian-Chinese Relations Stabilizing; New Zambian Government Rethinks Copper Mining Agreements; Uganda Protest Movement Stalled; Gabonese Parliamentary Elections; Rising Leader Profile: Fidele Waura; Swaziland: King Called Upon to Relinquish Power; Relations Between Zambia and Malawi; Emerging Armed Group in Mali Claims It Will Absorb Tuareg; and Niger: Violence in the West Between Farmers and Pastoralists.

The second December 2011 issue contains the following articles – Ethnic Violence in Nigeria’s Plateau State; Assessing the Security Threat of Migrants Fleeing Libya; Persecution of Journalists in Ethiopia; Zimbabwe: Opposition’s Prospects Uncertain as Elections Approach; Zambian President Sata: A Rough Start; Leadership Profile: Fatou Bensouda, New ICC Chief Prosecutor; Leadership Profile: Former Uganda VP Gilbert Bukenya; Equatorial Guinea’s Constitutional Referendum; Burkina Faso: Opposition Parties and Civil Society Personalities Boycott National Debate on Political Reform; and Sierra Leone: Timbergate?

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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

# THE AFRICA WATCH

OCTOBER 2011



## T O T H E R E A D E R

Welcome to the third issue of *The Africa Watch*, a publication of the Global Coverage Analyses Program - Africa (GCAP/A). As part of the Overwatch function of GCAP/A, IDA's Africa researchers scan a global array of information sources for trends and developments that relate to the stability of sub-Saharan African states. We give priority to issues and trends that are not being reported extensively elsewhere. *The Africa Watch* is the product of this monitoring effort.

IDA's goal is to maintain a standard of consistent excellence in serving its customers. We are particularly grateful to the readers who have provided feedback on the first two issues of *The Africa Watch*. Glad that the reports have been favorably received, we have decided to make two changes that will increase their utility. First, we will move from a monthly to a twice-monthly publication schedule. Instead of submitting the next issue on November 17, 2011, we will henceforth publish twice each month, beginning December 2011. We hope that this change will enhance the timeliness of our product. Second, we are going to shorten the length of the articles in *The Africa Watch*. Starting with the first December issue, we will limit Analyses to two pages, and Alerts to one. We hope that this change will help our busy readers. The articles in this issue are presented in the original format.

Again, thank you very much for your interest in *The Africa Watch* and for your feedback. If you would like to discuss a piece contained in this issue or provide suggestions for the future, please contact me at (703) 845-4394.

Happy reading!

*George*

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward



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## ANALYSES

### Senegal's 2012 Elections

**Researcher:** Ms. Ashton Callahan

#### Executive Summary

Senegal, long considered a healthy and stable democracy, is contending with a precarious political environment ahead of the 2012 presidential elections. President Abdoulaye Wade, aged 85, is seeking a third term despite his constitutional ineligibility and widespread criticism from opposition groups and civil society. The consensus is that Wade has no right to a third term and the Senegalese Constitutional Council must invalidate his candidacy. Wade and his *Parti Démocratique Sénégalais* (PDS) plan to submit his bid for candidacy in December 2011.

Several concerns remain ahead of the elections. If the Constitutional Council rejects Wade's bid, the party would be left without a candidate one month prior to the elections. Wade and his party have admitted they have no Plan B, but Wade recently said he would step aside if his bid were rejected. If the Constitutional Council accepts his candidacy, opposition groups will not remain silent. The opposition, however, runs the risk of defeat (again) if they are not able to unite behind one candidate.

No matter the election outcome, disruptions will result. A so-called 'African Spring,' where popular protests lead to leadership change, does not appear likely at this time. Unlike neighboring Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal has no hostile ethno-regional cleavages. Although Senegal is a conservative Muslim country, the tolerant Sufi denomination is predominant. Sufi religious leaders have a strong political presence and would likely play a mediating role.<sup>1</sup> Finally, the Senegalese public already enjoys unhindered free speech and a free press, which provide a pressure valve for growing dissatisfaction.

#### Background

Abdoulaye Wade was elected Senegal's third president in 2000. He served a seven-year term and was reelected in 2007 to a five-year term following constitutional revisions that imposed a two-term limit. Wade seemed to support the edict. When asked by a French journalist whether he would pursue a third term, he admitted that it was impossible because it would be unconstitutional.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile, it appeared that Wade was grooming his son Karim for succession. Karim was rejected by the Senegalese public and soundly defeated as a mayoral candidate in the March 2009 municipal elections. In response, Wade appointed Karim as minister of several government offices in May 2009, earning him the nickname "Minister of Everything."<sup>3</sup> Once it became clear that Karim was not a viable presidential candidate, President Wade announced in September 2009 that he himself would stand as PDS

presidential candidate in 2012. He publicly dismissed claims that he wanted his son to succeed him and denied ever saying he would not seek a third term – something the opposition has termed a “moral failure.”<sup>4</sup>

Based on a conversation with a Dakar-based researcher, the local population is waiting for answers to the following questions:

- Will the Constitutional Council allow Wade to run for a third term? If not, who will emerge as the candidate of the ruling party?
- Several opposition candidates have stepped forward, but will rivalries prevent them from naming an electable candidate? Who will lead the coalition of opposition groups known as “Benno”?
- If Wade is permitted to run, will he win a free and fair election? Will he enable his son Karim to step in as his successor?
- Will there be an ‘African Spring’ of sorts if Wade is reelected?<sup>5</sup>

### **Current Political Climate**

Wade’s first term seemed promising, but things began to unravel around the February 2007 presidential elections. The coalition that elected Wade in 2000 slowly dissolved. Two key PDS politicians (and former prime ministers), Idrissa Seck and Macky Sall, were marginalized when they became threats to Wade’s power. Wade has also obscured the separation between the three branches of government and created a strong, dominant executive. According to scholars studying Senegal, “Constant tinkering with institutions has been a distinct hallmark of Wade’s governance, and most of the early reforms have been gradually undone.”<sup>6</sup> Added to frequent electricity shortages, economic disparities between Dakar and the rest of the country (60 percent of all economic activity is in Dakar), and popular urban discontent, tension has reached an “unthinkable level.”<sup>7</sup>

President Wade’s attempted constitutional changes and his apparent desire for his son to succeed him as president have triggered widespread popular protests in Dakar for several months. In June 2011, Wade attempted to introduce new legislation that would create the post of vice president and ensure the simultaneous election of a president and a vice president in the first round after winning only 25 percent of the votes cast. This sparked the June 23 Opposition Movement (M23), which held protests in Dakar in June and again on September 23, 2011.

Despite the protests, there is no sign that Wade will withdraw his bid for candidacy. His political party and campaign organizers have publicly stated that Abdoulaye Wade is the one and only PDS candidate.<sup>8</sup> In a recent statement, Wade said that his bid will be validated by the Constitutional Council, and he would emerge victorious in the election. Importantly, he also said that he would step down if the council rejects his bid.<sup>9</sup>

## The Opposition

Political tension has been growing since Wade's September 2009 announcement. Several opposition groups that all rebuke Wade's attempt at a third term have emerged; the groups include Wade's previous supporters and party members, most notably former Prime Ministers Idrissa Seck and Macky Sall:

- *United to Boost Senegal (Benno(o) Siggil Senegal (BSS))*: BSS is a coalition of 35 political parties, of which four are major opposition groups. They include *Parti Socialiste du Senegal (PS)*; *Alliance des forces de progress (AFP)*; *Front pour le socialisme et la démocratie (FSD-BJ)*; and *Parti de l'Indépendance et du Travail (PIT)*.<sup>10</sup> The parties remain divided over a single candidate to represent the coalition. Some party members disagree that the coalition should present a united front and propose that three or four candidates run as a precaution.<sup>11</sup> The best outcome would be for the groups to throw support to one candidate to avoid rivalries and confusion among voters. During his 2007 election campaign, Wade exploited the rivalries, citing the opposition's lack of a common voice, and easily won reelection.<sup>12</sup>
- *M23*: M23 is an umbrella group covering opposition parties, civil society, and NGOs. It was established following protests on June 23 in response to Wade's proposed constitutional changes. Led by Alioune Tine (also leader of the African Rally for Human Rights Advancement or *Rencontre africaine pour la defense de droits d l'homme (RADDHO)*, an observer of the elections), the group has demanded that Wade step down because a third term is unconstitutional. During a second political rally on September 23, protesters chanted, "It's time to go, granddad," and Tine pressed the need for Wade to step down by the end of October, "or else."<sup>13</sup> He noted that a situation like in Côte d'Ivoire was not out of the realm of possibility for Senegal.<sup>14</sup>
- *MPC (Movement Politique Citoyen) Luy Jot Jotna – It's time to act!*: Cheikh Tidiane Gadio (former Senegalese foreign minister under Wade from 2000-2009) is the party leader as well as a declared presidential candidate – although his candidacy has yet to be confirmed by the Minister of Interior. Gadio recently participated in a lecture at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) where he discussed political events in Senegal. He stated that the people's respect and admiration for Wade were fading, and, if Wade were to leave office quietly, he could keep his legacy intact. Gadio warned that, if the Constitutional Council were to validate Wade's bid, the opposition would declare Senegal in a state of "constitutional coup d'état."<sup>15</sup>
- *Y'en a Marre – Enough is Enough*: Led by a group of rappers, *Y'en a Marre* is not a political entity but rather an antagonistic grouping of opposition supporters. Members agree that Wade should not seek a third term and are encouraging youth to vote against Wade. Members' music and demonstrations focus on corruption, urban flooding, and the frequent electricity outages common in Dakar.<sup>16</sup>

### **Senegalese Public Opinion and Influential Institutions**

Senegalese television and radio broadcasts reflect public opinion that 1) a proper reading of the constitution would exclude Wade from third term, and 2) Wade admitted himself that he couldn't run for a third term – although he has since denied this statement and says that the constitution can be interpreted at his discretion.<sup>17</sup>

Although no survey or poll has been conducted and many rural constituents may not fully appreciate the constitutional restrictions placed on Wade's presidency, it is clear that the consensus among the population is frustration over inadequate social services (power shortages in particular) and fear of a situation similar to recent events in neighboring Côte d'Ivoire.<sup>18</sup>

Because Senegalese religious leaders have followers from many political parties, it is in their interest to remain neutral in politics. They have not declared a preference for any one candidate. If, however, the election outcome results in violence, religious leaders would likely step in.

Military leaders – apolitical and generally professional – can also be expected to remain neutral. If conflict were to ensue, the military is unlikely to interfere with any election result perceived to be legitimate by the Senegalese public.<sup>19</sup>

## **Guinea-Bissau: Prospects for Military Interference in Politics**

**Researcher:** Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee

### **Executive Summary**

The premise of protests this summer in Guinea-Bissau was public sentiment that the government of President Malam Bacai Sanhá and Prime Minister (PM) Carlos Gomes Júnior is corrupt and complicit in a spate of political assassinations during 2009. The subsequent government reshuffle will have little impact on policymaking, which is directed by the military in most matters. Tensions are growing between Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, LTG António Indjai, and Navy Chief, Rear Admiral (RADM) Bubo Na Tchuto. Na Tchuto has been identified as a major facilitator of drug trafficking through Guinea-Bissau, although it's likely that most high-ranking members of the military are involved as well.

Trends to watch include continued military intervention in politics, particularly by RADM Na Tchuto, who continues to wield extraordinary influence in the affairs of the state and represents the most likely source of instability within the military. He will probably continue to undermine security sector reform efforts in order to protect his access to government resources from the younger generation of soldiers, who represent a growing threat to the top military brass.

Despite the neutral rhetoric coming from the military and the non-violent nature of the protests thus far, it is IDA's assessment that the Bissauan military will continue to intervene in the civil affairs of the state until effective security sector reform is achieved. General discontent among the population could provide the impetus for military interference with the political process. As with previous military coups in the country and surrounding region, the perpetrators will likely cite the incompetence of the current government and its complicity in drug trafficking as the rationale for the military's seizure of power.

### **Summer Protests and Government Reshuffle**

During July and August 2011, there were four large, non-violent public protests in Bissau (July 14 and 19, August 5 and 11). The protests were organized by the Social Renewal Party (*Partido para a Renovação Social* (PRS), the primary opposition party) with the backing of 16 other opposition parties, the majority of which do not have representation in parliament. In addition to the opposition parties, elements of the ruling African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (*Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde* (PAIGC)) were also reportedly involved in the organization of the rallies, leading to speculation of infighting in the PAIGC.

The protestors were upset by President Sanhá's refusal to fire Prime Minister (PM) Carlos Gomes Júnior, whom many perceive to be hindering investigations of several high-profile political assassinations in 2009. PM Gomes has likewise dismissed calls for his resignation, transferring blame to Attorney General Amine Michel Saad, whom he

subsequently fired and replaced with Former Deputy Director of the Judicial Police Edmundo Mendes.

One of the most vocal opponents of the current government has been Ibraima Djalo Sory, acting president of the PRS, who has made inflammatory remarks directed at President Sanhá, including threatening to burn down the president's residence.<sup>20</sup> Incidentally, the home of Public Service Minister Fernando Gomes was set on fire earlier in the month.<sup>21</sup> The culprits have not been identified, but, given the rhetoric from Sory, some speculate perpetrators with common motives.<sup>22</sup>

President Sanhá reshuffled his cabinet in what appears to be a gesture to the Bissauan public after the summer's protests. The following are among the most significant changes:

- Minister of Women's Affairs, Family, Social Cohesion and Combat of Poverty Lurdes Vaz and Minister of Territorial Administration Luis de Oliveira Sanca were both dismissed.
- Minister of Public Service Fernando Gomes now occupies the position of Interior Minister.
- Minister of Defense Ocante da Silva was dismissed. The post is now occupied by Baciro Dja, who was already youth minister in the first government formed after the 2009 legislative elections.
- Minister of Justice Mamadu Jalo Pires will exchange positions with Minister of Foreign Affairs Adelino Mano Queta.
- Industry matters were moved from the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, Tourism, and Traditional Artifacts (under Botche Cande) to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Energy (under Higinio Cardoso.)
- The Secretaries of State for the Environment and for Fisheries have also exchanged their portfolios.<sup>23</sup>

On the surface, the military has remained neutral in the political dispute and subsequent protests. However, the PRS (the main protest organizers) has many followers among the military. Some media reports imply that RADM Bubo Na Tchuto tacitly supports the protests.<sup>24</sup> The Chief of Staff (COS) of the Armed Forces, LTG António Indjai, may be verbally encouraging the military's non-interference in politics, but this may be disingenuous, given his history of meddling in government affairs. He arrested and threatened to kill PM Gomes in April 2010, and at the time unsuccessfully tried to remove him from the government leadership. Thus, LTG Indjai should not be viewed as a close ally to the PM, though they may be cultivating an alliance of convenience based on their mutual distrust of RADM Bubo Na Tchuto.<sup>25</sup>

Despite the fact that RADM Na Tchuto and LTG Indjai are both members of the Balanta ethnic group and *together* carried out the seizure of military power in April 2010, by most accounts the relationship is one of convenience.<sup>26</sup> Now that both occupy high-

level positions within the armed forces, it is likely that they have become competitors, especially given RADM Na Tchuto's reputation as one of the most influential and physically intimidating forces in the Bissauan military. LTG Indjai is considered by most to be loyal to the president, and together they represent a bloc against RADM Na Tchuto, who probably aspires to lead the armed forces.

### **Ethnicity and the Military**

Ethnicity has not historically been a deep cleavage in Bissauan society or a particularly divisive force in Bissauan politics. However, ethnic tensions have increased since the 1998-1999 civil war, which destroyed the relative national unity forged during the liberation struggle.

A growing trend has been the "Balantisation" of the country's political apparatus, a term coined during Kumba Yalá's tenure as President from 2000 to 2003. The Balanta are the largest minority in Guinea-Bissau, making up approximately 30 percent of the general population. However, they dominate the armed forces, comprising approximately 80 percent of its membership.<sup>27</sup> During the past decade, some Balanta have aggressively pursued the executive positions previously dominated by Creole and Papel (including Vieira and Seabra). The PRS is dominated by the Balanta and therefore has a strong following among the military. According to one report, acting PRS leader Sory has criticized current security sector reforms for aiming to exclude the Balanta from the armed forces – a charge that Indjai, himself a Balanta, vehemently denies.<sup>28</sup>

### **The Balance of Power within the Military**

Through victory over the Portuguese in 1974, the armed forces emerged as the dominant and most legitimate national institution in Guinea-Bissau. Coups, coup attempts, and army mutinies have been a recurrent feature in Bissauan society. The large, top-heavy military is a major drain on government revenues and a source of insecurity. At present, the two main levers of power within the military appear to be COS General Antonio Indjai and Navy Chief RADM Bubo Na Tchuto. Initially allies, it is possible that both are vying for overall control of the military and subsequent control of much of the state's resources, including the drug trade.<sup>29</sup>

Both men have operated with impunity in Guinea-Bissau. General Indjai was appointed as the COS, despite leading a mutiny in April 2011, ousting the head of the army, holding him in custody for several months, and briefly detaining the prime minister. RADM Na Tchuto was designated a drug kingpin by the U.S. Treasury Department, but in June





2011, Guinea-Bissau's Military Court dropped charges of an alleged coup by Na Tchuto. Immediately afterward, President Sanhá signed a decree reinstating him as chief of the country's Navy.<sup>30</sup>

It is IDA's assessment that RADM Na Tchuto continues to wield extraordinary influence in the affairs of the state and represents the most likely source of instability within the military. Citing the dwindling size of the entourage assigned to escort him on official duties, some local press reports speculate Na Tchuto's dismissal is imminent.<sup>31</sup> His followers within the Navy are not highly professional. In a recent incident, five Navy sailors clashed with members of the president's security unit. The nature and severity of the incident are unclear, but there were at least verbal insults exchanged and possibly a physical assault.<sup>32</sup>

### **Security Sector Reform**

It is also IDA's assessment that RADM Na Tchuto is one of the primary impediments to the successful implementation of security sector reform (SSR) in Guinea-Bissau. He likely regards it as an effort to retire the aging officer corps, including himself. If successful, SSR would curtail his longtime direct access to state resources. Thus, President Sanhá's assurances that Na Tchuto will "direct the [security sector] reform program with Angola" undermine confidence in the reform process, since RADM Na Tchuto has a vested interest in ensuring that SSR is not effectively implemented.

