



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

**The Africa Watch
January – March 2012**

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March 2013

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document contains the January 2012 through March 2012 issues of *The Africa Watch*. *The Africa Watch* is a twice-monthly report on trends and developments that might contribute to discontinuous change and instability in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The first January 2012 issue contains the following articles – East Africa: Economic Pressures Exacerbate Risks; The War in Somalia: Managing Kenyan Public Opinion; Senegal: The Opposition Field Takes Shape; Disruptive Entrepreneurship in Ghana: Herman Chinery-Hesse; Mauritania: Protests in Kaedi; Niger: Protests in Zinder; Zimbabwe: Unity Government Tensions of Party In-Fighting; and Resource Fueled Inter-Minority Group Conflict in East Africa.

The second January 2012 issue contains the following articles – Food Crisis in the Sahel and the Potential for Conflict; Illegal, Unregulated, and Unregistered Fishing; Potential for Change in Land Tenure in Uganda as Museveni Regime Wavers; Patronage Networks in Equatorial Guinea; ICC Ruling on Kenya Expected Before January 2013; Date for Kenya’s General Elections: March 2013; Guinea Bissau: Uncertainty After Sanha’s Death; Nigeria’s Fuel Subsidy Protests Not Over, Go Beyond its Borders; and Repression Threatening Democracy in Rwanda.

The first February 2012 issue contains the following articles – Sufi Brotherhoods Still a Powerful Political Force in Senegal’s Upcoming Elections; Profiles of Leading Candidates in Mali’s Presidential Elections; Angola: Election Watch; Madagascar: Political Impasse Persists; Wade’s Bid for Reelection Confirmed, Violent Protests Erupt; Apathetic No More? Occupy Nigeria; Tuaregs Launch Attacks in Northern Mali; Mauritius: Problems below the Surface of Africa’s Freest Economy; Casamance Region Heating Up Ahead of Senegal’s Elections; Massive Cyber Attack on Kenyan Government Websites; and Kidnapping Cases Garner Public Attention in Kenya.

The second February 2012 issue contains the following articles – Nigeria: Government Under Siege; DRC: Post-Election Prospects; Cote d’Ivoire: Accounting for Past Military Abuses; The Struggle for South Africa’s Young, Black Electorate; Mali: Possible Postponement of the Presidential Elections; Key Developments in the Fight Against al-Shabaab in Somalia; Malawi: Dissatisfaction with Democratic Progressive Party Spurs Political Competition.

The first March 2012 issue contains the following articles – Zimbabwe: Mugabe Threatens to Reject Zuma; Kenya’s Election Season Starts Tentatively; Posturing or Preparing for War? Relations between Sudan and South Sudan; Chadian Rebels and Crisis in the Central African Republic; Cameroon: Fertile Ground for Boko Haram; Lake Chad Basin: Regional Knock-on Effects of Boko Haram Violence; and Increased Heroin Trafficking in East Africa Already Destabilizing.

The second March 2012 issue contains the following articles – Nigeria: An Unfulfilled Promise; Senegal’s Elections: Who is Macky Sall and Will He Win; Iran in Africa; The Fourth Tuareg Rebellion in Mali: Prospects for Continued Fighting; Inter-State Tension Sparked by LRA as Violence Grows in the DRC; Ethiopia Attacks Eritrean Bases in Search of Rebels; Angola’s Ruling Party Clamps Down on Opposition; and Labor Unrest in the Great Lakes Region.



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

THE AFRICA WATCH

JANUARY 4, 2012



TO THE READER

Welcome to the first issue of The Africa Watch in this New Year. As always, IDA's team of Africa researchers welcomes your comments, questions, and feedback on the contents of our reports. If you would like to discuss an article in this issue or provide suggestions for future research, please contact me at (703) 845-4394.

With best regards,

George

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward

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ANALYSES


East Africa: Economic Pressures Exacerbate Risks

Researcher: Ms. Andrea Pongo

Summary

Risks to stability caused by a tense and uncertain political and security climate in several East African countries are being made more acute by high inflation and the increasing cost of basic goods for both the poor and the nascent middle class. In Uganda, high prices for staples could lead to a renewal of the protests in April that led to nine deaths and hundreds of arrests.¹ In Kenya and Ethiopia, droughts and floods have caused shortages of basic food staples. In 2012, food insecurity will continue to plague subsistence farmers as well as the urban poor, who are the most seriously harmed by spiraling food prices and more likely to participate in mass protest actions.

Factors Driving Costs in East Africa



Inflation across East Africa has been driven by rising world oil prices, food shortages, and intense transportation and energy pressures. In addition, East African governments loosened monetary and fiscal policies following the economic drop-off in 2008 and 2009, but failed to tighten them again once conditions improved in 2010.² Low interest rates and increased government outlays added to the inflationary pressures from the higher costs of food and fuel.

When East African currencies depreciated against the U.S. dollar between January and October 2011,

the cost of imported goods, including fuel and manufacturing inputs increased dramatically. The Tanzanian Shilling (TZS), the Kenyan Shilling (KES), and the Ugandan Shilling (UGX) dropped between 19 and 25 percent against the U.S. dollar through October before the effects of interest rate hikes began to be felt.³ East African currencies depreciated as the domestic demand for dollars increased, and less foreign capital flowed in as outside investors reacted to crises in global financial markets.

By November, the cost of diesel fuel in Uganda had increased 63 percent and petrol by 44 percent since the start of the year.⁴ Increasing fuel and transportation costs hurt sectors including construction and manufacturing. A Ugandan building boom underway since 2006 has slowed as the costs of cement, iron plating, steel, and electrical wire have increased by about 30 percent.⁵

A surge in regional food prices followed the drought and poor harvest of early 2011. Torrential rains during the months of October and November then exacerbated food issues by washing away planted crops and rotting already-harvested grains across the region.⁶ In Kenya, flooding killed at least 24 people and displaced 98,000 by mid-December according to Red Cross estimates. Bridges were washed away, and roads were made impassable. Officials in Kenya are advising farmers to store grains they harvest with the National Cereals and Produce Board instead of selling them, in order to avert a food crisis in 2012.⁷ The Kenya Red Cross reports that livelihoods in western Kenya are being seriously affected as farmland and grazing land are submerged. Farmers are harvesting green maize before the crops become spoiled, and food security after the second annual harvest is a concern for the region.⁸

Middle Class under Pressure As Well As the Poor

With staples such as maize, rice, wheat, meat, and oils almost doubling in the face of high inflation, the middle classes in several countries of the region are expected to contract as households spend more income on basics. The African Development Bank (AfDB) calculates the middle class in East Africa as those households that spend between \$2 and \$20 a day.⁹ According to the calculation, the middle class represents about 45 percent of the population in Kenya, 19 percent in Uganda, and 12 percent in Tanzania.¹⁰ A 2010 survey done by market research group Consumer Insight in Kenya showed that wages outstripped by inflation resulted in the middle income segment of society shrinking by 9 percent since 2005.¹¹ Urban households under pressure have either been borrowing for or forgoing school fees as costs for food and rents rise.¹²

The Kenyan National Bureau of Statistics cited food and fuel price spikes as the main reason the economy continued to slow in the third quarter of 2011.¹³ Although the majority of people in East Africa derive a living from agriculture, it is the urban poor that pose a greater risk to stability in regional capitals as declining commercial activity and food insecurity lead to protests and the potential for violence, as seen in Kampala in April 2011, when nine people died and hundreds were arrested.¹⁴

Food Prices and Instability

As IDA reported in the October 2011 issue of *The Africa Watch*,¹⁵ research done by the Cambridge-based New England Complex Systems hypothesized that an observable “food price threshold” can act as an indicator of violence in already unstable environments. According to the theory, if prices in East Africa persist above a consumer price index (CPI) threshold of around 210, “the security of vulnerable populations will be broadly and persistently compromised.”¹⁶ In East Africa, the CPI for Uganda is expected to be about 171 for 2011, Kenya about 204, and Ethiopia about 298.¹⁷

The threshold for Ethiopia has already been breached, and Kenya is very close. Continued stress on the urban poor could easily contribute to disturbances, depending on governments' reaction to popular protests. A non-violent urban-based Kenyan grassroots civil society group known as *Bunge la Mwananchi* (Parliament of Ordinary People) staged demonstrations throughout 2011 to protest the increasing price of maize flour and basic commodities. During protests held on July 7, demonstrators were attacked by police dogs, arrested, and imprisoned.¹⁸ Although the Ugandan CPI still falls below this threshold (see Figure), it is approaching a level where food insecurity among the population could lead to unrest as urban protest movements continue their activities.¹⁹

The War in Somalia – Managing Kenyan Public Opinion

Researcher: Amb. (ret.) George F. Ward

Summary

More than two months after Kenyan forces crossed the border into Somalia to counter al-Shabaab, the operation remains relatively non-controversial among the Kenyan public despite the sizable cost of the venture and the apparent lack of military progress. Kenyan patriotism is one factor. In addition, the Kenyan government has shown skill in managing the press. In the background, a few Kenyan observers are posing questions, and an electronic war of words has broken out between al-Shabaab and the Kenyan military. Greater public relations challenges may appear as the financial and human costs of the conflict increase.

Background

Three weeks after Kenyan forces entered Somalia on October 16, 2011, to counter the threat posed by the Islamic militant group al-Shabaab, G. Odera Outa, communications adviser in the office of the Kenyan prime minister, wrote an opinion piece for *The Standard*, a leading Nairobi daily.²⁰ Purporting to draw on international (including American) practices, Outa argued for restraint and self-censorship by the media in covering the military operation in Somalia. His message was clear: “Exuberant and publicity seeking commentaries must just face the delete button. I am certain that, even in the era of free speech and access to information, no country would permit such free-for-all in war situations without endangering itself further.”

This thinly veiled warning appears to have been hardly necessary. Press coverage of the operation in Somalia has been relatively sparse. It has been provided largely through two channels – journalists embedded with Kenyan forces and the official Ministry of Defense spokesman, Major Emmanuel Chirchir. Press stories from the front have accentuated the positive. One observer recorded this selection of headlines: “Nine Shabaab men killed in fierce clash near border town” (*The Nation*), “Kenya’s fearsome arsenal in offensive” (*The Standard*), and “Spirits high as navy kills 18 Shabaab” (*The Standard*).²¹ Major Chirchir is regularly in the news and provides a stream of “tweets” on Twitter.²² His reports are relentlessly upbeat, even if also a bit “offbeat” (see below).

In the background, thoughtful observers are posing questions. As one said to IDA, “To be honest, I was and (am) still concerned that there has not been sufficient questioning of the goals and how their achievement will be determined.”²³ Others have highlighted the high financial cost of the operation, which has been estimated to be approximately \$2.2 million per month.²⁴

Paying for the War

The Kenyan government has shown some skill in issue management, at least in the short term. For example, it has countered concerns about the operation’s costs by encouraging the idea that the United Nations will help pay the bill. The basis for this point of view is that, on December 7, 2011, the Kenyan cabinet and parliament endorsed the incorporation of Kenyan forces in Somalia into the African Union’s peace operation in that country (AMISOM). Press reports citing government sources have asserted that incorporation into AMISOM will provide access to financial support from the United Nations.²⁵ In fact, such support may not materialize and, if it does, it will likely offset only a portion of the costs of Operation *Linda Nchi* (Swahili for “Secure the Nation”).

AMISOM is staffed and managed by the African Union, not the United Nations. The UN Security Council, however, under the authority contained in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations (“Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”), has “authorized” AMISOM and made provision for some assistance to the operation. The most recent United Nations authorization, UN Security Council Resolution 2010, extended the UN mandate of AMISOM to October 31, 2012.²⁶ That resolution also directed the UN Secretary General to provide a logistical support package for AMISOM up to that force’s authorized level of 12,000 personnel, but it expressly excluded direct financial support.

The UN’s logistical package has been utilized to support the Ugandan and Burundian contingents based with AMISOM in Mogadishu. Given the needs of those forces, it is not likely that substantial in-kind support will be extended to Kenyan forces by the United Nations in the near term, and, as noted above, direct financial support is currently out of the question. Financial support would become possible only if the United Nations established its own peace operation in Somalia. The UN Security Council has foreshadowed that step, but has never taken it.²⁷ Thus, the Kenyan government’s hope for United Nations funding must be viewed at best as a tool for managing public opinion and at worst an illusion. As Kenya heads into a crucial election year, the costs of the Somalia operation could become a political issue.

The Twitter War

If the “Arab Spring” was the first revolutionary movement organized via social media, the conflict between al-Shabaab and the Kenyan forces may be the first war conducted via Twitter. Given the paucity of traditional reporting on the conflict, a Twitter-based propaganda battle between the Kenyan government, in the person of Major Chirchir, and al-Shabaab, which tweets at @HSMPress, has attracted a good deal of attention.²⁸

Major Chirchir has used Twitter to announce Kenyan military successes and to warn Somali civilians to stay out of harm’s way. His postings have at times been a bit unusual. In one, he noted that many al-Shabaab commanders had banned bras in their territories, and he urged readers to “re-tweet” in favor of the rights of Somali women. Another Chirchir tweet provoked an al-Shabaab retort that indicates even terrorists can have a sense of humor. In response to a Chirchir post threatening to bomb concentrations of donkeys that might be used in moving supplies for al-Shabaab, the latter responded, “Your eccentric battle strategy has got animal rights groups quite concerned, Major.”²⁹

Looking Ahead

The comic-opera flavor of this war of tweets will surely dissipate, and the Kenyan government will face more difficult public relations challenges. That could happen quickly should Kenyan forces suffer significant casualties, or more slowly should the military operation bog down in southern Somalia, short of the declared objective of the port of Kismayo.

Senegal – The Opposition Field Takes Shape

Researcher: Dr. Ashley Bybee

Executive Summary

- Senegal is heading toward one of the most unpredictable elections in its history, in which approximately 15 candidates will oppose President Wade on February 26, 2012.
- “United to Boost Senegal” (in Wolof “Bennoo Siggil Senegaal” or more commonly referred to as “Benno”) is the coalition that will be Wade’s primary opposition. The two candidates vying to represent Benno are Moustapha Niasse (leader of the Alliance of the Forces of Progress or AFP) and Ousmane Tanor Dieng (leader of the Socialist Party or PS). Since neither candidate will support the other, a recent vote was held that resulted in the selection of Niasse. (Nineteen of 33 parties within the coalition said they would support him,³⁰ while the remaining 14 parties abstained from voting.³¹) Nonetheless, Dieng refuses to step down as Benno’s candidate, stating he will still run for the Presidency under the PS. This will most likely split the Benno vote, which will benefit President Wade.
- Regardless of who becomes the candidate for Benno, Niasse and Dieng will both be among several key figures lobbying for influence in coalitions ahead of and during the 2012 elections. Other presidential contenders include well-known politicians such as Macky Sall, Idrissa Seck, and a recent entrant to the race, Abdou Latif Coulibaly. Niasse, Dieng, and Coulibaly are featured below.
- In a late development, the internationally-renowned Senegalese music icon Youssou Ndur, 52, who formed his own political movement, *Fekke ma ci bolle* (“I am involved” in Wolof) and who is CEO of the Futurs Medias Group, announced his candidacy in the presidential election. There are conflicting attitudes among the population, with some thinking that he is a strong candidate while others believing he should have supported one of the more established candidates.³²

Moustapha Niasse



(source: http://www.g-l-f.org/index.cfm?pagePath=Members/Biography_Bin/Biography_Moustapha_Niasse&id=23695)

Niasse is a 72 year-old, well-known politician and one of the few serious opposition candidates looking to unseat President Wade. Although he has held several high-level government posts in previous administrations, he has never been able to secure enough votes or to cultivate the right alliances to become President.

Niasse is member of the Tijani Sufi brotherhood, which has the largest in membership but tends to be less politically influential than the Mourides, a smaller but commercially more powerful brotherhood. While not a marabout (a Sufi leader), Niasse’s Kaolack-based family has strong influence among the Tijjaniya – enough to match Wade’s backing from the Mourides.³³ After studying in Paris and Dakar, Niasse quickly rose through the civil service ranks and became a

leader of the PS youth wing. Throughout the 1970s, he worked for President Léopold Sédar

Senghor; during this time, he developed an impressive network of international contacts, which he leveraged in the 1980s to enter business after leaving politics following internal feuding within the PS. He reentered politics in 1993 as the Minister of Foreign Affairs but left the PS and made a run for the Presidency in 1999 in his own party, the AFP. Since Niasse was not able to attain sufficient votes, he entered into a coalition with Wade, therefore securing himself the position of Prime Minister.³⁴

Niasse is an active businessman. He has served as a Director and Member of the Strategic Alliance Committee of Magindustries Corporation (<http://www.magindustries.com>) from January 2006 to June 14, 2010. He is Chairman and CEO of several other companies in the private sector, including Surestream Petroleum Limited (http://www.surestream-petroleum.com/key_figures), co-founder of Addax Petroleum, and the founder, chairman, and main shareholder of the ITOC Group, which includes seven companies involved in various businesses (including crude oil and refined products, insurance, port activities and consulting).³⁵ Niasse is also a member of the Institute of Vienna.³⁶

Ousmane Tanor Dieng



(Source: <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20111014-senegal-ousmane-tanor-dieng-est-le-candidat-ps-conduire-opposition>)

Dieng is approximately 63 years old and attended a Koranic school as a young child. He is a member of the “Sérére” ethnic group, which constitutes about 15 percent of the Senegalese population. Dieng doesn’t appear to have a strong affiliation with any Sufi Brotherhood, though it is highly unlikely he is active in politics without the support of some segment of the Sufi community in Senegal.

Dieng is often compared to Karim Wade, insofar as he (Dieng) was a very close political associate of Former President Abdou Diouf in much the same way as Karim is to his father, President Wade. This is a comparison that Dieng strongly refutes.³⁷

Dieng has come closer to the Presidency than Niasse in terms of votes in previous elections. In 2000, Dieng won 13.6 percent of the vote while Niasse received only 5.9 percent. Nonetheless, Niasse appears to be the more popular candidate among Benno, or perhaps the candidate with the best chance to unseat President Wade. Although Dieng will not represent Benno, his candidacy in the elections will likely split the Benno vote and therefore benefit President Wade.

Abdou Latif Coulibaly



(Source: www.senegalcelebrites.com/biographie-abdou-latif-coulibaly-209.html)

In his late 50s, Coulibaly is an author, investigative journalist, and managing editor of the weekly newsletter *La Gazette*. He is the head of the first Senegalese private press group and the director of the Higher Institute of Information Science of Dakar (ISSIC). Coulibaly has published about eight books, but he is most renowned for his investigative reports featuring President Wade. His latest report refers to a suspect contract that the Wade administration awarded to a France-based aeronautic company to repair the Presidential aircraft.³⁸ Coulibaly published a book in 2003 that was extremely critical of the government’s poor governance practices. Shortly thereafter he purportedly received death threats.³⁹ Coulibaly is an outspoken

contributor to the dialog against corruption, and vows to make it a priority should he become president.⁴⁰

Initially a member of Benno, Coulibaly split from the coalition in December over disagreements about the procedure for electing a candidate. He formed “Benno Alternative 2012,” a splinter opposition coalition that comprises about eight political parties.⁴¹ Coulibaly was named the party’s candidate on December 15.⁴²

Disruptive Entrepreneurship in Ghana: Herman Chinery-Hesse

Researcher: Dr. Caroline F. Ziemke-Dickens

Executive Summary

- Ghanaian entrepreneurs are on the verge of launching a set of disruptive financial technologies aimed at tapping into the country's informal economy (currently equivalent to 44 percent of the official economy) by providing cell phone-based marketing and financial tools that will enable cash-only craftspeople and other merchants to bypass Ghana's weak financial and IT infrastructures and sell their goods directly on the global market.
- A leading figure in this movement is Herman Chinery-Hesse, one of *Foreign Policy's* Top 100 Global Thinkers of 2011, who is dedicated to making Ghana a "Singapore for Africa": a world-class center of technological innovation that is tech-savvy, prosperous, but always African.⁴³
- The key to the success of Chinery-Hesse's companies – SOFTtribe and ShopAfrica53.com – has been their ability "to leapfrog decades of obsolete development in telecommunications and IT" by adopting "tropically tolerant" solutions: people tolerant, communications tolerant, power tolerant, and capital tolerant.⁴⁴

Emerging Disruptive Financial Technologies in Ghana

Although the business environment in Ghana is steadily improving and the economy is set to lead the world in economic growth in 2012, its IT and financial infrastructures remain weak. Day-to-day business is done largely on a cash basis, and the majority of Ghanaians do not have bank accounts. International transactions and money exchange remain extremely difficult. Enter a new class of Ghanaian entrepreneurs who are developing new financial technologies capable of working around weak infrastructure and ineffective government. Kingsley Awuah-Darko founded Money Systems International, which provides high-quality, low cost international money transfers for remittances from the African Diaspora. The leader of the pack, however, is Herman Chinery-Hesse, the "Bill Gates of Ghana," who founded Ghana's first software company – SOFTtribe – in 1991. Chinery-Hesse is now poised to revolutionize the business climate for small entrepreneurs in Africa with the launch of ShopAfrica53.com, an enterprise platform that will enable businesses and craftspeople to sell products online, in the global market, and accept payment by cell phone, thus bypassing the need for either a bank account or internet access.⁴⁵ The foundation of ShopAfrica53 is another Chinery-Hesse product, African Liberty Credit, a payment platform that enables payment both online and by cell phone. Along with other disruptive financial technologies like those offered by Money Systems International, African Liberty Credit and ShopAfrica53 aim at nothing less than eradicating trade barriers in Africa.

In some cases, these entrepreneurs find themselves in competition with government and NGOs that provide goods and services for free (as charity) that African business are capable of providing for a reasonable price, thus undercutting or crowding them out of the market. But Chinery-Hesse is confident that, in time, this will change:

The private sector is bigger than the government. We are the citizens, we are the people and if enough people enter the private sector, the balance will tip and the government will be puppets of the private sector, which is what the government needs to be.⁴⁶

The Need for Tropically Tolerant Solutions

The business model for SOFTtribe, as well as Chinery-Hesse's new enterprises, is what he calls "tropically tolerant" solutions that overcome the generally low level of technical training in the African workforce (people tolerant); the continued limitations of communication infrastructure, especially internet access (communications tolerant); frequent power outages (power tolerant); and limited financial resources (capital tolerant). SOFTtribe products are designed to run on outdated equipment, to require minimal data transmission and tech support, and to be modular, so business software systems can be installed gradually as capital becomes available. The key to all these enterprises is designing products and solutions suited to African realities. As Awuah-Darko has said, if you judge a company in Accra by the standards you would apply to one in Akron, you are likely to form mistaken impressions and miss opportunities.⁴⁷

Liberating Innovative Thinking in Africa

To reinvent Africa, the new African entrepreneurs must overcome what Awuah-Darko calls "the colonialism that exists in the African psyche" that leads Africans themselves to devalue African businesses and products.⁴⁸ Chinery-Hesse says he realized the power of small business to transform impoverished communities when he was a student in Texas (which he describes as the most racist place he has ever been). He believes, given their layered identities (family, tribe, nation, profession, citizens of the world) and their need to adapt to survive and thrive on a day-to-day basis, Africans are among the most innovative people in the world. But to fully capitalize on their potential, Africans need to "find the ability, education, and encouragement to push in the right direction." A major barrier, he believes, is a "legacy of rote learning" inherited from the colonial powers and perpetuated in a weak education system. Chinery-Hesse's companies take a broad approach to training:

I believe that to be innovative you need to be a well-rounded person, which was not being done by the education system. We debated philosophy, watched documentaries, listened to the BBC and broadened people's thinking so that they could innovate properly.

All in pursuit of the ultimate goal of the disruptive entrepreneurs: "to liberate innovative thinking to reinvent Africa."⁴⁹

ALERTS

Mauritania: Protests in Kaédi

Researcher: Ms. Meg Midyette

A Mauritanian news source reports that protests in the southern Mauritanian town of Kaédi (population 34,772)⁵⁰ against the arrest of Abbass Kane, a local student, turned violent when



security forces dispersed *Touche pas a ma nationalité* (TPN) demonstrators on December 17. *Touche pas a ma nationalité*, translated as “do not touch my nationality” is a movement protesting discrimination of black Mauritanians.⁵¹

TPN demonstrators were protesting the perceived unfairness of Kane’s detention by security agents.⁵² They set fire to the offices of the Regional Delegation for Culture, Youth, and Sports, and threw rocks at police. Police have been deployed to key locations in the area and have arrested an unspecified number of TPN sympathizers.⁵³

The Abolitionist Resurgence Initiative of Mauritania (IRA) released a statement condemning the use of violence against protesters.⁵⁴

This latest set of protests comes after several months of relative calm.⁵⁵ In September 2011, large-scale protests broke out against a government census that many saw as racist. Kaédi was also a focal point of these demonstrations, during which hundreds participated and several were arrested.⁵⁶

Niger: Protests in Zinder

Researcher: Ms. Meg Midyette

International French language news sources report a popular backlash following the death of a student in Zinder earlier this month during clashes between local police and demonstrators. In Niamey, thousands of academics organized under the Niger Scholars' Union (USN).⁵⁷ The city was reportedly "paralyzed" during the morning of December 15.⁵⁸ Demonstrators later peacefully dispersed.⁵⁹

- Protesters in Niger's capital believe that the government's reaction to police brutality in Zinder has been insufficient.⁶⁰
- Opposition groups are calling for an independent inquiry into the incident, which also resulted in the death of a woman of unspecified age.
- Head of the National Movement for the Development of Society (MNSD) Seini Oumarou called the police actions in Zinder "violent, inappropriate, and disproportionate."⁶¹

The two deaths occurred during the first week of December when police and protesters clashed in Zinder.⁶² Since the incident, six high-ranking security officials have been fired. Zinder's security will likely remain a priority for President Issoufou, as it is critical to the country's oil production and considered Niger's second city.⁶³

Zimbabwe: Unity Government Tensions or Party In-Fighting?

