



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

**The Africa Watch
April – June 2012**

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March 2013

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document contains the April 2012 through June 2012 issues of *The Africa Watch*. *The Africa Watch* is a twice-monthly report on trends and developments that might contribute to discontinuous change and instability in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The first April 2012 issue contains the following articles – Coup d'état in Mali: What Comes Next; Eritrean Response to Ethiopian Attacks; Somalis in Kenya's Eastleigh: Caught in the Middle; Corporate Concessions in Liberia Disregard Indigenous Land Rights; Deteriorating Political Climate in Malawi; Kenya: President and Prime Minister Reshuffle Cabinet; Kenya Strikes Oil in Conflict-Ridden Turkana Region; Oil Discovery in Liberia; and Ojukwu: A Complex Nigerian Hero.

The second April 2012 issue contains the following articles – Nigeria's Looming Demographic Disaster; A Potential "Hard Landing" in China: What It Might Mean for Africa; Malawi: Prospects for Political Stability after the Transition; Ethiopia: Rebellion and Response; Escalating Uganda-South Sudan Border Dispute; Another Coup in Guinea Bissau Heralds Nothing New; Sahel: Drought and Conflict Generate Famine; Mugabe's Declining Health Sparks Succession Tensions in Zimbabwe.

The first May 2012 issue contains the following articles – Sierra Leone's 2012 Elections: The Candidates and the Issues; Kenya: Pre-Election Political Maneuvering and Ethnic Violence in the Rift Valley; Regional Implications of a Third Sudanese War; Lesotho: Election Outlook; Arms Availability in Eastern Africa Magnifying Violence; Niger Delta Groups Threaten Boko Haram; Reverse Brain Drain in Africa; Guinea Bissau: Military Coup Puts Key Harvest in Jeopardy; Burkina Faso: December Election to Increase Size of Parliament; Mombasa Republican Council Destabilizing Kenyan Coast; and Growing Pro-Democracy Protests Suppressed in Swaziland.

The second May 2012 issue contains the following articles – African Responses to Piracy: Reasonable First Steps, But a Hard Slog Ahead; Recent African Coups: Not a Trend; Mali: Who's Who in the Transitional Government; Kenya in Somalia: New Approach Taking Shape; Ghana 2012: Civil Society Takes Activist Role; Somaliland: Stalling a Federal Somali Stat; Court Ruling Threatens to Further Sour South Africa-Zimbabwe Relations; and Guinea: Opposition Protests Begin After Delay of Legislative Elections.

The first June 2012 issue contains the following articles – Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa; Growing Political and Social Tension in Mauritania; Electing a New Chairman of the African Union Commission: Egos Impeding Progress; Proactive SADC Tackles Elections in Southern Africa; Eritrea: An End to the Authoritarian Lockdown; Sierra Leone: Return of the RUF and November's Presidential Elections; Riots in Zanzibar Threaten Tanzanian Stability; African Central Bankers and Finance Ministers Concerned About Effect of a Global Downturn; Iran Reaching Out to African Leaders for Support for NAM Summit in Tehran; The Gambia: Jammeh Fires Close Military Aide, Others; Kenya: Grenade Attacks at Dadaab and Wajir; Renewed Chadian Rebel Attacks in the Central African Republic; Sahel: Update on Food Crisis; and Zambia Threatens to Ban Raw Copper Exports.

The second June 2012 issue contains the following articles – Francafrrique in 2012: Will the Election of Francois Hollande Change France's Foreign Policy in Africa; South Africa: Land Expropriation Unlikely; Zimbabwe: A Tale of Two Bishops; Mounting Political Volatility in Burundi; Martha Karua: Kenya's "Iron Lady"; Cote d'Ivoire: Cross-Border Attacks Continue, Child Soldiers Suspected; and Togo: Protests Over Electoral Reform.

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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

THE AFRICA WATCH

APRIL 4, 2012



TO THE READER

IDA's team of Africa researchers welcomes your comments, questions, and feedback on the contents of *The Africa Watch*. If you would like to discuss an article in this issue or provide suggestions for future research, please contact me at (703) 845-4394.

With best regards,

George

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward

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ANALYSES

Coup d'état in Mali: What Comes Next?

Researcher: Dr. Dorina A. Bekoe

Summary

- The March 22, 2012 coup d'état in Mali badly hurt the country's democratization process, damaged its ability to fight the Tuaregs' fourth rebellion, and introduced the potential for civil unrest.
- Taking advantage of the disruption to the country's security forces, the Tuareg rebels have seized more towns.
- The disunity among the soldiers and the military leadership heightens the potential for a counter-coup to restore order.
- Political parties and civic groups have formed a broad-based coalition in opposition to the coup and have already demonstrated in Bamako.