President Sanhá's rhetoric supporting SSR is more likely lip service to the international community, which has pushed reform on Guinea-Bissau in recent years.<sup>33</sup> Among the countries that have offered SSR assistance, Brazil has the greatest technical capacity and seems to have demonstrated genuine political will. Because of shared Lusophone heritage and Bissauan sensitivity to outside meddling, Brazilian assistance would be the best hope for effective reform of the Guinea-Bissau security services and for fostering stability in the country.

Looking to the future, it will be important to monitor emerging leaders among the younger generation of the armed forces. Guinea-Bissau's military is known as a "gerontocracy" where the "old guard" – i.e., the warrior class that fought for the country's independence – is now faced with a younger cadre of officers trying to carve a similar niche for their generation. The generational dynamic is captured by one Bissauan journalist, who wrote about the rivalry between the previous young COS, Gen Jose Zamora Induta, and older officers within the military:

*"[He] never was a problem... He was a youthful figure. We all know that here in Africa, age counts. [He] was seen as an intrepid young man who dared to trespass into his elders' territory. From there, as is the custom amongst African people groups, he was disciplined and I do not believe that decision will be reversed for quite some time."*<sup>34</sup>

The issue of resource distribution breeds resentment among the rank and file, since older officers have historically controlled access to state resources and patronage networks, including profits from the drug trade. Inter-generational tensions and

personal rivalries will continue to be the main sources of instability both in the military and consequently in the country for the foreseeable future.

## **Boko Haram and Nigerian Stability: A Clash of Identities**

**Researcher:** Dr. Caroline F. Ziemke-Dickens

### **Executive Summary**

- The risk of serious instability in northern Nigeria may be increasing as a result of arms and fighters flowing in from Libya and the recent escalation of Boko Haram attacks over the summer of 2011.
- The Nigerian government is pursuing a dual strategy in response to Boko Haram: a harsh military crackdown on Boko Haram strongholds in Borno state coupled with overtures to open a dialog with Boko Haram leaders. At the same time, the Nigerian government is hoping to enlist U.S. support for its military operations by focusing on possible Boko Haram ties with Al-Qaeda and its associated networks in North Africa and the Horn.
- Boko Haram is the most recent in a long line of Islamic reformist, rejectionist movements in northern Nigeria that have roots in the political and cultural history going back to the pre-colonial era.
- Nigeria's failure to build a cohesive national identity, combined with two centuries of colonial and post-independence political and military elites who exploit and manipulate local ethno-religious rivalries to consolidate their power, has led to two fundamentally destabilizing trends: the securitization of local ethno-religious identities, and the atomization and privatization of security forces at the local level.
- Local communities who do not see themselves as stakeholders in the Nigerian nation rely for their sense of cultural and human security on alternative power hierarchies built by local elites around increasingly rigid local ethnic and religious identities.
- Opportunist local elites capitalize on their populations' sense that the federal government is unable or unwilling to defend their interest and ensure their security to build extra-governmental, extra-legal security apparatuses to consolidate their power and hold federal interference in local affairs at bay.
- Until the Nigerian government addresses the underlying sources of alienation from the Nigerian nation and creates a source of buy-in for local communities in the nation-building process, separatist violence in northern Nigeria will continue to undermine the security of the nation and the stability of the region.

### **Introduction**

Nigerian security forces have expressed increased concern that large numbers of advanced weapons (provided largely by France) may be finding their way from Libya into Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and other neighboring states.<sup>35</sup> There is also increasing concern that Nigerian mercenaries formerly in the employ of Muammar Gaddafi may be

reentering the region.<sup>36</sup> Finally, in the aftermath of the military crackdown following a string of Boko Haram attacks in Borno state and Abuja in the summer of 2011, growing numbers of refugees are moving into Nigeria's northwestern states from the northeast with the potential to spread violence across the predominantly Muslim north. Many of these internally displaced persons (IDPs) are suspected of being Boko Haram operatives and sympathizers. All this is exacerbated by the chronically porous and indifferently secured international borders in the region.<sup>37</sup>

The Nigerian government has both political and material interest in highlighting the connections between Boko Haram and the ongoing U.S. campaign against Al-Qaeda in North Africa and Al-Shabaab in the Horn. In particular, it seeks U.S. endorsement of and aid for the military campaign against the Boko Haram strongholds in Borno state in the aftermath of the August 26, 2011, attack on the UN Headquarters in Abuja.<sup>38</sup> Western counter-terrorism analysts have, so far, been unable pin down the nature and scope of ties between the escalation of Boko Haram violence and support from Al-Qaeda (AQ) and associated networks (AQAN). There is some evidence that Boko Haram members have received training at AQ camps, and the increasing sophistication of Boko Haram attacks may indicate technical advice and support from AQAN. But exploring the possible security implications of Boko Haram violence by focusing too closely through the Al-Qaeda lens risks overlooking the national and historical contexts within which the Nigerian group emerged that are key to understanding its motivations, the future direction of its operations, and the implications for the stability and coherence of the Nigerian nation.<sup>39</sup>

### **Boko Haram's Historical Antecedents**

Much of the territory that now makes up northern Nigeria was peacefully Islamized between the 11th and 17th centuries through contact with North African and Arab merchants and clerics. Most Muslims in the region follow one of two dominant Sufi brotherhoods.<sup>40</sup> The oldest, the Qadiriyya, incorporated many elements of the indigenous culture and became integral to the identity and power of the dominant Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups. The second, Tijaniyya, gradually became the dominant sect among the rising class of wealthy trading and bureaucratic classes, many of whom were migrants from other areas. Over time, religious tensions emerged between the two sects that mirrored tensions between the two classes.

As the cities of the north grew in the early colonial period, southern economic migrants brought Christianity and other minority faiths to the region, although according to British colonial practices designed to maintain the local hegemony of indigenous ruling classes, they were strictly segregated in *sabon gari*, or "strangers quarters." This institutionalized segregation eventually gave rise to the rigid and often contentious political distinction between indigenes and migrants ("strangers") that remains a key feature of Nigerian society and politics today.

The reformist and strictly fundamentalist worldview of the Boko Haram positions it squarely within the religious and cultural mainstream of much of northern Nigeria. Roughly 95 percent of northern Nigeria's Muslims are Sunni who maintain deep cultural

and religious ties with North African and Arab Islam. Thus, the northern Nigerian mainstream shares Boko Haram's pan-Islamic worldview and its suspicion of and hostility to the predominantly-Christian, or "Westernized" south. This separatist strain has even earlier origins in ethno-religious violence and migration during the reign of the Sokoto Caliphate that ruled most of northern Nigeria for a century (1804-1903) prior to British colonial rule.

The Sokoto Caliphate, which conquered and consolidated the smaller Hausa emirates between 1804 and 1808, was led by one of a series of puritanical, reformist, anti-Western, anti-materialist Islamic groups dating back to the late 18th century. These revivalist movements sought to purify Islamist practice and establish righteous leadership to replace what their leaders saw as excessive "innovation" in the religious and cultural practices of the time, many of which still incorporated elements of traditional African religious custom. The most extreme wings of these movements – past and present – have embraced rejectionist ideologies that condemn collaboration with secular authorities, whether British colonial administrations or the Nigerian federal government and, as often as not, direct their venom against other Muslims whom they regard as corrupt or apostate.

### Islamic Revivalism in the Post-Independence Era

Fundamentalist, anti-nationalist, revivalist groups – such as the Izala movement, the Muslim Students Society, and the Muslim Brotherhood of Nigeria – which reject secular Nigerian nationalism and seek to purge the "innovations" practiced by dominant Sufi brotherhoods, have spread since at least the mid-1970s. An early precursor to Boko Haram, the Maitatsine, was founded by a fundamentalist preacher from northern Cameroon. Its founder and spiritual leader, Marwa, was killed in a confrontation with Nigerian security forces in December 1980, but the remnants of the group continued to engage in occasional violent protests through the 1980s.



Around 2000, a group known as the Nigerian Taliban emerged in Borno state. It too suffered catastrophic losses in a showdown with Nigerian police in 2004. Its remnants may have reconstituted themselves, linking up with the nascent Boko Haram, which was emerging under the leadership of another radical preacher, Mohammed Yusuf, in Maiduguri at around the same time. Nigerian security forces killed Yusuf in 2009, and the group, while spreading and becoming operationally bolder, seems to have splintered into at least two, somewhat hostile factions. One, led by Yusuf's brother-in-law, Babakura Fugu, entered into a dialog with the government following the 2011 UN bombing, but was assassinated by the more radical, rejectionist element led by Abu Bakr Shekau in September 2011.<sup>41</sup>

The movements that resulted in the restoration of sharia law in twelve northern states during the 1990s had roots less in Islamic radicalization than in the widespread loss of faith in the ability of national and state governments to establish some semblance of good governance, law and order, or even basic human security. In fact, the establishment of the sharia legal system was supported by Christians in some areas, provided it was implemented in a manner that did not impinge on their personal practices (consuming alcohol and wearing non-Islamic clothing, for example), family law (marriage and divorce), and religious freedom. Over time, however, the established Islamic authorities and law enforcement (*hisbah*) came to be seen as inept at curbing corruption and crime as the federal authorities, triggering the rise of new “purification” movements like Boko Haram, whose early operations included motorcycle drive-by attacks against beer gardens and other centers of *haram* activities in Borno state.

While most northern Christians (who, for the most part, coexisted peacefully with the Muslim majority) supported, or at least tolerated, the reintroduction of sharia law in the 1990s, some Nigerian Pentacostal Christian groups became increasingly radical in their condemnation of Muslim cultural, political, and economic dominance, leading to a general increase in Muslim-Christian tension. At least one Christian extremist group, Akhwat Akwop, has recently emerged, threatening retaliation against Boko Haram violence. The most “muscular” Christian identity movements have emerged in the northern and middle belts, where Muslim political hegemony has created resentment.

### **The Socio-political Roots of Boko Haram**

Boko Haram’s name is loosely translated as “Western education is sacrilege.” “Western education” has long been a sort of political euphemism for the deep division between the north and south. Western education, specifically the English language secular education that is mandatory for federal government/military career seekers, is widely seen in the north as a colonialist and later Nigerian nationalist tool for segregating and containing northern political and economic power and, ultimately, for erasing the region’s unique ethno-religious identity. The 2011 re-election of Goodluck Jonathan, a Ijaw Christian from the Niger Delta region, in violation of an informal agreement that the presidency should rotate between a Christian and a Muslim, and his subsequent failure to observe constitutional quotas in the appointment of government ministers and cabinet members, are seen by northern Muslims as yet another sign of Southern efforts to gain national political hegemony.<sup>42</sup>

While Muslim army officers and politicians have often played a dominant role at the federal level, they are not, for the most part, politically allied with local Muslim political leaders in the north, and they are certainly not products of the local Koranic education system. In short, they are, in the eyes of many local northern elites, collaborators with the secular nationalist state.<sup>43</sup> It is in this sense, then, that their Western education is “sacrilege.” As in other deprived, predominantly Muslim societies, the vast majority of young men in northern Nigeria, about 80 percent, receive their education from traditional Koran schools that produce virtually unemployable, if religiously sound, graduates. In virtually every case since such movements began to surface in the early-

1970s, the rank-and-file of the anti-nationalist, Islamic revivalist movements have come overwhelmingly from the seemingly endless supply of young, unemployed, and often unemployable boys and men in the cities and towns of the northern states.<sup>44</sup>

### **Boko Haram, Nigerian Identity and the Future of Nigerian National Stability**

In an effort to shore up Nigerian national identity and strengthen central control, successive Nigerian regimes (both military and democratic) have echoed the British colonial strategy of “divide and rule.” Successive Nigerian Republics have encouraged the proliferation local ethno-religious identity communities (from three states upon independence to 36 today) and manipulating the tensions between them. Likewise, the federal system has bolstered legal distinctions between so-called “settlers” and “indigenes,” who claim special rights to public and economic resources. The unintended and destabilizing consequence has been the proliferation of local, often extra-legal, security forces, operating outside the framework or control of the federal police and military and under the control of opportunistic local political elites who use them to consolidate their power and advance their local agendas.

All of this has led to two trends that threaten to destabilize Nigeria over the long term, with or without the interference of transnational actors like Al-Qaeda: the securitization of identity, and the atomization and privatization of security.

Local populations, especially in northern regions, do not see themselves as stakeholders in the Nigerian nation. They do not see their communities receiving a fair share of the benefits of the country’s wealth, and the federal government is unable to provide even basic services. As the rise of other separatist and insurgent movements in the south, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), makes clear, this phenomenon is not unique to the Muslim North. Having lost faith in the ability of the Nigerian state and its political leaders to defend their interests and ensure their security, these communities are increasingly identifying with alternative power hierarchies built around ethnic or religious identities.<sup>45</sup> Opportunist local political elites, for their part, have a stake in promoting the notion that Nigeria’s identity as a modern nation-state poses an existential threat to the deeper, more complex ethno-religious identities in which local communities invest so much of their sense of security.<sup>46</sup> When these communities see their identity and culture as defensible only by maintaining and hardening their separateness, local elites are able to hold federal interference in how they run their affairs at bay.

The privatization of security at the local level is already well underway in most of northern Nigeria, where the state long ago lost the monopoly on the use of force. The prospect of the inflow of large numbers of arms and hardened fighters from Libya, however, risks enabling the growth of local, extra-governmental security forces and insurgent groups to spiral out of control in a way that could threaten the long-term coherence of the Nigerian nation-state.<sup>47</sup> A Nigerian government response to the recent outbreak of Boko Haram violence that focuses primarily on the deployment of military forces and the extra-judicial killing of key Boko Haram leaders runs the risk of aggravating regional insecurities and further legitimizing separatist movements. This, in

turn, could create an environment in which Boko Haram, alone or in combination with other similar (although, so far, less violent) groups, could metastasize into a full-fledged insurgent or separatist movement.

The recent Nigerian government attempt to open a dialog with Boko Haram is a positive step, and while the group has thus far been unresponsive, such efforts should continue. Ultimately, however, the problems Nigeria faces in its northern states reach far beyond the ranks of one violent extremist group.<sup>48</sup> Until it addresses the very real and deeply rooted grievances and insecurities that gave rise to Boko Haram and its predecessors and work with the communities of northern Nigeria to create a foundation for national unity, or at least cohesion, that reaches beyond political opportunism to address the basic requirements of human security, the problem of separatist violence in northern Nigeria will continue to undermine both the security of the nation and the stability of its broader regional neighborhood.<sup>49</sup>



## **Opposition Politics: Zimbabwe's Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)**

**Researcher:** Dr. Janette Yarwood

### **Executive Summary**

A number of developments in recent months indicate that Zimbabwe's ruling ZANU (PF) party is increasingly fractured. This fact, coupled with the ongoing and serious humanitarian crisis in the country, provide a window of opportunity for the MDC opposition party to respond to developments and chart a new course. The party must convey a message about more than just regime change and communicate a vision for the country's future. Even if the MDC successfully achieves this and wins more widespread support among Zimbabweans, it is not assured that institutions such as the military will let go of power. Nonetheless, the MDC will play an important role in the country's future only if it acts now to broaden its program.

### **Background**

Debate over who will succeed Robert Mugabe was renewed after the suspicious death of retired army commander Solomon Mujuru, who many analysts say could have played a central role in the succession process. After the release by WikiLeaks of U.S. State Department cables that confirmed Mugabe's failing health, members of his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU (PF)) party have questioned Mugabe's continued leadership, making clear the lack of cohesion within the party.

While ZANU (PF) is focused inward, the opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) has an opportunity to position itself as the best option for the future of the country. If the MDC is to successfully challenge the ZANU (PF) during the next presidential elections, it must do the following:

- End infighting and unite the two factions of the party. The MDC also needs to develop coalitions with smaller opposition political parties and civil society groups.
- Connect with the rural population by directly addressing the Zimbabwean land issue.
- Move past the goal of regime change and demonstrate to the Zimbabwean electorate that it is prepared to run the country in a post-Mugabe era.

President Robert Mugabe, 87, and his party, ZANU (PF), have ruled Zimbabwe since its independence in 1980. Since then, ZANU (PF) has elicited criticism from human rights activists for political violence, restricting basic freedoms, and endemic corruption in its effort to maintain political control of the country. In September 2008, under pressure from regional leaders and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), President Robert Mugabe and MDC opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai signed a power sharing agreement to resolve a political standoff stemming from flawed elections earlier in the year. The Global Political Agreement (GPA) they signed laid the foundations for a transitional government and outlined a timeframe for drafting and adopting a new

constitution. As part of the deal, Mugabe remained president, and Tsvangirai became prime minister of the new coalition government.