Researcher: Ms. Betty Boswell

A recent violent act against Zanu-PF could be a signal that the call for peace and tranquility by both President Mugabe (Zanu-PF) and Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai (Movement for Democratic Change, MDC-T) last month at an anti-violence conference has gone unheeded.⁶⁴

At midnight on December 27, an explosion hit the offices of Zanu-PF in Gweru. Some reports say dynamite was the explosive; others say it was a petrol-bomb. Damage was not extensive, nor was anyone hurt. Zanu-PF officials speculate it was a premeditated act of aggression against the party. Some officials have accused MDC-T activists for the attack; however, Zanu-PF's national spokesperson Rugare Gumbo will only confirm the incident and label it political, without attributing blame.^{65,66}

MDC-T spokesperson James Tsuro denies the allegations that his party is responsible for the Gwera attack against Zanu-PF, stating his party is not violence-oriented. Earlier this year, however, Zanu-PF youth chairman Cde Jimu Kunaka was assaulted by suspected MDC-T youths at a food outlet in the city days after the party's Matapi district offices were attacked (MDC-T was implicated in that attack).⁶⁷

An alternative theory circulating in the media is that a faction from within Zanu-PF bombed the party offices to show displeasure with party leadership and their continued backing of President Mugabe. There has been much in-fighting and rival loyalists attacking each other recently.⁶⁸

Speculation and denials of blame aside, the fact remains that politically motivated violence targeting Zanu-PF properties has increased this year.⁶⁹

Resource Fueled Inter-Minority Group Conflict in East Africa

Researchers: Dr. Eliza Johannes and Ms. Ivana Djak

Minority groups in East Africa are increasingly competing with each other for resources due to land takeover by majority groups, the state, and corporations. Inter-minority group conflict is likely to be a continuous destabilizing force in East Africa that will only escalate as more national and international corporations compete for land traditionally occupied by minority groups.

Inter-Minority-Group Conflict Fueled by Resource Scarcity

Minority Rights Group International (MRGI) recently published a report titled *Land, Livelihood and Identities: Inter-Community Conflict in East Africa*.⁷⁰ The report analyzes the state of select minority and indigenous communities in East Africa in relation to natural resource centered conflict. According to MRGI, conflict between minority groups arises when “minorities and indigenous groups compete with other surrounding majority communities, the State, national and multinational corporations for control of resources upon which they depend for their livelihood and cultural integrity.”⁷¹ Although minority groups view the land they have lived on for centuries as inextricably linked to their identity, ownership of the disputed land has never been formalized in law, and the groups are regularly evicted and displaced.⁷² Long-standing disputes and existing competitions for scarce resources between native groups are intensified as national and international companies compete for areas traditionally occupied by minority communities. MRGI Africa regional information officer Mohamed Matovu says of the in-demand minority land, “already these are disputed lands because many of them are held in trust, other are communally owned ... so they seem to be no-man’s land, but there are actually communities living here.”⁷³ The report notes that while indigenous communities in East Africa differ in size, mode of livelihood, and culture, most minority groups compare in that they face extreme livelihood challenges, ongoing discrimination, and vulnerability to conflict. They are poorer and have less access to resources.⁷⁴

Case Studies⁷⁵

Conflict between the Iteso of Katakwi and the Karimojong of Moroto in Uganda

The Iteso of Teso are an agro-pastoralist community that reside in several districts in eastern Uganda. The Karimojong of Moroto are a pastoralist cattle-keeping community that have frequently moved into Teso territory in search of grazing land and water. The Karimoja have repeatedly requested water access points from the government, and when denied, they again moved into Teso territory. The two communities see the borders of their distinct territories differently and, subsequently raid, pillage, and destroy each other’s settlements. Despite government arbitration, elder negotiations, and community mitigation programs, border clashes continuously destabilize the area.

The Murle Community in South Sudan

The Murle are an ethnic community whose traditional territory lies in the southeastern portion of Jonglei State in South Sudan. Frequent conflict between the Murle and neighboring ethnic communities led many Murle to migrate into the regional capital Bor. There, the Murle have been unable to access housing or land because of long-standing ethnic tensions in the capital. This lack of access has left 200 Murle people in Bor living in a compound of two houses on the outskirts of town. Minorities leaving their home territories, which they are often involuntarily forced to do, face serious challenges in accessing resources and land in their new territory.

The Maasai People in Hell's Gate National Park in Kenya

Energy company KenGen began operating in the Hell's Gate area in 1982; the Kenyan government opened the national park in 1984. Park operations and energy developments affected some 20,000 people living on Maasai settlements. In 2009, a court decision recognized the Maasai's claim to the land, but the court ordered the land to be individually allotted to families. This has led to conflict between the Kikuyu and Maasai families. As some community members are "buying out," and selling their allotted portion, other members are attacking them. Resistance to allotment has led to constant fighting among groups inside the area.

Prospects for Peace

Community-based conflict resolution efforts and effective coordination between communities and the government are key strategies for resolving inter-community resource-based conflict.⁷⁶ Additionally, new national land policies of the kind emerging in Kenya, Uganda, and South Sudan have the potential to effectively manage land conflicts.⁷⁷ Until land claim issues are effectively resolved, however, inter-minority-group conflict is likely to persist and continue to be a destabilizing force in the area, with a constant likelihood of escalation as more national and international corporations make their way into East Africa.

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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

THE AFRICA WATCH

JANUARY 18, 2012



TO THE READER

This issue of *The Africa Watch* features analyses of some of the underlying factors that have the potential for driving insecurity and violence in Africa. These include scarcity and competition for food resources, disputes over land tenure, and corruption rooted in political patronage.

As always, IDA's team of Africa researchers welcomes your comments, questions, and feedback on the contents of our reports. If you would like to discuss an article in this issue or provide suggestions for future research, please contact me at (703) 845-4394.

With best regards,

George

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward

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ANALYSES

Food Crisis in the Sahel and the Potential for Conflict

Researcher: Dr. Dorina A. Bekoe

Summary

- Poor rains are threatening to plunge the Sahel into a food crisis, affecting nearly 11 million people in Chad, Niger, Mali, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso.
- Food crises do not necessarily cause conflict, but this year's food crisis is exacerbated by the increased pressure of migrants fleeing the political crisis in Libya, the reduced remittances to the region resulting from the migrants' flight, and the general institutional and political weakness of the region's governments to address the food crisis.
- International institutions still have an opportunity to blunt the effect of the food crisis, but the logistics of doing so necessitate quick action and robust political will.

Contours of the Crisis

Large swaths of the Sahel are threatened with a food crisis in the first quarter of 2012. Although the region chronically experiences food insecurity, the impending shortage comes at a time of added environmental, political, and social stress on the region. The countries affected – Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania – are near the bottom of the Human Development Index and can ill-afford the economic and social pressures sure to be generated by this food crisis.¹ Moreover, coupled with the severely reduced remittances that used to come from the approximately 130,000 (mainly Chadian and Nigerien) migrant workers in Libya who have been forced back to their homes in the region,² the survival of millions of people in the Sahel hangs in the balance.³

An estimated 11 million people will be affected by the food crisis in 2012. This is nearly 60 percent more than were affected in the last food crisis in 2009; then, 7 million people in Niger and Chad suffered food insecurity.⁴ In the region, Niger is projected to bear the heaviest burden of the food crisis with 6 million people potentially affected.⁵ The other countries in the Sahel will also bear a significant share: food insecurity will affect 2.9 million in Mali; 2 million in Burkina Faso; 1.6 million in Chad – affecting 13 of its 22 regions; and 700,000 in Mauritania.⁶

Conflict and the Food Crisis

While a food crisis and its attendant increases in cost of living and competition for resources do not usually result in conflict, mitigating circumstances could raise its probability. In the case of the Sahel today, the flow of migrant workers from Libya back to their hometowns; the loss of remittances from the migrants; and the general weakness of state institutions, within the context of a food crisis, hold the potential for violence if immediate needs are not met by the international community. Moreover, the region as a whole has a history of conflict resulting from resource scarcity, economic and political marginalization, and the inability of national institutions to respond appropriately.

Some countries face unique circumstances, in addition to the factors mentioned above:

- Chad has 363,000 Sudanese and Central African refugees and 131, 000 internally displaced people, as a result of regional and internal instability.⁷
- Niger received approximately 160,000 returning migrant workers from Côte d'Ivoire.⁸
- Mali has received the bulk of Tuaregs returning from Libya; Tuaregs have clashed repeatedly with the government over political and economic grievances.⁹

If the past is any indication, the region's history of resource-based instability and protests against inadequate government services predisposes it to conflict. The added stress of a food crisis has the potential to exacerbate grievances against the government. In addition to the Tuareg rebellion in Mali mentioned above, the Tuareg rebelled in protest of the Nigerien government's political and economic marginalization of the group.¹⁰ In recent history, the government of Chad has also battled armed opposition groups protesting political and economic marginalization. In Burkina Faso, the government faced its strongest opposition yet in June 2011, when members of the military mutinied to protest the lack of pay, and other civil society activists demonstrated against the high cost of living.¹¹ Finally, the most enduring conflict in the region – the war in Darfur – is rooted in the politicization of the clashes between nomads and farmers over access to resources.¹²

Dissenting Voices

While most of the international institutions that focus on food security are sounding the alarm of the impending food crisis, FEWS NET, the USAID-funded project that monitors rainfall and harvest, is not issuing similarly dire warnings about the impending food crisis. In its analysis, it notes that harvests are average and the carryover of grains from 2010 should buffer any reductions.¹³ It is even forecasting a possible above-average food harvest.¹⁴ While FEWS NET does allow that there will be pockets of insecurity – mainly in Mauritania, Niger, Mali, and Chad¹⁵ – it maintains that malnutrition is chronic in the region and this year's harvest does not worsen this situation.¹⁶ Moreover, it is postulating that the resources lost by the retuning Sahelian migrants from Libya could be offset by the resources that could be gained from Sahelian migrants returning to work in Côte d'Ivoire as that country slowly stabilizes.

It is not clear, however, that the migrants who fled Libya will make up the lost earnings and reduce the pressure of any food crises by migrating to Côte d'Ivoire. Importantly, the migrants from Libya worked mostly in the oil and construction sector,¹⁷ while migrants in Côte d'Ivoire tended to work in the agricultural sector in cocoa producing regions or in the services sector in Abidjan. Second, migrants who fled Côte d'Ivoire were mostly Burkinabe and Malians, with some Mauritians and Liberians¹⁸ – destinations closer than Niger and Chad, homes for the bulk of the Libyan migrants. Third, it is doubtful that that Côte d'Ivoire can absorb the large number of former migrant workers from Libya: in the ever-critical cocoa sector, trade analyses indicate that the price of cocoa is set to increase and shortages are to ensue, due to climate-related changes¹⁹ – making it unlikely that cocoa production, the backbone of the Ivorian economy, could pick up the slack of the migrants' work in Libya. Finally, Côte d'Ivoire is still politically and economically fragile – precluding it from serving as the buffer against food shortages for the region.

Responses by the International Community

Notwithstanding the view of FEWS NET, the major international institutions have started interventions to address the crisis.²⁰ The United Nations Office of Coordination for

Humanitarian Affairs has issued consolidated appeals – encompassing needs for other humanitarian assistance, in addition to food aid – for Niger and Chad, among the most severely affected countries. Last year’s appeals were not fully met – 57 percent and 44 percent of the appeal were fulfilled for Chad and Niger, respectively.²¹ Averting a food crisis and reducing the potential for conflict depend on the promptness and generosity of the international donor community and the ability of national governments to deliver the assistance. Failing this, the risk of conflict increases.

Illegal, Unregulated, and Unregistered (IUU) Fishing

Researcher: Dr. Caroline F. Ziemke-Dickens

Summary

- IUU fishing by large foreign trawlers costs Africa roughly \$1 billion in lost revenue annually, threatening the livelihood of the 10 million Africans who depend on fishing and related activities for their primary income. Overfishing, much of it conducted illegally, is also threatening the food security of the 200 million Africans who depend on fish as their primary source of nutritional protein.²²
- The countries most severely affected by IUU fishing are Guinea and Sierra Leone in West Africa and Somalia and Kenya in East Africa. In these countries, estimated illegal catches per annum are as much as 40 percent higher than legal, regulated catches.
- The African countries most at risk lack the maritime security and surveillance capacity to monitor IUU fishing and enforce their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Sierra Leone and Liberia have teamed up with international NGOs to launch programs to train local fisherman to identify and report illegal fishing operations.²³
- Harassment and threats from large illegal trawling operations have forced Somali fisherman out of business. Somalis complain that international anti-piracy naval operations are providing protection not only to legal shipping but also to illegal fishing operations. As one Somali remarked, “as far as foreign navies are concerned, any Somali on the sea is a pirate.” As a result, Somalis are resorting to arrangements with private security firms to counter IUU fishing.²⁴

IUU Fishing: An Economic, Environmental, and Food Security Threat

As a whole, the African continent is losing an average annual export value of roughly \$1 billion to IUU fishing operations. The inter-regional trade, mostly conducted informally and below the government radar, is impossible to measure but is also suffering from the effects of the depletion of fish stocks by large, international fishing operations. Roughly 15 percent of the continent’s workforce is either directly or indirectly dependent on fishing for its livelihood, many in the informal economy. The long-term impact on economic and food security on the continent will only get worse as African fresh- and salt-water fisheries are expected to be hardest hit by the effects of climate change.²⁵

Sierra Leone and Liberia Fighting Back

International monitoring organizations call illegal fishing in the international waters off Guinea and Sierra Leone “the worst in West Africa” and, hence, “the worst in the world.”²⁶ Much of the illegal catch finds its way onto the EU and Asian markets, where demand for seafood is growing, and local stocks are declining. Three factors help account for the prevalence of IUU fishing in West Africa: official corruption, weak maritime and surveillance capacity, and a lack of will among countries that flag and license the large fishing vessels to ensure they are operating legally. In some cases, government authorities accept payment from foreign parties, the Chinese in particular, to overlook illegal fishing operations. Overall, illegal fishing thrives where open and accountable governance is lacking and civil society voices – who might agitate for change – are repressed. US AFRICOM and some EU countries have provided training to West African navies and coast guards, but few of the countries most at risk have sufficient patrol boats or financial resources to operate them.²⁷

Both Liberia and Sierra Leone have relied heavily on private security companies to monitor, license, and enforce illegal fishing in their EEZs.²⁸ Recently, they have taken steps to develop indigenous responses as well. Sierra Leone has joined forces with the Environmental Justice Foundation to implement a program that enlists local fisherman in the effort to combat IUU fishing in their territorial waters. Local fishermen are trained to identify and report illegal fishing vessels. When they see a trawler fishing illegally or find their nets have been damaged or destroyed, they notify a community coordinator who then takes a boat to document the location of the incident and the name of the vessel via GPS-tagged photographs. Eventually, this information will link into a new computerized Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) being set up in Freetown. A similar program, funded by the World Bank, is underway in Liberia. This program issues smartphones capable of taking and sending GPS-tagged photos to local fishermen, who can then transmit the information directly to authorities.²⁹

Somalia and Kenya: The Nexus of Piracy and Illegal Fishing

Kenya and Somalia face a different set of challenges to the security of their offshore resources base related to the insecurity brought about by Somali piracy. Kenya does not currently have the capacity to adequately monitor and enforce its EEZ, which has been severely depleted by IUU fishing. Until the security situation stabilizes in the waters off the coast of the Horn of Africa, however, Kenya will continue to find it difficult to attract the investment it needs to develop capacity to protect its fisheries and realize other offshore resources potential (including petroleum, gas, iron-manganese, and other minerals).³⁰

Various local Somali government entities – notably the transitional national government and Puntland – have entered into agreements with private security companies to conduct anti-piracy and anti-illegal fishing operations in their territorial waters. So far, however, the results have been minimal, and Somali fishermen are being forced out of business, squeezed between pirates, illegal trawling operations, and foreign naval forces providing protection for international shipping. According to the Puntland minister of fisheries, “fishermen [have been] killed or had their gear taken or destroyed by all three.” In the view of most local Somali fisherman, many of whom either have abandoned their pursuits or limit their operations to close-in (and less productive) fishing, the international navies are, effectively, protecting the illegal fishing operations and driving local Somali fisherman out of business. Armed security teams have fired on fishermen, believing them to be pirates, a fact acknowledged by a spokesman for the EU Naval Force Somalia. As one Kismayo fisherman says, “It appears that as far as the naval forces are concerned, any Somali on the sea is a pirate.”³¹

Potential for Change in Land Tenure in Uganda as Museveni Regime Wavers

Analysts: Dr. Eliza Johannes and Ms. Ivana Djak

Summary

To the dismay of the urban elite and traditional landlords, President Museveni has been a strong advocate for customary tenants' rights. It is unclear how growing opposition to the regime will impact the government's approach to land tenure questions, whether a new government would sustain the policy of protecting tenants' rights or whether a series of mass evictions would ensue. Even without regime change, Uganda's current four main systems of land tenure lead to broad confusion about what land is owned under which type of law; two of these systems, in particular – *mailo* and customary land tenure – frequently lead to urban and rural land conflict, respectively. Continual land conflict destabilizes the rural areas and prevents urban areas, as well as the country as a whole, from further developing.

Ugandan Land Tenure Systems

Uganda's 1995 Constitution vests land in private citizens under *mailo*, customary, leasehold, or freehold tenure law. These four land tenure systems, as follows, have constantly been in flux:

- The **freehold tenure** system grants full ownership rights in perpetuity. It is prevalent in the Western part of the country.
- **Leasehold tenure** is a system of owning land under contract for a specific period.
- **Mailo land tenure**, established by the Land Law of 1904, gives land titles to the king, clan chief, and their families. Much land is still held under *mailo* law.
- **Customary tenure**, a system regulated by customary rules through chiefs and other local bodies, is predominant in the North.³²

President Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) promised to eliminate the *mailo* land system when they took power. This greatly angered Bugandan landlords and other traditional leaders, who have continuously opposed land reform.³³ Museveni and his government continued to fight for the rights of tenants on leased as well as customarily occupied land. In 2005, the Court of Appeal dismissed a High Court ruling that awarded businessman George Mitala ownership of a piece of land in Ndeeba where more than 100 customary occupants live. At the same time, the Ugandan government also put into place an inquiry commission on the sale or allocation of land in Kampala because of allegations of corruption by Kampala City Council.³⁴ Museveni helped push through the Land Amendment Bill of 2007 to prevent the eviction of long-standing tenants by those who own land under *mailo* law.³⁵ The Land Amendment Bill of 2007 gave customary tenants further protection by ensuring that the District Land Board would not allocate land owned under customary tenure and by voiding controversial transactions that relocated customary land.

Because the bill was heavily supported by legislators who hail from communally owned areas, it cannot be said that Museveni is the tenants' only advocate.³⁶ Land reform, however, has long revolved around Museveni, and the current support customary and communal land tenants receive is tied to him. It is unclear how growing opposition to Museveni will impact the government's approach to land tenure questions, and whether a new government would sustain the policy of protecting tenants' rights. If a government that favors *mailo* land holders' rights comes into power, the patterns of land tenure and eviction could shift drastically.

Recent Disputes

The land tenure system described above leads to frequent land conflict and perpetuates violence from urban to rural areas. Land tenure violence most commonly affects rural areas with communally or customarily owned land. For example, in December, a group of pastoralists at the Runga Landing Site in Hoima District recently vacated disputed land they had shared with the Alur Community after their lodgings were destroyed. The Alur community is suspected of attacking the pastoralists as reprisal for the murder of some of its members. Pastoralists frequently clash with settled societies over crop field destruction and resource use, as the groups view their customary land boundaries differently.³⁷ Non-pastoral ethnic groups in Uganda also regularly clash over customary land. An *Alert* in the January 4, 2012 issue of *The Africa Watch* explained the conflict between the Iteso and Karimojong ethnic groups. The agro-pastoralist Iteso of Teso reside in eastern Uganda. The pastoralist Karimojong of Moroto frequently move into Teso territory in search of grazing land. Because the two communities see the borders of their territories differently, they sometimes raid and destroy each other's settlements.³⁸

While common among rural groups, land disputes in Uganda reach into the urban class too. According to Dr. Nuwagaba Augustus, senior lecturer at Makerere University, *mailo* land "creates legal ownership of land which the owner does not occupy, and occupation of land which the occupant does not own." Land disputes are common where *mailo* and customary land law governs tenure. Uncertainty in ownership prevents land upkeep, creating infrastructure problems in cities like Kampala where 52 percent of land is *mailo* land.³⁹ There are frequent land disputes between urban dwellers. Police boss Lt. Gen. Kale Kayihura of Kampala recently blocked the arrest of three professors and one former minister of women and development on the allegations of fraudulently acquiring *mailo* land in Maya, Wakiso Districts. The land ownership is contested between clan members. Some allege it is clan land while others claim it as family land that was not transferred in the 1950s.⁴⁰

Land disputes can span several generations and include multiple parties, sometimes involving the government itself. The National Housing and Construction Company (NHCC) is seeking intervention from the central government in a three-way dispute with members of the Buganda Kingdom over a 150-acre piece of *mailo* land in Namungoona. NHCC signed a 99-year lease with the Buganda Land Board starting in 1996. In December 2010, however, new members of the Buganda royal family surfaced and signed a provisional certificate with Sesam Energetics, which launched a waste-to-energy plant on the land in February 2011.⁴¹

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) stresses that land tenure rights and food security are inextricably linked and that land rights help encourage development.⁴² USAID argues that tenure security can be achieved only if rights are enshrined in robust laws and effective systems of administration.⁴³ Such effective systems are currently absent in Uganda as exhibited by the incessant disputes. It is unclear whether a new government would approach land rights in a way that protects tenants to avoid further instability. The lack of an effective land tenure rights approach is hindering Uganda's development and stability.

Patronage Networks in Equatorial Guinea

Analyst: Dr. Janette Yarwood

Summary

- Although Equatorial Guinea is often referred to as a textbook case of the “resource curse,” the authoritarian regime dominated by institutionalized neopatrimonialism had been entrenched long before the discovery of oil.
- Patronage networks are the primary means through which President Obiang is able to maintain power; Equatorial Guinea’s parastatals –the university, the social security administration, and the national gas company – are entities through which large sums of money have been disbursed to supporters of the regime.

Introduction

The discovery of massive oil reserves just off the Atlantic shores of Equatorial Guinea has already made the country Africa's third largest producer of oil, with an estimated output of 346,016 barrels per day and proven oil reserves of 1.7 billion barrels.⁴⁴ As a result of the discovery of oil, Equatorial Guinea is no longer one of the world’s poorest nations. In fact, the country enjoyed one of the fastest growth rates in the world during the 1990s and 2000s, placing its GDP per capita on par with many industrialized nations; however, most of the oil wealth has accrued to a small elite class and has bypassed the majority of citizens.⁴⁵

Given the country’s poor development performance, authoritarianism, and small elite that benefits greatly from the oil wealth of the country, Equatorial Guinea appears to mirror the experience of other natural resource rich countries that have fallen victim to the so-called “resource curse.” The country, however, has long been controlled by an authoritarian government and dominated by the institutionalized neopatrimonialism that permeates all levels of the government bureaucracy and anchors it to society. Therefore, the reasons for the predatory policies of the ruling class lie in practices deeply entrenched in the political structure of the country that was in place long before the discovery of oil.⁴⁶ Oil wealth has now provided the elite with access to greater financial resources than ever before.

Background

Macias Nguema, the country's first president, came to power in 1968 through relatively democratic means. He then installed one of post-colonial Africa's most oppressive regimes. Nguema's rule centralized power in the country via the draft constitution and gave the president the authority to nominate the vice-president and half of the ministers, dissolve *La Asamblea de la República* (parliament), and suspend fundamental rights for a two-week period. After coming into office, Nguema executed a classic purge of the opposition, especially targeting traditional leaders and intellectuals.⁴⁷ His reign of terror killed or forced into exile between a third and a half of the country’s population.⁴⁸

Macias Nguema filled most government posts with members of his family and his Esangui clan, a subset of the Fang people who dominate mainland Rio Muni. He discriminated openly against the Bubi people, the dominant ethnicity on Bioko and killed almost all of Bioko's Bubi politicians.⁴⁹ This widespread brutality and favoritism bred ethnic tensions between the Fang and Bubi, who together make up 90 percent of the country’s population, and fostered divisions

between the various Fang clans. Because the Fang dominate the mainland and the Bubi control the island, these tensions took on a regional component.⁵⁰

Eventually, Nguema began murdering increasing numbers of his own clan and family, alienating even his closest supporters. Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, the president's nephew, initiated a violent and successful coup in 1979 and came to power under the title "liberator." His regime ended the reign of terror but continued the police state and dictatorial apparatus installed by Macias Nguema. Since 1979 Mr Obiang has kept a tight grip on power principally through a network of relatives and members of his Esangui clan from Mongomo, in the east, who occupy all the top security posts in government.⁵¹ President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo and a small number of associates and family members control the government, economy, and legal system of Equatorial Guinea. It is also widely known that the president and his close circle fund their lavish lifestyles from Equatorial Guinea's natural resources revenues.⁵²

Patronage Networks in Action⁵³

Equatorial Guinea is widely ranked among the most corrupt and kleptocratic dictatorships in the world by Transparency International, the World Bank, Freedom House, and the Economist Intelligence Unit.⁵⁴ The Equatoguinean government does not distribute its oil wealth through social programs but rather has been pursuing the privatization of state assets, with a significant amount of oil revenue being channeled past the government budget and distributed through patronage networks among a tiny ruling elite.⁵⁵

In Equatorial Guinea, patronage networks are the primary means through which President Obiang is able to maintain power. On the local level, it is very common to hear stories about prestigious houses in rural villages belonging to government ministers and kin-based hiring systems that benefit the family members of ministers and other government officials. In addition, it can be difficult or impossible to get a job if not aligned with the ruling Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE), and people can lose their jobs for supporting opposition parties or publicly criticizing the government. On the larger governmental level, Equatorial Guinea's parastatals – legally separate entities created by the government to undertake commercial activities – are largely funded by the government, but ostensibly operate with some degree of autonomy.