Immediate Impact of the March 22 Coup d'Etat

On March 22, junior military officers, led by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, staged a coup d'état against the government of Mali, charging that President Amadou Toumani Touré had mishandled the rebellion by the Tuareg-led *Mouvement National pour la liberation de l'Azawad* (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, MNLA), which began January 12, 2012. The junta – the *Comité national pour le Redressement de la Démocratie et la restauration de l'Etat* (National Committee for the Recovery of Democracy and the Restoration of the State, CNRDRE) – also criticized the government for poorly equipping the army, rendering it unable to successfully combat the MNLA. The soldiers arrested a number of ministers, including Foreign Minister Soumeylou Boubaye and Minister for Territorial Administration Kafrougouna Kone, and the whereabouts of President Touré are not known.¹


The immediate effects of the coup in Mali are to derail its democratization progress and provide opportunities for the MNLA to take more ground. The elections, once scheduled for April 29, will certainly not take place. Nor will the ouster of President Touré resolve the Tuareg insurgency any faster. Even as Captain Sanogo called the Tuareg rebels “his brothers” and invited them to the negotiating table,² the MNLA announced that it would continue to take over additional territory.³ Indeed, within ten days of the coup, the Tuaregs took the towns of Anefis, Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu, which put them in control of northern Mali.⁴

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) suspended Mali's membership in response to the coup, placed the ECOWAS Standby Force on “high alert,” and threatened to impose financial and political sanctions if the CNRDRE did not restore the former constitution and step down from power by April 2. The sanctions agreed to include the following:

- Recalling ambassadors from Mali
- A travel ban on members of the CNRDRE and their associates within West Africa

- Closing the borders with Mali for all movements, except humanitarian purposes
- Freezing the financial assets of the members of the CNRDRE and their associates, within West Africa
- Halting transfers to Mali from the West African Central Bank, the West African Bank for Development, and the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development
- Suspending Mali from participating in the region's cultural and sporting events.⁵

Towns under MNLA control, as of March 28, 2012



Source: Political Geography Now, (<http://polgeonow.blogspot.com/>)

While the grievances of the army were well known, it is not clear how much support the junta has within the army.⁶ This raises the possibility of a counter-coup by more senior military officials who are not under the junta's control: Chief of General Army Staff General Gabriel Poudiougou and Chief of Army Staff General Kalifa Keita. They are believed to be in Bamako and Gao, respectively.⁷ The disunity within the military could portend a protracted fight to restore democracy in Mali.

Mounting Instability in Bamako?

On Monday, March 26 – 21 years to the day when President Touré himself seized power from then-president Mousa Traore – nearly 2,000 citizens in Bamako marched in protest of the coup.⁸ The demonstrators gathered in response to a call by the *Front Uni pour la Sauvegarde de la Démocratie et de la République* (United Front to Save Democracy and the Republic, FUDR).⁹ The FUDR comprises about 38 political parties and 20 other organizations united against the coup.¹⁰

The security forces allowed the march to proceed, although the CNRDRE issued a warning to demonstrators about overcrowding.¹¹ Still, it is not difficult to imagine that continued protests might be prohibited. If such a crackdown took place, the security situation in Bamako and other key population centers in Mali could become very tense, with clashes occurring between the loyalists to CNRDRE and those loyal to the former administration. Indeed, on March 27, the FUDR promised “civil disobedience” against the junta.¹² On March 28, many thousands marched in Bamako support of the junta. The march was organized by the *Mouvement populaire du 22 mars (M22)*, which was launched by the political opposition party, *Solidarité africaine pour la démocratie et l'indépendance* (African Solidarity for Democracy and Independence, SADI).¹³

Conclusion

The CNRDRE will not accomplish its stated goals of restoring democracy or defusing the Tuareg rebellion any time soon. Currently, the CNRDRE is distracted from fighting the Tuaregs. It is

consumed with establishing its control over the institutions of government – such as introducing a new constitution and managing its reception by the rest of the country. In the meantime, the Tuareg rebellion has gone further than others in the past, with no concrete steps toward resolution despite the invitation by Sanogo to negotiate with the rebels.

The coup has not altered the MNLA's strategy. The MNLA seem indifferent both to appeals to negotiate and to the coup in Bamako. Reached by phone by a journalist, one MNLA fighter assessed the new developments in Bamako: "The coup d'état ... if they accept talks for independence, then there's no problem. But not if they act like the last President, like the old government." Asked whether they prefer President Touré or Captain Sanogo, he responded: "They're the same for us."¹⁴

The situation in Mali has become precariously unstable. Pro- and anti-junta protests have each drawn large crowds of several thousand. Moreover, it is not clear whether senior Malian military leaders who oppose the junta will lend their support to the citizens' movement or stage a counter-coup. So far, there has been no response from the military elite. The Tuareg rebellion will very likely begin to consolidate its hold on northern Mali. ECOWAS is determined to press ahead with its sanctions, despite the CNRDRE's reinstatement of the former constitution – portending financial hardship for the country.¹⁵

Eritrean Response to Ethiopian Attacks

Researcher: Dr. Stephanie Burchard

Summary

- On March 15, 2012, Ethiopia attacked three military installations in Eritrea, each less than 20 kilometers from their shared border.
- Ethiopia claims that Eritrea has been financing and training rebel groups that are operating on several fronts against the government of Ethiopia in Afar, Ogaden, and Oromo.
- Although Eritrean President Isais Afewerki accused the United States of supporting Ethiopia's incursion, Eritrean news outlets have done very little reporting.
- The lack of domestic coverage by Eritrea of the Ethiopian attacks – given how closely the government regulates and controls the press – suggests that Eritrea is not preparing its citizens for an interstate conflict with Ethiopia.