Zimbabwe is a country facing serious political and economic challenges that stem from years of poor governance and mismanagement. Life expectancy for Zimbabweans fell from an estimated 56 years in 1990 to 44 in 2008.<sup>50</sup> In 2003, the country had a 90 percent literacy rate. Since then, the country's public education system has suffered a major decline due to long-term teacher strikes and lack of spending on education.<sup>51</sup> Almost 95 percent of the population lack formal employment.<sup>52</sup> Some 7 million Zimbabweans reportedly required food aid in the first months of 2009, and almost 2 million were considered food insecure through early 2010.<sup>53</sup> Lack of safe water and poor sanitation led to an outbreak of cholera in August 2008 that spread throughout southern Africa, infecting almost 100,000 people and resulting in several thousand deaths.<sup>54</sup>

Since Robert Mugabe and ZANU (PF) won election in 1980, a number of opposition parties arrived on the political scene. However, not one of them ever won enough seats in the legislature to take power from the ruling ZANU (PF) until the MDC emerged in 1999. The MDC was formed from an alliance between the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade unions (ZCTU), various civil society organizations, and student groups primarily united by opposition to Mugabe rather than by an agreed political program.<sup>55,56</sup>

The MDC was formed just before the 2000 referendum organized by ZANU (PF) and designed to legalize several key constitutional changes. The proposed changes would have limited future presidents to two terms in office, but with no retroactivity, Mugabe could have stood for another two terms. Changes also would have made government and military officials immune from prosecution for illegal acts committed while in office and would have legalized the confiscation of land owned by white people for redistribution to black farmers without compensation. The MDC led opposition to the referendum, and ultimately Zimbabweans rejected the proposal at the polls. This success fueled the rise of the MDC.<sup>57</sup>

The popularity of MDC continued during the 2000 parliamentary election campaign, when the party won 57 of the 120 seats up for election.<sup>58</sup> This marked the first time that a Zimbabwean opposition party achieved more than a handful of seats. The MDC dominated in most urban centers and the region of Matabeleland. It won all seats representing the two biggest cities, Harare and Bulawayo, and lost only two seats in Matabeleland. Nonetheless, MDC officials and international observers declared the elections flawed due to vote rigging and state-sponsored violence. After the elections, the MDC vowed not to participate again until free and fair elections could be held in Zimbabwe. The issue would later cause the MDC to split into two factions.

## **MDC Challenges**

### *Divisions among the Opposition*

In late 2004, MDC became increasingly divided in its strategy to challenge ZANU (PF) dominance. MDC officials initially decided that the party would not participate in 2005

parliamentary elections unless the government took steps to ensure they were free and fair. Party leader Morgan Tsvangirai argued against participation but was opposed by a group within the MDC headed by the Secretary General, Welshman Ncube, and Vice President Gibson Sibanda. This led to a split in the party, with Tsvangirai as the leader of one faction and Arthur Mutambara the other.

Both MDC factions participated in subsequent elections but have struggled to win a clear legislative majority. In early 2008, the two factions announced they would reunite, thus enabling a clear majority. By 2011, however, the groups are not formally merged, and recent newspaper reports indicate that the factions continue to be divided.

The MDC has an opportunity to capitalize on emerging divisions within ZANU (PF) while it struggles with questions about Mugabe's successor. Welshman Ncube, president of one MDC faction, told supporters at a July 2011 rally, "There is a greater need today for a strong and united front against ZANU (PF) if we are to win the next elections." Similarly, his spokesman, Nhlanhla Dube, said, "We are prepared to work with all democratic forces in Zimbabwe to ensure the country is delivered from tyranny." Methuseli Moyo, spokesman for the opposition party Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), stressed the need to form a coalition saying, "ZAPU is ready to unite with any political party ready to look at a post-Mugabe era."<sup>59</sup> Pastor Timothy J.M. Chiguvare, founder and president of the People's Progressive Party (PPP), has appealed to all opposition party leaders to form a coalition and develop a strategy to contest and win the next presidential elections.<sup>60</sup> If the MDC factions led by Tsvangirai and Ncube can move past political infighting, the time may be right to join with other opposition parties and civil society groups to challenge a fractured ZANU (PF).

#### *Appealing to Rural Constituents*

The opposition MDC has struggled to attract support among Zimbabwe's large (62 percent) rural population.<sup>61</sup> Its post-1990 opposition campaign stressed political, civic, and human rights and attempted to build on the popular frustration with ZANU (PF). This focus turned out to be alienating because it failed to address the day-to-day realities of people's lives. Most Zimbabweans depend on agrarian livelihoods, yet, from its inception, the MDC catered to urban constituencies. Only after land occupations began in 2000 did the party begin to address rural issues. By then, however, ZANU (PF) could thwart MDC access to many rural areas through violent campaigns against anyone perceived to be opposition party supporters.

The result has been a divide between rural and urban constituents that ZANU (PF) exploited with the slogan, "the land is the economy, the economy is the land." By making land a key issue, ZANU (PF) won support from Zimbabwe's rural population. Meanwhile, the MDC focus on human rights and democratization has been dismissed in rural areas as an imposition of Western values.

Rural support for Mugabe and ZANU (PF) is far from settled. In recent years, several factors have affected the agricultural sector and the lives of the rural Zimbabweans. The food crisis occurring in Zimbabwe and an ongoing drought may have undermined

popular support for ZANU (PF). A detailed understanding of new realities in the Zimbabwean countryside is needed to inform the development of land and agricultural policies in a post-Mugabe era.<sup>62</sup>

*Developing a Campaign Platform*

Another challenge for the MDC derives from the party's founding. The opposition was formed from an alliance among trade unions, civil society organizations, and student groups that were primarily united by opposition to Mugabe rather than by an agreed political program.<sup>63,64</sup> The MDC has focused its efforts on regime change while the electorate seeks policies that will better their lives. It will need to develop positive alternatives to the current ZANU (PF) agenda. Policies have to include distancing the party from the West and focusing on the internal issues that Zimbabweans face daily including food shortages, unemployment, and the land question.

## Food Security and Instability in Africa

Researchers: Claudio Biltoc and Ivana Djak

### Executive Summary

In the inaugural August issue of *The Africa Watch*, IDA researcher Ashton Callahan wrote about food shortages in Cameroon and the possible security implications for that country.<sup>65</sup> This analysis provides an overview of food security and rising food costs across the continent.

A recent study indicates that rising prices for staple food products in developing countries correlate with economic and social tensions that contribute to instability. Mounting food prices and associated food insecurity contributed to unrest before the Arab Spring. While food insecurity may not have the same impact in sub-Saharan Africa, it is an important factor to be considered, especially when steep price increases coincide with elections and other potentially divisive events.

### Food Prices and Stability

The food crisis of late 2007 and 2008 – when the average cost of imported foods rose by 25 percent, corn prices doubled, and wheat reached its highest price in three decades – resulted in outbreaks of violence. The crisis led to incidents in Russia, Brazil, and Mexico. In Africa, however, the crisis brought about food riots and mobilization of the armed forces in Burkina Faso, violent protests in Ivory Coast and Cameroon, and intense demonstrations in Mauritania, Mozambique, and Senegal.<sup>66</sup>




Figure 1: Food Prices and Violence

Scholars at the Cambridge-based New England Complex Systems Institute wrote in September 2011 about the association between rising food prices and violence. They hypothesize that a “specific food price threshold” is observable and can act as an indicator of violence. Food prices alone are seldom the sole cause of violence, but they

often reinforce multiple other governance failures. Compounded, these lead to demonstrations and violent outbreaks.

Figure 1 provides a comparison of the Food Price Index and global violence.<sup>67</sup> It shows the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Food Price Index from January 2004 to May 2011. The vertical red lines correspond to the beginning dates of food riots and protests associated with major unrest in North Africa and the Middle East. The overall death toll is reported in parentheses.




Figure 2: UN FAO Food Price Index

Not surprisingly, periods of low food prices show reduced levels of violence while high-price periods result in violence, death, and potentially a change of leadership or governance.

Figure 2 shows the 2011 food price index as higher than during the 2008 food crisis and reaching its all time high of 238 points in February 2011.<sup>68</sup> As of July 2011, food prices globally are 33 percent higher than last year, with maize up by 84 percent, sugar by 62 percent, and wheat by 52 percent. Developing sub-Saharan African nations are at a particular risk when food prices rise. Certain nations – such as Somalia, where locally produced red sorghum is up by 240 percent and white maize by 140 percent – are especially hard hit.<sup>69</sup> Across Africa, prices are still trending upwards despite some areas of decline. Cereal prices in eastern Africa are near record levels, while prices for domestically produced cereals are generally lower in western and southern Africa.




Figure 3: General Price Trends

There is wide variation in levels of food security across the African continent. Political factors, climate, and lack of infrastructure are important variables affecting food security. In some countries, the news is good. As the lean post-harvest season approaches in Mozambique, food security is stable, and staple food prices, especially for maize, are at or below last year's 2010 levels.<sup>70</sup> Malawi is also more secure than others with a 1.2 million metric ton (MT) maize surplus and food prices that are well below last year's.<sup>71</sup> While there are pockets of stressed areas affected by flooding and dry spells in southern Africa, most of the region is stable after experiencing three years of

above-average crop harvests.<sup>72</sup> Former crisis areas such as Niger have witnessed positive results for food security since 2010 as the nation partnered with humanitarian organizations to bring cereal harvests up by 60 percent. While malnutrition rates in the nation are still at 15 percent and there is much room for improvement, improvements have been made.<sup>73</sup>

The outlook is less hopeful for other regions. The food crisis on the Horn will persist because of high food prices, limited access to water and milk, and insufficient humanitarian response. September 2011 saw further droughts in Kenya, worsening an already poor food situation. Kenyans walked the roads in search of water and sent family members and livestock to regions with water.<sup>74</sup> Maize and sorghum prices are expected to increase further in Somalia. Kenya and Ethiopia will see improvements if rains fall at normal rates, as predictions currently say they will.<sup>75</sup> While the growing season is going well in Nigeria, violence in Plateau State hampered food deliveries and kept prices higher in deficit areas.<sup>76</sup> With little infrastructure or private sector economic activity, people in oil-sector-dependent South Sudan are currently attempting to raise staple crops on its vast stretches of uncultivated arable land.<sup>77</sup>

## **Regional Outlook**

### *Southern Africa*

Prices increased in July and August 2011, which can be partially attributed to seasonal price adjustments. In South Africa, prices are higher than average – up to 74 percent higher than 2010 prices – due to reduced crop yield in 2011. Zambia and Zimbabwe saw moderate adjustments while other economies saw price increases ranging from 8 percent (Madagascar) to 62 percent (Mozambique). As stated previously, Malawi is doing better, profiting from a good harvest and prices similar to or lower than July 2010.

### *West Africa*

Domestically produced cereal prices are also relatively stable, with moderate increases in some markets in Burkina Faso and Nigeria, and mixed trends in Chad, Niger, Mali, and Benin. Prices for imported grains, however, have risen due to increased transportation costs and the devaluation of currencies. In Burkina Faso, the price for imported rice has increased more than 20 percent, and in Togo, where the government has reduced fuel subsidies, maize increased by up to 31 percent. In Mauritania – a food deficit country where imports of the main staple wheat are critical – prices are 50 percent higher than in 2010, consistent with higher international market trends.

### *East Africa*

This region is enduring the most acute rise in food costs on the Continent, with prices at two-year highs. Somalia is still battling famine in multiple areas. However, prices are now declining slightly due to the influx of the *Gu* (early rainy season) harvest. Month-on-month prices are dropping slightly in Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda. Uganda, usually a net exporter of staples, is seeing a price increase of 18 percent for maize and over 30 percent for beans, driven by import demand from its neighbors. Markets in

Ethiopia, Sudan, and South Sudan are experiencing increases ranging from 7 to 49 percent. Some countries have taken measures to combat rising prices. Tanzania has imposed a ban on food exports.<sup>78</sup>




Figure 4: Price of Maize and Beans

## Causal Factors

### *Reliance on Imports*

Across sub-Saharan Africa, 45 percent of rice, 85 percent of wheat, and half of all fertilizer is imported, leaving markets vulnerable to changing transportation costs and international prices for their food security.<sup>79</sup> Other nations – such as South Sudan where inflation levels recently hit 57 percent and food prices increased by 64 percent on items such as fish, meat, cooking oils, and sugar – are experiencing internal and external security issues (the dispute with Sudan) that lead to food insecurity.<sup>80</sup>

### *Political Will*

Food security also depends on political will. Nobel-winning economist Amartya Sen takes the position that famines do not happen in functioning democracies. In this framework, the famine in the Horn of Africa is explained at least as much by clashes between the Ethiopian army and Somali rebels and subsequent Ethiopian reluctance to feed the ethnic Somali Ogedenians, as by natural disaster.<sup>81</sup> While battling the Transitional Federal Government and others in Somalia, al-Shabab has also been impeding the delivery of food aid in southern Somalia on the pretense that food aid harms local farmers by lowering prices.<sup>82</sup> These are all significant contributing factors to the already dire food security situation in East Africa.

### *Severe Weather Patterns*

Other forces including extreme weather and climate change affect food security. South African farmers are currently coping with extreme weather conditions and climate change. Excessive heat and high winds have led to wildfires scorching millions of acres of farmland in the southern part of the country. Climate change has the potential to wipe out whole crops. The International Center for Tropical Agriculture argues that a theoretical rise in temperature (2°C by 2050) would leave West African cocoa producing areas too hot to continue growing the bean. Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana would be acutely



affected because cocoa is a primary source of income in these areas.<sup>83</sup> Stanford University's International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre (CIMMYT) theorizes that maize yields could decline dramatically in East Africa – as much as 65 percent for each Celsius degree of increase in temperature.<sup>84</sup> In 2010, heat waves scorched Russia, untimely monsoons destroyed Pakistani crops, and a wet winter rotted Moroccan food supplies, illustrating the climatological effect on food security. The consequences are graver in developing nations, which are least equipped to effects of severe weather patterns.<sup>85</sup>

### Displacement

A potentially destabilizing trend is land acquisition by private foreign investors. Some investment projects are forcing tens of thousands of indigenous African farmers off ancestral land. More than 20,000 villagers were displaced from the highlands region of Uganda when London-based New Forests Company acquired a 10-year lease for 9,300 hectares at \$47 million (USD) to engage in carbon-credit trading.<sup>86</sup> If the trend continues, tensions among displaced persons will inevitably increase. (For additional information on foreign investment in African agriculture, see the article by Dr. Kongdan Oh Hassig in this issue and the September 2011 IDA paper *Roles, Motivations, and Impacts of Brazilian, Russian, Indian, and Chinese (BRIC) Investment in Africa's Natural Resources* dated September 28, 2011. Appendix D specifically addresses *Destabilizing Impacts of Land Grabs*.)




Figure 5: Graph of Monthly Price Changes

### Overall Structural Weaknesses

Key weaknesses of African agriculture that negatively affect food security across the Continent include:<sup>87</sup>

- The predominance of rain-fed agriculture as opposed to irrigated agriculture
- Underinvestment in agriculture and infrastructure
- The lack of competitive markets
- The key, but underdeveloped and ignored, role of women in agriculture

- The lack of enabling economic and political environments
- Persistence of low labor productivity.

### **Conclusion**

If politics can affect food security, food security can also affect politics. The Arab Spring was potentially fueled by food prices on some level. Shrinking availability of farmland combined with poor weather eliminated the option for many young people of taking over family farms, leaving them unemployed and unable to find work. The Tunisian uprising began in rural areas, and 32 percent of the Egyptians who rose up in protest worked in agriculture.<sup>88</sup> The 2010 food riots in Mozambique, which left 13 people dead, showed how food prices can lead to a violent tipping point. The world's poorest people spend 50 to 80 percent of their income on food and are thus most affected by prices and are more susceptible to unrest, if provoked.<sup>89</sup> If food becomes scarce in various markets around the world, there is more potential for explosive situations to arise among disadvantaged populations.<sup>90</sup>

Figure 5 summarizes price trends on the African continent, and the figures portend ill – especially because the late rainy season harvest may not be as abundant as hoped. Conventional wisdom was that African populations were shielded from higher food prices because a majority produce their own food and do not purchase it. While this may be true in some areas, increasing urbanization in Africa means people are not able to fall back on the family plot for food staples in lean times. Urban populations are more susceptible to higher food prices and likely to be more reactive to them. In light of upcoming elections across Africa in 2011 and 2012, there is increased potential for violence if people are dissatisfied with not only their political fate but also their inability to feed their families.

## Land Grabs in Africa: Beneficial to Africans?

**Researcher:** Dr. Kongdan Oh Hassig

Global media reports are describing the trend of foreign entities leasing or purchasing arable land in Africa as the African “land grab.” Chinese entities in particular, as well as other foreign enterprises, are actively seeking agricultural land. The reports raise an important question: Is this form of investment mutually beneficial for Africans as well as investors or will African governments one day regret the land deals? United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Director General Jacques Diouf has warned that the race to secure foreign farmland by food importing countries risks creating a neo-colonial system.<sup>91</sup>

Land acquisition deals are not limited to Africa, but many African countries have large areas of uncultivated land. According to a seminal study on Africa jointly carried out by the UN FAO, the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in 2009:

- A total of 2,492,684 hectares (one hectare is approximately 2.5 acres) of government-approved land sales have been documented in five study countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, and Sudan) since 2004. This figure excludes sales of farms of less than 1,000 hectares.
- All five countries anticipate continued growth in foreign land investment.
- Pressure to acquire higher-value lands (with irrigation potential or closer to markets) is particularly strong.
- Foreign private sector companies are the predominant investors, although they often receive financial and other support from their governments.
- Non-African investors predominate, but intra-African investment is a small but growing trend, led primarily by investment from South Africa.<sup>92</sup>

Companies from wealthy countries that lack arable land (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)) are showing a keen interest in African land acquisition. Populous and growing Asian economies, including China, India, and South Korea, are seeking to cultivate food crops in Africa to provide resources for their rapidly growing economies. Western companies pursuing “green” projects are procuring land in Africa to grow crops for biofuel production, as long as this seems to be a good investment.<sup>93</sup>

Ethiopia, Madagascar, and Sudan are the top three African countries attracting investment in land deals, with total acquisition amounting to 2.8 to 3.0 million hectares. However, in terms of total amount of land acquired, the top countries are the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mozambique, which have sold 11 million hectares and 10 million hectares, respectively, even though the DRC made only 6 land deals and Mozambique made only 10.<sup>94</sup>

The terms of land acquisition vary, and in any case they are not always known, thanks to a certain amount of secrecy in business practices that is tolerated and even encouraged by the governments of some developing countries. Thus it is not easy to make an informed estimate of the extent to which these land deals benefit or hurt the host countries now and in the long-term.