A recent dissertation by Hannah Appel draws attention to some of the ways that PDGE and Obiang supporters specifically benefit from patronage networks.⁵⁶ Appel's research highlights that a host of parastatals, including the university, the social security administration, and the national gas company, received government funding yet have never accounted for the money.⁵⁷ Appel notes that these parastatals were never asked to account for the money they received from the government. Ultimately Appel argues that when Obiang names someone to lead a parastatal, they use their appointment as an opportunity for self-aggrandizement. In 2006, Bata Ports, a parastatal in charge of port administration in the city of Bata, received a government subsidy of 100 million CFA (about \$200,000 (USD)), 100 percent of which was unaccounted for.⁵⁸

Of the National University (UNGE), a 2006 government document reads, "this institution lacks both accounting books and basic notions of accounting. This situation does not permit us to have reliable data." (República de Guinea Ecuatorial 2006:17).⁵⁹ The same document three years later says of the university, "Despite the presentation of budgets that don't even minimally respect the established criteria, [La UNGE] has never justified the use of the funds put at their disposal by the government." (República de Guinea Ecuatorial 2009:6).⁶⁰ By 2009, according to the Ministry of Finance responsible for these documents, the university has yet to produce a

roster detailing how many professors it has on payroll or their salaries. Despite this lack of personnel records, the document notes that in UNGE's anticipated budget for 2009, "there are 122 professors who do not appear on the remitted payroll." (República de Guinea Ecuatorial 2009:6).⁶¹

Additionally, the same government documents state that GE-Proyectos – the entity responsible for all infrastructure projects supposedly going on all over the country—submitted *no budget data* in four years. According to the documents, this company did not remit any information about the execution of its budgets (República de Guinea Ecuatorial 2009:10).⁶² Nevertheless, 2009's anticipated national budget showed that GE-Proyectos was to receive a *200 percent increase* in their government subsidy.

Conclusion

It is likely that President Obiang will continue to have access to immense patronage resources to buy off key constituencies as required for him to continue his rule. Yet Obiang understands that the general population notices that there is a great deal of money flowing through the country. He appears to have incorporated a strategy of 'visible development' to show that the government is attempting to distribute oil revenue. It remains unlikely, however, that Equatorial Guinea will develop broader social programs that benefit the majority of the population due to the extreme pervasiveness of criminality within the state.

ALERTS

ICC Ruling on Kenya Expected before January 23

Researcher: Dr. Dorina A. Bekoe

Ruling by the ICC

After a September 2011 hearing of the charges against six people deemed most responsible for the postelection violence in Kenya, the International Criminal Court (ICC) stated on January 16 that a ruling on whether the case will go to trial is expected no later than January 23, 2012.⁶³ In the short term, there are fears that an announcement by the ICC will result in conflict in particular communities where the postelection violence was most acute. In anticipation, the Kenyan police have increased their presence in Uasin Gishu, Nandi, Kericho, Nakuru, Naivasha, and key neighborhoods of Nairobi.⁶⁴ The 2007/2008 postelection violence took more than 1,200 lives and displaced more than 500,000 people in the space of approximately one month.⁶⁵

The Ocampo six include:

- William Ruto: the former minister for higher education and member of parliament (MP) from Eldoret (Rift Valley)
- Joshua Sang: former host of a radio show in Eldoret on KASS FM, accused of inciting communal violence
- Henry Kosgey: suspended minister of industrialization and MP from Tinderet (Rift Valley)
- Francis Muthaura: the head of the public service and a cabinet secretary
- Uhuru Kenyatta: deputy prime minister and minister for finance
- Muhammed Hussein Ali: head of the postal corporation of Kenya and the former head of the Kenya Police.⁶⁶

Additional Implications

Two of the Ocampo Six – Ruto and Kenyatta – have launched presidential bids for the next elections in Kenya. The seeming impunity surrounding Ruto and Kenyatta is viewed by many as continuing to fuel the prospect of electoral violence. Thus, some believe that a conviction of the ICC charges is a key element in breaking the cycle of electoral violence that has plagued Kenya since 1992. On the other hand, supporters of Ruto and Kenyatta see the ICC process as having been politicized.⁶⁷ Thus, the possibility of unrest exists with any outcome of the ICC process.

Date for the Kenya's General Elections – March 2013?

Researcher: Dr. Dorina A. Bekoe

Background

Three dates were being considered for Kenya's general elections following the December 2007 polls: August 2012, December 2012, or March 2013. Those arguing for August 2012 advised that the new constitution, approved in a referendum in August 2010, stated that elections were to take place every five years on the second Tuesday of August.⁶⁸ Others argued that the next elections should take place five years after the last ones – December 2012 – stating that such a date allowed enough time to finalize logistical arrangements.⁶⁹ Yet a third group argued that the elections could take place 60 days after the expiration of the parliament sworn in with the formation of the grand coalition government, which was created to bring an end to the postelection violence; the term of the current parliament began on January 15, 2008, placing its expiry in March 2013.⁷⁰

High Court's Ruling

On Friday, January 13, the Constitutional Division of the High Court ruled that the general elections would take place in March 2013, 60 days after the expiry of the current parliament, *unless* the grand coalition was dissolved earlier. The Court further clarified that, if both President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga agreed to dissolve the coalition earlier, the elections would take place within 60 days.⁷¹ With this ruling, the High Court did not provide a definitive date for the elections – advising that only if the coalition government was dissolved by October 2012 could elections take place by December 2012.⁷²

Implications

There are positive and negative aspects to the High Court's ruling. The longer timeframe for the elections provides additional time to further institutional reforms (such as security sector reform); work through the new procedures introduced by the electoral commission and the logistical and organizational issues introduced by the creation of 47 counties (up from 8 provinces); and provide more opportunities for violence prevention programs, in a bid to ensure peaceful elections.

More ominously, however, the longer timeframe allows for politicians who have been implicated in inciting electoral violence – such as William Ruto, MP of Eldoret North, who has been charged by the International Criminal Court (ICC) as having played a significant role in the postelection violence of 2007/2008 – more time to establish their presidential bid.⁷³ The ruling of the ICC is a critical aspect of removing the impunity that has been enjoyed by politicians who use violence to win elections. An indictment by the ICC is seen as a key factor in breaking the cycle of repeated electoral violence that has taken place in Kenya since 1992.

Guinea Bissau: Uncertainty After Sanha's Death

Researcher: Ms. Ashton Callahan

The late December 2011 failed coup d'état in Guinea Bissau and ill-timed death of President Malam Bacai Sanha highlight the country's tumultuous political past and likely future. The constitution stipulates that elections should be held within 60 days.⁷⁴ While *technically* possible, it is unclear when elections will be held given recent events.⁷⁵ Concerned for future stability, the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) appear actively engaged in the mediation between politicians and Guinea Bissau's armed forces.⁷⁶ Many question the possibility of a smooth power transfer without a stabilization force and a successful reform of the armed forces, which have historically dominated politics.⁷⁷ The key players (pictured left to right) in the military – Army Chief Antonio Indjai and Navy Chief Bubo Na Tchuto – and political arena – Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Jr., and Raimundo Pereira – have complicated histories and relationships that could foster instability and create a power struggle.⁷⁸



- Army Chief Antonio Indjai led the April 2010 military coup with the help of then-exiled Navy Chief Bubo Na Tchuto. After arresting Army Chief Zamora Induta and Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Jr., Indjai proclaimed himself the new Army Chief (later confirmed by President Sanha). Indjai is around 60 years old and a veteran of the national liberation struggle. He belongs to the Balanta ethnic group, which comprises 90 percent of the army (versus 30 percent of the population).⁷⁹ He recently forbade any military interference in political affairs following the death of President Sanha.⁸⁰
- Navy Chief Bubo Na Tchuto, named an “international drug kingpin” by the U.S. Treasury, fled to the Gambia after a failed coup in August 2008 and later participated in the April 2010 coup.⁸¹ Given recent events, many believe there has been a falling out between Tchuto and Indjai. Tchuto has been touted as the mastermind of the December 26 coup that reportedly aimed to murder Indjai and Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Jr.⁸² He refuses to leave a Mansoa prison until all 25 accused coup plotters are released.⁸³ Tchuto, first appointed Navy Chief in 2004, is also a member of the Balanta ethnic group.⁸⁴
- Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Jr. has a complicated relationship with both previously mentioned men and has twice been targeted by the armed forces. Currently, he appears to have the support of Army Chief Indjai. It is believed that he will run for president and has good prospects for election based on his popularity with the people.⁸⁵ On the other hand, Gomes has been the focus of opposition protests due to his perceived involvement in the 2009 assassination of the president. According to a recent interview with Antonio Aly Silva, a well-known Guinea Bissauan blogger, challengers to Gomes will likely emerge within his party – the African Party for Independence of Guinea Bissau

and Cape Verde (PAIGC). Other candidates will likely include former president and coup-victim, Kumba Yala (also a member of the Balanta ethnic group), as well as Henrique Rosa, interim president from September 2003 to October 2005 following the September 2003 coup.⁸⁶

- National Assembly Chairman, Raimundo Pereira, of PAIGC is serving as interim president until elections can be held. He previously served as interim President following the assassination of President Vieira in 2009. While Pereira has no history with the military, he is seen as a close associate of Gomes.⁸⁷ The Collective Democratic Opposition (COD) group, a coalition of opposition groups, has rejected the appointment, claiming that Pereira “will play the part of [Russian Federation President] Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Jr. that of [Russian Prime Minister] Vladimir Putin.”⁸⁸ Others are unhappy because he “unconstitutionally promulgated the appointment of Zamora Induta as Armed Forces Chief of Staff,” which ultimately led to the military coup in April 2010.⁸⁹ As a presidential contender, it is unclear whether he would have the support of Army Chief Antonio Indjai given historical events.

Nigeria's Fuel Subsidy Protests Not Over, Go Beyond its Borders

Researcher: Ms. Ashton Callahan

Although Nigerian labor union protests over the government's removal of the fuel subsidy have been suspended for the time being, some civil society groups are continuing to organize strikes.⁹⁰ Fuel prices climbed from \$1.70/gallon (40 to 45 cents/liter) to around \$3.50/gallon (86 to 94 cents/liter), sparking widespread protests now termed "Occupy Nigeria."⁹¹ Goodluck Jonathan partially reinstated the fuel subsidy after Pengassan (the largest oil labor union) threatened to shut down the country's oil platforms.⁹² *The Guardian*, a Nigerian newspaper, reports that fear of a possible coup also played into Jonathan's decision.⁹³ Fuel prices have decreased by 35 percent to around 60 cents/liter, but many workers remain on strike demanding that fuel prices be restored to their previous level.⁹⁴ Between Boko Haram, North-South ethnic and religious tensions, and now "Occupy Nigeria," the country may reach the boiling point. While incredibly worrisome for the future of Nigeria, the continued protests have potential economic ramifications for the country's West African neighbors.

If protests continue and the labor unions stop production, the fuel supply (both legal and illegal) to Nigeria's neighbors will be in jeopardy. Togo has reportedly been experiencing disruptions in fuel supply (a rumor that officials deny) that many consumers have attributed to the petrol price increase in Nigeria.⁹⁵ In terms of the informal sector, an end to fuel subsidization is also threatening the livelihoods of fuel smugglers in Benin, Cameroon, and Togo. One Cameroonian smuggler admitted, "The removal of subsidy has choked our business ... by the time you bribe some officials of the two countries at the border, what you get after selling the fuel is not encouraging at all."⁹⁶ The situation could be even more devastating in Benin where many consumers purchase their fuel through the informal sector. Major sellers (and their employees) of contraband fuel face unemployment, and consumers who are unable to afford the higher prices lose their means of transportation.⁹⁷

Increasing fuel prices could also translate into higher commodity prices.⁹⁸ According to a recent report, the unrest in Nigeria is already affecting commodity prices and trade between border communities in Nigeria and Cameroon.⁹⁹ The price hikes are a result of higher fuel prices as well as the closure Nigerian borders and, in particular, the Banki frontier market that used to supply Cameroon.¹⁰⁰ Recall that violent protests erupted in Cameroon and other West African neighbors in 2008 over high food prices.

Repression Threatening Democracy in Rwanda

Researchers: Dr. Eliza Johannes and Ms. Ivana Djak

Rwanda has made remarkable advances in economic growth, health and education. Kigali looks every inch a prosperous and bustling capital city. Accounts of repression of the opposition and the press, however, offer a stark contrast to the impressive progress exhibited in other aspects of Rwandan life.

Persecution of the Opposition

Andrew Meldrum of the *Global Post* admits in a recent article that President Kagame “had led Rwanda from chaos to order and set the country on a path towards security and affluence,” but also notes that government critics have been assassinated, exiled, and arrested.¹⁰¹ Several sources have attributed a recent grenade blast that killed two and injured 16 people near a Kigali market to the government. Leaders of a new opposition group existing in exile have condemned the explosion as government action carried out in order to find pretext for their periodic crackdowns on political opponents. Theogene Rudasingwa, of the opposition Rwanda National Congress (RNC), said in a statement, “Either the government is implicated ... or the regime has lost the ability to protect its citizens.” In its report on the grenade attack, *Salem News* argues that the explosion is actually an example of an attack on the opposition, arguing, “With grenades, [come] unjustified arrests, and attempted assassinations in other countries.”¹⁰²

One victim of repression in the wake of the attack is Gratién Nsabiyaireme, a member of the interim Executive Committee of the FDU (Des Forces Démocratiques Unies [United Democratic Force]), who was taken to an unspecified location by military personnel immediately following the attack. Eye witnesses report seeing him severely beaten by military officers. His party calls the incident a brutal kidnapping and demands the government ensure his safe return.¹⁰³ Mr. Nsabiyaireme’s detainment is one in a persistent series of opponent imprisonments. Victoire Ingabire is an opponent whose detention has recently garnered much press. Ingabire is an expatriate who returned to her native Rwanda in January 2010 to challenge President Paul Kagame in the August 2010 election. Kagame “won” the election by 93 percent while Ingabire was arrested and placed in Kigali’s 1930 maximum security prison where she has been held since. She was accused of genocide ideology, collaborating with a terrorist group, divisionism, spreading rumors, and inciting the population to rebel. Her trial has been delayed repeatedly. In a December interview, her daughter, Raissa Ingabire, argues that the lack of democracy in Rwanda significantly impacts the surrounding region, especially the Democratic Republic of Congo, since the conflicts in the region are intertwined. She warns that a lack of democracy in Rwanda has destabilized the region, and she urges the international community to pressure Kagame on his record of repression.¹⁰⁴

Freedom of Speech under Fire

Allegations of government-ordered grenade attacks and opposition repression are matched by reports of suppression of the press. Reporters Without Borders rates the Rwandan press climate as one of the 10 worst in the world, ranking it 168 out of 179. Independent papers regularly close down after publishing criticism of President Kagame; editors and reporters who anger the government flee the country and sometimes are ruthlessly gunned down. In December, Charles Ingabire [no relation to Victoire or Raissa Ingabire], 32, an outspoken critic of Kagame, was shot in exile in Uganda. In November, the editor of the *New Times* was arrested after running a corruption exposé.¹⁰⁵ Freedom of speech is limited as the government prescribes what can and

cannot be mentioned in the press and public forums. One of the most concerning constraints on free speech is the ban on mentioning the genocide. This ban leaves much resentment lurking beneath a currently calm surface, ensuring that, when tensions finally do surface, they have the potential to do so in a violent and disruptive manner.¹⁰⁶ Such repression could undo the hard-won progress in other areas of Rwandan life and destabilize the entire Great Lakes region.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) rankings (out of 187) for the affected countries are: Burkina Faso: 181; Chad: 183; Niger: 186; Mali: 175; and Mauritania: 159 (UNDP, Human Development Report 2011, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/103106.html>).
- ² International Organization for Migration, "Migration Crisis from Libya," *Daily Statistical Report*, November 27, 2011 (<http://www.migration-crisis.com/libya/page/index/2>).
- ³ Oxfam, "West Africa: Millions of People at Risk of Serious Food Crisis without any Action," December 12, 2011 (<http://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressrelease/2011-12-12/west-africa-millions-people-risk-serious-food-crisis>).
- ⁴ Celeste Hicks, "Growing Food Crisis in the Sahel – a region in need of long term solutions," December 22, 2011, African Arguments (<http://africanarguments.org/2011/12/22/growing-food-crisis-in-the-sahel-a-region-in-need-of-long-term-solutions-by-celeste-hicks/>).
- ⁵ "Al Jazeera: Fears Rise of Food Shortages in West Africa," *Open Source Center*, December 11, 2011
- ⁶ Oxfam, "West Africa: Millions of People at Risk of Serious Food Crisis without any Action;" UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Consolidated Appeal for Chad," December 9, 2011 (<http://unocha.org/cap/appeals/consolidated-appeal-chad-2012>).
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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

THE AFRICA WATCH

FEBRUARY 1, 2012



TO THE READER

Several important elections are scheduled to be held in Africa this year. With that in mind, we have focused this edition of *The Africa Watch* on issues related to elections in Angola, Madagascar, Mali, and Senegal.

As always, IDA's team of Africa researchers welcomes your comments, questions, and feedback on the contents of our reports. If you would like to discuss an article in this issue or provide suggestions for future research, please contact me at (703) 845-4394.

With best regards,

George

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward

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ANALYSES

Sufi Brotherhoods Still a Powerful Political Force in Senegal's Upcoming Elections

Researcher: Dr. Ashley Bybee

Summary

- The Sufi Brotherhoods, in particular the Mouride Brotherhood, continue to be extremely influential political forces in Senegal. Most presidential candidates have sought the support of the Caliph-General as well as more junior Mouride religious leaders in an attempt to secure the support of their followers in the February elections.
- To date, the Caliph-General has not issued a "*ndiguel*," or voting instructions, which is the much sought-after endorsement President Wade and the other candidates seek.

Background on Senegal's Sufi Brotherhoods

Sufism is a unique strand of Islam practiced predominantly in Senegal. Sufi Brotherhoods (Mouride, Tijani, Qadiri, and Layene) form the basis of religious civil society and serve not only as a source of religious inspiration for followers (referred to as "disciples"), but also as political instruction for voters. Although the Mouride Brotherhood is one of the smaller brotherhoods, it unequivocally enjoys the most influence politically and economically. As a result, all candidates are vying for the support of the Mourides, and whoever gains it will have a significant leg up on the opposition.

For any of the brotherhoods, their religious leaders (known as *marabouts*) enjoy a "social contract" with their disciples whereby a disciple declares allegiance and complete submission to his selected *marabout* in return for social and economic security. As disciples, Sufis devote themselves to learning the ways of their *marabout* and follow their example. One significant function of *marabouts* has been to issue a "*ndiguel*" to their disciples, translated as a "call to work" but colloquially interpreted as "to the letter voting instructions given by *marabouts*."¹ In return, *marabouts* act as intermediaries with the state, providing protection from legal troubles and facilitating access to resources. While tangible aid might not always be immediately forthcoming, support is reliable, and an "effective" *marabout* typically has significant influence with the state and an ability to make requests on behalf of his disciples.² Even if the tangible proceeds from one's *marabout* are minimal, it is well worth one's while to foster this beneficial relationship. This is why the wealthiest men in Senegal typically have a very close relationship with a major *marabout*.

The Mourides and the 2012 Election

The political influence of the Sufi Brotherhoods have fluctuated over time, most notably in the 1988 elections when many voters ignored the Caliph-General's *ndiguel* to vote for the incumbent President Abdou Diouf, opting to support the opposition candidate who they believed shared their interests. Although President Diouf ultimately won the election, it represented the first time that the country's newly urbanized and commercially active youth, disenchanted with the traditional election system, opted to distance themselves from the

brotherhoods whose focus was not on issues of mutual concern, such as unemployment. This appears to be true for a segment of the country's youth population today, although the vast majority of Senegal's devout Muslims, particularly in the rural areas, follow their *marabouts'* voting instructions diligently.



A common site in Senegal: a mural of the Mouride Brotherhood's figurehead and spiritual guide, the late Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba Mbacke

(Source: Reuters)

President Wade and the other presidential contenders are aware of this massive source of political support, and have openly courted the Mouride Brotherhood in the holy city of Touba. Recently, President Wade brought photographers and television cameras into a meeting with Serigne Abo Mbacke, the current Caliph-General, who enjoys the support of more than 1 million followers in Senegal.³ The media later reported that the Caliph “snubbed” Wade by meeting with him for only 15 minutes and refusing a second meeting requested by the President, possibly reflecting the Caliph's concerted effort to distance himself from Wade or any other politician.⁴ While in the Mourides' sacred home of Touba, President Wade also met with Abdoul Ahad Mbacke Gainde Fatma, the great-grandson of revered Mouride founder Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba Mbacke. Wade's Prime Minister, Finance Minister, Interior Minister, and Dakar's Socialist mayor Khalifa Sall (not a candidate this time but widely tipped as a future presidential hopeful)⁵ have all made appearances with Mbacke. Similarly, Idrissa Seck, Macky Sall, Moustapha Niasse, and Youssou N'Dour have all visited Touba in recent months, seeking the support of the influential Mourides. Bethio Thioune is another *marabout* whose support the candidates are vying for.⁶ According to one source, President Wade, through his Interior Minister, actually attempted to bribe the Caliph-General with CFA2.5 billion (\$5million (US)) to issue a *ndiguel* in favor of Wade.⁷ The President's spokesman, as well as the Caliph-General's, have both denied that the payment was a bribe, describing it rather as the regular amount the President gives every year for the Grand Magal – the annual religious festival of the Mouride Brotherhood in Touba.⁸

Despite a premonition in which the winner revealed himself to the Caliph-General, the latter has not issued a *ndiguel* supporting any one candidate,⁹ but Wade's Mouride background will likely win him this endorsement in the coming weeks. The only question that remains is how receptive the younger, literate, urbanized, and unemployed population will be to this endorsement. As history has demonstrated, a *ndiguel* by the Caliph-General does not guarantee votes, and the

presumption that it does may be disproven by the aforementioned population, who may see *marabouts* as guides in Islam, but irrelevant to one's political activities. Or, in the absence of a *ndiguel* by the Caliph-General, more junior *marabouts* may take the opportunity to issue their own *ndiguels*, which may influence the vote at the local level.¹⁰



President Wade (left) and an influential *Marabout* in Touba

(Source: www.onislam.net)

In any event, the Mouride brotherhood will continue to wield extraordinary influence over some large segment of voters, so much so that Mbacke has stated: “A politician who is not on good terms with Touba cannot govern this country.”¹¹

Profiles of Leading Candidates in Mali's Presidential Elections

Researcher: Dr. Dorina A. Bekoe

Summary

- Malians will elect a new president on April 29, 2012. It will mark the fifth consecutive election since the adoption of multiparty elections in 1992. On the same day, Malians will also vote on a constitutional referendum that proposes revisions to the power of the presidency and parliament.
- The next president will likely be from one of four candidates: Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, Dioncounda Traoré, Soumaila Cissé, or Modibo Sidibé.
- The elections will take place in the context of renewed violence in Tuareg strongholds, fueled by looted weapons from Libya, a regional food crisis, and protests against proposed constitutional reforms. Thus far, the candidates have not substantively addressed these challenges, emphasizing instead their credentials to lead the nation.

Context of the Presidential Election

On April 29, 2012, Malians will cast their vote for a new president for the fifth time since 1992. Having served two terms, President Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT, as he is popularly known) is

constitutionally barred from seeking re-election. On the same day, Malians will vote on a referendum proposing 20 revisions to the 1992 constitution. The revisions to the constitution have been actively protested by *Touch pas a ma Constitution* (Don't touch my Constitution), a coalition of political parties; the National Union of Malian Workers; the National Confederation of Malian Workers; and non-governmental organizations. They claim that the constitutional changes provide too much power to the president.¹²

The presidential election will occur in the context of a resurgence of violence in the Tuareg regions, fueled by weapons looted from Libya's arms depots by returning Tuaregs, a regional food crisis, and perceived marginalization by ATT of the country's political class. Yet, these issues have not been actively discussed by the candidates. Political parties have complained that ATT's status as an Independent has marginalized political parties and diminished their role in Mali's democracy.¹³ In this regard, the three largest

parties – Adéma-PASJ, URD, and RPM – have formed alliances with smaller parties, hoping to decrease the chances that an independent candidate wins the election.¹⁴ Box 1 shows the

Box 1. Mali's National Assembly, 2007	
Political Party	MPs (% of total)
Adéma-PASJ	46 (31%)
URD	30 (20 %)
Independents	23 (16%)
RPM	11 (7 %)
MPR	8 (5%)
CNID	7 (5%)
PARENA	5 (3%)
SADI	4 (3%)
UDD	3 (2 %)
BARICA	2 (1%)
MIRIA	2 (1%)
PSP	2 (1%)
BDIA	1 (1%)
PCR	1 (1%)
RND	1 (1%)
US-RDA	1 (1%)
Total MPs	147

Source: Government of Mali. Acronyms listed in Endnote 15.

current parties in the national assembly, their corresponding number of members of parliament (MPs), and the percent of the total MPs they represent.¹⁵

Four Candidates to Watch

Thus far, eight Malians have declared their intention to seek the presidency, but only four can be considered strong contenders. The four leading candidates are Dioncounda Touré (Adéma-PASJ), Soumaila Cissé (URD), Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (RPM), and Modibo Sidibé (Independent and recent prime minister). Keïta previously contested the presidency in 2007.