Ethiopia Invades Eritrea

For the first time since the Eritrean-Ethiopian War ended in 2000, Ethiopian forces launched an attack on neighboring Eritrea. Addis Ababa claimed that it was within its rights to attack three



Source: Nazret.com

military installations in Eritrea since all were being used to train and equip Ethiopian rebel groups.¹⁶ The Ethiopian government has stated that this incursion was a direct message to Eritrea to cease its material support for Ethiopian rebel groups and that it will continue this campaign until Asmara relents.¹⁷ At least four rebel groups are currently operating in different regions across Ethiopia; three of these groups are demanding independence. Despite its protestations otherwise, Eritrea has long been believed responsible for a large portion of Ethiopian rebel group funding.¹⁸

The location of the military strikes was close to Badme, an area of intense fighting during the 1998-2000 war and the subject of an ongoing border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Although the Boundary Commission (which was established by the Algiers Agreement specifically to address border issues) has sided with Eritrea on the demarcation of the border and the awarding of Badme to Eritrea, Ethiopia has not yet implemented its recommendations.¹⁹ This is an ongoing source of contention between the two countries. Although denied by both countries, there are reports that negotiators from Israel and Qatar have quietly been meeting with representatives from Ethiopia and Eritrea in an attempt to finally settle the border dispute.²⁰

Eritrean Response

The initial response from Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki was to accuse Ethiopia of attempting to reignite conflict in order to divert attention away from its own domestic unrest. Two weeks later, however, Eritrea seemingly changed its tactic and accused the United States of

orchestrating the attack.²¹ President Afewerki accused the United States of attempting to undermine Eritrean independence and the country's "bright economic prospects."²²

Eritrean state news has reported on this issue sparingly. On the day of the attack itself, neither Eritrean nor Ethiopian news outlets covered the story.²³ Only one Eritrean news item addressed the Ethiopian attack, and it repeated Afewerki's accusation that the United States masterminded the attacks in Eritrea.

Analysis

Based on the current lack of Eritrean war rhetoric, that country does not seem to be intent on pushing a conflict with Ethiopia. Afewerki probably understands how little support there is from Eritrea's major allies for an escalation of this conflict. Eritrea's closest allies are currently embroiled in their own conflicts: Sudan is facing a potential war with South Sudan, and Libya and Egypt are both engaging in post-revolution nation building. Furthermore, given the proximity of the Arab Spring to Eritrea and the manner in which it has affected Eritrean allies, the government may be focusing on preventing its own civil unrest. There are unconfirmed reports that an Eritrean rebel group has attacked government forces and that government forces have sustained casualties.²⁴ For a country routinely referred to as the least open and most repressive in the world, it may view any opposition as extremely problematic.

Somalis in Kenya's Eastleigh – Caught in the Middle

Researcher: Ms. Andrea Pongo

Summary

Both Kenyan and foreign observers are expressing concern about the consequences for the large Somali-Kenyan community in the Nairobi suburb of Eastleigh if al-Shabaab were to commit a major terrorist act against Kenyan targets.²⁵ The UN Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea reported in July 2011 that al-Shabaab operatives recruiting among Kenyan Muslim youth intend to conduct large-scale attacks in Kenya.²⁶ Long-standing tensions between ethnic Somalis and the wider Kenyan population have become more acute since Kenyan defense forces (KDF) directly engaged al-Shabaab in October 2011 and could reach a crisis if a critical incident were to occur.

The limited capacity of Kenyan law enforcement to address the threat of domestic terrorism is contributing to heavy-handed treatment of the ethnic Somali community in Nairobi. Recent grenade attacks in Nairobi by al-Shabaab sympathizers operating in Kenya have led to widespread ethnic profiling of Somalis by police and a decline in business for the thriving Somali commercial center, Eastleigh.²⁷ In the event of a large attack, security forces would likely target Somali refugees without papers in Nairobi – deporting them to camps in northern Kenya or to Somalia – and take further steps to pressure property owners in Eastleigh (See Box).

Current Situation

Suspicion of the ethnic Somali community in Nairobi took on a more anxious tone following October 2011 grenade attacks, perpetrated by al-Shabaab sympathizers, in a pub and at a bus stop.²⁸ Subsequent al-Shabaab incidents in Kenya between October 2011 and March 2012, including a March grenade attack at the Machakos country bus station in Nairobi, have increased tensions.²⁹ Although observers report that business has resumed in Nairobi's central business district, the first grenade attacks in October 2011 resulted in losses of about \$1 million (USD) per day as customers stayed away from malls, bars, restaurants, and hotels, according to the head of the Nairobi Central Business District Association (NCBDA).³⁰

Police in Nairobi responded to the initial terrorist incidents using tactics that have frequently garnered international condemnation when used against Somalis in the Dadaab refugee camp and in the town of Garissa in northeastern Kenya. Police summarily arrested dozens of ethnic Somalis in Eastleigh including women and children, according to press reports. Detainees were held for five days without access to lawyers and without being

PROPERTY DEMOLITIONS IN EASTLEIGH

In late November 2011, the Kenyan government approved the demolition of multiple residential and commercial structures in the Eastleigh district of Nairobi.