Stories about displaced farmers and diminished food production by traditional small farmers who have little leverage against large foreign corporations and their own governments are starting to receive more coverage by press sources and international organizations. However, it is often the case that farmers' interests are trumped by the interests of the small wealthy class and government officials. To the extent that land deals promote beneficial agricultural joint ventures and contribute to technology transfers, they can be beneficial to both the host country and investors. Land acquisition projects in Africa should be tracked so that a clearer picture emerges of the nature of these investments and whether they are indeed beneficial to Africans.

## ALERTS

### **Malian Elections 2012, Prospects for the Presidency**

**Researchers:** Betty Boswell and Meg Guliford

Amadou Touré, the two-term president of Mali, is due to step down from the presidency in 2012 under constitutional term limits. During this last year of his presidency, the Malian parliament has passed several constitutional amendments, among them one that will strengthen the powers of the president, including greater freedom for setting government policy. Another reform passed by parliament is the establishment of a second chamber, aligning the Malian parliament with those in Western democracies.<sup>95</sup> The constitutional reforms will be put to a referendum vote at the end of 2011. If they pass, many powers now held by the prime minister will be transferred to the president. Many believed Touré would push for an additional constitutional amendment allowing him to seek a third term; however, this has not been the case.

With elections set for April 2012, the following candidates are contenders for office:

- *Dioncoundra Traore*: Currently speaker of parliament and candidate of the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA). ADEMA is the majority party in parliament, holding 54 of 147 seats. At this time, seven other potential candidates have stepped aside in favor of Traore. The party is splintered, and backers of former Prime Minister Modibo Sidibé are attempting to lure ADEMA members to their candidate.<sup>96</sup>
- *Modibo Sidibé*: Prime Minister since 2007, he resigned his position in March 2011, and resigned in September as Inspector-General of Police. These resignations sparked speculation that Sidibé would announce his candidacy for president, but, as of October, he has yet to do so. Sidibé meets the legal requirements for candidacy and has the support of a constituency within the ADEMA party.<sup>97</sup>
- *Ibrahim Boubacar Keita*: A former prime minister of Mali and candidate of the Rally for Mali (*Rassemblement pour le Mali* (RPM)) party, split off from ADEMA in 2002. Keita has held several political and military offices in Mali and is a popular figure in the country.<sup>98</sup>
- *Soumana Sako*: Another former prime minister and candidate of the newly created National Convention for African Solidarity (*Convention Nationale pour une Afrique Solidaire* (CNAS)). This party's platform is "social justice, equality, patriotism, national unity, fight against corruption, respect for public property and transparency."<sup>99</sup>

Mali has held successful democratic elections since 1992, and President Touré hopes to maintain Mali's positive international image in order to secure continued foreign investment in its industries. Political stability and a non-contentious election process are Touré's goals during the last several months of his term.<sup>100</sup>

## Mauritania: Protestors Clash with Police

**Researcher:** Meg Midyette and Meg Guliford

Since August of this year, both French and English news media have reported on the anti-slavery group Initiative for the Resurgence of the Abolitionist Movement (IRA) in Mauritania. The group has taken action against multiple incidents of slavery in the country.

- In August, IRA members protested against slavery in Nouakchott, after a woman was found with a 10-year-old female slave. At least four IRA members were arrested on charges of rebellion and unlawful assembly.<sup>101</sup> Most of the arrested members were later acquitted.<sup>102</sup>
- On September 8, the group staged a sit-in in Nouadhibou against a woman who reportedly owned six slaves. Police allegedly used violence to break up the protest and several IRA members were injured.<sup>103</sup>

Reports give conflicting information about whether or not the IRA is considered a militant organization, but its members are regularly arrested.<sup>104</sup> Though the IRA has attempted to formally register with the government, the government refuses to recognize it. Although an Amnesty International official states it is practicing peaceful means of dissidence, some IRA statements seem to incite rebellion.<sup>105</sup> For example, in early August, the IRA called on social organizations and political parties to “mobilize against” President Aziz’s regime, emphasizing the regime regularly deprives its citizens of their rights.<sup>106</sup> Of a population of approximately 3.1 million, Mauritania is estimated to have 500,000 slaves.<sup>107</sup> It is unclear at present whether the issue of slavery in Mauritania could be a potential flashpoint for further violence. In combination with other events, such as the recent protests in Nouakchott, Kaédi, and Maghama, however, the IRA may be one of many indicators of public discontent.<sup>108</sup>



Figure 6: Map of Mauritania

## Conditions in Eastern DRC

**Researchers:** Dr. Eliza Johannes and Ivana Djak

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is reeling from recent clashes ahead of November elections. Violence in the eastern part of the country continues to be a major source of instability. Incidents such as the October 2010 Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) attacks on UN peacekeepers and unarmed civilians and the September 2011 Mai Mai militants attack at Lake Tanganyika continue to unsettle the region.

Conflict in eastern DRC predates the 2011 election campaign and the wars that brought fleeing Hutu and Tutsi *génocidaires* into Eastern Congo's hills.<sup>109</sup> There are several identifiable factors fueling it today.

### Minerals, Militias, and a Failed Army

#### *Minerals*

The sale of minerals on the black market including coltan, cassiterite, and tungsten used in electronic equipment, as well as natural resources including tropical woods, quinine, and tea have enabled armed groups to purchase heavy weaponry, ammunition, and other equipment.<sup>110,111</sup>

#### *Army*

Complex criminal networks in the DRC army foster insecurity in order to profit from illegal mining. According to the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR), less corrupt units are poorly armed and trained and therefore inefficient.<sup>112</sup>

#### *Militias*

The main perpetrators of violence in eastern DRC are militia groups at various times backed by Uganda and Rwanda but also hired by the DRC government. Efforts by the Rwandan and DRC governments to stop the groups have been unsuccessful.<sup>113</sup>

Prominent militia groups operating in eastern DRC include:

- *Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR))*: Hutu dominated, North Kivu based, rebel group composed of Rwandan ex-soldiers who fled to DRC after the 1994 genocide. The DRC and Rwanda launched a joint military offensive against the group in January 2009, and by the end of 2010 the number of fighters fell from 6,000 to 3,500.
- *National Congress of the Defense of the People (Congres national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP))*: North Kivu based group formed by commander of Rwanda-backed main rebel group that controlled eastern part of DRC during Congolese war.
- *Mai Mai*: Ex-government militias operating in Katanga, the most mineral rich province, particularly close ties to corrupt police and army officials.



- *Hema and Lendu*: Based in mineral-rich northeastern Ituri region, these two ethnic groups were trained by various militia groups. The Hema are pastoralists and the Lendu are farmers who fight for control of the land, further destabilizing the area.<sup>114</sup>

#### **Additional Factors**

- As of July 2011, there are 1.7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 180,000 refugees in the DRC.<sup>115</sup> The constant movement of populations is very destabilizing.
- The active presence of militias indicates weak state capacity and a lack of sovereignty.
- Inter-province tension in the DRC is high. Joseph Kabila's government in Kinshasa has struggled to govern strong regions that prefer to act as autonomous entities and has made little progress in working with the eastern regions to calm unrest.<sup>116</sup>
- A large number of civilians in the DRC are well armed and willing to fight to protect themselves from perceived danger.<sup>117</sup>
- A rape epidemic, which started in the 1990s when Rwandan Hutu militiamen escaped to Congo, has persisted to this day. From July 30 to August 3, 2011, alone, more than 300 women, children, and men were raped in a series of attacks in the Walikale territory, North Kivu, by a coalition of Mai Mai, FDLR, and FARDC. The destabilizing consequences of mass rape that people in the DRC are dealing with include severe injury and trauma, undesired pregnancies and the consequent collapse of family units, and an increased chance of exposure to HIV.<sup>118</sup>

## **Instability in Central African Republic (CAR)**

**Researcher:** Ivana Djak

The Central African Republic (CAR) is a nation plagued by weak national institutions, extreme poverty, persistent human rights abuse, and high rates of violence perpetrated by armed groups.<sup>119</sup> Recent struggles for control of diamond mines, attacks on civilians in Massini village, and fighting between rebel and militants groups have left dozens dead and the international community concerned about the bloodshed.<sup>120</sup> Several factors contribute to the violence.

### **Minerals and Ethnic Tension**

Fighting between rival groups for control of diamond mines in the western town of Bria killed more than 50 people in a two-week period in September.<sup>121</sup> The Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), dominated by the Goula ethnic group, and the predominantly Ronga Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (*Union de Forces Démocratique pour le Rassemblement* (UFDR)) engaged in major clashes at Bria. The groups have been competing for control of the mines for decades.<sup>122</sup> The CAR government in Bangui has called for peace and has tried to enforce ceasefire agreements signed by the militants and President Francois Bozize in 2008, but found the groups unwilling to disarm.<sup>123</sup>

### **Political Instability**

Political uncertainty and corruption heighten tensions in the violent nation. President Bozize is pushing a constitutional amendment that would allow him to run again in 2016.<sup>124</sup> In what his opponents are calling a “headhunt,” the president has also taken steps to destabilize the opposition.<sup>125</sup> Sources close to the president claim he has become increasingly paranoid about a potential coup and is increasingly cautious.<sup>126</sup>

Meanwhile, as rumors swirl over the president’s health, the opposition – specifically, chairman of the Democratic Movement for the Rebirth and the Evolution of the CAR (*Mouvement Démocratique pour la Renaissance et l’Evolution de Centrafrique* (Mdrec)) Joseph Bendounga – is appealing to the country’s Constitutional Court to declare Bozize unfit.<sup>127</sup> Doubts about potential successors further confound the situation.<sup>128</sup>

### **Civilians at Risk**

Civilians are exposed not only to diamond-related clashes, but also to incessant attacks by militants, especially the LRA, whose activity increased sharply during 2011.<sup>129</sup> The government has attempted to disarm rebels, but the number of armed militants still at large is unknown.<sup>130</sup> Central African Armed Forces (*Forces Armées Centrafricaines* (FACA)) has been unable to protect civilians from armed groups because it lacks capacity and operates inefficiently.<sup>131</sup> According to Foreign Minister Antoine Gambi, the departure of the UN mission from CAR and Chad left a security vacuum. He stressed the continued destruction that the LRA inflicts in CAR.<sup>132</sup> More than 200,000 civilians have been internally displaced and are living in precarious conditions due to the fighting.<sup>133</sup>

Refugees who fled to neighboring countries are slowly trickling back into CAR, further destabilizing the situation.<sup>134</sup>

### **Continued Use of Child Soldiers**

The UN Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict recently expressed concern over violations of children's rights in CAR and urged all armed groups to ban the practice. Children in CAR are continuously abducted, recruited into armed groups, and denied access to humanitarian assistance. They are mainly used as soldiers and sex slaves.<sup>135</sup> The problem is severe enough to prevent parents from sending children to school in certain areas.<sup>136</sup>

The Working Group encouraged the *Armée Populaire pour la restauration de la République et de la Démocratie* (APRD) in its efforts to ensure the release of all remaining children in its ranks. The Group voiced concern over continued recruitment by the *Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement* (UFDR), the *Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain* (FDPC) and the *Mouvement des Libérateurs Centrafricains pour la Justice* (MLJC).<sup>137</sup>

## ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Leonardo A. Villalon. *Senegal: Assessing Risks to Stability*. CSIS: June 2011; Phone Interview with Dr. Oussmane Sene on 3 October 2011; Lecture with Dr. Cheikh Tidiane Gadio on 20 September 2011 at CSIS.

<sup>2</sup> Phone Interview with Anonymous Source, West African Research Center (WARC) on 3 October 2011;; Lecture with Dr. Cheikh Tidiane Gadio on 20 September 2011 at CSIS.

<sup>3</sup> Karim was appointed Minister of International Cooperation, Regional Development, Air Transport, and Infrastructure. Source: Lecture with Dr. Cheikh Tidiane Gadio on 20 September 2011 at CSIS; “Karim Wade”, accessed on 28 September 2011. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karim\\_Wade](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karim_Wade)

<sup>4</sup> “Selection List: Senegal Press 05 Oct 11”, AFP20111005620001 *Senegal -- OSC Summary* in French 05 Oct 11; Dakar *Walfadjri* in French – independent daily & Lecture with Cheikh Tidiane Gadio on 20 September 2011.

<sup>5</sup> Phone Interview with Anonymous Source, West African Research Center (WARC) on 3 October 2011; Lecture with Dr. Cheikh Tidiane Gadio on 20 September 2011 at CSIS.

<sup>6</sup> Leonardo A. Villalon. *Senegal: Assessing Risks to Stability*. CSIS: June 2011.

<sup>7</sup> Lecture with Dr. Cheikh Tidiane Gadio on 20 September 2011 at CSIS. Also see: “Senegal: Country Brief,” The World Bank. Accessed at <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/SENEGALXTN/0,,menuPK:296312~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:296303,00.html>

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- <sup>17</sup> Phone Interview with Anonymous Source, West African Research Center (WARC) on 3 October 2011;
- <sup>18</sup> Phone Interview with Anonymous Source, West African Research Center (WARC) on 3 October 2011; YouTube video reporting on the 23 September protests, accessed on 30 September 2011. <http://uk.video.yahoo.com/afp-25406358/politics-25406672/senegal-protests-against-wade-third-term-26723063.html#crsl=%252Fafp-25406358%252Fpolitics-25406672%252Fsenegal-protests-against-wade-third-term-26723063.html>
- <sup>19</sup> Leonardo A. Villalon. *Senegal: Assessing Risks to Stability*. CSIS: June 2011.
- <sup>20</sup> "Opposition Leader Warns of Libya-Like Situation in Guinea-Bissau," *Bissau Digital*, trans., August 31, 11.
- <sup>21</sup> "Unidentified Persons Set Minister's House on Fire," *Bissau Digital*, trans., August 11, 2011.
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- <sup>23</sup> "Guinea-Bissau Government Reshuffle Sees New Defense, Foreign Minister Appointed," *Lusa*, trans., August 26, 2011.
- <sup>24</sup> "Bubo Na Tchuto Worried About Image in Press," *Bissau Digital*, trans., September 16, 2011.
- <sup>25</sup> Paulo Gorjao, "Who wants to play the Russian roulette in Guinea-Bissau?" *Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security*, August 2011.
- <sup>26</sup> Anonymous source, Member of Guinea-Bissauan diaspora in the U.S.
- <sup>27</sup> "Jane's Sentinel: Guinea-Bissau," (2008).
- <sup>28</sup> "President Meets with Democratic Opposition," *Gazeta de Noticias*, trans., August 12, 2011.
- <sup>29</sup> For some recent reporting on the continued use of Guinea-Bissau as a transit hub for drug trafficking, see the reports titled "Guinea-Bissau: High-Level Drug Corruption Continues," U.S. Africa Command, J2-Intelligence Directorate, Theater Analysis Report, July 18, 2011 and "Cufar Airfield Likely to Remain Drug Transshipment Node" U.S. Africa Command, Intelligence Knowledge Directorate, Theater Analysis Report, March 22, 2011 [both classified SECRET]
- <sup>30</sup> Historically, RADM Na Tchuto has a track record of interference in politics. He purportedly attempted to organize a coup in August 2008 but was pre-empted by soldiers loyal to the President and was subsequently forced to flee to the Gambia. According to most accounts, Bubo was one of the first Bissauans to get involved with the drug trade, due in large part to his position as Navy Chief and the control he exerted over the shores and waters off of Guinea-Bissau's coastline. Many argue that this coup attempt was an effort of Na Tchuto to take back his control of the drug trade, which had been lost to President Vieira and his Army COS General Tagme Na Waie.
- <sup>31</sup> "Bubo Na Tchuto Worried About Image in Press," *Bissau Digital*, trans., September 16, 2011.
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<sup>38</sup> John Campbell, "To Battle Nigeria's Boko Haram, Put Down Your Guns," *Foreign Affairs Snapshot*, 9 September 2011, [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68249/john-campbell/to-battle-nigerias-boko-haram-put-down-your-guns?cid=rss-africa-to\\_battle\\_nigerias\\_boko\\_haram-000000](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68249/john-campbell/to-battle-nigerias-boko-haram-put-down-your-guns?cid=rss-africa-to_battle_nigerias_boko_haram-000000).

<sup>39</sup> David Francis, "Is Nigeria's Boko Haram group really tied to Al Qaeda?," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 22 September 2011, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2011/0922/Is-Nigeria-s-Boko-Haram-group-really-tied-to-Al-Qaeda>.