Dioncounda Traoré (Adéma-PASJ)

Dioncounda Traoré is currently the president of the National Assembly. Mr. Traoré was born on February 23, 1942, at Kati, Mali (north of Bamako in the Koulikora region). He is a trained mathematician, having received his doctorate from the University of Nice, France, in 1977. Politically, he has served in various leadership functions of Adéma-PASJ: he was vice-president and vice-president of training from 1990 to 1991; 2nd vice-president of Adéma-PASJ in 1992; 1st vice-president of Adéma-PASJ in 1994; represented the Nara district in 1997; and has been president of Adéma-PASJ since 2001.¹⁶ Adéma-PASJ currently has the most seats in parliament: 46 out of 147, or 31 percent.¹⁷ Mr. Traoré is married and father of seven children.¹⁸

Soumaila Cissé (URD)

Soumaila Cissé, the founder and flag bearer for the URD, was born on December 20, 1949, in Tombouctou, Mali. From 2004 to 2011, Cissé was the president of L'Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA, the West African Economic and Monetary Union). The URD holds the second largest number of seats in the parliament – 30 out of 147 (20 percent).¹⁹ URD has allied itself with the Parti du renouveau démocratique et du travail (PRDT, the Party of Democratic Revival and Work); Parti des Jeunes Démocrates (PJD, the Young Democrats Party); and Bloc des Alternatives pour la Renaissance, l'Intégration et la Coopération Africaine (BARICA, the Bloc for Alternatives in Renaissance, Integration, and African Cooperation). The PRDT, PJD, and BARICA have agreed that they will support Cissé in the 2012 election.²⁰ PRDT and PJD are new parties, with no representation in parliament; BARICA has two representatives in parliament.²¹

Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (RPM)

Born in Koutiala, southern Mali, on January 29, 1945,²² Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (IBK, as he is popularly known) is the founder of the RPM and a founding member of Adéma-PASJ, one of Mali's oldest modern political parties; the former minister of foreign affairs (1993 to 1994); and former prime minister (1994 to 2000).²³ IBK earned degrees in history and political international relations from the Sorbonne and the Institute for Contemporary International Relations History (l'Institut d'histoire des relations internationales contemporaines).²⁴

IBK sought the presidency in 2007, when he was considered ATT's main opponent. He gained 19.15 percent, a distant second to ATT's 71.2 percent.²⁵ In 2007, RPM won 7 percent of the parliamentary seats (11 out of 147).²⁶ Notably, during his tenure as prime minister, IBK presided over the settlement of the 1990-1995 Tuareg rebellion.²⁷

Modibo Sidibé, Independent

Modibo Sidibé was prime minister from 2007 -2011.²⁸ He was born in Bamako on November 7, 1952. He is married and father of six children.²⁹ He obtained a doctorate in criminology from the University of Aix-en-Provence, France, in 1983. Like ATT, Sidibé is an independent.³⁰ In

support of his candidacy, a network of clubs, civic organizations, other institutions, and even other political parties have banded together to support his candidacy.³¹ Notably, there are 23 independent candidates in the National Assembly – comprising 16 percent of the total number of parliamentarians.³²

Other Notable Candidates

- Dr. Oumar Mariko (SADI). Dr. Mariko ran for president in 2002 and 2007. SADI currently has four seats in the national assembly.³³
- Cheick Modibo Diarra (Rassemblement pour le Développement du Mali (RDM)). The RDM is a new party, created in 2010.³⁴
- Moussa Mara (Yelega). “Yelega” means change in Bamanan. This is a new party, created in 2010.³⁵
- Mountaga Tall (CNID). The CNID has seven seats in the National Assembly.³⁶

Angola: Election Watch

Researcher: Dr. Janette Yarwood

Summary

- Angola is preparing to hold parliamentary elections in late 2012.
- Jose Eduardo do Santos, who has been president for 32 years, is not expected to give up power. However, Manuel Vicente, head of the Angolan state oil company, Sonangol, has been discussed as a possible successor.
- While no opposition party appears positioned to win the election, youth and the poor are increasingly frustrated. Large-scale demonstrations are likely after election results are reported as Angolan citizens express growing anger at the lack of improvement in their day-to-day lives in the face of increased prosperity among certain sectors.

Background

Angola will hold parliamentary elections in late 2012. In 2010, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos strengthened his grip on power with a new constitution that ended the need for a direct presidential ballot. The head of the party that wins in parliamentary elections becomes president. Dos Santos and his Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA) party are expected to win given that the MPLA won 81.64 percent of the votes during the 2008 elections and holds 191 of the 220 parliamentary seats, maintains control over the media, and has the financial means to dominate a campaign.³⁷ The charter opens the way for dos Santos, who has been president for nearly 33 years, to remain in power for up to two additional five-year terms. Meanwhile, there have been increasing rumors about dos Santos naming Manuel Vicente, head of Sonangol, as Deputy President, thereby creating a possible avenue for succession.

The Opposition

Regardless of the ruling party's advantages, the opposition has failed to convince voters that it could provide a credible alternative to the MPLA.

The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)

UNITA was founded in 1966 as a guerrilla movement (largely representing the Ovimbundu ethnic group) fighting for independence from Portugal. After UNITA's charismatic leader, Jonas Savimbi, died in a shootout with government forces in 2002, UNITA negotiated a truce with the government and became Angola's largest opposition party. Although UNITA was once an influential movement, it is now politically weak due to party infighting and lack of financial capacity. UNITA has suffered defections to the ruling party and is thought to have been infiltrated and co-opted by the MPLA.³⁸ The party has been linked with interests in the diamond industry in Eastern Angola and has been affiliated with the radio station Radio Despertar and with the public relations and communications company Socitel.³⁹ UNITA is said to receive some support from Angolans living abroad. UNITA won only 16 seats at the 2008 polls.

The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA)

The FNLA also has its origins in the liberation movement like the MPLA and UNITA. During the 2008 elections, the party won just 1 percent and three seats. After the death of founder Holden Roberto, the party was severely divided and has been reduced to a small political force.⁴⁰ FNLA has its strongest support base in the north, particularly in Zaire and Uige.

The Social Renewal Party (PRS)

PRS, the third largest party, is also the oldest of the non-liberation movement parties. It was established in 1990. The party's support base is in both Lunda Sul and Lunda Norte and to a lesser extent Moxico, which are the easternmost provinces of Angola.⁴¹ During the 2008 elections, PRS managed to secure only 3 percent of the vote and eight parliamentary seats.⁴²

Political Parties Outside of Parliament

The Democratic Party for Progress – Angolan National Alliance (PDP-ANA) was once a promising party, but, since its leader Mfulumpinga Lando Victor was killed in 2004, it has been divided and unable to mobilize support. It did manage to receive .5 percent of the votes but the party did not receive parliamentary representation. Instead of becoming politically insignificant, the party has managed to re-emerge after endorsing the protests against MPLA and dos Santos.⁴³

Bloco Democrático (BD) is a new political party that has its roots in the *Frente para a Democracia (FpD)* party, which disbanded after the 2008 elections. The membership base of the party is said to be intellectuals from major cities in Angola, especially Luanda and Benguel, and intellectual figures linked or associated with the MPLA in the past.⁴⁴ The party is headed by Justino Pinto de Andrade, director of the economics faculty at the Universidade Católica de Angola; the former leader of the FpD, Filomeno Viera Lopes, serves as the party's Secretary General.⁴⁵ The BD intends to draw its support from the youth and disenfranchised Angolans.

New Coalition of Parties and Civil Society Cooperation

Abel Chivukuvuku will be the presidential candidate of a new coalition of parties, civic movements, and individuals. The coalition of Civil Opposition Political Parties (POC) includes former members of UNITA and the BD. UNITA supporters such as Leonel Gomes and Rafael Aguiar are among Chivukuvuku's supporters.⁴⁶

This attempt to build a coalition of opposition parties and civil society groups may indicate a new level of collaboration and cooperation in the country. The coalition could feed off popular sentiment in support of change, which is symbolized by the increased number of protests throughout the country. While Angola remains highly divided – ethnically, politically, and socioeconomically – youth who have been the main supporters of the growing demonstrations do not have feelings of loyalty to any one of the traditional political parties because they were children at the end of the civil war.

Madagascar – Political Impasse Persists

Researcher: Amb. (ret.) George F. Ward

Summary

The abortive attempt on January 21, 2012 by Marc Ravalomanana, the exiled former president of Madagascar, to return to his country highlighted the continuing political rift between Ravalomanana and Andry Rajoelina, his rival and current president. Even before this latest development, the likelihood that President Rajoelina would be able to fulfill his promise of elections in the spring of 2012 had faded due to the lagging pace of needed legislation and other prerequisites for the polling. In his successful effort to oust Ravalomanana, Rajoelina tapped into concerns that the former president was using control of the state to enrich himself. These suspicions persist, but the conflict between Ravalomanana and Rajoelina is based on conflicting personal and business interests rather than on questions of ideology, social or political policies, ethnicity, or regional identity. After Ravalomanana's aborted return on January 21, African mediators renewed pressure on Rajoelina to grant amnesty and admit Ravalomanana. Nevertheless, the failure so far of mediation efforts to resolve this long-running crisis points up the weaknesses in African regional peace and security arrangements.

Leaving – But Not Arriving – on a Jet Plane

Former Malagasy President Ravalomanana stepped down from office in March 2009 after he had lost the active support of the armed forces. Elements loyal to his rival Rajoelina, who was then mayor of the capital, Antananarivo, had taken control of key government installations.⁴⁷ In the intervening period of almost two years, Ravalomanana has lived in exile in South Africa while mediation efforts by representatives of the United Nations, the African Union (AU), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have proceeded in fits and starts (see below). On the basis of partial progress in mediation efforts, national elections were foreseen – first for 2010, then for 2011, and finally for spring 2012. Ravalomanana declared his intention to run in these elections, despite having been thrice sentenced *in absentia* by Malagasy courts for alleged offenses connected to his term in office.^{48,49}

In an apparent bid to launch his candidacy inside his country, Ravalomanana boarded a scheduled commercial flight from Johannesburg to Antananarivo on January 21. One hour before the flight's scheduled landing, Madagascar authorities closed the country's airports, forcing the aircraft's return to South Africa. Ravalomanana initially refused to deplane in Johannesburg, and did so only after the intervention of South African President Jacob Zuma and other senior officials.⁵⁰

International Mediation Sputters Along

Both the AU and SADC became involved in the Madagascar crisis early. The AU suspended Madagascar's membership on March 20, 2009 on the basis that Rajoelina came to power through unconstitutional means. SADC suspended Madagascar ten days later. In subsequent weeks and months, major aid donors reduced or severely curtailed their programs in Madagascar.⁵¹

SADC took the lead in mediation efforts, but failed to devote sufficient resources to its efforts. Former Mozambique President Joachim Chissano has played the role of chief mediator, but he has had little support from the SADC secretariat.⁵² SADC has also failed to establish a permanent presence on the ground in Madagascar. As a result, it has been unable to monitor

on an ongoing basis compliance with the implementation of commitments by the Madagascar government.

The mediation efforts did achieve some results. In November 2010, a new constitution has adopted by referendum. One important change was the lowering of the minimum age for running for president from 40 to 35. The current president, Rajoelina, is 37.⁵³ Nevertheless, the settlement process stalled after the adoption of the constitution over the issue of the return to the country of Ravalomanana. An apparent breakthrough came on September 17, 2011, when almost all of the country's political parties signed an agreement that called for the unconditional return of all political exiles. The agreement also called for a power-sharing agreement pending presidential and parliamentary elections. In the interim, Rajoelina would remain president.⁵⁴

Agreement Is Short-Lived

The parties to the conflict lost no time in casting doubt on the viability of the September accord. Only one day after signature of the agreement, the Malagasy justice minister endorsed the view that former president Ravalomanana would be arrested as soon as he "sets foot on the tarmac at Antananarivo airport."⁵⁵ In turn, representatives of Ravalomanana expressed their doubts, but insisted that they had compromised in the interest of the nation. In an addendum to the agreement, SADC may have undermined the accord that it had brokered when it said that returning Malagasy would not benefit from immunity because SADC did not have the right to "interfere with or annul a judicial sentence by a national court."⁵⁶

Some observers have noted that the difficulty of resolving the dispute between Ravalomanana and Rajoelina is at least partially due to the fact that the two men are so similar. Rather than differing on political, ethnic, ideological, or social grounds, both men come from business backgrounds and emerged from the same relatively privileged *merina* (highlander) ethnic group. Their differences seem personal and based to some extent on competing business interests.⁵⁷ Rajoelina used the alleged involvement of Ravalomanana in land deals with foreign interests and similar incidents related to Ravalomanana's self-aggrandizement in his successful bid for power in 2009. Ravalomanana is seen generally as more oriented to the United States, while Rajoelina may be more open to France, the colonial metropole.⁵⁸

Outlook

According to reports, the UNDP deputy resident representative in Antananarivo recently opined that Madagascar was not prepared for elections because the electoral law had not been ratified and a credible independent national election commission had not been set up. In addition, a UN electoral assistance mission had yet to commence its work, which could take 11 months.⁵⁹ Most recently, the key SADC countries renewed pressure on the Rajoelina government to allow Ravalomanana to return with amnesty by the end of February. The apparent agreement to this demand by Malagasy Prime Minister Omer Beriziky, reported on January 26, 2012, is a positive sign, but will need to be confirmed by action.⁶⁰ With all of these factors considered, it is likely that the elections needed to resolve the ongoing political crisis in Madagascar will continue to be deferred, at least through the spring of 2012.

ALERTS

Wade's Bid for Reelection Confirmed, Violent Protests Erupt

Researchers: Dr. Ashley Bybee and Ms. Ashton Callahan

Violent protests erupted in Dakar on Friday and in the northern city of Podor on Monday after the Senegalese Constitutional Court validated President Abdoulaye Wade's bid for reelection. Thirteen others were confirmed as contenders, including Moustapha Niasse, Idrissa Seck, Macky Sall, and Ousmane Tanor Dieng. Another "peaceful gathering" is planned for Tuesday afternoon in the Dakar suburb of Colobane – the site of Friday's riots – fueling fears of escalating violence. The following is a brief summary of where the people, opposition, and other significant actors stand.



(Source: www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/01/201212712295177724.html)



(Source: www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/28/senegal-protests-president-wade-dakar)



(Source: www.teendiariesonline.com/blog/?p=24521)

The People

An opposition rally of about 2,000 people protested in Dakar prior to the ruling. "If they [Constitutional Court] don't reject him [Wade], the people will rise up against him," said a 26-year-old student. Following the ruling, protesters set fire to and looted buildings while youths vandalized vehicles. One policeman was killed during the protests. Local newspapers are calling the protests a night of "fire and blood."⁶¹ The police station in Kaloack was reportedly ransacked and the local headquarters of Wade's *Partie Démocratique Sénégalaise* (PDS) was burned down. Street protests were also reported in Thies and Mbour.⁶² On Monday, two people were shot dead by security forces in the northern city of Podor during a protest purportedly led by the regional leader of the June 23 Movement (M23).⁶³ One Dakar resident predicted the protests will only get worse: "They should expect it to be worse than the June 23 protest, because starting from tomorrow onwards, our youth – what we call our youth forces – will position themselves here in the street."⁶⁴

The Opposition

Political and civil society leaders held a meeting on Saturday to discuss the next steps and future protests. The M23 movement has termed the court's decision a "constitutional coup, and a prelude to what will be an electoral coup." M23 encouraged Senegalese across the country to resist Wade's reelection bid and vowed to "render the country ungovernable."⁶⁵ The candidacies of three opposition candidates including music star Youssou N'Dour, Abdourahmane Sarr and Kéba Keinde, were turned down by the Constitutional Council for failing to gather the required 10,000 signatures of support. N'Dour called on his supporters to prevent the elections from moving forward. Moustapha Niasse echoed the warnings of others, "Wade has no right to

a third term and the people will resist this.” Macky Sall called for “everything at once: marches, sit-ins, resistance,” but “no violence.” *Y'en a Marre*, the popular Senegalese youth movement pushing for political change, announced it would organize demonstrations “to confront this abuse of authority until the law is restored and the candidacy of Abdoulaye Wade is invalidated.”⁶⁶

The Senegalese Government, Brotherhoods, and International Actors

Anticipating public unrest following the Constitutional Council’s ruling, the Interior Ministry took action on January 26 to ban all public demonstrations countrywide until the end of the month.⁶⁷ Wade is now calling for an end to the protests and has promised “free and fair” elections. Police arrested Alioune Tine, a senior member of the M23 movement along with many others, but released him on Monday without being charged.⁶⁸ The Mouride Brotherhood, particularly its leader Serigne Cheikh Sidy Moctar Mbacke, is urging calm, imploring followers to preserve peace in the country, and asking political leaders to move forward with transparent elections.⁶⁹ The UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon continued to promote respect for democracy when speaking at a recent African Union summit in Ethiopia. Although there was no specific mention of Senegal, he said the Arab Spring revolutions were “a reminder that leaders must listen to their people” and that those events “proved that repression is a dead end.”⁷⁰ ECOWAS is similarly concerned by rising tensions in Senegal and has urged all stakeholders to act responsibly.⁷¹

Assessment

Thus far, opposition groups – particularly M23 – have followed through on their promises to protest the ruling of the Constitutional Court and oppose Wade’s third term – without delay. IDA believes that protests will continue, and probably grow in size, strength, and impact, as the election draws closer. Spates of violence will likely continue, reflecting the power of opposition groups to mobilize citizens and the genuine desire to preserve Senegal’s vibrant democracy which has traditionally been heralded as the beacon of success in West Africa. Should Wade win the election on February 26th (the most likely scenario,) the legitimacy of Senegal’s increasingly fragile democracy will be significantly undermined, potentially prompting more opposition activity.

In the long term, there appears to be a growing trend toward the increased use of Wolof in politics, which academics have referred to as “the ‘wolofization’ of Senegal.”⁷² Look for increasing backlash against politicians who speak predominantly in French or evoke other symbols of political elitism, which has been a major contributor to Karim Wade’s unpopularity (he speaks very little Wolof). Rather, watch for the political dialog to take on a more local flavor, as epitomized by Youssou N'Dour who conveys his message in Wolof, which resonates with a larger segment of civil society. In IDA’s assessment, this type of expression and these community-level organizations have the greatest potential to incite violence and opposition to the traditional political elite in Senegal.

Apathetic No More? Occupy Nigeria

Researcher: Dr. Caroline F. Ziemke-Dickens

The January 16, 2012 deal struck between Labor and President Goodluck Jonathan's government to partially restore fuel subsidies and end a crippling general strike is unlikely to mark the end of the grassroots "Occupy Nigeria" movement. In the words of one Nigerian blogger, "a new generation of Nigerian activists has come into their own" in the wake of the government's attempt to take away the only benefit most Nigerians were getting from the country's oil wealth.⁷³ In the view of Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe, the government erred in "contemptuously" mistaking a popular "posture of subservience, quietness, etc." – adopted to survive decades of systemic subjugation – for weakness.⁷⁴ Across the blogosphere, Nigerians were echoing the view that "Nigerians have laid to rest the old lie that they are apathetic cowards and will accept everything from their government without complaining Finally, Nigeria has grown up."⁷⁵

Reform activists are already applying the lessons of the January protests to honing their tools and skills and strengthening their coalitions. Numerous civil society and youth organizations have issued after-action reports that identify areas of focus for strengthening their ability to mobilize collective action against the government's "corruption, intolerance of opposing views, high handedness and poor human rights record."⁷⁶ Two items stand out among the "lessons learned." First, the Occupy Movement must broaden its domestic coalition to draw in university students and, more importantly in highly religious Nigeria, high-profile Christian and Muslim religious leaders. "Imagine," one blogger writes, "if a coalition of churches and mosques had been marching alongside the protestors?" Such a coalition could serve a dual purpose, not only strengthening the movement but also helping to bridge bitter sectarian divides by creating a sense of common interest and fomenting a shared, populist "Nigerian" identity. Second, the movement must foster stronger links with Western media to ensure that future protests get the kind of 24-hour international coverage that "shamed the Egyptian government and forced Western governments to take a stand they didn't want."⁷⁷

Occupy Nigeria's use of social media succeeded in taking their protest international and inspired protests at Nigerian embassies and consulates in New York, London, Toronto, and elsewhere. The movement also utilized tools created by youth groups such as Enough-is-Enough Nigeria and Yourbudgit.com to mobilize the youth vote and conduct grassroots monitoring of the April 2011 Presidential election.⁷⁸ In the aftermath of the fuel subsidy protests, under the banner of "Occupy Nigeria," local activists are also mobilizing popular resistance to "anti-people policies" at the local level.⁷⁹

Tuaregs Launch Attacks in Northern Mali

Researchers: Dr. Dorina A. Bekoe and Ms. Betty Boswell

A group of Tuaregs, many of whom fought for Moammar Gadhafi, are part of a new formation calling itself the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA). Azawad is an area covering northern Mali, northern Niger, and southern Algeria, considered to be the birthplace of the Tuaregs. The goal of the MNLA is to liberate the northern towns of Mali from the central government and to fight for the independence of their homeland. The Tuaregs claim the government, composed predominately of southern ethnic groups, has failed to keep its promise of sharing the nation's resources with the north.⁸⁰ The recent attacks are raising concerns of instability across the region.

The attacks launched during the week of January 16, 2012, have broken the relative peace of the past two years in the area.

- Late on Monday, January 16, and into Tuesday, the MNLA attacked the town of Menaka. Witnesses talked of a clash of rifles and heavy weapons between the rebels and the Malian armed forces. When the Malian helicopters and reconnaissance planes entered the fight, the shooting stopped. No details of casualties were given in early reports. Menaka is significant in that it was the location of the start of the Tuareg's 1990 rebellion.⁸¹
- On Wednesday, January 18, the MNLA launched attacks on two other northern Malian towns: Aguelhok and Tessalit, about 300 miles northwest of Menaka. Conflicting stories about these clashes are reported. A rebel spokesman claims his group has taken the town of Aguelhok and is working on taking Tessalit. He further claims that many government soldiers have been killed, but the MNLA suffered no losses. The Malian Armed Forces claim many rebels have been killed, but that only one government soldier died.⁸²

According to a January 20, 2012, report from the Missionary International Service News Agency (MISNA), the Ministry of Defense reported 35 MNLA fighters were killed in the attacks, with most of the casualties in Aguelhok. MNLA spokesman Moussa Ag Achartoumane denied the official report, saying that many regular soldiers were killed, but there were no casualties among the MNLA. He went on to say further that the attempt to conduct a dialog with the government stopped when they sent military equipment into the region. The MNLA rejected this government attempt "to combat insecurity in the region," calling it instead an occupation and taking up arms to gain their independence.⁸³

Should the violence continue to escalate, it will mark the fourth time the Tuaregs have taken up arms against the state since independence. Mali fought Tuareg insurgencies from 1962 to 1964; 1990 to 1995; and 2006 to 2009. Each time the Malian government opted to settle the conflict through a combination of negotiation and enforcement. The last settlement was brokered by Libya and Algeria.⁸⁴ The current rebellion is more worrisome in the context of the returning Tuaregs from Libya. With Gaddafi gone, so is their main arbiter and supporter of their cause. Equally important, many suspect that the Tuaregs left Libya with significant arms; it is unknown what kind and how many have been brought into Mali.⁸⁵

In reaction to these recent clashes in northern Mali, Niger's President Issoufou organized a forum on peace and development in Arlit, in the Agadez region, to prevent a spillover of the rebellion

into Niger. The forum was attended by Malian Prime Minister Cissé Mariam Kaïdama Sidibéas well as several Tuareg members of the Nigerien government. The Malian Prime Minister encouraged cooperation between the two countries, as President Issoufou announced a plan for reintegrating former Tuareg rebels into Niger society. A plea from Mohamed Anako, a Tuareg activist who heads the Agadez regional council, called for the Malian Tuaregs to “favor dialogue over violence.” It is clear that the recent Tuareg attacks have worried not only the Malian government, but also its neighbor Niger. The previous clashes between the Tuaregs and the state armies caused destabilization across the region, and the governments are trying to avoid a repeat of that situation.⁸⁶

Mauritius: Problems below the Surface of Africa’s Freest Economy


Researcher: Ms. Andrea Pongó

The Index of Economic Freedom 2012 lists the tiny island economy of Mauritius as the eighth freest in the world and the most free of 46 Sub-Saharan African states.⁸⁷ However, the country’s continuing status as an offshore banking haven and a growing trend of heroin transshipment from South Asia justify continued monitoring.

In spite of a developed regulatory regime and the functional rule of law, the identity of corporate owners and bank account holders in Mauritius can be hidden behind several layers of camouflage. Banking secrecy laws, the use of nominee ownership of assets (whereby an asset is registered under another name and held in trust for the real, beneficial owner), and the abuse of attorney-client privilege all protect investor anonymity. Although directors and shareholders of corporations are registered with the government, there is no public registry of companies on the island. According to European officials, available records indicate that the same nine people administer more than 1,500 companies.⁸⁸ French investigative magistrate Renaud van Ruymbeke was quoted in press reports saying, “I recommend Mauritius to those with money to launder. Whenever a judge asks for information from Mauritius during an investigation, there’s no response.”⁸⁹

According to a report by the South Africa-based Institute for Security Studies (ISS), it is common practice for entities and individuals to register shell companies in offshore havens like Mauritius for the purpose of “transfer pricing” – a practice whereby, for example, \$500,000 worth of goods is reported as a shipment of \$100,000 worth of goods to an entity’s Mauritian subsidiary, thus transferring \$400,000 of value out of the country of origin.⁹⁰ The practice is most often used to transfer assets from a high-tax, highly regulated economy – in this case, India – to a low-tax one, such as Mauritius. Because of the two countries’ double taxation avoidance agreement (DTAA), assets not taxed in Mauritius (for example, Mauritius has no capital gains tax) can be later repatriated back to India as foreign investment. About 42 percent of foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into India is routed through entities in Mauritius.⁹¹

Also troubling is the growing use of Mauritius as both a transshipment point for heroin arriving from South Asia and a market for illicit drugs trafficked from larger regional countries including Kenya and Tanzania.⁹² The small 1.2 million population of Mauritius has the highest prevalence of opioid use in Africa as a percent of the age 15 to 64 population.⁹³ Heroin sold in Mauritius is known as “Brown Sugar” and enters the country mainly via couriers who swallow or carry the drugs.⁹⁴ Mauritius has the highest rate of heroin use in Africa. However, even more common than heroin is the use



of pharmaceutical Buprenorphine (brand name Subutex), a semi-synthetic opioid originally used for the treatment of heroin addicts but now abused by addicts in East Africa.⁹⁵ U.S. military experts judge that the limited resources of the Mauritian military and law enforcement cannot effectively tackle drug trafficking without strong support from partners including the United States, United Kingdom, France, and India.⁹⁶

Casamance Region Heating Up Ahead of Senegal's Elections

Researcher: Ms. Ashton Callahan

Senegal's southern Casamance region has experienced a surge in violence since November 2011. Separatist rebels of the Movement for Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) have reportedly claimed 30 lives during the past two months, although it is unclear which of the three rebel military factions is responsible.⁹⁷ The uptick in violence is somewhat typical for the month of December (the conflict began in December 1982), but the Casamance has become an important campaign issue ahead of the February elections. The ongoing violence is a reminder to presidential candidates that the region remains a problem that needs a resolution.