The controversial demolitions were carried out with little or no warning to property owners and apparently no warning at all to residents, who scrambled to remove belongings when the two-day action began at 6am on November 22.

Responding to members of parliament who protested against the move, the Kenyan ministers of defense and lands claimed that the decision in Eastleigh was based on a security imperative to eliminate any structure over two stories standing within 50 meters of the perimeter of the Moi air base, located adjacent to Eastleigh Section 3.

Property owners in Eastleigh succeeded in having the courts halt the demolitions when they showed they held legal title to the land. Nonetheless, tenants of the structures were rendered homeless.



Source: The Standard Kenya, Nov. 23, 2011

charged.^{31,32} According to the International Crisis Group, police in Nairobi adjusted their tactics and became more targeted and restrained by December 2011.³³ Nonetheless, new precautions, such as cordoning off soccer fields in Eastleigh adjacent to the Moi Air Base, military patrols in Eastleigh, or security checks of Somalis entering central Nairobi offices, have the community on edge.³⁴

What Kenyans fear is the apparent ease with which al-Shabaab operates among the ethnic Somali community in Nairobi. Both licit and illicit trade is conducted in Eastleigh. Guns, narcotics, and illegal migrants are smuggled from ports in Somalia to Kenyan coastal towns and trucked over land to Nairobi.³⁵ Smuggling routes are also used for the benefit of al-Shabaab fighters moving between Somalia and Kenya. Al-Shabaab sympathizers have been sheltered in Eastleigh hotels by human smugglers, according to UN reporting, either transiting through Nairobi or arriving there.³⁶ Local journalists have long claimed that buying a gun in Eastleigh is as easy as buying bread.³⁷

Nonetheless, Eastleigh is also a thriving center for legitimate wholesale business. Large volumes of licit goods including clothing, jewelry, and electronics are imported by Eastleigh merchants from Mogadishu, Dubai, and markets in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and China for sale to Kenyan customers at low prices.

Anecdotal reporting suggests that commercial activity has dipped in Eastleigh since the Nairobi terrorist incidents took place. Wholesale merchants in Eastleigh complain that their usual customers from other Kenyan provinces are suffering from a drop-off in local business or are unwilling to take the security risk of traveling to Eastleigh.³⁸ The head of the Eastleigh District Business Association Hassan Guleid has stated that recent crackdowns by the Kenyan government on Somalis are discriminatory and meant to divert attention away from the corruption and controversies plaguing the government in the run-up to 2012 elections.³⁹

Background

Eastleigh is a well-defined district in the northeastern suburbs of Nairobi with an estimated population of 348,778. The area originally got its name from the British air force base (RAF Eastleigh, now Moi Air Base) established there in the 1930s.⁴⁰ The population of Eastleigh is not uniformly ethnic Somali, but it does represent the largest urban concentration of Somali people in East Africa outside of Somalia. Despite its failing roads, inadequate sewerage infrastructure, and trash collection, the area is well-known throughout East Africa as a major center of trade.

The relationship between the ethnic Somali community and its Kenyan hosts is complex and longstanding, going back many decades to the early years of Nairobi's development as a major regional center under British colonial rule. The relationship today is one of guarded suspicion fostered by the insularity of the Somali community and Kenyan skepticism about the community's commercial success. Traditionally, the groups have passively coexisted in Nairobi.⁴¹ Discrimination against ethnic Somalis by Kenyans goes back to the 1960s, but some notable ethnic Somalis – General Mohamed Borow was the chief of the general staff under Daniel Arap Moi, his brother Hussein Maalim held multiple cabinet posts during his 30-year political career, Farah Maalim is currently the deputy speaker of parliament, and several current cabinet posts are held by ethnic Somalis – have achieved prominence in the military, politics, and business. One-on-one relationships between Kenyans and Somalis help to foster trust, but new security concerns about al-Shabaab working through the Somali diaspora have made Kenyans wary of interaction with Somalis.

Conclusion

It is well known that al-Shabaab operates under the cover of the ethnic Somali community in Nairobi and that the likelihood of a significant al-Shabaab attack within Kenya increased after KDF directly engaged al-Shabaab in October 2011. So far, Kenyan security forces in Nairobi – unlike those operating in North Eastern Province – have avoided a widespread or indiscriminate crackdown on Kenyan Somalis that could foster more radicalization of Somali youth. According to experts on the ground, steps to reduce the appeal of radical Islam and the use of state resources to make up for decades of neglect would help to alleviate the security risk posed by al-Shabaab recruitment of Kenyan Somalis.⁴²

Corporate Concessions in Liberia Disregard Indigenous Land Rights

Researcher: Dr. Ashley Bybee

Summary

A recent *New York Times* piece focusing on concessions made by Liberian president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf to the Malaysian corporate giant Sime Darby has directed a new wave of attention to the numerous large-scale land acquisition projects in Africa.⁴³ The latest media reports from Liberia admonish the Nobel Laureate for betraying her countrymen by selling their ancestral land to multinational corporations. This specific case carries numerous environmental implications that may impose suffering on the affected communities. It may also pose a broader governance issue by adding to the general perception that African leaders are “soft” on investors and insensitive to local grievances.