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<sup>41</sup> Jacob Zenn, "Can Nigeria Exploit the Split in the Boko Haram Movement?," *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 9, Issue 36 (September 22, 2011), [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\\_cache=1&tx\\_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=381&tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=38442&cHash=0510096d4b4329a63eb5d1adf56570e8](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=381&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38442&cHash=0510096d4b4329a63eb5d1adf56570e8).

<sup>42</sup> See, International Crisis Group, *Nigeria's Elections: Reversing the Degeneration?* Africa Policy Briefing No. 79 (Abuja/Dakar/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 24 February 2011) <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/B79%20Nigerias%20Elections%20---%20Reversing%20the%20Degeneration.pdf>; International Crisis Group, *Lessons from Nigeria's 2011 Elections*, Africa Policy Briefing No. 81 (Abuja/Dakar/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 15 September 2011), <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/nigeria/B81%20Lessons%20from%20Nigerias%202011%20Elections.aspx>.

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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

# THE AFRICA WATCH

DECEMBER 7, 2011



## TO THE READER

Welcome to *The Africa Watch*, a publication of the Global Coverage Analyses Program – Africa (GCAP/A). As part of the Overwatch function of GCAP/A, IDA’s Africa researchers scan a broad variety of information sources for trends and developments that relate to the political, economic, and social stability of sub-Saharan African states. We give priority to issues and trends that are not being reported extensively elsewhere. *The Africa Watch* is a product of this monitoring effort.

In response to reader demand, we are beginning with this issue of *The Africa Watch* to publish twice monthly. We will distribute *The Africa Watch* on the first and third Wednesdays of each month. In order to help readers make the best use of their time, we have also abbreviated the length of Analyses and Alerts.

Two complementary Analyses in this issue focus on Zambia. The first notes that the relationship between the Zambian government led by President Michael Sata and China seems to be headed in a positive direction after a rocky start. It points out that one determinant of the future course of the relationship will be the handling by the Zambian government of financial and tax arrangements related to the mining industry. The second Analysis looks at the Zambian copper mining industry in more detail and emphasizes that uncertainty over government policies may harm prospects for foreign investment.

Thank you very much for your interest in *The Africa Watch* and for your feedback. If you would like to discuss the contents of this issue or provide suggestions for future analysis, please contact me at (703) 845-4394.

With best wishes for the holiday season,

*George*

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward

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## ANALYSES

### Protests and Violence in West Africa Over Land Acquisition by Foreign Firms

**Researcher:** Ashley Bybee

#### Executive Summary

- Conflict over large-scale land acquisition is well-documented in East Africa, but several instances of violence and protests in West Africa represent a new trend. “Water grabs” – the acquisition of water rights by foreign firms – is a similar phenomenon that has the potential to cause conflict in drought-prone regions of Africa.
- The U.S. Government should consider these business deals to be a growing source of instability in the coming years and should not underestimate small-scale protests against foreign firms and national governments that have the potential to become violent quickly.

#### Several West African Countries Experience Growing Tensions Over Recent “Land Grabs”

Africa is a growing target for large-scale land acquisition by foreign firms, which appears to be an increasing trend. In 2009 alone, 60 million hectares of African land were purchased or leased for the production and export of food, cut flowers, and agrofuel crops.<sup>1</sup> As Africa continues to grow in importance as a target for foreign investment, the struggle to accommodate the interests of foreign firms with the rights of indigenous land owners will continue to be an important issue for those concerned with conflict in Africa. The potentially destabilizing impacts of so-called “land grabs” (the pejorative term given to the buying or leasing of large pieces of land in developing countries by domestic and transnational companies, governments, and individuals) has been well-documented. These impacts include (but are not limited to) food insecurity, environmental degradation, and resentment toward companies with a poor track record of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). “Water grabs,” or concerted efforts to acquire access to water, can also upset the balance of resource use between different indigenous groups, such as pastoralists and farmers, thus precipitating conflict.<sup>2</sup>

To date, there have been a few high-profile stories of outright violence and instability resulting from foreign acquisition of African land, most notably in Madagascar where South Korea's attempt to buy a third of all Madagascar's arable land led to the fall of its president. Local news reports from West Africa indicate that this type of conflict is a growing trend, but that governments do not appear to be making any progress toward land tenure reform, which would preclude much conflict. Following are three examples of protests and violence in West Africa exemplifying this trend that has emerged in the last decade.

#### Sierra Leone

Since early October 2011, indigenous land owners in the Sahn Malen chiefdom, Pujehun district of Sierra Leone, have been protesting the operations of the Socfin Agriculture Company Sierra Leone Ltd (Socfin SL, a subsidiary of the Belgian company Socfin). Socfin, a large-scale investor in Sierra Leone's palm oil industry, enjoys a high level of government support. It commenced work

in April 2011 having leased 7,000 hectares of prime farmland in Malen chiefdom for rubber and oil palm cultivation. The lease period was purportedly for 50 years, and the company is now seeking more land in neighboring chiefdoms.<sup>3</sup>

Approximately 30 people have been arrested by local security forces in Pujehun district for peacefully protesting against the terms of the agreement between the government and Socfin. Local landowners have grown increasingly disaffected by the government's refusal to consult with them on issues pertaining to the land they farm or provide information on the lease agreement. For example, land owners were not informed about the rent paid per hectare per year, the size of the leased area in the chiefdom, how much land would be left for local farmers, and whether they would have to be resettled.<sup>4</sup> Affected communities have frequently asked for renegotiation of leases to allow for greater compensation for their lost livelihoods, but local authorities have done very little to make this happen. Moreover, local workers have complained about the working conditions under Socfin, such as not having proper protective clothing to work in, lack of adequate tools, no medical treatment in case of accidents, low wages, and work uncertainties.<sup>5</sup>

The contentious climate surrounding this deal, as evidenced by the presence of armed security forces when the lease was signed in March 2011, demonstrates that the Sierra Leonean government believes this issue could eventually spark violence among local protestors. The recent arrest of 30 peaceful protestors is further evidence that local resentment is high and that government security forces are prepared to confront aggrieved locals with force. This case also highlights the often uneasy coexistence of traditional chiefs with the Western-style Sierra Leonean government. In this case, the local paramount chief Brima Victor Sedi Kebbie has championed the deal in contrast to the local Member of Parliament who opposes it.

### **Senegal**

In October 2011, clashes broke out over a disputed biofuels project in northern Senegal resulting in three deaths, 22 people injured, and the burning of a community house.<sup>6</sup> The conflict arose when the government gave 20,000 hectares in the village of Fanaye to an Italian company to cultivate sweet potatoes for the production of biofuels. Although cultivation has not yet begun in this village, nor has President Wade's general push for biofuel production in Senegal come to fruition, it shows how sensitive local populations are regarding the use of their lands. Fighting with "sticks and machetes," villagers in Fanaye feared that they not only would be displaced and their religious sites desecrated but they would also lose critical grazing land for their livestock, which would threaten their livelihoods.<sup>7</sup> They claimed the biofuel project would be a "form of slavery" and initially claimed to plan a march to protest the project in Dakar, although there is no evidence this protest occurred.<sup>8</sup>

In April 2011, the charity ActionAid reported that although residents in one village were given jobs in exchange for relinquishing their land to a biofuels project, they were soon fired, leaving them without employment *or* land.<sup>9</sup> Some estimates claim that in the past 10 years, 17 percent of Senegal's arable land (650,000 hectares) has been sold or given away to private companies, often for the purpose of biofuels production for the European market. Given urban dissatisfaction with President Wade and his increasingly erratic behavior in the runup to next year's elections, widespread loss of land could possibly increase instability in one of Africa's most stable countries.



## **Liberia**

A recent report from Liberia exposes local dissatisfaction among residents near a palm oil plantation under cultivation by the Malaysian company Sime Darby. The government deal reached with Sime Darby includes the relocation of 25,000 people squatting in the area. Residents feel that that half a million acres of land being given away is *their* ancestral home and not the government's to give away.<sup>10</sup> So far, residents have been very outspoken against not only the Malaysian company, but also the Liberian government for its inattentiveness to their grievances and for its inability to explain the situation clearly. Although violence has not yet occurred, the U.S. State Department has identified the standoff as a potential threat to the stability of the country.<sup>11</sup>

## Zambian-Chinese Relations Stabilizing

**Researchers:** Dr. Eliza Johannes, Ivana Djak, and Ambassador (ret.) George Ward

### Summary

Zambian President Michael Sata's campaign rhetoric that focused on Chinese investments had the potential to destabilize Zambia's relationship with the PRC. Since coming into office in September 2011, Sata has clarified some of his campaign statements, acknowledged the role of Chinese investments, and reached out to the PRC government. The Chinese have reciprocated, and the bilateral relationship seems to be stabilizing for the moment. Given the controversial nature of Chinese direct investment in Zambia, constant attention and good judgment will be required on both sides to keep the relationship on an even keel.

### Electoral Background

Sata campaigned on a strong anti-Chinese platform, promising to crack down on Chinese investors. Ignored during the 2011 campaign was the fact that Sata's rhetoric was less hostile toward the Chinese than during his 2006 run, and that his complaints against Chinese companies' practices in Zambia were supported by at least one respected non-governmental organization.

- Much of Sata's discourse on China during the 2011 election focused on the alleged exploitation of Zambians, and did so in a less hostile manner than during the 2006 election. In that election, Sata had promised to recognize Taiwan if elected, and China had threatened to break all ties if Sata won.<sup>12</sup>
- After his victory, Human Rights Watch urged Sata to take promised action against the owners of poorly run copper mines. The state-owned China Non-Ferrous Metals Mining Corporation (CNMC) runs four copper mines where miners work up to 18 hour shifts in unhealthy conditions, have to buy their own safety equipment, and are paid lower wages than those offered at other multinational copper mining firms.<sup>13</sup>

### Sata Clarifies and Reaches Out

After a rough start with the Chinese government, Sata has taken pains to soften his campaign rhetoric, has acknowledged the key role played by Chinese investors in Zambia, and has reached out to the Chinese government.

- When the Chinese ambassador visited newly inaugurated President Sata in late September 2011 to deliver a congratulatory letter from the Chinese president, Sata used the occasion to complain that there were too many Chinese in Zambia and that Chinese firms paid low wages.<sup>14</sup>
- Later, Sata clarified his campaign rhetoric and responded to opposition criticism that he was breaking his campaign promises with the argument that the problem was not Chinese investments, but the lack of labor law enforcement on the part of the state – a condition he intended to improve.<sup>15</sup>
- Sata also acknowledged that China, which invested \$6.1 billion in Zambia since 2007, has been key to Zambia's development since the 1960s and reassured, "if they adhere to local laws, there is no need to point fingers at each other."<sup>16</sup>

- On October 29, 2011, President Sata hosted a luncheon in honor of the Chinese community in Zambia. During his speech on that occasion, Sata said, “My dear brothers and sisters from China ... you are all welcomed in Zambia, because you are the all-weather friends of Zambia.” He also announced that he intended to send Kenneth Kaunda, the revered former president of Zambia, to China as a special envoy and to seek Chinese development assistance.<sup>17</sup>

### **China Reciprocates**

Chinese investors and the Chinese government lost no time in grasping the hand proffered by Sata.

- On November 15, 2011, Tao Xinghu, the Deputy General Manager of China Nonferrous Metals Mining Company confirmed that the company plans to invest \$2 billion in Zambia from 2011 to 2015.<sup>18</sup>
- The government of the PRC accommodated the short-notice request for the visit by former President Kaunda, who left for Beijing amid much fanfare on November 21, 2011.<sup>19</sup>

The question for the future is whether both sides will continue to devote the effort needed to keep the bilateral relationship on course. Triggering events to watch for will be Chinese reaction to possible Zambian revisions to investment fees and changes in royalty arrangements (see separate analysis following) and any future labor disputes involving Chinese employers.

## New Zambian Government Rethinks Copper Mining Agreements

Researcher: Andrea Pongo

### Summary

The government of Zambia under newly elected populist Michael Sata has announced that it is considering revisions to investment agreements for foreign-owned copper mines and raising royalty fees. If changes are undertaken, Zambia – Africa’s leading copper producer and seventh largest in the world – risks loss of foreign investment in capital-intensive industries and a subsequent decline from the 6 percent annual GDP growth it has managed to achieve for 5 years.

### Current Developments

The Zambian government announced November 11, 2011, that it will double the royalties charged to international copper mining companies from 3 to 6 percent of revenues.<sup>20</sup> If changes stop there, the investment climate might stabilize. Other changes, however, are being considered by the new government, which include raising existing government ownership stakes in copper mines and imposing new taxes on company earnings. The government currently holds between 10 percent and 21 percent ownership stakes in mines including Konkola Copper Mine (KCM) (20.6 percent), Kansanshi Copper Mine (20 percent), and Mopani Copper Mine (10 percent).<sup>21</sup> (See Figure 1) Foreign investors could agree to the 35 percent stakes that new Mining Minister Wilbur Simuusa is proposing, but the perception of Zambia as less investor-friendly could encourage foreign mining companies to expand along the same copper belt in neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or in South Africa rather than pursue existing multi-billion dollar expansion plans in Zambia.

FOREIGN-OWNED COPPER MINES, BY ZAMBIAN OWNERSHIP SHARE					
Copper Mine	Size (2009) metric tons/y	Majority Owner	Percent Ownership	Country of Origin	Zambian Ownership
Kansanshi Copper Mine	18,000,000 ore	First Quantum Minerals	79.4	Canada	20.6
Konkola Copper Mine (KCM)	9,700,000 ore	Vedanta Resources Plc	79.4	India (British-registered)	20.6
Konkola North	2,500,000 ore (2015)	Vale JV with African Rainbow Minerals	80	Brazil/ South Africa	20
Luanshya Copper Mine	1,800,000 ore	China Nonferrous Metals Corp (CNMC)	85	China	15
NFC Africa	800,000 ore	CNMC	85	China	15
Chibuluma Copper Mine	600,000 ore	Metorex	85	South Africa	15
Chambishi Copper Mine	1,000,000 ore (2012)	CNMC	90	China	10
Mopani Copper Mine (MCM)	5,500,000 ore	Glencore International	90	Switzerland	10

Sources: USGS 2009 Minerals Yearbook; allAfrica, October 14, 2011; Metal Bulletin, October 11, 2011

Figure 1: Zambian Copper Mines

Ratings agency Standard & Poor's warned that, if the new government weakens Zambian fiscal or monetary balances by unproductive borrowing or inflationary spending or if copper mining is affected, the country's current B+ rating – placing it on par with Kenya and Nigeria – could be reconsidered.<sup>22</sup> According to an officer at regional expert Standard Bank of South Africa, copper and cobalt exports made up about 83 percent of total Zambian exports in 2009.<sup>23</sup>

As much as changes to tax or ownership requirements, the climate of uncertainty created by Sata's government during its first weeks in office is harmful to foreign investment prospects.<sup>24</sup> For example, Sata originally campaigned on a new windfall profits tax for copper mine operators but now is unclear about future tax plans. It seems certain that the government will expand the 8 to 10 percent of tax revenue it currently gets from copper mining, but no one knows when or by how much, making it difficult for companies to plan.<sup>25</sup>

If foreign investment currently flowing into Zambia were to decline, the following are the most important risks to the macro-economy:

- The Zambian kwacha would weaken; imports of fuel and processed goods would become more expensive.
- Increased inflationary pressure would be exacerbated by increased cost of imports.
- The government would have a higher debt service burden because of a weaker currency.
- Lower reserves of foreign currency would be available to cover months of imports.

#### **Reaction from Investors**

Amid the uncertainty, international investors are declaring confidence in the Zambian investment environment, hoping to stabilize their own share prices. The CEO of First Quantum of Canada – whose share price dropped 35 percent upon Sata's election – said the company was confident its investment in Zambia was safe.<sup>26</sup> Construction is proceeding at the \$400 million Konkola North project undertaken by Vale of Brazil and its partner ARM of South Africa. The project is expected to generate 1,500 jobs in the area before production begins in 2013.<sup>27</sup>

Standard Bank of South Africa announced in early October that it approved a \$500 million bridge loan to London-registered Vedanta Resources Plc, owner of the Zambian Konkola Copper Mine (KCM), and a \$700 million term loan to finance upcoming expansion plans. "The investment made by Standard Bank is an illustration of our commitment to [...] the broader copper region in Zambia," said Brad Breetzke, head of Mining, Energy & Infrastructure at the bank.<sup>28</sup>

## Uganda Protest Movement Stalled

**Researcher:** Amb. (ret.) George F. Ward

### Summary

The walk-to-work protests in Uganda last April resulted in massive demonstrations, widespread violence, and nine deaths. When opposition political organizers attempted to rekindle the protests in October, government authorities acted decisively and strategically, and succeeded in stifling demonstrations. With key protest leaders confined in jails or at their homes and charged with serious criminal offenses, President Yoweri Museveni seems to have the upper hand. Although much of the population remains unhappy with the *status quo* of rising prices and repression of political dissent, the opposition appears divided. The wild card is the economy, especially the development of newly discovered oil reserves. Meanwhile, the opposition to Museveni is effectively using social media to promote its cause.