November 21, 2011: Diagon, 10 civilians killed.⁹⁸

December 13, 2011: Kabeumeu, Several killed and 5 soldiers taken hostage.⁹⁹ MFDC will release the hostages if the Senegalese army abandons its pursuit of rebel forces.¹⁰⁰

December 20, 2011: Diagon, 8 killed and 7 wounded in rebel attacks.¹⁰¹

December 21, 2011: Bignona, 1 killed and 1 wounded.¹⁰²

January 2, 2012: Affiniam, 1 killed, 3 wounded, and 2 missing (possibly taken hostage).¹⁰³

January 13, 2012: Saliote, 1 wounded.¹⁰⁴

Previous peace agreements have failed due to factionalism within MFDC and the *maquis* (military wing of MFDC) because some parties refuse any agreement that does not include an independent Casamance.¹⁰⁵ President Wade recently urged peace talks with rebel chiefs César Atoute Badiate, Salif Sadio, and Ousmane Niantang Diatt during his New Year's speech, but has also perpetuated the violence by ordering the Senegalese army to pursue fleeing rebels beyond the country's borders.¹⁰⁶ According to recent press, Salif Sadio (formal rebel chief of the Atika, one of three military factions) is favorable to peace negotiations, but has also been blamed for the recent attacks in the North.¹⁰⁷ General César Atoute Badiate has denied his involvement, while MFDC intellectuals have blamed Ousmane Niantang Diatta for attacks in the South.¹⁰⁸

In December 2011, Jean Marie François Biagui (Secretary General of MFDC's political wing) announced that MFDC would be transformed into a political party – *Mouvement pour le Fédéralisme et la Démocratie Constitutionnels* – to work toward a resolution.¹⁰⁹ Not all MFDC camps seem onboard with this plan. Dr. Ahmed Apakéna Diémé, coordinator of the rebellion's intellectual wing, took the opposite stance in an interview with *Diaspora.fr* – he slammed Biagui for these remarks, emphasized Casamance independence, and threatened “severe havoc” if President Wade dared to campaign in the region.¹¹⁰ Thus, it appears that while some factions of the MFDC view the presidential elections as an opportunity to reengage in peace talks, other see them as an arena to pressure presidential hopefuls into supporting their independence agenda. Given the complicated politics and cross-border nature of the conflict, several presidential hopefuls have encouraged the involvement of the Gambia and Guinea Bissau in the peace process.¹¹¹

Massive Cyber Attack on Kenyan Government Websites

Researchers: Dr. Eliza Johannes and Ms. Ivana Djak

An Indonesian hacker known as Direxer took down 103 Kenyan Government websites on Monday, January 16, 2012. Reports identify the attacker as part of an Indonesian security forum known as Forum Code Security. On his website, the hacker claims to have taken down the websites following a tutorial from the forum, and promises to carry out attacks on other servers if the government further neglects security. The ministries affected include the Ministries of Finance, Education, Public Health, Local Government, Environment, Housing, Livestock, Fisheries, Industrialization, Youth Affairs, National Heritage, and Roads. Sensitive departments such as Immigration, Prisons, Administration Police, and various municipal and country councils were also impacted.¹¹² The hacker marked the websites with his name, a message regarding his “victory,” and a song playing in the background.¹¹³

The government hosts more than 100 of its websites on a single server at the Treasury, which was the server targeted by the hacker. The administration saved money by placing everything on one server. This made the entire system ineffective and slow but, worse, also very vulnerable to hackers. The administration allowed for other loopholes by not providing every user of the sites a unique login and password. The Kenyan government also does not use digital forensics experts to secure its cyber space.¹¹⁴

A Cyber Incident Response Team (CIRT) based out of the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK), took action quickly to restore the affected websites, but some of the website was still not restored a few days later. The government has not reported whether its data has been compromised.¹¹⁵ More Kenyans than ever are using government e-services, and volume on government websites is only expected to increase. Another attack would be devastating, especially in coming years when government e-services become the predominant way of handling applications and other processes involving sensitive information. A scenario in which the Treasury’s financial transactions or the Ministry of Roads’ electric train maintenance are shut down would be disastrous.¹¹⁶

At a meeting on Cooperation in Defense, Inter-State Security and Foreign Policy Coordination in Tanzania on January 16, 2012, the East African Community (EAC) Deputy Secretary General Beatrice Kiraso listed cyber-crime, terrorism, and kidnapping as the top threats to proposed regional integration. Cyber attacks were compared to insecurity in Somalia in their potential to destabilize the region.¹¹⁷ Kenyan and East African cyber security urgently needs to catch up with recent technological developments. There are many steps the Kenyan government can take to prevent further cyber attacks.

Kidnapping Cases Garner Public Attention in Kenya

Researchers: Dr. Eliza Johannes and Ms. Ivana Djak

Summary

The recent kidnapping of Kenyan local government officials following a series of kidnappings of foreigners by al-Shabaab is getting much media and social network attention. Kenyans appear to be blaming the government for the kidnapping outbreak that has hit the country.

Kidnapping of Local Kenyan Officials

Foreign Affairs Minister Moeses Wetangula has confirmed that Kenya is negotiating the release of four hostages abducted by al-Shabaab militants during an attack on January 12, 2012, and several foreigners abducted in Kenya since the fall of 2011. Edward Mule, a 30-year-old Kenyan Government District Officer for Burderi and Wajir South, and Frederick Irungu Wainaina, a 56-year-old Registration Clerk for the Kenyan Ministry of Immigration, were among those kidnapped by al-Shabaab in the raid that killed six people in a Kenyan border town. Al-Shabaab states that it is holding Mule and Wainaina and two others as prisoners of war in retaliation for the Kenyan invasion of Somalia.¹¹⁸ Three policemen, a primary school teacher, a civil servant, and a pregnant woman were killed during the attack. George Tonui, the police commander in Wajir confirms al-Shabaab also captured vehicles, communication equipment, and weapons.¹¹⁹

Mule and Wainaina have received particular attention because al-Shabaab recently tweeted out photos of them.¹²⁰ The two were also allegedly sighted by residents of Bardhere, a Kenyan border village, on Friday, January 13, 2012. The residents said that al-Shabaab paraded the two Kenyans around in a pickup truck.¹²¹ Reports of their pictures sent out via Twitter, and sightings of their being paraded around as hostages have elicited a strong response from Kenyans, who are demanding their release via Facebook and other social media groups.

Foreigners Kidnapped

These recent kidnappings come after several foreigners were kidnapped in Kenya at the end of 2011; the thought of the kidnapping of native local officials seems to have particularly enraged Kenyans. In September 2011, gunmen raided the Kiwayu Safari village, shooting British publishing executive David Tebbut, and taking his wife hostage to Somalia. In October 2011, six armed men kidnapped and killed 66-year-old wheelchair-bound French national Marie Dedieu. October 2011 also saw the kidnapping of two Spanish female aid workers from the Dadaab refugee camp.¹²² Kenya invaded Somalia in the wake of these kidnappings, stating that it would no longer tolerate threats to its security and tourism industry.

Recent reports confirm the suspicion that al-Shabaab was behind these initial kidnappings. According to the Somalia Report website, the two aid workers kidnapped in October 2011 were sold to Somali pirates by al-Shabaab militants. Reports of hostages being sold complicates the claim that al-Shabaab is carrying out these attacks as reprisal, and indicate other potential incentives for the kidnappings.¹²³

Comments by Kenyans on the *Daily Nation* message board express anger at the Kenyan government for going into Somalia, and attribute the recent kidnappings to this involvement. One commentator notes:

We went into this war because of kidnapping of foreigners by al-Shabaab and we were not able to secure their release. Now while actively at war al-Shabaab prove they can still get inside our borders and kidnap Kenyans, then we are being told the Government is negotiating for their release? Who is fooling who? This war is not our thing.¹²⁴

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T O T H E R E A D E R

IDA's team of Africa researchers welcomes your comments, questions, and feedback on the contents of *The Africa Watch*. If you would like to discuss an article in this issue or provide suggestions for future research, please contact me at (703) 845-4394.

With best regards,

George

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward

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ANALYSES

Nigeria: Government under Siege

Researcher: Dr. Caroline Ziemke-Dickens

Summary

- A number of key Nigerian influencers are beginning to question the ability of President Goodluck Jonathan's government to respond constructively to escalating sectarian violence in the north that, to some, seems to be pushing the country toward civil war and damaging Nigeria's prospects for economic development.
- Jonathan is developing a siege mentality, charging in January that Boko Haram had infiltrated the government and security services and was enjoying the patronage of disgruntled northern elites seeking to ensure that that the government will be unable to accomplish other important goals before the 2014 elections.¹
- Both the government and Boko Haram spokesmen have portrayed the group as part of the al Qaeda (AQ)-led global jihadist movement. But recent Boko Haram claims that its leaders received training from AQ in Saudi Arabia while on the Hajj strain credulity,² its agenda remains solidly local, and the millions of Muslims in Nigeria's predominantly Christian south have not embraced the militant agenda in significant numbers.
- Boko Haram does, however, capitalize on a deep cleavage between Nigeria's south and north rooted in the government's failure to deliver long-promised economic and educational development and establish an environment of basic human security in which economic progress in the north would be possible.

Drifting toward Civil War?

Nigerian Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka made international news in January when he told the BBC that Boko Haram violence was pushing the "Nigeria Project" to the brink of civil war. More recently, he told *TheNEWS* magazine that his name was "high on the list" of prominent Nigerians Boko Haram has targeted for assassination:

"The reason for this programme (elimination) which I know is very much their third phase," he charged, "is that those pushing this agenda know very well that this could be the last straw that will break the camel's back. And they would rather this country broke up and possibly in an inferno than continue to accept the loss, even though temporal loss of power in this country. For these people, government is the only business around."³

Several state leaders have echoed Niger State Governor Dr. Muazu Babangida Aliyu's warning that the Jonathan government must stop treating terrorist acts "with kid gloves" and "act fast in order to avert the disintegration of Nigeria as predicted by the United States' Central Intelligence Agency a few years ago."⁴ Dr. Joe Okei-Odumakin, head of the civil society group Campaign for Democracy, characterizes the government response as "directionless and incapable of appreciating what the urgency of the moment is" as illustrated by the "national embarrassment" of the escape from police custody of Kabiru Sokoto, the alleged mastermind of

the bloody Christmas bombings in Madalla.⁵ Others counter that Boko Haram will not succeed in its goal of forcing “the bloody disintegration of Nigeria” in a “country that has developed so many political, economic, and social ties now woven in a complex tapestry for secularity and unity.”⁶

Government under Siege

President Jonathan, who calls Boko Haram a terrorist organization with global ambitions, has “no doubts” that the group has links with international jihadist organizations. He told Reuters that the group has infiltrated the military, police, and his own government and enjoys the patronage of disgruntled northern elites seeking to ensure that the government will be unable to accomplish other important goals before the 2014 elections.⁷

Ineffective responses to the Boko Haram threat, failure to deliver on long-promised economic and educational development programs in the north, and the lack of a comprehensive strategy for addressing the needs of increasing numbers of refugees fleeing violence⁸ have diminished the public’s faith in the Jonathan government’s ability to deliver on promises of long-term reform. That sentiment, and the failure of a besieged government to properly prepare the population for the likely economic impact of the decision to lift fuel subsidies, likely contributed to the outrage and widespread anti-government demonstrations that caught the government by surprise in January. Even in the predominantly Christian south, where he won overwhelming majorities in the 2011 Presidential elections, President Jonathan has lost much of his post-election goodwill.

Both the influential northern socio-political group, the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), and a Boko Haram spokesman vehemently denied government suggestions (echoed by Soyinka and other Nigerian intellectual and political figures) that Boko Haram is receiving financial support from northern elites in the form of protection money. In a statement that also condemned Boko Haram bombings as “un-Islamic,” ACF Chairman Alhaji Aliko Mohammed expressed “grave concern” over “serious allegations peddled by certain people to the effect that some people from other sections of the country were conspiring to cause a high level of insecurity across the country with the clear intention of making the country ungovernable.” After demanding that President Jonathan launch an official investigation based on specific charges if it believes northern leaders are engaged in activities that “border on treason,” he concluded, “We call on the government to be more proactive, more decisive, and engage in less lamentation.”⁹ A Boko Haram spokesman, who goes by the pseudonym Qaqa, denied reports of a protection racket with some northern governors more succinctly, vehemently telling *The Guardian* (UK) in a telephone interview, “May God punish anyone who said so.”¹⁰

DRC: Post-Election Prospects

Researchers: Dr. Eliza Johannes and Ms. Ivana Djak

Summary

- Persistent claims of electoral fraud, protests by the opposition, recently released incongruous parliamentary election results, and anticipation of an upcoming mass protest initiated by the Catholic Church have combined to create a precarious political situation in the DRC following the November 28, 2011 polls.
- In addition to political upheaval, there have been rumors and reports of divisions within the military and potential revolts across the country. It is unclear whether Kabila has control of the army, and whether there is a united army to speak of.
- There has been a recent spike in violence in the eastern DRC that is not fully understood but may be related to the electoral results. Dozens have died, and more than 100,000 people have been internally displaced because of local violence tied to militias.
- Violence is spilling into Uganda, and controversy surrounding the elections is impacting Kabila's foreign allies and may affect their attitudes toward the DRC regime.

An Uncertain Victory and Political Upheaval

On December 9, 2011, the Independent National Electoral Commission announced that Joseph Kabila won reelection with 48.95 percent, with Etienne Tshisekedi garnering 32.33 percent.¹¹ Amid allegations of election fraud by the international community and the opposition, the Supreme Court proclaimed Kabila the official winner on December 17 after rejecting appeals. Claims of election fraud persist.¹² In the Masini district of North Kivu, for example, there was a notable military presence at polling stations, and voters claim they were forced to vote for Kabila.

The delayed parliamentary election results that were released on February 2, 2012 are also problematic. Many point to the fact that Kabila's party, the People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (*Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie* [PPRD]), lost 45 percent of its legislative seats. Critics claim that Kabila could not have won the Presidential election by nearly 49 percent, given such losses. Although Kabila's party still holds a majority, it is much smaller – that is, 260 of 500 seats. As a result, Kabila will find it more difficult to pass legislation and constitutional changes. The smaller margin could lead to more power sharing among factions, but it also has the potential to create gridlock and lead to further conflict.¹³

Claiming fraud, Etienne Tshisekedi has not accepted Kabila's victory. He had himself "sworn in" as president at a private residence. The ceremony was supposed to take place at the Martyrs Stadium in Kinshasa, but, on Kabila's orders, police blocked all roads and entrances to the stadium. The Union for Democracy and Social Progress [*Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social* (UDPS)], Tshisekedi's political party, called on the Congolese to mobilize and escort Tshisekedi to the presidential palace, but only a small crowd gathered, which was eventually dispersed by the police.¹⁴ Although this particular incident went without fatalities, Human Rights Watch claims that 24 people have died in election-related violence since the disputed polls.¹⁵ There have been sizable demonstrations, but life in Kinshasa has mostly gone on as normal. Most recently, Tshisekedi called for a general strike. His call was heeded in Mbuji-Maya, the capital of central Kasai-Oriental province, but was largely ignored in Kinshasa.¹⁶

While massive protests have so far been avoided in the capital, and Kabila's government appears to be doing business as usual, there is potential for unrest as the Catholic Church – one of the main power brokers in the nation and one of the most outspoken critics of the November 28 election – has called for a mass protest against the election results on February 16. The last time the Catholic Church in ordered such a protest, it helped overthrow long-time dictator Mobutu Sese Seko.¹⁷

Military Alliances and Upheaval

In a December 2011 report, the United Nations (UN) stated that former rebels had been promoted to senior military positions in the DRC in return for supporting Kabila's reelection efforts. Former rebels have "hijacked" a process by which the government and Congo's senior military leaders have been integrating former rebels into the army in order to curb rebellion. For example, Bosco Ntaganda, a former member of the National Congress for the Defense of the People (*Congres National Pour la Defense du peuple* [CNPD]), a Rwanda-backed rebel group previously opposed to Kabila, is currently an Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (*Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* [FARDC]) general despite being wanted by the International Criminal Tribunal. Bosco has used his position to secure senior posts for his supporters, who backed Kabila's reelection.¹⁸ These findings have not only discredited the army and further fueled anger over the November polls, but could also further deepen fissures in an already divided force.

Fears of military fragmentation and rebellion are growing. Some in the President's circle fear that military factions in western Congo are allying themselves with Congo-Brazzaville through the former DRC Air Force Chief of Staff, General Faustin Munene, who is accused of masterminding a failed coup and is said to be hiding in Congo-Brazzaville. Military factions in the west are particularly angry because they have lost much of their former power to the CNPD. Munene is said to be linking up with thousands of former officers and soldiers who were loyal to deposed dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. Munene is also suspected of having close ties to General Didier Etumba, current Congolese army chief of staff, who has repeatedly clashed with President Kabila. The military question is further complicated by Etienne Tshisekedi's recent claims that he will pay military members \$150 for their services. Since the lack of salary for soldiers is a serious problem, Tshisekedi's claims could stir unrest within the ranks.¹⁹

Recent acts of rebellion by the military are illustrative of the situation. The city of Goma remains on high alert as reports of an attempted revolt became public on February 4, 2012. According to the spokesman for the governor of North Kivu province, a military attempt against local authorities had been planned. High-ranking officers and an outgoing National Assembly member, Bakungu Mitondeke, are said to have planned the attack. Some reports indicate that Goma and Butembo were to be attacked simultaneously, and that other attacks could be in the making.²⁰

Increasing Violence

Violence involving government troops and militia in the eastern DRC has forced more than 100,000 people from their homes since November according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Clashes in North Kivu's Walikale and Masisi territories have left 22 people dead, an unknown number of women raped, and more than 35,000 displaced. About 70,000 have fled Shabunda in South Kivu. While the violence did follow the elections, it is not certain that it was election-related, as militia groups such as the Rwandan rebel group Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (*Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda* (FDLR)) appear to be behind the attacks.²¹ The UNHCR recently reported further

atrocities against displaced persons as armed groups entered refugee camps in North Kivu province, torturing and killing the inhabitants.²² Katanga province has also experienced violence with the return of Kyungu Mutanga, a war criminal who escaped prison in September 2011. According to the African Association for the Defense of Human Rights, of those who fled his return, 19 children and six pregnant women died of malnutrition and another 1,000 children are hungry.²³ New violence has left dozens dead and thousands dislocated.

The Violence Spills Over

More than 200 Congolese citizens entered the Kisoro district in Uganda in mid-January. Officials at Nakivale Refugee Settlement have since claimed that about 70 to 100 DRC refugees enter the camp every two weeks. The refugees started arriving in anticipation of violence before the November election. They continued fleeing into Uganda after the election as militia harassed them for not supporting Kabila. The refugees have told camp staff that the militias kidnapped their family members and raided their homes.²⁴

Even more worrisome than the influx of refugees are reports of militants crossing the border with them. Musa Ecweru, the Ugandan Minister of Disaster Preparedness, stated that the militia groups are infiltrating the country along with refugees fleeing violence in the DRC. There are reports in Kisoro district of militia gang-raping women, killing, and looting. This has prompted the ministry to relocate refugees in special areas where they cannot intermix with the local populations.²⁵ Kabila has had the support of his neighbors so far, but, should continued fighting in the DRC further impact neighboring nations, the governments of those nations may reconsider the advantages of their alliance.

Governments that are supporting Kabila may also have to take the DRC diasporas living in their nations into consideration. Exiled Congolese staged a major protest in front of the headquarters of the African National Congress (ANC), South Africa's governing political party, in reaction to the South African government's recognition of Joseph Kabila's electoral victory. About 300 Congolese men have been arrested in Johannesburg under charges ranging from kidnapping to damage of property. One Congolese man argues that pro-Kabila strongmen have pushed the South African police into authoritarian action. These Congolese protesters vow not to give up their protests against the Kabila government.²⁶

Côte d'Ivoire – Accounting for Past Military Abuses

Researcher: Dr. Dorina A. Bekoe

Summary

The 2010 presidential elections were intended to unify Côte d'Ivoire, divided by political instability and social conflict since 1995. Instead, post-election election violence left 3,000 dead and one million displaced, as former President Laurent Gbagbo refused to concede power to Alassane Ouattara. Gbagbo was forced from power on April 11, 2011, and 60 of his supporters were arrested. The Ouattara administration created the National Commission of Inquiry (*Commission Nationale d'Enquête* [CNE]) and the Commission on Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation (*Commission de Dialogue, Vérité, et Réconciliation* [CDVR]) and invited the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate suspected perpetrators to address the human rights abuses and war crimes of the post-election crisis and earlier. The CNE's report on victims' testimony is due in late February;²⁷ the CDVR's work has barely begun. Whereas the ICC's indictment of Gbagbo is regarded positively by some, others perceive it as sparing pro-Ouattara militia leaders – especially since only Gbagbo supporters have been arrested. Breaking Côte d'Ivoire's cycle of violence and fostering reconciliation require ending impunity for past military abuses, regardless of political affiliation.

Background

Côte d'Ivoire has been politically and socially volatile since 1995. The 2010 presidential elections were meant to unify the country – politically, socially, and regionally. When former President Laurent Gbagbo refused to acknowledge his defeat to Alassane Ouattara, however, pro-Gbagbo forces clashed with pro-Ouattara armed groups. The five-month struggle for power reflected longstanding regional and ethnic divisions. Breaking Côte d'Ivoire's cycle of violence requires an end to the impunity enjoyed by government and rebel forces.

Post-election Violence: 2010 – 2011

The 2010-2011 post-election violence resulted in 3,000 dead, 150 women raped,²⁸ and nearly one million displaced over the course of five months – earning Côte d'Ivoire the dubious distinction of having the highest level of electoral violence on the continent since 1990.²⁹ The violence ended, and Ouattara assumed the presidency when the *Forces Nouvelles* (FN) rebels, aided by the French military, took control of the country and Abidjan, and Gbagbo was arrested. Ouattara's victory notwithstanding, it was clear that social and political reconciliation would require an end the impunity enjoyed by both Ouattara and Gbagbo supporters. Yet, it is not clear that Ouattara could summon the political will to do so in a manner that would further reconciliation and break the cycle of violence, given his debt to the FN, and the fact that the 60 people arrested in connection with the post-election crisis are all pro-Gbagbo.³⁰

Both sides share responsibility for the violence. Gbagbo and 12 others have been identified by Human Rights Watch (HRW) as bearing a disproportionate level of responsibility for the post-election violence of 2010-2011; eight are Gbagbo supporters, while five are pro-Ouattara. Gbagbo was transferred to the ICC in November 2011; the others are listed below:

Pro-Gbagbo

- Charles Blé Goudé (39) was the leader of the “Young Patriots.” He is currently in Ghana.

- Phillipe Mangou (59) was Chief of Army Staff. He pledged allegiance to Ouattara after Gbagbo's arrest, but was replaced with General Soumaïla Bakayoko. Mangou may be named ambassador to Gabon.
- Bruno Dogbo Blé (59) was head of the Republican Guard. He is currently in a military detention camp at Korhogo (northern Côte d'Ivoire).
- Guiai Bi Poin (59) was the head of Security Operations Command Center units (*Centre de Commandement des Opérations de Sécurité* [CECOS]). He is currently in preventive detention in Abidjan.
- "Bob Marley" was the head of a Liberian militia in western Côte d'Ivoire. He is currently in detention in Monrovia.
- Pierre Brou Amessan is the former director general of Radio Television Ivoirienne, the state television station. He is in exile in Accra.
- Denis Maho Glofiëi (56) founded the 25,000-strong Far West Liberation Front (*Front de Libération du Grand-Ouest*). He is believed to be in Abidjan.³¹

Pro-Ouattara

- Eddi Médi was the former FN commander in Danané, western Côte d'Ivoire. He is now the commander of the national army, the *Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire*.
- Losseni Fofana was the FN zone commander in Man, western Côte d'Ivoire. In August, he was named vice-commander of the Special Forces.
- Chérif Ousmane was a FN force commander in Bouaké. He is currently the deputy chief of presidential security (*Groupe de Sécurité de la Présidence de la République*).
- Ousman Coulibaly was the FN commander in Odienné, western Côte d'Ivoire. He is currently part of the Special Forces.
- Amadé Ouérémi led a group of Burkinabè militia based in Péko, western Côte d'Ivoire, where he remains.³²

Ending Impunity

The Ivoirian-led CNE and CDVR are meant to explain the background of the violence and document the experiences of its victims. Côte d'Ivoire's judicial system and the ICC will prosecute those arrested for the postelection violence.³³

The CNE began the collection of testimony from victims in Abidjan in January 2012 and is due to submit its report at the end of February. Already, Gbagbo supporters are denouncing the report, calling the commission non-inclusive.³⁴ The CDVR, officially established on July 13, 2011, is led by former Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny and has a two-year mandate to undertake its work. Budgetary constraints prevent it from implementing its mandate in earnest, and it has not yet established a framework for the various crimes it will investigate.³⁵ Moreover, while the CDVR proposes to create an opportunity for victims to air grievances and perpetrators to seek forgiveness, it will not prosecute perpetrators. Instead, victims are promised "physical, material, moral, and psychological" reparations.³⁶

The International Criminal Court

Although Côte d'Ivoire did not sign the Rome Statute, both the Gbagbo and Ouattara administrations have recognized the jurisdiction of the ICC to investigate crimes of genocide,

war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international law.³⁷ Some see the ICC as central in the fight against impunity³⁸ – perhaps because of the inherent partisan nature of Ivorian judicial institutions. Thus, some praised the ICC for charging Gbagbo with bearing “individual criminal responsibility, as indirect co-perpetrator for four counts of crimes against humanity” (namely, murder, rape and other sexual violence, persecution, and other inhuman acts).³⁹ For others, however, the focus on Gbagbo as an obstacle to reconciliation is an example of the international community’s partisanship⁴⁰ – Ouattara’s supporters are also culpable.