Sime Darby in Liberia

In Liberia, Sirleaf has approved the long-term lease of 220,000 hectares to the Malaysian giant Sime Darby for palm oil production. This follows the allocation of four oil concessions to two small firms linked to Chevron and purported bribes paid to the Liberian legislature.⁴⁴ Despite protests and significant outcry from the affected communities, Sirleaf indicated that she won't be held ransom to local environmental groups and has even warned rural Liberians that “when your government and the representatives sign any paper with a foreign country, the communities can't change it.”⁴⁵

Palm oil plantations will affect the livelihoods of several thousand Liberians, many of whom live in communities with clear customary rights to their lands. Sime Darby is a member of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) – an international certification body that requires members to observe the RSPO standards and procedures. Letters to RSPO, however, from local clan chiefs on behalf of elders, women and youth claim that Sime Darby is operating in violation of the RSPO Principles and Criteria and in violation of the RSPO's “New Plantings Procedure.”

In one such letter, clan chiefs lamented how Sime Darby's land clearing had contributed to:

- Destruction of sacred sites and grave sites
- Destruction of crops
- Destruction and pollution of drinking water sources
- Damming of creeks and streams
- Filling in of swamps
- Forceful displacement of people without adequate compensation.

The filling in of swamps has been a major detriment to local livelihoods, since swamps have been a source of food (particularly protein from fish, snails, mollusks, and clams but also fertile ground for growing vegetables) and a source of building and construction materials (for example, straw for roofing, clay, vines, twines, roots, barks, and stems). Now, they claim all the community's swamps have been filled in to make way for oil palm trees.

Yet their principal complaint appears to be that these activities have been allowed to occur without prior informed consent.⁴⁶ They note that the affected land is “tribal land,” “family land,” and “community land” and claim they are legally entitled to free prior-informed consent with the full power to reject or accept proposals to invest on their property. Moreover, the chiefs

claim that Sime Darby has done little to create alternative living arrangements in their communities and that they now pay more for locally produced palm oil and have to travel to Monrovia to buy it.

The affected communities in Liberia do not appear to oppose the economic investment, but resent their exclusion from any discussions and the blatant disregard for their customary rights to the land. Their desire to be compensated for lost livelihoods and to have some say in how their lands and resources are used by foreign investors for such long-term concessions appear to be reasonable. Similar attitudes in the western region of Ghana where new oil discoveries have incited considerable anger among the affected communities toward their government are another example of how national leaders appear to be “selling out” their countrymen in favor of corporate concessions. That governments can claim customary land without any regard for indigenous land rights poses a major source of potential instability in the near future, especially if large-scale land acquisition for food production, cultivation of biofuels, and oil extraction continues at the same rate as over the last 10 years.

Land Acquisition for Food Production

A recently released dataset compiled by the GRAIN organization shows some broader trends in the foreign acquisition of global lands for the production of food crops.⁴⁷ While it is practically impossible to compile an exhaustive list of all land deals, since transparency is lacking in many public transactions, Figure 1 shows that Africa has clearly been the target for the majority of land acquisition projects.




Figure 1. Number of Projects

Figure 2 illustrates another trend in foreign land acquisition in Africa, revealing the main acquirers of land. The UAE is in the lead by a significant margin, followed by India, the U.S., and the UK. Dubai-based companies are known to be investing heavily in Africa for the production of food crops as well as construction of facilities for a growing tourism industry. The numbers presented here, however, may be slightly skewed since a large number of companies register their businesses in the UAE as a tax haven, while their true operating bases may reside elsewhere. The same applies to the UK and Singapore. Interestingly, Figure 2 shows that China is not as large a land acquirer as many have labeled it, while the U.S. appears to be purchasing four times as much African land as China.




Figure 2. Total Number of Hectares Acquired, by Acquirer

Figure 3 shows that Sudan is selling the most land to foreigners – more than two times as much as the runner-up, Mozambique. The newly independent South Sudan has also relinquished much of its land to foreign investors, actually signing away 9 percent of its land before it even attained independent status.




Figure 3. Total Number of Hectares Acquired, by Country

IDA highlights these statistics not to emphasize the deleterious environmental effects of *corporate* farming, since subsistence farming can also have a detrimental impact on local environment and communities; rather, it is intended to put the Liberian case in a broader context, underscoring the potential implications that such massive transfers of land have on society, governance, and security in Africa.