### Background

In April 2011, Activists for Change (A4C), a Ugandan political group, called on citizens in Kampala to walk to work in protest over rising prices. The Ugandan authorities responded forcefully to demonstrations throughout the country, at times firing live ammunition into crowds of protesters. Nine people, including a two-year-old, were killed, and dozens were injured.<sup>29</sup> Key opposition leaders, mostly notably Dr. Kizza Besigye, were arrested during April and May. They were confined, charged with a variety of crimes, and later subjected to house arrest.<sup>30</sup> During the April protests, the Ugandan government attempted, with only partial success, to block the use of social media by the opposition.<sup>31</sup>

Three opposition parties united again in October to organize another round of demonstrations. The government moved decisively and preemptively, countering demonstrators on October 17 with tear gas and police batons, and placing organizers under house arrest or in jail on charges of treason. At least in part due to the government's actions, a second rally, planned for October 22, did not take place.<sup>32</sup>

Uganda's high rate of inflation, the proximate cause of the demonstrations, continues unabated, and economic growth is hobbled by a dilapidated infrastructure.<sup>33</sup> Projected cash flows from Uganda's reserves of up to 2 billion barrels of petroleum have yet to materialize and may be delayed by disputes over enabling legislation and difficulties in bringing the oil to market.<sup>34</sup>

### Analysis

At first glance, it appears that President Museveni might have reason to celebrate a victory over his opposition. Indeed, an on-line opposition voice portrayed Museveni as congratulating his police chief for countering the protests and proclaiming that opposition leader Besigye "will never be president."<sup>35</sup> Museveni has even hinted that he is entertaining the thought of standing again for president in the 2016 elections.

Other factors may also limit the likelihood of Uganda becoming the scene of an "African Spring." First, unlike the leaders in North Africa, President Museveni has tolerated a political opposition and enjoys significant popular support. Second, the organization of protests in Uganda was top-down, engineered by politicians, rather than a bottom-up mass movement. Third, democratic institutions in Uganda do function, even though imperfectly. Thus, a Ugandan court ruled in October that the week-long "preventive" house arrest of opposition leader Besigye had been

unlawful.<sup>36</sup> Fourth, the opposition has been able to maintain its voice, expressed on-line by A4C and *The Observer Online*.<sup>37</sup>

It is the country's economic state that could upset this positive outlook for President Museveni. Prices are continuing to rise, the economy is not growing as fast as it needs to, and oil revenues are not going to come to the rescue anytime soon. According to the Uganda Bureau of Statistics, the annual rate of inflation increased from 5 percent in January 2011 to 30.5 percent in October. Food inflation was even higher, reaching an annual level of 45.8 percent in October 2011.<sup>38</sup> Economic growth is continuing at a moderate level of 5 to 6 percent annually. At the same time, income inequality in urban areas remains high, magnifying the impact of large increases in food prices for the poor.<sup>39</sup>

Finally, the Museveni government risks being seen as having significantly oversold the impact of oil revenues. Uganda may possess up to 2 billion barrels of petroleum reserves, a moderate amount viewed in global terms.<sup>40</sup> These deposits are located in a fairly inaccessible region of western Uganda. Some government sources seem to have predicted that commercial production would begin in 2012. Given the absence of the necessary petroleum infrastructure, including the necessary pipeline, this timetable is unrealistic. In addition, consideration by the Uganda parliament of enabling legislation for the petroleum sector still underway, and could take longer than anticipated.<sup>41</sup> Uncertainty over the rules of the game for oil in Uganda could act as a brake on the international investment needed to bring Uganda's modest but significant oil reserves into production.

In summary, Ugandan President Museveni has reason to feel secure for the moment. Rising food prices and increasing income inequalities, however, could provide the sparks for a new round of violent protest – this time from the bottom up. If that should happen, the advanced social media capabilities of the opposition could give the movement greater sustainability and prospects for success.

## Gabonese Parliamentary Elections

Researcher: Caroline F. Ziemke-Dickens

### Executive Summary

- Elected in 2009 in a widely disputed election, President Ali Bongo has not consolidated his authority over Gabon's ruling political class. The stakes in the upcoming December 17 Parliamentary elections are high and the ruling party has already hinted that retaliation against organized resistance will be harsh.<sup>42</sup>
- There is little doubt that the ruling Gabonese Democratic Party (GDP) will hold on to its majority, especially since several opposition parties have pledged to boycott the election. The margin of GDP control is in question, however, and key opposition parties and civil society organizations have already denounced the election as rigged and will dispute any outcome.
- Conventional observers downplay the risk of post-election violence as Gabon has little history of organized resistance, but the level of pent-up frustration within the general population is high. In the words of one anti-government blog, "Gabon is more and more like a volcano waiting to explode."<sup>43</sup>

### December 17 Elections Key to Consolidating Ali Bongo's Hold on Power

Elected in a widely disputed 2009 election to replace his father, Omar Bongo, whose 42-year authoritarian rule ended with his death earlier that year, President Ali Bongo has not yet consolidated his authority over Gabon's ruling political elite. While he enjoys the benefit of the vast wealth his family has accumulated after four decades in power, it is not clear that he will be able to maintain the current crushing GDP majority. His election by a 41.3 percent plurality was considerably less impressive than the 50 percent plus majorities his father claimed in previous elections. Ali Bongo's challenge is to consolidate the power he inherited from his father.<sup>44</sup> The President of Gabon is, nominally, elected by direct popular vote to a 7-year term. Through what came to be known as the "Bongo System" – using the financial resources of a bold kleptocracy to buy-votes and co-opt political opposition – Omar Bongo became president-for-life with absolute authority over all branches of the entire Gabonese government. There are roughly 35 political parties in Gabon, most of which are wholly-owned subsidiaries of the ruling GDP.<sup>45</sup>

Ali Bongo enjoys three key advantages in his quest to consolidate his hold on presidential power. First, he continues to enjoy strong support from France, which has substantial political and economic interests in Gabon. The French national oil company, Total, is a major presence in Gabon. Successive French governments supported the elder Bongo (including the use of French forces pre-positioned in Gabon to help put down protests in 1990 and 1993), and Prime Minister Nicolas Sarkozy attended his funeral in 2009. Sarkozy has since declared a "revitalization of bilateral relations" including the implementation of a "strategic partnership."<sup>46</sup> French support may be a mixed blessing as it has become a lightning rod for opposition rhetoric, as characterized by the opposition slogan "*C'est suffit!*" which denounces the Bongo regime as a puppet installed by a meddling France. Much of the violence that followed the 2009 Presidential election was directed against French interests (protestors set fire to the French Consulate in Port Gentil and attacked individuals taken for French nationals in Libreville). Still, as opposition leaders point out, France is unlikely to allow what happened in Côte d'Ivoire to happen in Gabon, should it prove necessary for the Bongo regime to "cook" the election results.<sup>47</sup>



Second, as Grand Master of the Grand Lodge of Gabon (GLB) and the Grand Equatorial Rite, the two predominant Freemason orders in Gabon, Ali Bongo can use the “fraternal” networking machine of the Masonic orders to consolidate his informal power.<sup>48</sup> Omar Bongo founded the two orders as a sort of “ante-chamber” for political recruiting and a means of binding his power base in Gabon and strengthening his ties to ruling elites in France. Under his regime, a politician could not enter the President’s circle of trust unless he was a member of one of the orders. As a result, virtually the entire Gabonese political class, an estimated 1,000 Gabonese politicians (about 80 percent), are freemasons. The Grand Master of the National Grand Lodge of France (GLNF) presided over Ali Bongo’s installation as Grand Master in 2009 (which involved blatant line-jumping from the middle-ranks of Masonic leadership) to the post previously held by his father.<sup>49</sup>

Finally, the Gabonese political opposition is weak and divided. The opposition media was largely shut down and charged with libel after some of its members challenged official government estimates of deaths as a result of the violence that followed the 2009 elections (the official number was three, press estimates were as high as 20). The leading opposition party, l’Union du Peuple Gabonaise (UPG), has been weakened by the death of its long-time president, former presidential candidate, and sworn opponent of the Bongo family, Pierre Mamboundau (who received 25 percent of the vote in 2009), in October 2011. A coalition of 13 opposition parties, backed by about 20 non-governmental and civil society associations, came together earlier this year to declare a boycott of the elections if the government failed to implement biometric voter registration as a counter to election rigging.<sup>50</sup> In a cynical play for legitimacy, Ali Bongo agreed to delay the vote until December 2012, provided the constitutional court (which he effectively controls) approved.<sup>51</sup> It did not. In the aftermath of the decision, at least one political party broke ranks and declared its intention to participate in the elections. The other parties are divided as to their strategies, some calling on their supporters to simply stay home on election day and others hinting at direct action to prevent the vote from taking place. The secretary general of the ruling GDP, Faustin Boukoubi, has issued a not-so-veiled threat to the opposition: “If some of them do not want to take part in the elections, it is undoubtedly their right, but if they prevent the Gabonese people from choosing freely, they will expose themselves to the punishment provided by law.”<sup>52</sup>

## ALERTS

### Rising Leader Profile: Fidèle Waura

**Researcher:** Caroline F. Ziemke-Dickens

The October 2011 death of Pierre Mamboundou, president of Gabon's main opposition party, l'Union du Peuple Gabonaise (UPG), has thrust his principal deputy, UPG Secretary General Fidèle Waura, into the political limelight. Prior to Mamboundou's death, Waura was a relatively low-profile figure who served as President of the Gabon Olympic Committee prior to rising to a leadership position in the UPG. As spokesman for the UPG, Waura is part of the movement to boycott the December 2011 parliamentary elections and force a delay until biometric voter registration can be implemented to ensure "a transparent and reliable election." Waura told Agence France Press that President Ali Bongo's government's sudden conversion to the cause was, in essence, a cynical play for the appearance of legitimacy. "We are in favor of the deferral," he told AFP, "but if we are to introduce biometrics, it must be done correctly" and under outside supervision.<sup>53</sup> In his eulogy for Mamboundou, Waura threw down a gauntlet to the ruling party:

*No party in the world can claim legitimacy without free, fair, and reliable elections. At stake is the credibility of the country. The introduction of biometry remains one of the projects that Pierre leaves to the Gabonese people. Our responsibility to honor his memory is by completing this last fight.<sup>54</sup>*

While it is not, as yet, clear whether Waura aspires to take over the leadership of the UPG over the long term, he has become a *de facto* opposition hero for his willingness to challenge the regime in the wake of Mamboundou's death. Waura and other UPG leaders engaged in a confrontation with police during Mamboundou's funeral procession. The UPG had decided that, in order to give his grassroots followers the opportunity to pay their respects, Mamboundou's casket would make a stop at the Rio roundabout en route to the National Assembly, where various dignitaries waited to pay their respects. Concerned that such a memorial, at the location of numerous UPG anti-government rallies, might trigger an outburst of opposition and anger at the regime, the government ordered police to block the procession's access to the roundabout. UPG leaders vowed that, were they prevented from reaching Rio roundabout, they would not allow the procession to continue to the National Assembly. The procession eventually forced its way through the police blockade and held the public memorial for Mamboundou.<sup>55</sup>

## Swaziland: King Called Upon to Relinquish Power

**Researcher:** Meg Midyette

The BBC has reported that a senior Anglican cleric, Bishop Meshack Mabuza, has called for the establishment of a democratic government in Swaziland and the relinquishing of power by King Mswati III. The bishop cites the country's economic crisis as the principal reason for making this appeal, stating that "the answer really lies in regime change."<sup>56</sup>

- A leaked government document reportedly states that civil servants' salaries will be delayed until December due to a money shortage.
- Hospitals may run out of anti-retroviral drugs also as a result of inadequate funds to purchase them; almost 30 percent of HIV/AIDS patients in Swaziland depend on hospitals providing these medications for free.
- Critics of the Mswati Government accuse him of high spending despite the nation's poverty.<sup>57</sup>

Although most traditional Swazis reportedly respect the monarchy, an unspecified number of protests against the king have occurred.<sup>58</sup> Furthermore, the Swaziland Coalition of Concerned Civic Organisations (SCCCO) demanded that the cabinet resign in the wake of news that civil servants would go without payment during November.<sup>59</sup> King Mswati III is in seclusion, part of an annual cleansing ritual, and will emerge in January. This could delay action on the part of the government to deal with the current financial crisis and other challenges.<sup>60</sup>

## **Relations between Zambia and Malawi**

**Analysts:** Dr. Eliza Johannes and Ivana Djak

Relations between Zambia and Malawi have soured since the election of Zambian President Sata in September. Sata and others in the Zambian government are demanding an apology from Malawi for deporting Sata in 2007 when he was opposition leader. He publicly turned down an invitation to the COMESA summit in Lilongwe even after the deportation ban had been lifted. The relationship between the two neighboring states has always been complex, but Sata has added a difficult personal element.<sup>61</sup>

## Emerging Armed Group in Mali Claims It Will Absorb Tuareg

**Researcher:** Meg Midyette

News sources report the emergence of an armed group in Mali, the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad. It is reportedly composed of ethnic Tuaregs and has pledged to “absorb Tuareg fighters returning from Libya.”<sup>62</sup>

- This movement began in October 2011.<sup>63</sup>
- The group, which reportedly has secessionist aspirations, has united the Azawad, Haratines, and Tuaregs in the area to achieve this end.<sup>64</sup>
- The spokesperson for the North of Mali Tuareg Movement, Ag Sid’Ahmed, also stated that his group was working with pro-Gaddafi soldiers to “organize a possible rebellion against Mali’s government.”<sup>65</sup>
- The Tuaregs have rebelled against President Touré’s government in the past, and the president has sent Interior Minister General Kafougouna Kona to the area in an attempt to prevent renewed violence in the area.<sup>66</sup>

On November 13, regional government officials met with unnamed Tuareg armed groups in Takalotte. Tuareg participants reportedly numbered in the hundreds. Discussions focused on disarmament and under what conditions this may be achieved. Simultaneously, Malian armed forces have been deployed to Gao and Menaka in an effort to “ensure the security of property and persons in the North.”<sup>67</sup>

## **Niger: Violence in the West between Farmers and Pastoralists**

**Researcher:** Meg Midyette

A Burkina Faso news source reports that violence broke out between Fulani<sup>68</sup> and Houssa groups when Fulani animals were found grazing on Houssa agricultural fields in Bagaza-Koli. The fighting resulted in:

- Four dead and ten severely injured
- Multiple homes destroyed
- 53 arrests.

Drought has caused an agricultural crisis in Niger.<sup>69</sup> The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and Nigerien Government issued a joint statement indicating Niger will have a deficit of cereals of 519,639 tons and of food for animals of 10,222,308 tons. The influx of refugees from Libya (estimated at 200,000) has aggravated the situation.<sup>70</sup>

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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

# THE AFRICA WATCH

DECEMBER 21, 2011



## TO THE READER

IDA's team of Africa researchers welcomes your comments, questions, and feedback on the contents of *The Africa Watch*. If you would like to discuss an article in this issue or provide suggestions for future research, please contact me at (703) 845-4394.

With best regards,

*George*

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward

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## ANALYSES

### Ethnic Violence in Nigeria's Plateau State

Researcher: Dr. Caroline F. Ziemke-Dickens

#### Executive Summary

- Twenty-five people died in late November 2011 in the latest clashes between Muslim and Christian ethnic groups in Nigeria's Plateau State, located in Nigeria's "middle belt" between the predominantly Muslim North and the predominantly Christian South.
- Tension has escalated since the April 2011 reelection of Jonah Jang, a Christian Burom, as Governor of Plateau State. Jang's government has steadfastly resisted pressure from the national government and regional mediators to include representatives of the majority Muslim Hausa population in state and local governments.
- The roots of the conflict lie in Nigeria's indigene/settler dichotomy, which affords privileged legal residency status for purposes of state and local elections to ethnic groups deemed to be the "original" inhabitants of an area. The result, in Plateau State, has been the disenfranchisement of the Muslim Hausa population, which now constitutes the majority and dominates commerce in the region.

#### Cycle of Ethnic Violence in Plateau State Escalates

Twenty-five people died in the latest clashes between Muslim and Christian ethnic groups in Nigeria's Plateau state in late November 2011. Another 160 were arrested. The state, located in Nigeria's "middle belt" between the predominantly Muslim North and the predominantly Christian South, has long been plagued by periodic outbursts of violence between the region's overwhelmingly Christian "indigene" groups – Burom, Anaguta, and Afizere – and the "settlers" – the Muslim Hausa and Faulani.<sup>1</sup> Thousands have died in recent years, including dozens in a series of bombings on Christmas Eve 2010 and more than 700 in riots in 2008. There have also been tit-for-tat reprisal killings between Christian Burom farmers and Muslim Faulani cattle herders in the countryside. The presence of a joint military taskforce and a number of civil society initiatives in the region are credited with largely preventing the kind of violence that had been expected in the period surrounding the April 2011 elections.