Conclusion

The dearth of funds for the CDVR, the CDVR’s inability to prosecute, the rejection of the CNE by Gbagbo supporters, the ICC’s focus on Gbagbo, and the current detention of only Gbagbo supporters cast doubt on the impartiality of the processes in place to effectively end impunity. Ouattara recently declared that “impunity is over ... anyone who has committed a crime will be judged. The process will be fair, and we will not try to protect anyone.”⁴¹ Unfortunately, the judicial system, like many institutions in Côte d’Ivoire, is considered partisan. Moreover, the record of FN and other militia leaders who have committed abuses, but still received plum assignments in the Ouattara administration, casts doubt about Ouattara’s political will for insisting on impartial justice. If Côte d’Ivoire is to remain peaceful, Ouattara will have to make a more determined effort to demonstrate that even members of the FN and affiliated militia who helped him must answer to charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. As currently designed, the mechanisms for addressing past military abuses cannot effectively end the cycle of violence in Côte d’Ivoire.

The Struggle for South Africa's Young, Black Electorate

Researcher: Dr. Janette Yarwood

Summary

In late January 2012, South Africa's Democratic Alliance Student Organization distributed a poster featuring an image of a white man and black woman in a semi-naked embrace above a caption that read, "In our future, you wouldn't look twice." This comes just a few months after the election of Lindiwe Mazibuko, a 31-year-old black woman as Parliamentary Leader of the Democratic Alliance (DA). Both of these moves indicate that the DA is actively attempting to court a new generation of voters across South Africa. Meanwhile, 30-year-old African National Congress (ANC) Youth League (ANCYL) President Julius Malema, who was suspended from the party for five years, remains controversially popular among the majority of young black South Africans.

Mazibuko: The DA's New Parliamentary Leader

The DA is the official opposition party in South Africa. The party has always maintained that South Africa should be a color-blind society, and it clearly opposes racially based policies such as affirmative action and Black Economic Empowerment. During the 2009 national elections, the DA won 17 percent of the overall vote and dominated in the Western Cape, winning approximately 52 percent of the votes in that province.⁴²

In what can only be declared an effort to appeal to a broader electorate, the DA elected Lindiwe Mazibuko as parliamentary Leader in October 2011. There was some opposition within the party to Ms. Mazibuko, with those against her candidacy arguing that she lacked the necessary experience. This led to the perception that Mazibuko was chosen simply because she is young and black. Could Mazibuko represent an alternative to Julius Malema? This is highly unlikely in the near term given that the DA dominates the polls only in areas that lack a black majority. The broader question is whether the DA can appeal to young, black voters in order to become a true opposition party on the national level.

Julius Malema: The ANC Youth Leader

On February 4, 2012, the ANC upheld the five-year membership suspension of ANCYL President Julius Malema. In November 2011, Malema was found guilty by the ANC disciplinary committee of creating divisions within the party and bringing the party into disrepute by calling for regime change in Botswana. While Malema lost his appeal to overturn the charges that will lead to his suspension, he can appeal for a lighter sentence.

The Eastern Cape ANCYL has resolved to disregard Malema's suspension since it has yet to come into effect. The Youth League's provincial Secretary, Mziwonke Ndabeni, stated, "Julius is still president ... any discussion of a post-Julius era is premature at this stage."⁴³ Additionally, the ANCYL has vowed to intervene on Malema's behalf by proposing that the National Executive Committee (NEC) attempt to save Malema by using two further options provided for by the ANC constitution.⁴⁴

There are certainly those who are celebrating Malema's downfall and hoping that his suspension means the end of his political career. It cannot be denied, however, that Malema has broad appeal because he is able to tap into the anger of the majority of blacks who complain that 18 years after the end of white-majority rule they continue to live in poverty. Malema's presence

these past few years has cast a sharp light on the ANC's own weaknesses and the inability on the part of the current leadership to rise above and preside over the fighting factions. Malema is a face of the lobby for change, which is bigger than Malema and still very much on track. It is an underground initiative in which Malema merely played a very visible role.⁴⁵ Even with the suspension, Malema is unlikely to leave the public stage for some time. (The suspension will not come into effect until December 2012.) If for some reason Malema does step down, another Malema-like character will probably step forward.

View from the Field

While traveling in South Africa during October and November 2011, the author took the opportunity to ask a number of people across a range of ages, races, and socio-economic status their thoughts on both Mazibuko and Malema. Several young, black, professional South Africans held the position that Mazibuko's election is a DA ploy to attract voters. Others stated that Mazibuko is a good choice because she can get media attention in a way that no other DA politician has been able to attract. Working class and poor South Africans felt that Mazibuko could not represent them because "she does not know what their lives are like."⁴⁶ The author asked a group of 18- to 20-year-old black South African students their thoughts on Malema. To her surprise, several explained that they had been impressed with him because he cares about everyday South Africans when other politicians enter the townships only during election season. One young man said that he is the only politician who is talking about poor people.

Conclusion

The DA party is attempting to appeal to young (especially black) voters. Many feel, however, that the opposition remains clueless about how to engage effectively on the day-to-day issues that affect the majority of South Africans. While electing Lindiwe Mazibuko to a leadership role is certainly an attempt to show that the party is changing, her recent comment that South Africa needs a leader "who can help us find our way to a post-racial future" does not resonate with the masses, especially when a quarter of South Africa's workforce is unemployed and 18 percent of the population lives below the poverty line.⁴⁷ The IDA view is that Mazibuko's rise to leadership may strengthen the DA at the polls, but only marginally.

ALERTS

Mali – Possible Postponement of the Presidential Elections?

Researcher: Dr. Dorina Bekoe

Summary

- A number of Malian publications have begun to ask whether the presidential elections will be postponed, in light of the Tuareg insurgency.
- The renewed Tuareg insurgency could present logistical difficulties in holding the presidential elections.
- Some question whether elections can be deemed credible, when held in the context of an insurgency.

The renewed insurgency by the Tuareg in north and eastern Mali has led many analysts to begin to question whether the presidential elections can take place as scheduled on April 29. Some question the logistical practicality of holding the elections in the Tuareg-affected areas.⁴⁸ Still others – rumored to include President Amadou Touré⁴⁹ – question whether the disenfranchisement of those displaced by the fighting undermines the legitimacy of the winner.⁵⁰

The Minister of Territorial Administration, Kafougouna Koné, asserts that the ministry is organizationally on course with holding elections on April 29. He recently faced questions by journalists, however, about the logistics of holding elections in the context of the current instability. Koné responded that the Constitutional Court will make the final determination as to whether elections could go forward.⁵¹ Thus, it appears that the administration is keeping its options open on whether the elections will take place as planned.

Key Developments in the Fight against al-Shabaab in Somalia

Researcher: Dr. Stephanie Burchard

On January 30, 2012, Ethiopian troops crossed into the Gedo region of south central Somalia through the border town of Dolow.⁵² According to initial reports, the troops are equipped with armored vehicles – although the government of Meles Zenawi has not confirmed this account.⁵³ This incursion occurred less than a week after an al-Shabaab suicide bomber attacked an Ethiopian army base in Beledweyne, also located in south central Somalia.⁵⁴ Beledweyne was the site of a New Year's Eve battle between Ethiopian troops and insurgents from al-Shabaab in which Ethiopia was able to capture the town and drive out the rebels.⁵⁵ The deployment of Ethiopian troops – which began in November 2011 – represents a renewed effort and a collaborative approach to combating al-Shabaab in Somalia. Ethiopia had previously contributed troops to the effort in 2006 but withdrew them in 2009 after suffering several serious losses to al-Shabaab and after much criticism from the Somali population regarding the interaction of Ethiopian troops with Somali civilians.⁵⁶

Ethiopian forces are fighting in concert with African Union (AU) troops deployed near the capital city of Mogadishu and Kenyan forces concentrated in southern Somalia.⁵⁷ In early February the Kenyan military estimated that it killed at least 100 al-Shabaab rebels in Badhadhe, a key city in southern Somalia that purportedly connects al-Shabaab forces with supplies arriving via the Indian Ocean.⁵⁸ The declared objective of the Kenyan troops is the southern port city of Kismayo, which contributes an estimated \$70 million per year to al-Shabaab through taxes and revenues.⁵⁹

The popular acceptance of Ethiopian and Kenyan troops in Somalia may also signify increasing displeasure of the Somali population with al-Shabaab, who recently cut off all foreign food aid. Until the end of January, the International Committee of the Red Cross had been the only source of foreign aid al-Shabaab allowed into southern Somalia; however, al-Shabaab accused the Red Cross of distributing expired foodstuffs – an allegation that the Red Cross denies – and summarily banned the Red Cross from continuing its relief efforts in Somalia.

On February 2, 2012, British Foreign Secretary William Hague traveled to Mogadishu – the first time in 20 years that a British foreign secretary has visited Somalia.⁶⁰ Secretary Hague's visit comes just a few weeks before a conference on Somali instability, called by British Prime Minister David Cameron, is set to take place in London. Some have said these developments represent a renewed commitment by the British to find a tractable solution to the decades-long conflict in Somalia.

Malawi: Dissatisfaction with Democratic Progressive Party Spurs Political Competition

Researcher: Ms. Betty Boswell

Malawians are unhappy with President Bingu wa Mutharika and his administration in the face of economic and other social problems in the country. In an effort to win back public support and pave the way for his brother, Peter Mutharika, to represent the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the 2014 election, President Mutharika is poised to rejuvenate his party and reshuffle his cabinet.⁶¹

The president's ruling DPP will likely face political competition in the next election from the following sectors:

- Reports are surfacing about intra-DPP rivalry and challenges from a DPP group called Hope Alliance, led by legislator Moses Kunkuyu.⁶²
- Another challenge comes from Vice President Joyce Banda, who is also president of the People's Party.⁶³
- Atupele Muluzi, son of former president Bakili Muluzi and deputy leader of the United Democratic Front (UDF), will campaign on an "agenda for change."⁶⁴

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T O T H E R E A D E R

IDA's team of Africa researchers welcomes your comments, questions, and feedback on the contents of *The Africa Watch*. If you would like to discuss an article in this issue or provide suggestions for future research, please contact me at (703) 845-4394.

With best regards,

George

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward

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ANALYSES

Zimbabwe: Mugabe Threatens to Reject Zuma

Researcher: Dr. Janette Yarwood

Summary

Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe threatened to reject the role of South African President Jacob Zuma as the official Southern African Development Community (SADC) mediator if Zuma stands in the way of Mugabe's wish to hold early elections this year. Mugabe maintains that Zimbabwe reserves the right to reject facilitators whose conduct exhibits bias toward any party in the coalition government.¹ SADC, however, has continued to support Zuma as the mediator on the Zimbabwe situation.

Background

Mediators from the 15-nation SADC organization under the direction of then-South African President Thabo Mbeki brokered the power-sharing deal between Mugabe and opposition rival Morgan Tsvangirai in 2008. The Global Political Agreement (GPA) for Zimbabwe was a watershed agreement. The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and the two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formations resolved to work together toward consolidation of peace and reconstruction of the country's shattered economy and political landscape.² In this agreement, President Robert Mugabe retained the Executive Presidency (head of State and Government) and the positions of commander-in-chief of the armed forces and chair of cabinet, while Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC-T grouping became the Prime Minister (head of the Council of Ministers), and Arthur Mutambara of MDC-M was given the position of Deputy Prime Minister.³ Jacob Zuma took over as SADC mediator for Zimbabwe in November 2009.

Current State of Affairs

In December 2011, Mugabe informed a ZANU-PF conference in Bulawayo that elections will be held in 2012 with or without reforms, including a new constitution and election and media reforms, laid out in the GPA. Mugabe's comments came at a time when the SADC facilitator had demanded full implementation of the power-sharing agreement before polls are held. Zuma adopted a tough stance on Zimbabwe in 2011, noting in a report to the SADC Troika Summit⁴ entitled *Zimbabwe Peace Process*: "It is time that SADC must speak with one voice in impressing to all the parties concerned that this situation can no longer be tolerated. ...The fact that Zimbabwean parties are in an electioneering mode, and are more and more agitating for the holding of elections while they have not done enough groundwork towards ensuring that the building blocks and institutions are firmly in place towards the holding of free, fair, and democratic elections is counterproductive."⁵

SADC intervention is essential to ensure legitimate elections can take place and to prevent Zimbabwe from slipping back into crisis. Although levels of political violence in Zimbabwe have decreased since the signing of the GPA, incidents of politically motivated violence have been reported, especially during the constitutional review process and since the announcement of possible elections in 2011.⁶ Further, the MDC and other opposition groups do not believe the

present political environment is conducive to free and fair elections and want the provisions of the GPA to be implemented before elections. Mugabe's ailing health, the struggle over his succession within ZANU PF, and the unreformed security sector leadership – the so-called "securocrats" – have the potential to prevent a democratic transfer of power.

Mugabe's insistence that elections take place this year with or without reforms and Zuma's position that the country cannot hold elections before a clear roadmap is in place put Mugabe and Zuma (and SADC) at odds. SADC has supported Zuma in no uncertain terms. The SADC executive secretary, Tomaz Salo-Mao, told Zimbabwean media that the regional grouping was satisfied with Zuma's facilitation in Zimbabwe, stating that the facilitator had not been appointed by any political party, but by a summit of the 15-member regional grouping. "President Zuma remains the mediator in Zimbabwe. He is not a party mediator; he is a SADC mediator appointed by the summit," he said.⁷

President Zuma appears determined to resolve the current impasse and is seeking support from SADC nations. According to a statement released by the Office of the Presidency, Zuma visited Botswana on Wednesday, February 29, and Namibia on Thursday, March 1. Although the agenda of the meetings has yet to be officially released, media reports in South Africa said one reason for the visits was to seek support against Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe, who recently threatened to expel Zuma from his role as facilitator of the country's crisis talks.⁸

Implications for South Africa-Zimbabwe Relations

It is in South Africa's interest to ensure credible elections and a smooth transfer of power in Zimbabwe. A new influx of Zimbabwean political refugees would almost certainly rush across its borders in the event of election-related instability. The May 2007 eruption of xenophobic violence in South Africa was partly attributed to the burgeoning Zimbabwean refugee population in poor neighborhoods in the country. A new inflow of Zimbabwean refugees would escalate such tensions and could lead to renewed violence. Finally, election-related instability in Zimbabwe would have a spill-over effect in the region, including a massive exodus of refugees to Botswana, Namibia, Malawi, Zambia, and South Africa, among other countries.

Conclusion

If President Jacob Zuma is to make an impact on the Zimbabwe situation, he should be more direct and engaged with the political parties, ZANU PF and the two MDC formations, to ensure that GPA reforms that were agreed upon in 2008 are implemented.

Given that Zimbabwe's security chiefs pose a threat to sustainable peace, they should be brought into the vision for a post-GPA Zimbabwe. The inclusion of security chiefs in the negotiations for democratic reform in Zimbabwe is crucial given that this group has the hard power to prevent a smooth democratic transition. Finally, SADC needs to ensure all its members are in agreement on a way forward for Zimbabwe.

Kenya's Election Season Starts Tentatively

Researcher: Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward

Summary

Even though the date for Kenya's next presidential election has not been set, the season of pre-electoral maneuvering and deal making has begun. Prime Minister Raila Odinga is still the candidate to beat. His two closest rivals both have been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for offenses connected with the post-election violence in 2007 and 2008. The factors that have driven recurring electoral violence in Kenya have not been thoroughly addressed, and the potential for violence surrounding the next election is high. Watchers of the Kenyan political scene will want to focus attention on several key areas that could cause additional turbulence during the campaign, including:

- Developments in the ICC cases
- Determination of the date of the election
- Efforts of PM Odinga's opponents to forge an effective coalition
- Kenya's military campaign in Somalia
- Performance of the Kenyan economy.

The ICC Cases

On January 23, 2012, the ICC confirmed charges of crimes against humanity, including murder, in the cases of four of the six Kenyans accused of offenses in connection with the 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya.⁹ The four included Deputy Prime Minister Uruhu Kenyatta and William Ruto, a Member of Parliament. Kenyatta and Ruto are former political opponents who are now allied in a challenge to PM Odinga's presidential hopes. Both men vehemently proclaim their innocence and have said that they intend to appeal the confirmation of charges. The ICC's decision seems hardly to have dented Kenyatta's support. According to a recent Infotrak poll, preferences for Kenyatta as the next president of Kenya declined only one percent, from 19 to 18 percent, from October 2011 until February 2012.¹⁰ Barring an unlikely swift and successful appeal of the recent ICC decision, both Kenyatta and Ruto will remain under a cloud throughout the election campaign, and actions by the ICC could be consequential.

Election Date Uncertain

True to the principle that nothing is simple in Kenyan politics, the date for the next presidential election is still in play. The Kenyan constitutional court may have thought it had resolved the issue in January, when it ruled that the election should take place in March 2013 unless the president and the prime minister signed an agreement dissolving the current coalition government earlier. The ink was hardly dry on that ruling when PM Odinga called it into question. During Question Time in the Kenyan parliament on February 15, 2012, Odinga stated the election date decision was too important to be left to an agreement between himself and President Kibaki. Instead, he intended to introduce a bill so the National Assembly could debate and fix the election date.¹¹ Thus, the election will take place in March 2013 – unless it takes place earlier. The alternative date most often cited is December 2012, which would require an agreement to dissolve the legislature by October. One significant factor to bear in mind is the desire of many members of parliament to hold on to their seats – and their substantial salaries and perquisites – as long as possible.

Viability of Opposition Dependent on Weak Coalition

According to the Infotrak poll taken in February, 38 percent of Kenyans support PM Odinga for president, double the total of his closest rival.¹² Since Odinga's support is less than the absolute majority that would be required to avoid a run-off election, there is substantial incentive for multiple candidates to enter the race. A loose and shifting coalition, dubbed the "G7 Alliance," has formed around Kenyatta and Ruto.¹³ Other than a common desire to defeat PM Odinga, it does not appear that this coalition has a coherent platform or program. In addition, the possibility of further ICC action against Kenyatta and Ruto further weakens the coalition.

Not Yet an Election Issue

Up to now, the operations of the Kenyan armed forces in Somalia have not become a political issue. On the contrary, the operation has sparked significant expressions of Kenyan patriotism and support for the forces. The recent re-hatting of the Kenyan force in Somalia under the African Union and the decision by the UN Security Council to expand the size of the African Union force provide significant political cover and potential financial support.

One aspect of the operation that could spark negative domestic reaction is the possible under-reporting of casualties. Although Kenyan official sources have not published specific casualty numbers, government statements have conveyed the impression that casualties have been low. Other observers and analysts believe the number of dead and wounded, compared to the size of the force in Somalia, may be fairly high. In a conversation on January 31, 2012 with IDA, a senior researcher at an authoritative Washington think-tank estimated the number of killed in action as of mid-January at around 200. He estimated weekly losses could be as high as 10 killed each week.¹⁴ Under-reporting of casualties could become a significant political issue if discrepancies between the reported numbers and actuals are revealed publicly.

State of the Economy Will Be Critical

As of December 2011, the World Bank painted a fairly rosy picture for the Kenyan economy in 2012. It projected growth to accelerate from 4.3 percent in 2011 to 5.0 percent in 2012.¹⁵ This estimate was a slight downgrade from the Bank's previous forecast of 5.3 percent growth. The Bank also noted the Kenyan economy has been "like an airplane flying on one engine: its strong domestic demand and a vibrant service sector keep it in the air, but to get to its destination, the second engine (exports) will have to pick up."¹⁶ In addition, the Bank noted Kenya's economy is especially vulnerable to possible external shocks, including both higher fuel prices and a possible crisis in the Euro zone. Since publication of the Bank's projections, both of these external vulnerabilities have emerged. Rising oil prices will exacerbate inflation, already at 13 percent annually, and increase the cost of staples. The result could be popular unrest in the midst of a national election campaign.

Conclusion

Kenya is entering its electoral season with an unusually large number of open issues that could both affect the campaign and provide fuel for popular unrest. At this distance from the elections, it is too early to make predictions, but the potential for violence in connection with the poll is quite substantial.

Posturing or Preparing for War? Relations between Sudan and South Sudan

Researcher: Dr. Stephanie Burchard

Summary

- The government of South Sudan has shut down all oil production in the country until an agreement can be reached with its northern neighbor Sudan over oil transit fees, among other issues. More than 70 percent of the region's oil reserves are found in South Sudan; however, the only existing pipelines to transport oil from the landlocked South Sudan run through Sudan. Since approximately 98 percent of South Sudan's budget is derived from oil revenue, this will result in a *de facto* moratorium on incoming government revenue.
- The Republic of Sudan has responded by increasing its war rhetoric and preparing its military for the possibility of war.
- Both countries are currently facing significant domestic unrest. South Sudan is dealing with an internal ethnic conflict in Jonglei, its largest state. Sudan has been experiencing a rash of protests in response to a crackdown by the government and a sharp economic contraction. Conflict in the disputed border areas of Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile is ongoing.
- The next attempt at negotiating an agreement between South Sudan and Sudan is scheduled to take place in Addis Ababa in March.

Oil Revenues

Less than a year after formally declaring independence from Sudan, relations between Sudan and the government of the newly formed South Sudan are as contentious as ever. Much of the current conflict stems over how to distribute revenue from the production of oil. Approximately 70 to 75 percent of the region's oil reserves are found in South Sudan; however, the only existing pipelines to transport oil from the landlocked South Sudan run through Sudan and into the Red Sea. The two countries are currently in seemingly deadlocked negotiations over transit fees. Khartoum is requesting upward of \$36 per barrel while South Sudan has countered with less than \$1.¹⁷ Prior to the secession of South Sudan in July 2011, the North and South split oil revenues evenly.

In late January 2012, South Sudan took the unprecedented step of completely shutting down its oil production after accusing Sudan of stealing 6 million barrels of oil.¹⁸ Sudan defended its appropriation of the oil, saying that the oil was taken in order to compensate itself for unpaid transit fees. This maneuver was meant to punish Sudan and provide the South with leverage in negotiations over future oil revenues. Because almost the entirety of South Sudan's budget is derived from oil revenue, the shutdown will result in a *de facto* moratorium on incoming government revenue. Until the shutdown, Sudan was producing 350,000 barrels of oil per day.¹⁹

As a means of decreasing the South's dependence on the North's pipelines (and perhaps the North in general), South Sudan signed in January a memorandum of understanding with the government of Kenya to construct a pipeline connecting South Sudan to Kenya's coast through the port city of Lamu.²⁰ It is expected that this pipeline, due to the associated risk of construction in troubled northeastern Kenya, could take anywhere from 11 months (South Sudan's estimates) to three years to be fully operational. Further complicating matters, in

February, South Sudan expelled the head of Petrodar, a consortium of Chinese and Malaysian companies responsible for more than 65 percent of oil production in South Sudan. China is Sudan's largest trade partner and the recipient of the majority of Sudanese oil.

Diversionsary Politics

Accusations that Sudan and South Sudan are fomenting unrest in each other's backyards have been flying back and forth between the two countries. Khartoum accuses Juba of covertly supporting rebels in South Kordofan.²¹ Juba accuses Khartoum of arming militias to destabilize the nascent country²² and sabotage the South's oil fields.²³

Internal unrest has been escalating over the past several months within *both* countries so an external conflict could be a mutually beneficial distraction for both countries.²⁴ There have been sporadic protests in Khartoum over the past year or so, six to eight or so newspapers closed since secession, and hundreds of protestors have been arrested at the University of Khartoum.²⁵ Jok Madut, a writer from South Sudan, argues that Khartoum is escalating war rhetoric in order to divert Sudanese attention from failures of its own government in providing for its people.²⁶

In South Sudan, significant ethnic violence is occurring in Jonglei; the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM-N) has continued to agitate for secession and reformation; and fighting continues in the disputed areas of Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile. A report issued by the London School of Economics suggests that Khartoum is being used as a scapegoat by Juba to distract specifically from the ongoing ethnic violence in Jonglei.²⁷

The Likelihood of War

In late January, some 700 members of the SAF met with President al-Bashir and his defence minister. The president allegedly warned the troops of the possibility of war with South Sudan. Officers reportedly told the government that the troops were not prepared or equipped to successfully wage war against the South.²⁸

A 2007 study found that, in civil wars in which rebel group emerged victorious and in which peacekeepers were present after cessation of hostilities, the likelihood of re-engaging in civil war was low.²⁹ Both of these conditions are present in the Sudans. Economic underdevelopment, however – a major problem in both countries – is significantly and positively related to the resumption of civil war hostilities.³⁰ In addition, the presence of a valuable commodity (such as oil) provides both sides with a powerful economic incentive to re-engage in war. Finally, ethnic hostilities and secessionist conflicts – which characterize the Sudanese Civil War – are highly correlated with the recurrence of civil war.³¹ To make matters worse, in a 2009 pre-independence survey, 43 percent of South Sudanese reported believing there would eventually be another war with the north, and 38 percent were confident there would be another war within South Sudan.³²

In an attempt to broker a deal, representatives from both countries met in February in Addis Ababa. After several contentious and unproductive rounds of talks, further discussions have been postponed until March.³³ Absent a sudden change of policy, Sudan has stated that it intends to strip all South Sudanese immigrants of their Sudanese citizenship in April 2012.³⁴ Southern nationals living in the north number between 500,000 and 1 million. The effect of this act could send upward of 1 million persons back to South Sudan.