ALERTS

Deteriorating Political Climate in Malawi

Researcher: Mr. Alexander Noyes

President Bingu wa Mutharika of Malawi has recently stepped up efforts to suppress burgeoning political dissent and anti-government demonstrations. Over the March 17-18, 2012 weekend, protests organized by opposition and civil society groups turned violent when police tear-gassed and assaulted opposition supporters, and demonstrators threw stones at security forces and set fire to a police station.⁴⁸ Following the unrest, police arrested Atupele Muluzi, the son of Malawi's former President Bakili Muluzi and member of the United Democratic Front (UDF) opposition party, initially on charges of inciting violence. The charge was later downgraded to "disobeying the district commissioner," and he was released on bail.⁴⁹ Police also detained and later released John Kapito, chairman of the Malawi Human Rights Commission, on charges of illegally possessing foreign currency.⁵⁰

- Further demonstrating President Mutharika's increased clampdown on dissent, the State House warned on March 9 that journalists and human rights activists faced fines and up to two years' imprisonment if they continued "twisting information" and discrediting Mutharika.⁵¹
- In the wake of the protests and calls for him to step down, Mutharika declared on March 22 that he would remain in power and could "amend the constitution to rule for another term, or forever."⁵²
- While previous demonstrations were primarily organized by civil society, opposition politicians – most notably Muluzi of the UDF – were heavily involved in coordinating the most recent protests.⁵³

Although elections in Malawi will not be held until 2014, rising popular discontent and President Mutharika's increasingly draconian suppression of the opposition presents a situation in need of close monitoring.

Kenya – President and Prime Minister Reshuffle Cabinet

Researchers: Dr. Eliza Johannes and Ms. Ivana Djak

Summary

Several key cabinet changes and appointments were made in Kenya during the week of March 26, 2012. The dismissal of the Minister for Tourism and changes to the Ministry for Justice, which have garnered much criticism, have been described in the press as attempts to limit cooperation with the International Criminal Court (ICC) proceedings against the “Ocampo Four” as well as political maneuvering ahead of elections.

Cabinet Reshuffle

President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister (PM) Raila Odinga met on Monday March 26, 2012 to reshuffle the Cabinet in the Grand Coalition government.⁵⁴ President Kibaki moved four ministers aligned with his Party of National Unity (PNU) while his coalition partner – and political opponent – PM Odinga replaced one minister from his Orange Democratic Movement (ODM).^{55,56}

Controversy

The most controversial shifts are the dismissal of Najib Balala, Minister for Tourism, and the transfer of Mutula Kilonzo from Justice to Education. Kilonzo’s transfer has been linked in the media to his outspokenness on the ICC cases facing Uhuru Kenyatta, Francis Muthaura, William Ruto, and Joshua arap Sang. Kilonzo was the only Cabinet minister on the President’s side of the coalition to support ICC intervention and call for Kenyatta’s and Muthaura’s removal from government. His replacement, Eugene Wamalwa, on the other hand, is a member of the G7 Alliance that includes Kenyatta and Ruto.⁵⁷ Wamalwa has publicly opposed the ICC process.⁵⁸ He is also largely perceived to be Uhuru Kenyatta’s choice of running mate and is a brother of one of President Kibaki’s top political backers.⁵⁹ Local newspapers allege that the reshuffle is an attempt to limit compliance with the ICC during the trial stage. *The Star* claims that the President has sent letters to the United Nations Security Council and the ICC, paid exorbitant amounts for foreign defense lawyers, and aided the dissemination of anti-ICC propaganda.⁶⁰

Najib Balala, one of the most visible ministers in Kenya, is seen as having improved the Ministry of Tourism.⁶¹ Since he took over that portfolio in 2008, Kenyan tourist arrivals climbed to 2 million in 2011, and the sector earned 98 billion shillings.⁶² Prime Minister Raila Odinga said that he dismissed Balala for repeatedly demonstrating that his interests were different from those of the Orange Democratic Movement. Balala argues that he was sacked despite his good performance because he was not afraid to point to Odinga’s dictatorial leadership of the party. He says that PM Odinga has betrayed him and the Muslim community.⁶³

Balala’s dismissal caused outrage among segments of the Muslim population. The National Muslim Leaders Forum and the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya said the dismissal nullified a memorandum of understanding they had signed with PM Odinga in 2007. The groups have vowed to start a door-to-door campaign against Odinga.⁶⁴ Another Muslim group, the Kenyan Muslim National Advisory Council has stated, however, that it does not plan to sever ties with the Prime Minister.⁶⁵ Chairman Sheik Juma Ngao said Muslims benefited little from Balala’s position.⁶⁶ That the Prime Minister is worried about Muslim backlash is evidenced by his appointment of MP Ali Hassan Joho, a Muslim, as Assistant Transportation Minister soon after threats began to pour in.⁶⁷ Balala has said he will consult with various stakeholders before announcing which political party he will join in the next general election.⁶⁸

Kenya's political class has been quick to express a variety of concerns about the reshuffle. NARC Kenya party leader Martha Karua accused President Kibaki and PM Odinga of planning to extend their stay in office. She asserted that PM Odinga used the opportunity to get rid of a political opponent, and President Kibaki used it to shore up the G7 alliance in preparation for the elections.⁶⁹ Others have raised regional and ethnic concerns. Kiambu County citizens argued that Kenyatta's departure left the region underrepresented.⁷⁰ *The Star* noted that Onger's appointment leaves the Foreign Affairs docket firmly in the hands of the Kisii ethnic community.⁷¹

Civil society activists have called the reshuffle an attempt to entrench impunity through noncooperation with the ICC and have called on Kenyans to be vigilant ahead of elections.⁷²