Tension has escalated since the April 2011 reelection of Jonah Jang, a Christian Burom, as Governor of Plateau State. Jang's government has steadfastly resisted pressure from the national government and regional mediators to include representatives of the majority Muslim Hausa population in state and local governments. Jang's supporters, including some hardline Christian leaders, describe him as leading a religious war for the soul of Nigeria against a Hausa-led Muslim jihad to dominate all of Nigeria.<sup>2</sup> In the words of one Jos Christian leader, Reverend Zang Tegong:

I know what Jesus said, but Islam is a demonic religion. These people are very dangerous, we know them, this is a religious war. We will fight to the last drop of blood.<sup>3</sup>

Jang, who holds a Bachelor's Degree in Divinity, has called on Christian Nigerians to fight back against Muslim attempts to take over Nigeria and implement sharia law. In his view, the Hausa – who came to the Plateau State in the early 1900s to work in the tin mines – may be grudgingly tolerated, but must not be afforded the privileges of indigeneship. He also fiercely resists Hausa attempts to establish their own chieftaincy in Jos North – the overwhelmingly Muslim commercial center of the state – to carry out traditional law in parallel with Christian Burom Chiefs (a step that conflict mediators argue would go far toward defusing tension and reducing violence). Jang has taken an equally hard line against non-Burom Christian groups who also claim indigene status in the state, particularly the Afizere people. One local conflict mediator has speculated that without the unifying factor of the Hausa, the three indigenous groups would likely be fighting among themselves over “who is the superior owner of Jos” and the allocation of state resources.<sup>4</sup>

### **Fear of Cultural Extinction**

The roots of the conflict lie in Nigeria's indigene/settler dichotomy, which affords privileged legal residency status for purposes of state and local elections to ethnic groups deemed to be the “original” inhabitants of an area. The result, in Plateau State, has been the disenfranchisement of the Muslim Hausa population, which now constitutes the majority of the population and dominates commerce in the region. Opposition to the indigene/settler dichotomy has been growing at the Federal level among those who see it as a violation of democratic principles and rights of citizenship enshrined in the 1999 Constitution and a barrier to the development of a Nigerian democracy and a unifying national identity.<sup>5</sup>

Jang and his supporters see the issue as a matter of cultural survival. The three indigene groups are already vastly outnumbered by the Muslim Hausa population. The Hausa dominate the private sector. Hausa is the *lingua franca* of the Plateau State, and most residents of the region – even Christians – adopt Hausa dress and business practices. The last bastions of indigene dominance are in the state and local governments. Given these realities, indigene leaders recognize that Hausa political power is probably inevitable, but, as one member of the Conflict Management and Mitigation Regional Council of Plateau State explained:

They worry about the future of their children. A Hausa man can always run back to Kano [the largest city in the North]. If something happens, a Plateau man has nowhere else to go.<sup>6</sup>



## Assessing the Security Threat of Migrants Fleeing Libya

Researcher: Dr. Dorina A. Bekoe

### Summary

- The civil conflict in Libya resulted in the exodus of a significant number of the migrant workers in the country.
- The migrants' return to politically and economically fragile countries in the Sahel strains local and national resources and may worsen the region's humanitarian crises.
- The return of Tuareg liberation fighters to Mali may pose a security risk to the country and the sub-region.
- National, regional, and international efforts have begun to counter the security risks posed by the proliferation of weapons from Libya and the return of the Tuaregs.

### Background

Before the political crisis erupted in February 2011, about 10.5 percent of the 6.5 million residents in Libya were immigrants.<sup>7</sup> Among sub-Saharan Africans, Chadians and Nigeriens were the largest groups of sub-Saharan Africans residing in Libya; the Chadians alone numbered between 300,000 and 500,000.<sup>8</sup> In the weeks and months following the fighting, approximately 1 million migrants fled Libya. Within sub-Saharan Africa, most migrants – more than 208,000 – have returned to the Sahelian countries in West Africa. The majority, 86 percent, returned to Chad and Niger – 82,302 and 95,584 migrants, respectively.<sup>9</sup> Much smaller numbers returned to the other Sahelian countries – Mauritania: 772; Algeria: 1,666; Mali: 11,212.<sup>10</sup> Because of the proliferation of weapons from the conflict, challenges in governance, persistent instability, and food insecurity, there are concerns that the returnees may pose a security risk to their countries and the sub-region generally.

### When are migrants a problem?

Migrants fleeing from conflict zones can present particular security concerns to their home countries or the region at large. The central questions hinge on whether migrants significantly represent groups of terrorists or criminals, have the capacity to threaten national security, and can be successfully deterred by the state.<sup>11</sup> Some of the migrants crossing over to Niger, Chad, and other Sahelian countries are third country nationals (TCN) – which can include nationals of countries outside the Sahel. While the Nigerien, Chadian, and other Sahelian nationals may pose a burden on local and state resources, TCNs present a different tension. TCNs who are not able to leave for their home countries may find it difficult to blend into the existing community. As outsiders, they may place additional pressure on already fragile resources.<sup>12</sup>

### Security threats in the Sahel

The countries in the Sahel face different security threats from the returning migrants. Although Tuaregs have lodged grievances in Niger and Burkina Faso, it is in Mali that the Tuaregs have been most restive. Accordingly, the Malian government is concerned over their return and the weapons they may have acquired in Libya. In Niger and Chad, the concern is the additional pressure being placed on fragile economic and social institutions.

**Mali.** It is estimated that approximately 100,000 Tuaregs settled in southern Libya at Gaddafi's invitation.<sup>13</sup> In the wake of the death of Gaddafi, the return of Tuaregs, who had fought alongside him in his bid to retain power, is worrisome to the government of Mali.<sup>14</sup> Already,

Tuaregs have begun to demonstrate their continuing grievances. On November 1, hundreds of Tuaregs in Mali answered a call to celebrate the one-year anniversary of the formation of the National Azawad movement, which calls for the autonomy of the Azawad region, home to the Tuaregs.<sup>15</sup> To accurately assess the security risk, more information is needed on the number of Tuaregs returning to Mali and the type and number of weapons, if any, they are transporting back. To this end, the United Nations Security Council has charged the transitional Libyan authorities with tracking and documenting weapons and weapons sites.<sup>16</sup>

**Niger and Chad.** The returnees are putting pressure on social and economic networks in Niger and Chad. Many created a high standard of living in Libya – sending hundreds of millions of dollars in remittances annually. The crisis caused a sharp decline in remittances: for example, by June, four months into the conflict, the Nigerien economy had suffered an \$80 million loss from the diminished remittances.<sup>17</sup> For Niger, which ranks 186 out of 187 on the Human Development Index, the remittances to family members are a lifeline.<sup>18</sup> For the tens of thousands who returned home to Niger, the prospects are as bleak as those who had depended on them. The Nigerien economy does not have the capacity to absorb the returnees, nor does the government have the capacity to assist them.<sup>19</sup> With more than half of Niger's villages facing a food shortage, the returnees are putting pressure on already-scarce resources.<sup>20</sup> In 2006, Nigeriens protested the high cost of living; similar protests due to the current strain on resources cannot be ruled out.

Chad has similarly weak economic opportunities and social institutions; it ranks 183 on the Human Development Index.<sup>21</sup> As in Niger, remittances were critical.<sup>22</sup> Migrants returning to Chad face a precarious social, economic, and political environment. They join 285,000 refugees from Sudan and 95,000 refugees from the Central African Republic,<sup>23</sup> a country with easily available access to small arms and light weapons, a result of the many insurgencies in recent years. In the northern towns of Faya-Largeau, Ounianga Kébir, and Kalaït, which were the first stops for the returnees from Libya, the population doubled within a few months of the crisis and prices increased sharply, as a result of the interruption of the trade with southern Libya.<sup>24</sup> Chad has a history of street demonstrations to protest social and economic hardships: recently, 150 people were arrested in demonstrations in N'Djamena, protesting the late payment of university subsidies to students. Earlier in 2011, two students were arrested on suspicion of planning demonstrations inspired by Tunisia and Egypt, to advocate political reform.<sup>25</sup> Demonstrations in protest of increased economic pressures cannot be ruled out.

### **Current Efforts to Combat Security Risks**

There are national, regional, and international efforts to cooperate in reducing the prospect of instability from the proliferation of weapons and the return of the Tuaregs. Mindful of the Tuareg's grievances of political and economic marginalization, the Malian government announced a \$69 million development scheme for the northern regions, home to the Tuaregs.<sup>26</sup> Regionally, the army chiefs from Mauritania, Mali, Algeria, and Niger, who have formed a committee to coordinate joint operations in the Sahel, emphasized the need to work together to combat rising insecurity.<sup>27</sup> Finally, the European Union promised €64 million to Mali to aid with security efforts.<sup>28</sup>

### **Assessment**

There are many concerns about the security risks that returning migrants from Libya may pose to the Sahel. Principally, the concerns center on the returning Tuaregs, the weapons they may have acquired, and their propensity to threaten the Malian government. Information on the number of Tuaregs and the weapons that are leaving Libya is not known, however. An equally

important problem is the pressure on food stores and other resources that returning migrant workers are currently placing in Niger and Chad – two economically and politically fragile countries with histories of protest. Pockets of instability are well within the realm of possibility if the governments are not provided the resources to tend to the increased pressure on economic and social institutions.

## Persecution of Journalists in Ethiopia

**Researcher:** Mr. Claudio C. Biltoc

### Summary

Ethiopia has been using anti-terror laws in order to criminalize news coverage of those opposing the government of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.<sup>29</sup> Ethiopia has the highest number of exiled journalists in the world and, in the African context, is second only to Eritrea in the number of journalists imprisoned.<sup>30</sup> It is likely that the latest rise in detentions reflects the government's fear of political and social unrest and its fear of the "Arab Spring" morphing into an "Ethiopian Winter." The anti-terrorism rationale used as a basis for the current crackdown on opposition groups and "non-cooperating" media may not play well with the Ethiopian public and could possibly feed anti-American sentiments. Meles' anti-terrorism policies are closely aligned with U.S. efforts, and some Ethiopians might perceive the Prime Minister's crackdown as supported, or at least not opposed, by the U.S. government.

### Current Conditions

The persecution of journalists is escalating worldwide with a 20 percent increase in the number of imprisoned journalists since the 1990s. Research from Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) indicates that much of the increase is attributable to widespread harassment of journalists across the Middle East and North Africa.

The Meles government is using anti-terrorism laws as the basis of this year's crackdown on Ethiopian journalists. A sweeping 2009 anti-terrorism law enabled the government to designate the exiled opposition movement Ginbot 7 (named for the Ethiopian calendar date for disputed 2005 elections), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) as terrorist groups. A majority of those charged with terrorism under the law are accused of supporting and associating with Ginbot 7 or one of the other groups.<sup>31</sup>

There is a decades-long history of persecution of journalists in Ethiopia, but the recent increase in detentions, harassment, and use of anti-terrorism laws may foretell increased focus on the part of Meles and his government on control of the press.

### Recent Events

A total of seven journalists including two Swedes are currently being detained in Ethiopia. The two Swedes were detained while covering the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) group and were charged with aiding the organization.<sup>32</sup> While the total number of those arrested

#### HISTORY OF PERSECUTION

The overthrow of the previous military regime by Meles Zenawi in 1991 led to high hopes for a free and more open press. Many private papers and other news organizations in Ethiopia were formed during the years immediately following, resulting in the number of press publications rapidly rising to almost 300.

Unfortunately, the period of openness quickly came to an end as the government started banning most independent news outlets and imprisoned more than 200 journalists between 1993 and 1998.

A relative "calm" ensued until 2005, when the most recent round of harassment started with the arrest of 21 journalists charged with "involvement in an illegal attempt to overthrow the government". Five of the 21 were working for Voice of America (VOA) Amharic service, while others were local editors, columnists and members of the opposition.

Source: "Public Order, State Security and Press Freedom in Ethiopia: Towards finding a common Ground" Exiled Journalists' Network, 27-29 September 2006. Accessed at [http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/13159/1/Ethiopian\\_Forum\\_2006\\_doc\[1\].pdf](http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/13159/1/Ethiopian_Forum_2006_doc[1].pdf)

and/or detained seems low, the tactics employed by the government seem to follow a consistent pattern of detainment, instilling fear, and compelling those charged to leave Ethiopia and cease publication and anti-government activities.

A review of events during the last year includes many similar examples. Dawit Kebede, editor and publisher of *Awramba Times* recently fled Ethiopia and ceased publication of the paper, which covered parliamentary affairs, health and women's issues, satire, and folklore. Kebede was previously arrested in 2005 and served 21 months in prison on charges of genocide and treason.<sup>33</sup> Dawit Kebede's flight leaves Ethiopia with only one remaining independent media outlet.



**Awramba Times**

In September 2011, Ethiopian journalist Argaw Ashine fled the country after being identified in WikiLeaks documents as a source for a U.S. Embassy cable regarding the government's plans to silence *Addis Neger*, formerly a leading independent newspaper in Ethiopia. The editors of *Addis Neger*, after fleeing the country in November 2009, now publish strictly online.<sup>34</sup>

Also in September of this year, opposition leader Andualem Arage and the respected award-winning journalist Eskinder Nega were arrested and later charged with 22 others with terrorism and plotting against the state with support from Eritrea. Berhanu Nega, a former mayor of Addis Ababa currently living in exile in the United States, was also charged with terrorism *in absentia*.<sup>35</sup> Andualem Arage and Natnael Mekonnen, who is also under arrest, are leaders in the Unity for Democracy and Justice Party (UDJ), the largest party within the opposition Medrek group. In this case, the Meles government is using accusations of terrorism as a pretext to criminalize activities that are routine tasks of party leaders.<sup>36</sup>

A newly emerging and chilling nexus is the apparent cooperation that Ethiopia is getting from Sudan. The Berlin based Solidarity Committee for Ethiopian Political Prisoners (SOCEPP) alleged in November 2011 that former opposition member Andualem Alemayo was jailed by Sudanese authorities after illegally entering the country from Eritrea, and then deported to Ethiopia. This level of assistance further limits the escape options available to opposition and media members if they are being harassed and persecuted.

## Zimbabwe: Opposition's Prospects Uncertain as Elections Approach

**Researcher:** Dr. Janette Yarwood

### Summary

With national elections scheduled for 2012, the political opposition to Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe faces uncertain prospects for a number of reasons:

- First, Zimbabweans are seeking a decisive leader with a charismatic personality. None of the leading opposition leaders fit that mold.
- Second, the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) is split into two factions, both of which are to some extent discredited.
- Third, former minister Simba Makoni and his Mavambo Kusile Dawn Movement enjoy support from the business community and the diaspora, but are disadvantaged by rumors that their movement was created by Mugabe during the 2008 election campaign in order to split the opposition.
- Finally, the electorate seems especially hard to read.
  - The role of the large number of active war veterans remains important
  - The youth vote is a wild card
  - Many ordinary Zimbabweans cannot imagine an alternative to Mugabe, especially among the current contenders

### Background

Zimbabwe's ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party held its annual conference in Bulawayo in early December 2011. As expected, the party endorsed President Robert Mugabe as its presidential candidate for next elections. Mugabe also called for elections to be held next year, claiming that the Government of National Unity expired in February 2011.<sup>37,38</sup>

The power-sharing arrangement between the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and ZANU-PF – troubled from the start – never performed as an inclusive government. The MDC itself has split into factions led, respectively, by Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and by Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara (MDC-M). During the past two years Tsvangirai has threatened to break away from government because of harassment and his inability to exercise executive authority.<sup>39</sup> His reputation as an opposition leader has nevertheless suffered because of his connection to the government. Meanwhile, Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara has contributed to Tsvangirai's difficulties by supporting Mugabe's unilateral appointment of key government officials.<sup>40</sup> These developments make it increasingly difficult for Zimbabwe's electorate to view the MDC as a party that can actually run the country. Some analysts argue that Mutambara's faction, the smaller of the two, is increasingly becoming irrelevant.<sup>41</sup>

### The Mavambo Kusile Dawn Movement: Opposition or Mugabe Front?<sup>42</sup>

During the 2008 elections, many Zimbabweans were dissatisfied with the choice between two large opposing parties that fought for political dominance, often using violent methods. Gangs of unemployed youths were paid to beat up and at times even rape and kill members of the

opposition. Individuals dissatisfied with both the MDC-T and ZANU-PF came together to support Simba Makoni, a former minister under ZANU-PF.

Makoni is one of the most educated presidential candidates thus far. He has a Ph.D in Chemistry from Leicester University. He also has the advantage of having been a ZANU student leader and representative. Despite coming from within ZANU-PF, he has had the courage to stand up against ZANU-PF's policies and actions, and to leave the party to form an opposition movement for the 2008 elections.

Makoni's ZANU-PF past enabled him to garner some of the support that ZANU-PF traditionally enjoyed. A further advantage was that he was in a position to garner the backing of the military. He was reputed to have the support of the late General Solomon Mujuru and other top military leaders. Rumors that Mujuru was firmly behind Makoni and would eventually endorse him<sup>43</sup> did not turn out.<sup>44</sup> Zimbabwean citizens in the diaspora reportedly provided financial support. Business interests in Zimbabwe contributed generously, viewing Makoni as a desirable alternative to the ZANU-PF regime that has been so hostile to business, particularly to the banking sector. The smaller MDC faction under Mutambara also chose to support Makoni's bid.

During the 2008 election season it was rumored that President Mugabe asked Makoni to stand as a way of 'stealing' votes away from Tsvangirai. This issue re-emerged in January 2011 when controversial politician and retired Major Savious Kudzai Mbudzi, who was Simba Makoni's right-hand man during the 2008 general elections, confessed that Mavambo Kusile Dawn was a ZANU-PF project meant to destroy the MDC-T and to split the votes.<sup>45</sup>

Regardless of whether Makoni and his Mavambo Kusile Dawn campaign were real or fabricated to further divide the MDC and split the vote, his campaign made it clear that Zimbabweans are desperately searching for an alternative.<sup>46</sup> The dilemma is that there is no consensus on what that alternative should look like.

#### **The Electorate – Difficult to Read**

**War Veterans.** Freedom fighters helped select their political leaders in the guerrilla war of the 1960s and 1970s. They remain an important – and feared – group. Since independence, ZANU-PF politicians have tried to maintain control over this group – and have managed to – through the use of patronage and financing. The controversial leadership of Joseph Chinotimba and Jabulani Sibanda of the War Veterans' Association is being challenged by a substantial number of war veterans, who contend that the two were teenagers during the liberation struggle and do not represent the welfare needs of genuine war veterans. Chinotimba and Sibanda were implicated in the 2008 electoral violence.<sup>47</sup> They both argue that struggle credentials remain important for the next elections.<sup>48</sup> The outcome of the contest for leadership of the veterans' movement could affect the next election.