Taken as a whole, the situation is not encouraging. Given the degree of interdependence between the two countries, conflict would result in mutual economic destruction. At the same time, however, the leaders of both countries may view conflict as politically expedient. In fact, the reckless behavior of both governments suggests a renewed North-South conflict is in the works.

Chadian Rebels and Crisis in the Central African Republic

Researchers: Dr. Eliza Johannes and Ms. Ivana Djak

Summary

The FPR (*Front Populaire Pour le Redressement* [Popular Front for Recovery]), a Chadian rebel group operational in the Central African Republic (CAR) since 2008, was involved in particularly destructive clashes with Central African rebel groups at the end of 2011.³⁵ These clashes prompted Chad and CAR to create a joint task force to fight the FPR in the northern part of the country. Joint force actions have in turn led to massive population displacements. International NGOs are warning the situation could turn into a substantial humanitarian crisis.³⁶ The growing insecurity in CAR could attract additional rebel groups to CAR, further perpetuating the cycle of violence.

Rebel Clashes in Late 2011

In December 2011, the FPR clashed with a Central African insurgent group, the FDPC (*Front Democratique du Peuple Centrafricain* [Central African People's Democratic Front]) in the northern village of Vafio, on the road between Kabo and Batangafo. Civilians were killed, and numerous houses burned when the FPR attacked the town of Kabo several days later in retaliation. A December 21, 2011 United Nations Security Council resolution expressed "deep concern about the extensive recruitment and the acquisition of weapons by the FPR," and condemned the violation of a peace agreement signed by FPR



(<http://www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/africa/central-african-republic/>)

leader General Abdel Kader Baba Ladde (Baba Ladde) and mediators of Chad and the Central African Republic. After the December attacks, CAR President Francois Bozize said he would continue to encourage the FPR to return to Chad but that force would be used if negotiations failed.³⁷

Joint Force Operation and Baba Ladde's Response

As attacks continued, a joint Central African-Chadian military operation was set up on January 15, 2012 by the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to capture Baba Ladde. The joint force attacked FPR positions in Gondova and Quandago for the first time on January 23, 2012. The joint operation is ongoing and Baba Ladde has not been captured.³⁸

Baba Ladde claims to be fighting on behalf of the Fula people, a tribe spread over numerous African countries from Senegal to Sudan. The FPR is operating in CAR with the goal of overthrowing the Chadian government, specifically Chadian President Idriss Deby, who has been in power since 1990. In a recent statement, the group claims it is in a position to launch an

attack on N'Djamena, Chad's capital city, by joining forces with other rebel groups in the country.³⁹ FPR claims it has created alliances with other groups, namely the PJD (Party for Justice and Development [*Parti pour la Justice et le Développement*]), the CPJP (Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace [*Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix*]), the UFDR (Union of Democratic Forces for Unity [*Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement*]), and the APRD (People's Army for the Restoration of Democracy [*Armée populaire pour la restauration de la démocratie*]), to depose CAR President Bozize. The CPJP signed a ceasefire agreement in 2011; the APRD and the UFDR signed peace accords in 2008 and have denied involvement with the alliance. It is unclear how real the threat is.⁴⁰ In a February 27 interview with RFI News, Baba Ladde claimed his forces are moving closer to Chad where they plan to go on the offensive. He denies being in Sudan and denies committing atrocities in CAR, where he claims his group seeks peace.⁴¹

Instability and Humanitarian Crisis

Fighting between the FPR and Chadian and CAR forces along the border by Gondova and Quandago has left thousands displaced. Following the initial January 24 attack, up to 16,000 people fled the northern region. Kaga-Bandoro's bishop, Albert Vanbuel, said the counter-operation led to a generalized fear among the population as Chadian troops comb the area for rebels.⁴² Populations are continuously on the move and figures are changing daily but initial estimates report more than 11,000 people are internally displaced in the Kaga-Bandoro sub-region alone.⁴³ Many villages north of the road between Quandago and Gondova have been partially or completely destroyed. Families have found neighbors and relatives to stay with, but many are living in the bush without basic provisions. Victims report armed men destroyed homes, raped women, and threatened further violence.⁴⁴

Although the group Doctors Without Borders has managed to reopen health clinics in some villages, they are working without backup and are warning that the medical care available is inadequate.⁴⁵ The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been distributing food and essentials in affected areas that it can reach, but it has been difficult to distribute aid in remote locations where the ICRC is not well known.⁴⁶ Those in the bush, which is the least accessible area, are the most vulnerable population.⁴⁷

The FPR has additionally destabilized the region through occasional banditry. During the second week of February, FPR rebels robbed 40 people including local government officials on a road between Ndjoukou and Galafondo in central CAR. The rebels tied up victims and took their valuables.⁴⁸ Central African civilians are organizing into militia groups to defend themselves from the foreigners. These groups can potentially become violent groups themselves, perpetuating the cycle of violence.

A Country on the Brink of Disaster

CAR has about 19,900 refugees, 94,400 internally displaced persons, and 71,600 returnees. UN agencies and partners recently requested more relief funding, arguing that there is great potential for disaster in a country with so many displaced persons. Any incident in the country quickly turns into humanitarian crisis.⁴⁹ The food sector is fragile, farmers remain engaged in small-scale market gardening due to insecurity, and the variety of products is weak.⁵⁰

The currently affected northern region is additionally destabilized by other distressed populations settling in it. More than 2,000 Nigerian cattle grazers migrated to Cameroon and CAR in 2011 due to conflicts between farmers and grazers in the northeast region. This foreign pastoral population adds strain to an already precarious situation.⁵¹ Additionally, when

President Francois Bozize overthrew President Ange-Felix Patasse in 2003, many Patasse loyalists fled to the north and have periodically taken up arms.

An Alert in the October 2011 issue of *The Africa Watch* described CAR as a nation plagued by weak national institutions, extreme poverty, persistent human rights violations, and high rates of violence perpetrated by armed movements, in which civilians are exposed to incessant attacks by militants such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The departure of the UN mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT) in December 2010 has left a security vacuum that CAR has not yet managed to fill.⁵²

Though Chad is the main target of FPR activity, the rebel group probably does not have the capacity to inflict significant damage on Chadian targets. The Central African government maintains a weak grip on the country and lacks the capacity to eradicate militant groups and protect civilians. The situation is likely to become more volatile and has the potential to attract more rebels as CAR's reputation as a safe haven for criminal activity grows. The innocent civilians of CAR stand to bear most of the cost of FPR and other militant activities in that country.

ALERTS

Cameroon: Fertile Ground for Boko Haram?

Researcher: Dr. Caroline F. Ziemke-Dickens

Concern is growing in Cameroon that Boko Haram has ambitions to franchise its brand of sectarian violence into the predominantly Muslim Extreme-Nord region. Boko Haram has used northern Cameroon as a sanctuary, staging area, and source of weapons. Its foot soldiers are known to have included a small number of Cameroonians. What is less clear is whether its extremist message has gained a foothold within Cameroon's Muslim community that might, down the road, destabilize the Extreme-Nord. Sheik Ibrahim Mbombo Mubarak, Imam at the Central Mosque in the northern capital of Douala, confirms that some high-profile Cameroonian Boko Haram members have returned following the recent Nigerian crackdown on the group.⁵³ There have also been reports of sect members traveling from village to village proselytizing, distributing CDs of radical sermons, and offering large sums of money to individuals who agree to adopt and spread the group's ideology. Cameroon security forces recently blocked 25 radical itinerant Arabic teachers from crossing the border from Nigeria.⁵⁴

The Extreme-Nord shares many of the socioeconomic factors that fueled Boko Haram's rise in Northern Nigeria: widespread unemployment, a rapidly growing disenfranchised and economically deprived youth population, illiteracy rates that are high and increasing, and an education system heavily reliant on religious schools that provide none of the skills required to compete in the modern African job market in either the public or private sectors.

So far, however, Boko Haram and its ilk have not gained much of a foothold in the Muslim communities in the Extreme-Nord. In fact, resentment of the Nigerian extremist group is high in the face of severe economic disruption in border communities since Nigeria shut down cross-border trade in December 2011. Northern Cameroonian businessmen have expressed their frustration: "Damn these Boko Haram people! ... We've been hearing about Boko Haram all this time but we have not seen them. They are in Nigeria, not here. ... They are not here."⁵⁵ There has been a gradual influx of "Arabized" fundamentalism through Arab-trained Wahhabist teachers since the 1970s. Cameroon's Muslim religious elites, however, have taken strong and public stands against "foreign influence." As Imam Mubarak put it, "We understand our Islam and we don't need those who think they understand this religion better than us."⁵⁶ In contrast to Nigeria, Cameroon's Muslims draw as much on local African traditions as Islam as sources of their collective identity and have no tradition of indigenous Islamic fundamentalism/reformism. Perhaps more importantly, in the view of Cameroonian experts, Cameroon's Extreme-Nord lacks the "violent political turf wars that have become characteristic of Northern Nigerian electoral politics since the reinstatement of civilian rule."⁵⁷

Lake Chad Basin: Regional Knock-on Effects of Boko Haram Violence

Researcher: Dr. Caroline F. Ziemke-Dickens

The State of Emergency in northeastern Nigeria and resulting border closures are having severe economic impact on communities in neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These communities, often remote from centers of trade in their own countries, have deep economic and social ties with Nigeria. Pastoralists in Niger have seen the price of staple grain double at the same time that prices for their livestock (camels and sheep) have dropped by 60 percent as buyers from Nigeria have disappeared. Diffa, in Niger's arid southeast, is dependent on income from livestock trade with Nigerian buyers for money to buy food. The government estimates people there will begin to run out of food by April.⁵⁸

Border communities in Cameroon are experiencing similarly devastating effects as economic activity has come to a halt. As one businessman in the border town of Amchide explained, while the region has seen no signs of Boko Haram activity, "since the closure of the border, life is tough. We don't have anything: no money and nothing to feed our children." Storage facilities are full of goods waiting to be sold to buyers from Nigeria, and staples that the region imports from Nigeria (sugar, milk, flour, oranges) are in short supply. Fuel prices in the region have doubled. Cameroon authorities estimate they have lost nearly 90 percent of their customs revenue along the border. Customs officials in the border town of Maroua in Cameroon's Extreme-Nord estimate that the region's economic activity has shrunk by 80 percent since the border closure in December.⁵⁹ The cost in lost customs revenue since January could be as much as 50 million CFA francs (roughly \$100,000 (US)).⁶⁰ The presence of large numbers of refugees from the violence in the north places further economic strain in Cameroon's border communities.⁶¹

Nigeria's decision was based on indications that Boko Haram has received training and supplies and has established sanctuaries across the formerly porous borders. In late January, authorities in Niger arrested 15 people associated with Boko Haram in possession of homemade explosives and grenades.⁶² They were alleged to be planning attacks in Diffa. Niger's Foreign Minister Mohamed Bazoum has admitted that Nigerian Boko Haram members have received training from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the Sahel.⁶³ Boko Haram has long used staging areas across the border in Cameroon, Nigerian security forces have seized weapons smuggled in from Cameroon, and a number of Boko Haram foot soldiers are known to be from Cameroon.⁶⁴


Leaders in Niger, Chad, and Cameroon are calling for a unified regional security approach to establish sufficient border security to restore normal economic activity, perhaps through the already operational Multi-National Joint Task Force Operation in Lake Chad.⁶⁵ Cameroon is not currently a member of the Joint Task Force. As the crisis escalates, the Cameroon government will come under increasing pressure to implement Decision 4 of the 2000 Lake Chad Basin Commission Summit to create a permanent multinational security force "to restore [a] security atmosphere favorable for the development and movement of persons and goods within the Lake Chad basin."⁶⁶ Low-level bilateral consultations between Cameroon and Chad commenced in January to explore cooperative security measures to ensure a smooth flow of trade and security against the infiltration of Boko Haram elements.⁶⁷

Increased Heroin Trafficking in East Africa Already Destabilizing

Researcher: Ms. Andrea Pongo

The successful maritime seizure of 240 kilograms of amphetamines and heroin by Australian and New Zealand Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 on February 3, 2012 in the northern Arabian Sea demonstrates the necessity of international cooperation and the scale of the heroin trafficking problem in the East Africa region.⁶⁸ The endemic corruption perpetrated by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and the social costs of high rates of heroin use among the youth population of urban communities represent worsening trends that will intensify with increasing flows of Afghan heroin into East Africa.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates heroin flows to East Africa have increased from 30 to 35 tons earlier in the 2000s to 40 to 45 tons by 2009.⁶⁹ Regional law



enforcement, customs, and border control have been ineffective against the swelling tide. Among all regions of the world, seizures of heroin are consistently the lowest in East Africa. In 2009 (the last year for which data are available), seizures in the region were 0.02 percent of the world total.⁷⁰

The DTOs operating in East Africa are exacerbating already intense problems with the corruption of local law enforcement, judicial authorities, and public officials. It is widely reported local police in

cities like Mombasa, Nairobi, and Dar es Salaam take bribes to release citizens and tourists arrested on drug charges.⁷¹ In Tanzania, it is believed that when traffickers do reach the courts, delays in sentencing are often caused by time needed for DTOs to bribe judges hearing traffickers' cases.⁷² Local sources report that police supply drugs at the street level themselves from stores taken from drug seizures.⁷³

Particularly in Kenya, DTOs have achieved the highest levels of influence over the structures of government. A Member of Parliament (MP) representing Kilome John Harun Mwau was designated a drug kingpin by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in June 2011 while serving as the assistant minister for transportation in charge of the port of Mombasa. Two other Kenyan MPs (William Kabogo and Hassan Joho) and a prominent Mombasa businessman (Ali Badrudin Punjani) are also identified as high-level traffickers. In Mozambique, named drug kingpin Mohammed Bachir Suleman has had his chain of shopping centers blacklisted as a result

of the June 2010 U.S. OFAC designation.⁷⁴ Authorities in Mozambique, nonetheless, have made no progress investigating or prosecuting Suleman 20 months after the U.S. action.

Even if it were currently possible to reduce the supply of drugs to East Africa, price increases would do little to change the demand for drugs among addicts and the social harm caused by addiction. In Kenya, where 42 percent of the population is under 15, Mombasa drug treatment expert Said Salim Buran warns that Coast Province is experiencing an epidemic of drug use among 10- to 18-year-olds.⁷⁵

He cites the easy availability of drugs and cheap prices (a bag of marijuana is one-third the price of a loaf of bread) for childhood usage rates.⁷⁶ According to Buran, heroin use erupted in Mombasa in the late 1970s when it was disseminated by sailors and then spread to the coastal resort town of Malindi and to Nairobi. The price of heroin on the streets of Kenyan cities is almost the same as for marijuana.⁷⁷ Survey results show that heroin use is most prevalent in Nairobi and Coast Province – Buran estimates about 20,000 heroin addicts in Coast Province – where the confluence of youth, money, and drug supply contribute to high usage rates.⁷⁸

There are already economic and public health costs that will need to be addressed in East African coastal communities. Increased costs from higher rates of HIV and AIDS among intravenous drug users, rehabilitation programs, and drug awareness programs will all require additional spending by government or by international donors. The economic impact of addiction on poor families, as well as on the local labor force, will potentially set marginal communities in cities like Mombasa and Dar es Salaam further back than they are today.



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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

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T O T H E R E A D E R

IDA's team of Africa researchers welcomes your comments, questions, and feedback on the contents of *The Africa Watch*. If you would like to discuss an article in this issue or provide suggestions for future research, please contact me at (703) 845-4394.

With best regards,

George

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward

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ANALYSES

Nigeria: An Unfulfilled Promise?

Researcher: Dr. Caroline F. Ziemke-Dickens

Summary

- Nigeria is facing a protracted period of paralyzing, low-level, localized ethnic and sectarian violence and civil unrest that will impede social, political, and economic development. As a result, increasing numbers of Nigerian political, religious, and intellectual leaders are questioning the viability of a unified Nigeria.
- Recent events have stepped up calls for a Sovereign National Conference to renegotiate the country's constitutional structure and formulate "a way forward" to transform the country and set it back on a path of economic development.
- The disintegration of Nigeria is unlikely because the localized conflicts lack the kind of clear fault lines around which separatist movements jell: clear geographic ethnic "zones," ideological movements capable of mobilizing widespread popular support, and charismatic and effective leadership.

Unity or Disintegration?

In his 1996 jeremiad, *The Open Sore of a Continent*, Nigerian Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka posed the question: "Are we trying to keep Nigeria a nation? Or are we trying to make it one?"¹ Prominent Nigerian public intellectuals are increasingly reopening the question of national unity in the most populous state on the African continent. Unity skeptics cite Nigeria's origins in an economic marriage of convenience between two British imperial administrations: the economically unviable North and the resource-rich, urban South. In their view, Nigeria has never become more than a "geographic entity" forcibly held together by a small cadre of corrupt elites who have treated the nation's natural wealth as a "cash cow." If, in their view, the arbitrary conglomeration of ethnic and religious groups that make up Nigeria was ever politically viable, it is not any longer. The nation has reached a crisis point that necessitates a dramatic change in the configuration of Nigeria. These views fall into three broad categories.

The first, and on the surface, most dangerous to Nigerian security and stability, are separatist movements and insurgent movements. Boko Haram is currently the most active and destructive of these, but there are signs that other groups – notably the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) – are again growing restless as the government in Abuja fails to make good on promises it made in exchange for an on-again, off-again cease-fire. A series of recent attacks on oil pipelines and the killing of four police officers in Bayelsa state in early March 2012 have raised concerns that MEND is remobilizing and may be forging operational ties with pirates who have kidnapped foreign crews on Dutch-owned tanker vessels.² There are few indications that Boko Haram and MEND are forging operational or tactical connections, but even if they don't, the twin threat they pose will be a significant distraction for a government already under severe strain.³

A second category is the growing number of regional and tribal leaders and public intellectuals who call for a Sovereign National Conference (SNC). SNC advocates, for whom Soyinka is a prominent spokesperson, maintain that a national conference of tribes and ethnic groups is the only way to replace regional, separatist “monologues” with a national “dialogue.” The only long-term hope for Nigeria to realize its unfulfilled promise is the negotiation of a new Constitution that enshrines “True Federalism” – reflecting the rights and aspirations of all the groups that make up Nigeria’s polity – to replace the current, corrupt system of Ogas (big men), patronage, and special privilege that serves only the interests of the entrenched political elites.⁴ The SNC would, its advocates stress, provide a venue for addressing the grievances raised by Boko Haram and MEND, as well as Nigeria’s numerous disaffected groups and regions, and forge a common roadmap for transforming Nigeria.⁵

The third category among those questioning the viability of the “Nigeria Project” comprises the disintegrationists. They, like senior Nigerian statesman Dr. Uma Eleazu, are not opposed to the idea of an SNC, but see it primarily as a means to negotiate the disaggregation of an illegitimate federal system that provides little in the way of services or security for a citizenry that never had a say in how it would be governed. “Let us have a conference,” Eleazu said in a recent interview, “if we don’t, there would always be people who are going to challenge the existence of Nigeria. Nigeria is already a failed state; what remains is for it to disintegrate.” In this way, he believes, Nigeria can re-emerge as a looser Confederation of willing members. At this point, Eleazu sees no recognition of a common interest around which the people of Nigeria might choose to stay united. If Nigeria dissolves “into confederation, [with] each [state] developing on its own line, the force of economic integration would bring us back together in the future.”⁶

Untangling the Spaghetti Bowl

As outspoken as the disintegrationists have become of late, the mainstream consensus among both Nigerians and international observers remains that Nigeria is unlikely to break up, for a number of reasons. First, migration, economic development, and urbanization have erased the clear geographic zones that once divided Nigeria’s ethnic groups. While deep regional cleavages are clear, particularly between the predominantly Muslim north and the predominantly Christian south, any attempt to break up the country along such lines would leave large islands of minorities outside their own “ethnic” state. “The idea of unity even within the same ethnic group is overly idealistic,” one commentator writes, “there are sub-groups and sub-groups of sub-groups. Take away a common enemy to unite them and chaos could ensue.”⁷ Even within the so-called “sharia states” in the north – until the recent brutal military crackdown on Boko Haram strongholds focused rage against the federal government – grassroots resentment had been directed as much against the corrupt local religious and political elites as against Abuja. Any attempt to untangle Nigeria’s ethnic “spaghetti bowl” could lead to mass migrations, ethnic cleansing, floods of refugees, and bloodshed that would make the current violence between Christian *indigenes* and Muslim “settlers” in the country’s middle belt look tame.

Second, while economic factors have not proven to be absolute barriers to independence movements in other regions of the world, if Nigeria were to disintegrate, few of the successor states would be economically viable. Much of the motivation for sectarian violence in the north is the perception that the resource-poor northern states are not receiving their fair share of national oil revenues. Between 2008 and 2010, the northern region, which is home to 53 percent of Nigeria’s population, received only 34.2 percent of Nigeria’s oil revenues. Were Nigeria to break up, even that share would likely disappear. Most of the skills that were traditionally the foundation of the region’s economy – agriculture, pastoralism, craft trades –

have disappeared in the wake of urbanization. In Plateau State, in the unlikely event that the politically dominant Christian *indigenes* succeed in forcing Muslim “settlers” to “return” to their homelands in the north, the latter would take with them the lion’s share of the state’s economic activity. Even in the resource-rich southern region, there are few guarantees that the wealth would be distributed or invested any more equitably or responsibly than under the current, corrupt federal system. Eleazu argues that these economic realities would eventually become apparent and move individual states to voluntarily regroup into economic confederation. But how long such awareness might take to dawn and the likely cost in human suffering are daunting to contemplate.

The third, and perhaps most important, factor is the general lack of clear ideologies and charismatic leadership around which successful separatist movements coalesce. In early March 2012, former Biafran rebel leader Emeka Ojukwu was given a state funeral in Nigeria. One commentator speculated that Ojukwu, who 45 years ago tried to engineer the break-up of the country, triggering a devastating Civil War, is today remembered as a national hero “because many in Nigeria believe the man had a point.”⁸ While Nigerians from various ethnic groups, religions, and regions may be “unhappy with the way their country has turned out” and “are now questioning the viability of the state itself,” charismatic leaders of the caliber of Ojukwu or Ken Saro-Wiwa have yet to emerge to galvanize them into concerted action. Boko Haram remains a shadowy organization with no clear leadership and no clear agenda capable of mobilizing mass support.

Finally, there seems still to be a significant plurality, if not a majority, of Nigerians who believe that, while transformational change is clearly needed, Nigerians are better off in a unified state. Many share Soyinka’s view that while Nigeria remains “an unfulfilled promise” it is also a responsibility.⁹ As one Nigerian commentator explains it: “The fact that the Nigerian state is an artificial construct notwithstanding, there are now more things that bind us together than separate us. Business, friendship, marriage, children ... the cost of falling apart is unthinkable.”¹⁰ As a former governor of Anambra State put it, while the country cannot move forward without restructuring: “All Nigerians need Nigeria. We need a country that works.”¹¹

Senegal's Elections: Who Is Macky Sall and Will He Win?

Researcher: Ms. Ashton Callahan

Summary

A run-off election between opposition candidate Macky Sall and President Abdoulaye Wade will be held on March 25, 2012. Sall appears to enjoy more popular support than President Wade and has the backing of all 12 previous opposition candidates who have joined the Alliance of Forces for Change (RFC) coalition to support him in the second round of elections.¹² Wade's chances of winning against a single opponent in the second round are reduced by the fact that opposition candidates received a combined 65 percent of votes cast in the first round – confirming the people's dissatisfaction with Wade and their desire for change. According to Senegalese analyst Mamadou Mbodj, choosing Macky Sall over the “older hands of the opposition” shows “a desire of the people to remain in the momentum for change launched in 2000. The Senegalese people are disappointed with Wade but they are still dreaming of change.”¹³

Who is Macky Sall?

Sall, leader of the Alliance for the Republic (APR), was born in Fatick in northwest Senegal. He has a positive public image, particularly among the youth. He speaks five languages – Wolof, Serere, Pulaar, French, and English – which has allowed him to effectively campaign in all regions of the country.¹⁴ A geological engineer, 51-year-old Sall was the longest-serving prime minister under Wade (2004-2007). Prior to this, he held several high-level positions, including Minister of Mines and Energy and Minister of State. Formerly a member of the ruling *Parti Democratique Sénégalais* (PDS), he founded his own party and joined the opposition after he was forced to resign from his post as President of the National Assembly (2007–2008) due to a falling out with Wade. Since this time, he has been critical of Wade's decision to pursue a third term and has become a prominent leader of the Benno Siggil Senegal (BSS) coalition.

Sall, an economic liberal, is a proponent of decentralized government. He has promised to maintain a clear separation of power between the executive branch and the rest of the government while improving management of public funds. In interviews, Sall has outlined the five initiatives/goals that he plans to address if elected:¹⁵

- Health Infrastructure: Healthcare must be improved and accessible to all.
- Education: Children should not be deprived of education because they cannot meet financial requirements. It is also important to encourage vocational training.
- Developing Productivity: This is particularly important in the area of agriculture. In addition, there should be an audit of national accounts including Senegal's financial and foreign commitments, level of indebtedness, major projects, and land policy.
- Respectable Democratic Model: Institutions must be balanced, and the separation of powers is important.
- Peace, Security, and Economic Integration in West Africa.