Kenya Strikes Oil in Conflict-Ridden Turkana Region

Researchers: Dr. Eliza Johannes and Ms. Ivana Djak


Summary

In the wake of Tullow Oil Plc's discovery of oil in the Turkana region of Kenya, Kenyan government officials stressed the necessity for further exploration of the commercial significance of the find. The discovery in the conflict-ridden and impoverished Turkana region, where the inhabitants have had a strained relationship with the national government could lead to challenges over land ownership in the area. The discovery could fuel electoral violence as it raises the stakes of victory. Some accusations of questionable government official involvement have already been made.⁷³

The Discovery of Oil

The Irish firm Tullow Oil Plc, which is traded on the London Stock Exchange, is behind big finds in Ghana and Uganda. It has now struck oil at Kodekode village in Nakukulas in Turkana East District on Block 10BB in Ngamia-1.⁷⁴ The oil block is 50 percent owned by African Oil Corp, a Canadian company headed by the Lundin group, whose oil exploration in South Sudan during Sudan's wars has been criticized by rights groups.⁷⁵ Conservative estimates put the worth of the discovery at \$250 billion – a significant amount for Kenya whose GDP is \$38 billion.⁷⁶

Energy minister Kiraitu Murungi announced that more than ten similar prospects have been identified in the Rift sub-basin and that more exploratory wells are necessary to establish whether the discovery at Ngamia-1 is of commercial significance. President Kibaki and Minister Murungi went to great lengths to warn that the oil production process usually takes three years or longer to begin, as was the case in neighboring Uganda.⁷⁷ Their caution could not deter international and local excitement about the discovery. The stage for a new investment rush has been set. The oil find has lowered Kenya's exploration risk as companies have new reason to believe that their investment will not go to waste.⁷⁸ Tullow is already exploring an additional field in Turkana at Kalokol near Lake Turkana and Loima in Turkana North, and will expand exploration into the Kerio Valley and Pokot.⁷⁹



<http://www.tulloil.com/index.asp?pageid=432>

Turkana

The discovery happened in one of the most troubled regions of Kenya. The Turkana people continue to live a pastoral lifestyle, have little political representation, and have limited access to resources. Water, electricity, health clinics, and schools are scarce in Turkana region. The region has been associated with suffering, poverty, conflict, and drought for decades.⁸⁰ In recent weeks, more than 3,000 people fled their homes in the remote villages of Kapelipok and Kaptir in Turkana over the killing of seven local herdsman by Pokot cattle rustlers.⁸¹ The incident is characteristic of violence that continuously plagues the region. The government has taken precautions and placed Ngamia-1 under permanent watch by 150 police officers deployed to secure the area; however, continuous conflict could impact oil exploration.⁸²

The discovery has raised hopes and expectations among the locals. Turkana residents expressed optimism that the discovery will open up northern Kenya, a region the government and the international community have largely been uninterested in, for development.⁸³ Reverend Paul Chelinga said of the oil, "It is a God-given gift to the people of Turkana who have never known what life really means...God has remembered us."⁸⁴ Turkana South Member of Parliament (MP) Joseph Nanok said the discovery will give the Turkana a competitive edge as they will have more bargaining power as a community. He expects that infrastructure and social amenities will be provided.⁸⁵ Residents are preparing themselves for the changes they believe are coming to Turkana. A shopkeeper who runs one of the few wholesale shops in town told the *Daily Nation*, "There is every reason for us to start thinking big. I will certainly expand because we will soon be seeing new faces and everyone coming over will need something to eat and a place to stay."⁸⁶ If these expectations are not met, there could be unrest among the local population.

Potential for Conflict and Corruption

While some Turkana residents expressed hope, others urged caution. The Greater Turkana Civil Society Network has disputed the ownership of the oil exploration field. The organization claims it has evidence of government officials who own title deeds for mineral exploration in Turkana. Local government officials have denied the claims, but these allegations point to the tug of war between the national and local government that could ensue.⁸⁷ Land across most of Turkana is not properly demarcated, and nobody officially owns a majority of it.⁸⁸



Political Cartoon: <http://storyful.com/stories/23900>

A model production-sharing agreement drawn by the Ministry of Energy shows that the government is set to receive a substantial share of crude oil and to acquire equity stakes in the oil exploration firms. While each contract will be changed to accommodate each prospector, the government would acquire stakes of more than 10 percent

in the firms. One model contract shows that 40 percent of the first 20,000 barrels would belong to the government. The implementation of contracts could be complicated, however, by local communities laying claim to the wealth. The Constitution identifies the national government as the owner of natural resources, but since the Narok County Council wrestled control of the Mara National Reserve from the government two decades ago, there has been a precedent for local groups to win land rights. The Turkana, however, are so marginalized that they might not be able to successfully challenge the government.⁸⁹

There have already been accusations of government misdealing. In 2010, Turkana Drilling Company, associated with Cabinet minister Moses Wetangula, who was moved from the Foreign Affairs Ministry to the Trade Ministry in a cabinet reshuffle on March 26, 2012, sold Block 10BB for \$10 million to Africa Oil. Wetangula admits that his former law firm was involved with the transaction, but denies any questionable dealings. The minister's involvement points to the fact that block acquisition is subject to influence-peddlers and well-connected middlemen. License holders in Kenya have made millions of shillings selling their licenses to third parties.⁹⁰ How licenses are acquired and resold and to what extent corrupt government officials are involved could have a significant impact on whether Kenya benefits from the discovery or is devastated by it. Gichugu MP Martha Karua has called for a transparent system to ensure the oil discoveries are well managed. She has demanded that terms and conditions of contracts, criteria used to award those contracts, and information relating to the viability of companies investing be made public. She has challenged Parliament to take its oversight role seriously.⁹¹