**Rural Population.** As the rural population comprises 68 percent of the total, its vote can be critical. Until 2000 rural voters overwhelmingly supported ZANU-PF, but they shifted their support in that year. Winning rural support will be a key factor for candidates in the 2012 election.

**The Youth Factor.** Zimbabwean youth are aware of the wave of change that swept across Northern Africa this year. While current conditions in Zimbabwe make an 'Arab spring' unlikely – if only because ZANU-PF enjoys the support of the military – youth might lead the way in promoting change if a viable opposition candidate were to emerge.

***Everyday Zimbabweans.*** Many in Zimbabwe find it difficult to imagine an alternative to Robert Mugabe, who has been in office for 31 years. During a recent trip to Southern Africa, the author asked a number of Zimbabweans if they thought the MDC had the potential to win the next election. The majority of respondents said that the MDC could not win, and some admitted that they intended to vote for Mugabe. A search of blogs, web pages, and forums confirm that, for many Zimbabweans, an alternative to Mugabe is beyond imagining.



## Zambian President Sata: A Rough Start

**Analysts:** Dr. Eliza Johannes and Ms. Ivana Djak

### Summary

President Michael Sata has substantial popular appeal because of his humble roots and strong anti-corruption rhetoric. His electoral victory as an opposition candidate instilled a new hope in the Zambian people. Sata's questionable institutional rearrangements and appointments, however, raise concerns about his competency. Sata's opponents are also accusing him of favoring certain tribes and Christian denominations.

### President Sata's Appeal

The people of Zambia elected Michael Sata as President in part because he promised to sweep the country clean of corruption.<sup>49</sup> In his first week in office, Sata fired the anti-corruption commission director Godfret Kayukwa and central bank governor Caleb Fundanga on the grounds that both were allegedly corrupt.<sup>50</sup> He ordered the sacking of 13 Brigadier Generals and 15 Colonels appointed by predecessor Rupiah Banda because they too were allegedly involved in corruption.<sup>51</sup> He not only dismissed officials, but also had them arrested.<sup>52</sup> These actions are readily perceived by the Zambian people as a genuine fight against corruption. As a porter and policeman turned trade unionist and politician, Sata connects to the working poor.<sup>53</sup> He also connects to young Zambians for whom he stood as the candidate of change and who are largely responsible for his victory.<sup>54</sup> Even Sata critics like Daimone Siulapwa, the Executive Director for Diaspora Advocacy Center in Lusaka, admit that his victory energized the population and instilled faith that Zambia can do better.<sup>55</sup> While his popular appeal is imposing, some of his decisions are leading supporters to question his competency.

### Institutional Restructuring

Sata made significant institutional changes from the outset of his term. He dissolved the entire Road Development Agency because he believes it misused funds. He restructured the Finance Ministry to put one secretary instead of three in charge in order to mainstream the process. He dismissed the boards of several state-owned companies including the central bank, the electricity monopoly, and the national pension scheme. He restructured civil service appointment processes, moved back retirement ages, and reorganized the police to include a deputy inspector-general.<sup>56</sup>

There is uncertainty about the practicality of his reorganization schemes and what the long-term effects will be. Some complications have already emerged from these changes. Sata initially threatened to dissolve Parliament, claiming that the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) and United National Independence Party (UPND) were coming together to frustrate Patriotic Front (PF) attempts to make appointments to the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). In response, the opposition leader in Parliament, Felix Mutati, placed the blame for the delay on the government, which has allegedly failed to fill the key role of the Secretary of the Treasury.<sup>57</sup>

### Appointments

Sata has recently made a series of questionable appointments. First, Sata appointed and subsequently dismissed Xavier Chungu to the post of Luapula Province Permanent Secretary.<sup>58</sup> Next, he appointed and revoked Docor Simon Miti as ambassador to Switzerland. This move was described as embarrassing by *Get Involved* director Frank Bwalya. Transparency International Zambia (TIZ) President Rueben Lifuka has urged the President to consult extensively before

making appointments, in order to weed out questionable candidates and save the judiciary from unnecessary burden.<sup>59</sup>

### **Tribalism**

Zambia's first president Dr. Kenneth Kaunda made it a point to foster strong inter-tribal ties, and tribalism has not been a major issue in Zambia for several decades. One *Zambian Watchdog* contributor, Given Mutinta, argues that Sata has given the word "tribe" a negative connotation that it has not had since before the time of Kenneth Kaunda.<sup>60</sup> There is much speculation about Sata's tribal favoritism of his own Bemba tribe and how it is shaping his government.<sup>61</sup> The media has pointed specifically to the lack of proportional representation of the more than 70 tribes of Zambia in Sata's Cabinet and appointees.<sup>62</sup> Austin Mbozi, another contributor to *Zambian Watchdog*, argues that Sata's campaign was particularly effective in leveraging tribal fears by accusing his competition, arguably without much proof, of favoring certain groups.<sup>63</sup> Mbozi also points to the fact that significant funds have been allocated to new Muchinga and Choma provincial capitals, roads, and universities, while other regions in similar need are not receiving comparable funds. Northern Province, where Sata's tribal and regional allegiances lie, is receiving funding for road and university renovations.<sup>64</sup>

### **Religious Divisions**

During his campaign, Sata emphasized that he would rule Zambia as a "Christian nation" based in biblical principles, but he has since not elaborated on what this means in practical terms.<sup>65</sup> His religious beliefs have manifested themselves on the national stage mainly in his verbal hostility toward the gay community. Sata has stated, "The constitution of Zambia does not accept lesbianism or homosexuality...so as a Christian nation why should we even be talking about those things?"<sup>66</sup>

Sata is also Zambia's first Catholic President, which has caused concern among other denominations. His recent appointments to the technical committee to draft the constitution included only two of the three umbrella church bodies in Zambia. He appointed one member from the Council of Churches in Zambia (CCZ) and three from the Zambia Episcopal Conference (ZEC), but none from the Evangelical Fellowship in Zambia (EFZ), which led the opposition to accuse him of discriminating against Evangelicals.<sup>67</sup>

## ALERTS

### Leadership Profile: Fatou Bensouda, New ICC Chief Prosecutor

Researcher: Ms. Ashton Callahan



Ms. Fatou Bensouda of the Gambia was elected Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on December 12, 2011. After the election, the Gambian foreign ministry said, “This is the first time a Gambian is occupying such a high position in a global organization and is therefore a great pride for this country.”<sup>68</sup> Ms. Bensouda, the former Gambian Minister of Justice and also Attorney General, has served as Deputy Prosecutor of the ICC since September 2004. Prior to joining the ICC, she spent two years on the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. In addition, Ms. Bensouda has been proclaimed the Gambia’s leading expert on international maritime law.<sup>69</sup> She will replace the outgoing (and much

criticized) Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo of Argentina, in June 2012.

Overall, Ms. Bensouda’s upcoming tenure has been met with widespread praise and acceptance.<sup>70</sup> She was the consensus candidate from the start, forcing three other candidates (including one African nominee) to withdraw from the race.<sup>71</sup> Her appointment appeases the African Union by providing African representation. It will also help allay fears that African nations are being purposely targeted and that the ICC is a Western mechanism to achieve political ends.<sup>72</sup> Her supporters argue that she will be “no shrinking violet,” and her reserved temperament complements the challenges of the role.<sup>73</sup> At a post-election news conference, Ms. Bensouda responded to a question about how she would handle criticism from Africa: “My origin, being an African, has nothing to do with my mandate.”<sup>74</sup> Thus, many believe she will bring reform and credibility to the ICC institution.

## **Leadership Profile: Former Uganda VP Gilbert Bukenya**

**Researchers:** Dr. Eliza Johannes and Ms. Ivana Djak

### **Summary**

Former Ugandan Vice President Gilbert Bukenya's recent arrest and the handling of his case by the Inspector General of Government (IGG) have received national attention and heightened worries about corruption in President Museveni's government. The case points to the discord in Museveni's cabinet and the complicated links between national and local politics in Uganda.

### **Inspector General of Government Entanglement**

Former Ugandan Vice President Gilbert Bukenya was arrested on October 3, 2011, under instruction from the IGG for allegedly abusing the office in connection with the procurement of executive BMW vehicles and motorcycles used at the Commonwealth Heads of State and Government Meeting in 2007. He allegedly fraudulently influenced and directed the award of a contract for the supply of 204 vehicles to Motorcare Uganda Ltd in disregard of regulations governing public procurement.<sup>75</sup> Bukenya's troubles started first in February when he was accused of election fraud while running for a seat in the Busiro North elections, the results of which were nullified. In May, President Museveni announced that Bukenya would not be appointed Vice President again. His retirement from public life in September came as a shock. The circumstances surrounding Bukenya's arrest took another twist when, in November, Raphael Baku, the IGG, dropped all charges. A final hearing on the charges is currently in progress. Bukenya's defense team has been able to bring forward several noteworthy witnesses, including Transport Ministry Permanent Secretary Charles Muganzi, to attempt to exonerate him.<sup>76</sup>

The Ugandan media has long portrayed Bukenya as a somewhat strange, womanizing, witchdoctor-visiting politician, but he was also understood to be popular among the general public who viewed him as a hardworking, diligent public servant and scientist.<sup>77</sup> Many in the country view his ordeal as a witch-hunt by a corrupt and unpopular government. IGG Baku's reputation has since come under increased scrutiny. As Baku was initially very adamant about prosecuting Bukenya, the sudden dropping of charges is suspect, especially since Baku has gone after some of the biggest politicians, including Sam Kutesa, the father-in-law of Museveni's son.<sup>78</sup> Baku is accused of targeting Bukenya on orders of Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi.<sup>79</sup>

### **Turmoil in Museveni's Cabinet**

Bukenya's imprisonment points to the deep division within President Museveni's cabinet. Many believe that Prime Minister Mbabazi orchestrated Bukenya's downfall. IGG Baku was the controversial Prime Minister Mbabazi's former personal assistant, and as the general public is skeptical of the Prime Minister, Baku's intentions have come into question as well. The IGG is increasingly unpopular and calls for Baku's resignation are growing.<sup>80</sup> Baku has reacted angrily to these accusations, arguing that the IGG acts independently and has to investigate all claims of corruption. He has stated that he will not resign over the Bukenya case.<sup>81</sup> President Museveni has also been criticized heavily for allegedly following Mbabazi's lead on many issues, especially in allowing the attacks on Bukenya. The president has lost valuable allies over Bukenya's arrest.<sup>82</sup>

Since Museveni reshuffled his cabinet to exclude Bukenya in May, rumors that the former VP is now supporting the opposition have run rampant. He is also supposedly plotting with Catholic Church leaders to overthrow the president. Bukenya and the Church have denied all rumors

vehemently.<sup>83</sup> Bukenya himself has noted that he completely supports President Museveni, that he believes that Uganda would do best under his continued leadership, and that the president showed him great kindness while he was in prison.<sup>84</sup> There are also rumors that the President actually advocated on Bukenya's behalf, contacting Attorney General Peter Nyombi and Vice President Edward Ssekandi to meet with Baku and persuade him to drop the charges.<sup>85</sup>

### **Local Elections**

Bukenya is furthermore a controversial figure because of his continued involvement in local politics. On November 14, he was nominated again for the parliamentary seat for Busiro North province that he had held from 1996 until his recent legal trouble began. He ran on the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) ticket, and beat his closest rival and Democratic Party (DP) candidate Kasta Bukenya, whom he ran against and beat in the nullified February election,<sup>86</sup> with a commanding 76.7 percent of the vote.<sup>87</sup> While even his opponents, such as Norbert Mao, party president of the DP, have expressed their gratitude for all he has done for the country,<sup>88</sup> Bukenya's victory could prove disruptive considering his entanglement with the cabinet and his continued legal troubles.

## Equatorial Guinea's Constitutional Referendum

Researcher: Ms. Ashton Callahan

On November 13, 2011, voters in Equatorial Guinea passed a referendum allowing changes to the constitution to bolster the power of President H.E. Obiang Nguema Mbasogo. It was reported that 97 percent of citizens approved the reforms.<sup>89</sup> The overwhelming consensus appears to be the result of several factors, namely fraudulent voting (via ballot stuffing and voter intimidation), a misinformed public, and the ruling party's dominance of state and private media.<sup>90</sup> Critics argue that these modifications will solidify already unchecked executive power, ensure dynastic succession, and further deprive citizens of political and civil rights.<sup>91</sup> Members of the opposition, who were forcefully prohibited from campaigning against the referendum, have called the reforms a sham designed to strengthen Obiang's power.<sup>92</sup> Other actors are speaking out as well. Tutu Alicante, executive director of EG Justice said, "President Obiang hopes to polish his tarnished image and rebrand himself as a reformer."<sup>93</sup> Overall, the constitutional changes are viewed as a mechanism for the highly corrupt regime to appear more democratic in the eyes of the international community.<sup>94</sup> The constitutional changes are as follows:<sup>95</sup>

- Removes a maximum age limit for the president (previously 75 years)
- Limits president to serving two seven-year terms
- Creates the post of Vice President
- Creates a Senate (100-member House of Representatives already in existence)
- Creates new "anti-corruption" bodies (e.g., Court of Auditors and the Ombudsman).

President Obiang informed the House of Representatives of the proposed changes to *The Fundamental Law* in July 2011: "This is a regime change of a mixed parliamentary government to a pure presidential regime, which gives more responsibility to the President of the Republic, to avoid conflicts that are often created by the governments of parliamentary regimes in Africa."<sup>96</sup> Under the guise of democracy, the reforms enable President Obiang to consolidate his power. First, the removal of the existing age limit potentially allows 69-year-old Obiang, who seized power in a 1979 coup, to pursue two additional seven-year terms. As the opposition has cited, the text does not stipulate whether the change is retroactive and whether Obiang has to step down in 2016.<sup>97</sup> Second, creating the post of Vice President enables Obiang to choose a successor at his discretion. It is widely believed that he will appoint his eldest son, Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, who is the subject of foreign corruption and money-laundering investigations in France, Spain, and the United States. Third, the reforms extend his heavy influence on judicial bodies to the newly created bodies (e.g., Senate, Court of Auditors) contradicting their very purpose, while on the surface, giving the illusion of a system of checks and balances.<sup>98</sup>

## **Burkina Faso: Opposition Parties and Civil Society Personalities Boycott National Debate on Political Reforms**

**Researcher:** Ms. Meg Midyette

A Netherlands news source reports that opposition parties and influential civil society leaders have boycotted a national debate on political reform in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.<sup>99</sup>

- Despite the recommendation by regional officials brought together by the Advisory Council on Political Reforms (CCRP) not to overturn Article 37, which forbids President Blaise Compaoré from seeking another term,<sup>100</sup> opposition parties suspect President Compaoré is using this debate to push through revisions of the Constitution that will allow him to seek another term of office in 2015.
- Approximately 2,000 political officials, religious figures, and other personalities attended the event, which opened on December 7, 2011.<sup>101</sup>
- Last summer, President Compaoré faced arguably the most significant challenge to his rule to date when soldiers attempted mutiny and civilians mounted protests in Bobo-Dioulasso, provoking a violent reaction on the part of the government and resulting in at least seven dead.<sup>102</sup>

## Sierra Leone: Timbergate?

**Researcher:** Ms. Ashton Callahan

Al Jazeera's television program *Africa Investigates* recently aired a documentary by Sorious Samura, a well-known Sierra Leonean journalist, that exposes an illegal timber trade operation involving Vice President (VP) Samuel Sam-Sumana.<sup>103</sup> Since the release of the footage, the VP has denied any allegations of his involvement. The government of Sierra Leone has promised to investigate the scandal, dubbed "Timbergate" in the media, through its Anti-Corruption Commission and domestic law enforcement.<sup>104</sup> In addition, a group of U.S. Congress members recently wrote to U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton requesting that the United States push the Government of Sierra Leone for a full and transparent investigation.<sup>105</sup> The scandal surfaces at a critical time for President Ernest Bai Koroma, who is up for reelection in November 2012.

In the footage, two supposed advisors of the VP brokered a deal on his behalf with two journalists, posing as timber executives, to facilitate illegal timber trade in exchange for a \$50,000 bribe. Although the general perception is that Sam-Sumana is guilty, there is no strong legal evidence implicating him in the illegal deal. For example, the transactions did not occur in the Office of the Vice President, but rather in the office of his two advisors. Moreover, these men do not have an official relationship with the VP, although it is understood that they maintain a very close personal relationship with him. Incidentally, the men have since disappeared and are thought by some to be in the U.S.<sup>106</sup> The VP has a long and sordid history in the timber industry. Called the "king" of timber logging in some circles, he has been admonished in the past for facilitating another transaction during a logging ban. According to a local businessman, Sam-Sumana has consistently been advised to step away from the industry to avoid any perceived (or actual) conflicts of interest. To that end, timber executives reportedly helped finance the last election, and this deal could have been his way of returning the favor. Because of his history in the timber industry, it is plausible that the VP was purposely targeted by the opposition, his own political party (in which he is not very popular), or a concerned international entity.

In terms of local opinion, the Sierra Leonean people are very quiet at this point, which is not typical of the country. This is partially because only a small percentage of the population saw the documentary and those who did are waiting to see what will happen next.<sup>107</sup> It is understood that President Koroma has already asked Sam-Sumana to step down, but that he refused. This is problematic as the constitution makes it difficult to fire the VP. Desmond Luke, a former chief justice of Sierra Leone, told Reuters, "People will expect if something is not done about Sam-Sumana it will indicate there is weakness in the dynamic of the APC (ruling party) and the President."<sup>108</sup> Thus, if Sam-Sumana remains in office, President Koroma's anti-corruption platform would be publicly undermined, and his chances for reelection would be jeopardized.<sup>109</sup>



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