Through these initiatives he intends to address the two main grievances against Wade – failure to make progress in reducing poverty and unemployment. Sall's commitment to better management of public funds and independent institutions was evidenced during his tenure as

President of the National Assembly in 2008. At that time, without consultation with President Wade, he summoned the latter's son, Karim Wade, to the Assembly to account for alleged mismanagement of funds by the National Agency for the Organization of the Islamic Conference (ANOCI), of which the younger Wade was president.



Source: http://www.daylife.com/photo/0dMW6XDajF5vv?__site=daylife

Support from the Opposition

The M23 Movement – comprising musician Youssou N’Dour and 12 failed opposition candidates, including Idrissa Seck, Moustapha Niasse, and Ousmane Tanor Dieng – has joined the RFC coalition in support of Sall.¹⁶ The coalition recently held a rally on March 11 at Obelisk Square.¹⁷ In addition, the secretary general of the Movement of Casamance Democratic Forces [MFDC] has encouraged Senegalese in the Casamance region to vote for Sall.¹⁸

Potential Obstacles for Sall

In order for Sall to win the second round, he must retain the trust and support of the leadership of the opposition. Abdou Lo, head of Premum Africa (a Senegalese think tank) said, “It will be complicated for some of the opposition candidates because they know that, if Macky Sall wins, he is going to be there for probably 14 years If it is Abdoulaye Wade who wins for the second round, they would have the probability to go in a competition in two or maximum four years. There is some kind of dilemma here for them. If they vote for Macky Sall instead of Wade, most of them will end their political career.”¹⁹

Even if Sall retains the support of the defeated opposition candidates, they may find it difficult to persuade their followers to shift loyalty to Sall rather than voting for Wade by default. Recent statements by failed opposition candidate supporters suggest this may be an obstacle:

- Adama Diop, representative of Idrissa Seck’s party and Rewmi leader said, “The Rewmi militants in Zone nord (Thies) will vote for Abdoulaye Wade...in the runoff of the presidential election taking place on 25 March.”²⁰
- Pape Tamedou Diatta, local leader of the Alliance of Progressive Forces [AFP] youths in Nioro, recently questioned the support that Moustapha Niasse promised Macky Sall in the runoff poll. According to *Le Populaire* newspaper, Tamedou asked his leader to resume contact with Wade.²¹

Wade's Prospects Shaky

Wade only has two potential avenues of support – the Muslim brotherhoods, particularly the Mourides (see *The Africa Watch*, February 1, 2012), and voters in rural regions who were not part of the 51.5 percent voter turnout during the first round.

- “I know there are many behind you, who listen to you. I am not going to twist your arm, but know that I am counting on you,” Wade was cited as saying to the Mouride leader by the Senegalese Press Agency. He has also visited the Tivaouane, home of the Tidiane brotherhood. So far neither has made a public endorsement on Wade's behalf.²² Given that marabouts declined to issue a “*ndiguel*,” or voting instructions, to their followers prior to the first round of elections, one can logically assume that they will similarly refrain from providing instructions for the second round.
- Amadou Sall, spokesman for Wade's reelection campaign, said the president is campaigning in cities and rural areas to ensure victory. He also reiterated the point on candidate loyalty.²³

It Looks Like Sall

The opposition seems confident and committed to doing whatever is necessary to defeat Wade. Musicians such as Ouza Daillo, whose recording “*Le Vote*” mocks vote-buying in Senegal, continue to stress to citizens that it is both a duty and choice to vote responsibly. The youth opposition movement, *Y'en a Marre*, also represents the popular idea of *Le Nouveau Type de Senegalais* that encourages all sectors of society to act independently of the influence of the marabouts, who are perceived by some to be authoritarian.²⁴ And perhaps most important, many believe that reelecting Wade would mean setting his strongly disliked son, Karim, up for succession in a couple of years' time.



Supporters of Macky Sall hold a banner reading “Stop Wade, Karim it's over. To vote for Wade is to elect Karim” on March 12, 2012 in Dakar. Source: http://www.daylife.com/photo/0dMW6XDajF5vv?__site=daylife

Several uncertainties remain, however, including the position and voting “throw weight” of the Muslim brotherhoods, the ability of the coalition to remain unified, and whether or not the people will shift their loyalties from failed opposition candidates to Sall or Wade. If Wade were to win, it would likely prompt more opposition activity and violent protests as seen prior to the elections.

Iran in Africa

Researcher: Dr. Stephanie Burchard

Summary

- Iran appears to be strengthening and deepening ties across Africa ahead of EU sanctions scheduled to go into effect in July 2012.
- Iran's foreign policy in Africa is seemingly based on supporting countries with either of two commonalities: large Muslim populations and/or anti-Western sentiment.
- Iran has strong economic, political, and military ties to South Africa, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. Iran has also pledged assistance to Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Malawi, Somalia, and Tanzania in recent months.
- South Africa's relations with Iran are under increased scrutiny as the government deals with Western pressures to end Iranian oil imports and as bribery and corruption charges have been levied against high ranking government officials in connection with arms deals with Iran.

Iran's Foreign Policy in Africa

While official statistics are hard to come by, anecdotal evidence and piecemeal news reports suggest that Iran has been making a concerted effort to court the African continent through aid and investment. In February 2012, Tanzania announced that it welcomed investments from Iran in agriculture and other sectors of the economy and that the Red Crescent of Iran was set to open healthcare clinics in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar.²⁵ In late 2011, Iran announced that it planned to send foreign assistance to Malawi – the decision reached as Western countries cut their aid to Malawi.²⁶ This was in addition to the \$50 million that Tehran invested in Malawian mining projects earlier in 2011.²⁷ Iran has also recently pledged aid and development assistance to Ethiopia,²⁸ Somalia,²⁹ and Kenya,³⁰ among others.

In March, Mali sent former president Alpha Oumar Konare to Iran as a presidential special envoy. President Ahmadinejad received him to discuss ways in which their countries could strengthen ties. Iran had previously pursued relations with other countries in West Africa (namely Senegal and the Gambia), but both countries severed all diplomatic ties with Tehran in 2011 after it was uncovered that Iran had covertly shipped arms through Nigeria destined for rebel groups in the region.³¹


Iran's Key African Allies

Iran, which has very strong ties to Sudan, has traditionally been a significant supplier of small arms and light weapons to that country.³² In 2011, President Ahmadinejad and Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir met in Khartoum. President al-Bashir, under intense scrutiny for human rights violations, said of the visit: "We are looking for more economic cooperation with sisterly Iran We confirm our support for Iran's right to develop its nuclear technology for peaceful purposes."³³ President Ahmadinejad has said that Iran's relationship with Sudan is based on "common Islamic values" and meant to "deter the divisive plots of arrogant powers."³⁴

Iran has also pursued improved cooperation and trade with Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe. On March 12, Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi announced that Iran would provide funding and training to help strengthen Zimbabwe's military in order to help protect it from Western aggression.³⁵ It has been reported that Zimbabwe and Iran signed a deal in 2010 that would allow Iran access to Zimbabwe's 455,000 tons of raw uranium.³⁶

Historically, South Africa and Iran enjoyed good relations until the deposition of the Shah in 1979. The new Islamic Republic of Iran opposed South Africa's apartheid regime and instead supported the ANC and the anti-apartheid movement. Upon the transition to multiparty democracy in 1994, Iran re-established formal relations with the government of South Africa.

Iran and South Africa currently have a close economic relationship. Since 1994, South Africa has imported significant amounts of goods and resources (including oil) from Iran; these levels have been steadily increasing (see graph). Approximately one-fourth of South Africa's oil comes from Iran.³⁷ The *Tehran Times* reported in early March that meetings were taking place between South Africa and Iran in an attempt to find a mutually beneficial arrangement that would allow South Africa to continue to import Iranian oil, despite Western sanctions.³⁸ At the same time, reports indicate that South Africa is searching for alternatives to Iranian oil as prospects of EU sanctions loom.³⁹



Source: South African Department of Trade and Industry

The close Iranian-South African relationship has also been pressured by allegations of bribery and corruption. In February, the Turkish telecommunications firm Turkcell accused the South African firm MTN of promising South African support for Iran's nuclear program in exchange for a lucrative contract to provide cellular service in Iran.⁴⁰ South Africa, which currently holds a seat on the UN Security Council, often votes in favor of Iran and against Western sanctions and punishments.⁴¹ In 2011, however, South Africa voted in favor of imposing sanctions on Iran but later stated that it meant to vote against the measure.⁴²

These accusations were followed by another serious scandal in March involving Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe. His partner, Gugu Mtshali, is accused of attempting to solicit a bribe from a South African company wishing to sell arms to Iran, in contravention of current sanctions.⁴³ It is alleged that she promised the aviation company "360 Aviation" the support of the South African government in selling military equipment to Iran in exchange for \$13 million.⁴⁴

Future Implications

Iran appears to be strengthening and deepening ties across Africa ahead of EU sanctions that are scheduled to go into effect in July 2012. Iran's foreign policy as it relates to Africa is seemingly based on two commonalities with potential allies: Islam and anti-Western sentiment. Iran has demonstrated its willingness to align itself with international pariah states such as

Sudan and Zimbabwe; it has fostered close relations with South Africa, the continent's economic powerhouse; and it has been alleged that Iran has armed African rebel groups.

On the diplomatic front, Iran announced in late January that it was opening embassies in Somalia, Djibouti, South Sudan, and Cameroon.⁴⁵ The announcement was made by Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi after his return from Addis Ababa where he had just attended the African Union summit. Statements by President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad⁴⁶ and the Iranian foreign minister⁴⁷ suggest that African countries are increasingly viewed as partners in Iran's overall foreign policy due to the continent's resources and the potential to ally with likeminded leadership. Furthermore, because of its growing international isolation – both economically and politically – Iran's choices of international partners are limited.⁴⁸ The African continent has plentiful resources, emerging markets, sometimes tenuous relations with Western countries, and three rotating UN Security Council seats.

The Fourth Tuareg Rebellion in Mali: Prospects for Continued Fighting

Researcher: Dr. Dorina A. Bekoe

Summary

- The fourth Tuareg rebellion began on January 17, 2012, led by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA).
- Past rebellions have been quelled by a combination of military force and negotiation. The two peace agreements that intended to end the 1990 and 2006 rebellions remained largely unimplemented.
- The government of Mali seems on course to use the same strategies to address the fourth Tuareg rebellion.
- The MNLA, however, are better armed, have a stronger institution, and have developed a sophisticated communications effort. This is likely to make settlement more difficult and prolong the fighting.
- The dynamics of an electoral campaign could also make it more difficult for the government and the rebel group to find common ground to start meaningful negotiations.

The Toll of the Fourth Tuareg Rebellion

The fourth Tuareg rebellion is now in its second month.⁴⁹ The ultimate goal is to obtain the independence of Azawad, the area that many Tuaregs regard as their homeland. Azawad comprises the regions of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu in Mali. The Tuareg rebels, led by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA, by its French acronym), attacked the town of Menaka, a traditional stronghold, on January 17. In quick succession, the MNLA attacked the towns of Tessalit and Aguelhoc in the Kidal region on January 18; Lere (Timbuktu region) and Anderamboukane (Gao region) on January 26; and Niafunke (Timbuktu) on January 31. Since then, the Malian army has been engaged in a frustrating battle to quell the rebellion, even being forced into retreat in the recent battle to retake Tessalit on March 10.⁵⁰

Thus far, the government of Mali has handled this fourth rebellion in much the same manner as the rebellions of 1990 and 2006.⁵¹ The agreements made at the conclusion of those rebellions completely failed. Moreover, there are important new developments within the rebel organization that will make settlement more challenging. Finally, the posturing and dynamics of the presidential campaign will make any attempts at compromise more difficult. In sum, the fourth Tuareg rebellion can be expected to last longer than the others.

The Failure of Past Peace Agreements

Neither the 1992 National Pact nor the 2006 Algiers Accord was able to stop the fighting. In 1992, Algeria successfully brokered the National Pact between the government and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA). It called for the following:

- Integration of Tuareg rebels into the Malian army
- The establishment of a commission of enquiry to investigate the reasons behind the conflict
- The establishment of a commission to oversee the implementation of the accord

- The establishment of two funds for the region: a fund to assist small business development and another to compensate the victims of the conflict
- Designation of a special status for Northern Mali, under which the region would enjoy greater administrative and governing autonomy.⁵²

Despite the agreement, low intensity fighting continued until 1996.⁵³ The National Pact proved quickly unpopular in the south and among the Tuaregs. Many in the south felt that the government had over-accommodated demands for autonomy, and many in the north felt excluded by the negotiations. The government was also unable to provide the funds promised in the national pact, further reinforcing a sense of economic marginalization.⁵⁴ Moreover, attempts to integrate the Tuaregs into the National army failed.⁵⁵ In the end, the main provisions of the National Pact were not implemented – and despite community reconciliation overtures, the existing grievances were deepened.⁵⁶

On May 23, 2006, a third Tuareg rebellion broke out, led by a new rebel group, the Democratic Alliance of May 23 for Change (ADC). The 2006 Algiers Agreement called for many of the same provisions as the National Pact. As its predecessor, the Algiers Agreement could not stop the fighting; clashes continued for another three years.⁵⁷ The implementation of the Algiers Agreement was also uneven, with the government unable to fulfill many of its provisions. Implementation was made all the more difficult by the refusal of Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, the leader of the ADC, to accede. Bahanga was finally defeated by the Malian army in February 2009, ending the rebellion.⁵⁸

Management of the Fourth Tuareg Rebellion

The government of Mali has not fundamentally changed its approach in managing the latest resurgence of the Tuareg rebellion. It has employed a strategy of military intervention and peace making overtures. The Malian army engaged the MNLA, most notably in Tessalit. The government has also engaged the *Collectif des ressortissants du nord Mali* (COREN, an association of North Malians) to reach out to the MNLA.⁵⁹ Furthermore, Algeria has become involved again in attempting to start a negotiation process.

A Different Kind of Rebel Group

There are a number of factors that indicate that the rebellion could persist – perhaps for an even longer period than the previous two conflicts. The MNLA differ in significant ways from the MPLA and the ADC, which led the second and third rebellions. The MNLA are equipped with better and more sophisticated arms that were looted from Libya. Moreover, a number of MNLA served in the Libyan army and thus have received formal training as fighters.⁶⁰ Finally, the overtures of elder statesmen and community leaders that were used in the past as interlocutors may not have the same effect. Accounts indicate that the new generation of Tuareg rebels is less likely to compromise and feel confident in their abilities to obtain self-determination.⁶¹

A Stronger Rebel Institution

The leader of the MNLA, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, who also led the ADC into the third rebellion, was killed in August 2011. Significantly, the MNLA did not then fall apart. Such resiliency is a sign of a strong institution; it indicates that the MNLA are bigger than the vision of one person. Indeed, reports of the planning that preceded the launching of the rebellion demonstrate a concerted effort to build a movement, overcome differences, and develop a mission.⁶²

Outreach Efforts by the Tuareg Rebels

Despite a number of reports that many Tuareg do not agree with the rebels' tactics,⁶³ the MNLA seem to have expanded their constituency. Notably, the Movement for Azawad was founded in late 2010 by university students, with the objective of seeking independence for Azawad. The group founded the Toumast Press, an online news service that actively disseminates information on the conflict and on the MNLA.⁶⁴ These activists may not be fighting in the desert, but their intertwined interests could considerably expand the rebels and support that the rebels receive.

ALERTS

Inter-State Tension Sparked by LRA as Violence Grows in the DRC

Researchers: Dr. Eliza Johannes and Ms. Ivana Djak

Summary

Nations in the Great Lakes region have recently criticized one another over efforts to eliminate the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). With an internet campaign focusing international attention on the issue, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have blamed each other for the failure to capture Kony. At the same time, thousands of Congolese have been displaced by new LRA attacks.

Great Lakes Nations Debate Threat Posed by LRA

In response to the internet campaign "Kony 2012" that went viral during the first week of March, the Ugandan government attempted to respond to criticism that it is not doing enough to capture Kony. A Ugandan government spokesperson complained that the internet campaign misrepresented the conflict and that Uganda needs more support from its African neighbors. Fred Opolot, director of the Ugandan government media centre complained on March 12, 2012 that the Democratic Republic of Congo is obstructing the U.S.-backed hunt for Joseph Kony within the DRC. The Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF) do not have unimpeded access to Congolese territory, making finding Kony difficult.⁶⁵

In response to Ugandan complaints, Congolese General Jean Claude Kifwa, in charge of fighting the LRA in the DRC, told journalists, "We have reduced the capacity of the LRA. For us it's no longer an issue of defense. It's a public order issue." Kifwa added that much of the insecurity in the region that has been blamed on the LRA has actually been carried out by bandits.⁶⁶ Kifwa continued, "We've addressed the problem. Kony is not here...he's not Congolese, and I can't go hunt him in another country."⁶⁷

The four countries that harbor fragments of the movement – the Central African Republic, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Sudan – disagree over the threat posed by the LRA and how to address it. The nations acknowledge that the LRA is operating across the region. Ugandan spokesman Opolot recognized that most LRA fighters are in the Central African Republic, but that some have remained in the DRC and neighboring nations.⁶⁸ Philip Aguer, the spokesman of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), told journalists that his army intercepted movement of the LRA from Central Africa and the DRC into Western Equatoria State.⁶⁹ Yet the verbal scuffle between top military officials in Kinshasa, Kampala, and neighboring nations continues over how they should cooperate in capturing Kony and eliminating the LRA. Mutual mistrust between Uganda and the DRC stemming from the 1990s conflict makes cooperation especially difficult.⁷⁰

Recent LRA Attacks in the DRC

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that thousands of people have been displaced after a series of renewed LRA attacks in the DRC's Orientale province. UNHCR spokesperson Fatoumata Lejeune-Kaba said most recent attacks occurred in the village of Bagulupa, near Dungu. Twenty attacks since the beginning of the year have left one person


dead, 17 abducted, 3,000 displaced, and many villages leveled. Many of the newly displaced people are living in makeshift settlements around Dungeni without basic necessities. The situation of those who fled further is worse. Lejeune-Kaba notes that the UN and its partners may not be aware of all attacks that have occurred, since it takes days or weeks to travel from remote villages to town.⁷¹ UNHCR regional officer Celine Schmitt reports victims stated LRA soldiers told them they were there to loot and destroy.⁷²

The number of recent attacks not only has created a humanitarian crisis, but also raises questions about the strength of the LRA. Mounoubai Madnodje, a spokesman for the UN's Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) said that the LRA is a dying organization. Madnodje claims that there are about 200 LRA fighters left, and that they are working in small groups to raid villages, steal food, and survive. But experts on the LRA such as Mareike Schomerus at the London School of Economics and David Leonard, a professor at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, have pointed out that smaller scale attacks do not necessarily mean that the LRA is weaker. The LRA has varied how it operates over the decades, and there have been periodic lulls in activity.⁷³ Nonetheless, UNHCR regional officer Schmitt argues that the region was more secure last year, and LRA activity has destabilized the area.⁷⁴

Ethiopia Attacks Eritrean Bases in Search of Rebels

Researcher: Ms. Ivana Djak

In response to attacks during the second week in January 2012 in Afar regional state in Ethiopia – during which five European tourists were killed and two Germans and two Ethiopians kidnapped – Ethiopian forces attacked three military camps about 20 kilometers inside the Eritrean border, allegedly killing dozens of militiamen on March 15, 2012.⁷⁵ Ethiopian soldiers attacked the Ramid, Gelahbe, and Gimbi bases.⁷⁶ Some sources claim that lower level Ethiopian government officials affirmed that the country carried out additional attacks on Saturday, March 17, 2012 in Badme.⁷⁷ Getachew Reda, the Foreign Ministry's public diplomacy and communications director, however, has denied that additional attacks occurred.⁷⁸



<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/16/ethiopian-raid-eritrea-conflict>

SHEMELES Kemal, Ethiopian State Minister of Communications, stated that the attacks did not constitute a direct military confrontation between Eritrea and Ethiopia since the military bases are training facilities for Eritrean-backed militant groups suspected of attacking Ethiopia. He went on to say that he did not expect retaliation from Eritrea, but added that a counterattack would be disastrous.⁷⁹ Mr. Kemal threatened further attacks against Eritrea if that country continues to pose a threat to Ethiopian security. Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi had previously accused Eritrea of destabilizing Ethiopia by backing rebel groups like the Oromo Liberation Front, the Ogaden National Liberation Front, and al-Shabaab.⁸⁰

Eritrean Foreign Affairs Minister Osman Saleh said Ethiopia was trying to divert attention from a border dispute between the countries and from the fact that Ethiopia is illegally occupying Eritrean territory. He continued, "It is patently clear that the Ethiopian regime could not have unleashed such a flagrant act of aggression with such audacity without the protection and succor of the United States in the Security Council," again, accusing the U.S. of overlooking abuses by Ethiopia.⁸¹ The attack occurred right before the 10th anniversary of a UN-backed Eritrean and Ethiopian Border Commission ruling that awarded the town of Badme to Eritrea, following the border war from 1998 to 2000 that killed 80,000 people and left Ethiopia landlocked.⁸²

Eritrean Information minister Ali Abdu told the BBC that Eritrea will not retaliate or rush to aggression because it values the life of its people and that his country would raise the issue through appropriate diplomatic channels such as the UN. He accused the U.S. of destabilizing the region through its blind support of Ethiopia, and denied that Eritrea was harboring and training Ethiopian rebels.⁸³ Abdu made the point that Eritrea is not to blame for Ethiopia's failure to resolve internal crises created by its marginalization of certain ethnic groups.⁸⁴

Although this is the first time Ethiopia has sent troops into Eritrean territory in more than a decade, fears of renewed conflict should be taken seriously. Eritrea, which has been sanctioned by the UN for human rights violations,⁸⁵ will probably continue supporting rebel groups as proxies in its relations with Ethiopia.⁸⁶

Angola's Ruling Party Clamps Down on Opposition

Researchers: Dr. Janette Yarwood and Mr. Alexander Noyes

Two recent events signal the Angolan government's willingness to crack down on the opposition as election season approaches. On March 12, 2012, Angolan police raided the offices of the *Folha 8*, one of the few private independent weekly newspapers in the country, and seized computers. The publication, which is often critical of the government, was accused of crimes of slander, calumny, and defamation for publishing articles about Angolan state officials.⁸⁷ The effective shutdown of the paper and the questioning of its editor, William Tonet, comes just 48 hours after attempts by Angolan youth to stage demonstrations in the capital Luanda and southern coastal city of Benguela were violently suppressed. On the morning of March 10, protestors, organized under the slogan "Against Fraud in the Next Elections," were beaten by police and an armed gang, leaving several protestors hospitalized.⁸⁸

- Until recently, political protests were rare in Angola. Since March 2011, citizens, especially youth, have voiced their opposition to the current government by taking to the streets and calling for dos Santos to step down.
- Such protests have coalesced into a movement named Central 7311 (named after the date of their first demonstration).⁸⁹
- The main Angolan opposition party, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), expressed solidarity with the protestors and condemned the police action.⁹⁰

As Angola heads into election season, with parliamentary elections scheduled for late 2012, this growing anti-government sentiment and the ruling party's willingness to violently suppress it are cause for concern.

Labor Unrest in the Great Lakes Region

Researchers: Dr. Eliza Johannes and Ms. Ivana Djak

Summary

Governments in the Great Lakes region are facing mounting pressure from public sector workers over the increased cost of living. Recent strikes in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have shown the ability of labor unions to exert significant pressure on governments in the region, but long-term solutions have not been reached in most instances, and strikes could resume. Given that strikes are occurring simultaneously and in the wake of the largest protests seen in South Africa since the anti-apartheid movement, the activities of labor unions in the mining region could encourage their counterparts in other sectors to press their demands.

Unions Show Influence in the Great Lakes Region

Kenyan nurses ended a two-week strike on March 14, 2012 after holding talks with Prime Minister Raila Odinga, who revoked a mass dismissal he initiated during the standoff. The nurses protested the government's failure to raise wages and demanded improved services in ill-equipped hospitals. The strike crippled hospitals as patients across the country lay unattended.⁹¹ The strike, which involved 25,000 public health workers, was led by the 40,000-strong Kenya Health Professionals Society. The fact that the workers were able to ignore the government's firing threat and negotiate shows the significant influence of the union.⁹² A task force representing the parties has been set up and will commence sitting on March 21, to resolve problems facing the Kenyan health sector.⁹³

At the same time, hundreds of Tanzanian doctors went on strike during the first week of March, shutting down public hospitals across the country. The 1,000-strong Medical Association of Tanzania demanded better conditions and pay as well as the dismissal of Health Minister Hadji Mponda. The strike came to an end on March 12, after the president met union representatives and made concessions. Tanzania's government is facing rising pressure from other public sector workers as teachers are currently threatening to go on strike as well.⁹⁴ Patients' rights activists are not convinced the agreement reached will keep doctors from striking again and are urging the government to ensure a long-term solution for the medical community.⁹⁵

More strikes may be imminent. Burundi's opposition leader recently encouraged the government to negotiate with union and civil society leaders to avoid massive demonstrations. The Alliance for Democratic Change is planning the strikes in which 470 civil society groups and 39 labor unions would participate if the government does not address the increasingly unbearable cost of living.⁹⁶ In Uganda, taxi operators went on strike on March 12, over a new operational fee, bringing transport in the capital to a standstill. Passengers were stranded along city routes as taxis were towed to nearby police stations.⁹⁷ The strike was called off the following day as the government and Kampala City Authority put new buses into operation to rescue stranded passengers. The ability of workers to shut down transport left Museveni's regime apprehensive and could lead to more repression.⁹⁸

Workers' warnings that their power should not be disregarded have echoed in other parts of Africa. A strike organized during the first week of March by South Africa's powerful Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) to oppose the ruling African National Congress's (ANC) disregard of workers, drew tens of thousands of people, including 32 cities that shut down large sectors of the economy for the day. How the governments of Africa balance workers demands and foreign investors' aversion to labor unions will have important implications for economic growth on the continent.⁹⁹

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