One worrisome factor is that the discovery comes as Kenya prepares for elections early next year. Whoever wins those elections will control many billions of new resources, raising the stakes and incentives for conflict.⁹² Kenya made itself into East Africa's economic powerhouse despite, or perhaps because of, its lack of gold, diamonds, minerals, and, until now, oil. How the government manages the discovery of natural resources will influence Kenyan development for decades to come.

Oil Discovery in Liberia

Researcher: Ms. Ashton Callahan

The Australian oil company African Petroleum recently discovered oil deposits off the coast of Liberia.⁹³ Liberians are cautiously optimistic about oil prospects and do not want to fall victim to the “resource curse.”⁹⁴ According to the U.S. Geological Survey, the region (the “West Africa Coastal Province”) sits on as much as 3.2 billion barrels of offshore crude oil.⁹⁵ “We do not yet really know how much is down there. But we know, according to African Petroleum, that this discovery is of very good to excellent quality oil,” said Dr. Randolph McClain, President and CEO of the National Oil Company of Liberia (NOCAL). Although it will be five to seven years before Liberians see a drop of oil, the debate on how the oil could be extracted, properly managed, and used to benefit the Liberian people and state has already begun and will likely continue for some time.⁹⁶

- **Accusations and Scandals.** President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s son, Robert Sirleaf, has been accused of seizing five of Liberia’s offshore oil blocks for commercial purposes. The report, *Robert Sirleaf Poised to Become Liberia’s First Billionaire by 2013*, claims the president’s son was working with Samuel P. Jackson (a close friend and former Minister of Economic Affairs) to secure buyers in South Africa for oil concessions.⁹⁷ His position as Chairman of the Board of NOCAL, a state-owned public corporation, while *pro-bono*, further complicates the matter.
- **Promises of Policy Reform.** President Sirleaf and NOCAL realize the need for oil policy reform. During a public phone-in program, *Conversation with the President*, President Sirleaf said, “In the oil sector, my responsibility will be to make sure that we have proper laws and policies to be able to rationalize our institutions, to model them after those countries that have done well in the oil sector like Norway so that oil revenue will benefit not only current but future generations.”⁹⁸ Likewise, NOCAL has pledged to regularly provide a status report on each of Liberia’s 17 offshore oil blocks.⁹⁹
- **Potential Security Concerns on the Horizon.** Liberia is still recovering from a 14-year civil war; the failure to manage oil revenues transparently could lead to future conflict. In addition, the Gulf of Guinea is a growing pirate haven. Criminals are targeting the oil industry and threatening the overall security of the region. Adding another oil-producing nation would increase the threat and possibly impede the trade in Liberia’s other natural resources.

Ojukwu: A Complex Nigerian Hero

Researcher: Caroline Ziemke-Dickens

In weeks-long funeral observances during February and March 2012, Biafran secessionist leader Odumegwu Ojukwu was widely hailed as a reminder to the young generation that Nigerians, in a time of division and crisis, must see leadership “as genuine service to the people, not an avenue for accumulating wealth.”¹⁰⁰

Ironically, Ojukwu – the leader and symbol of a civil war in which 100,000 soldiers died in combat and more than a million civilians died, most from starvation and disease – is being lauded in emotional tributes as a hero of Nigerian unity. President Goodluck Jonathan, in his tribute, praised Ojukwu as a “rare patriot and humanist” whose “immense love for his people, justice, equity, and fairness ... forced him into the leading role he played in the Nigerian civil war.” More important, in Nigeria’s current climate, Jonathan stressed Ojukwu’s “commitment to reconciliation and the full reintegration of his people into a united and progressive Nigeria in the aftermath of the war (that) will ensure that he is remembered forever as one of the great personalities of his time who stood out easily as a brave, courageous, fearless, erudite, and charismatic leader.”¹⁰¹ Former Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings praised him for having the courage “in the midst of adverse circumstances” to choose “using reconciliation as a first option.”¹⁰² Even his former adversary, Nigeria’s wartime leader General Yakubu Gowon, paid tribute, saying that “Ojukwu loved Nigeria so much. His opting out of Nigeria was because of perceived injustices,” and when the civil war ended in January 1970, he helped ensure that Gowon’s policy of “no victors; no vanquished” largely worked.¹⁰³

In the long term, Ojukwu’s greatest symbolic power may be as an avatar of the kind of selfless public service and rejection of corruption that Nigerians increasingly see as the prerequisite for any meaningful improvement of their country’s grim economic and political outlook. Ojukwu himself summed up this aspect of his heroic image, saying that “there is nothing wrong with Nigeria except that we have not got the political will to live together ... our problem, therefore, is the problem of greed.”¹⁰⁴ The son of a wealthy Northern Igbo transportation and real estate magnate, Ojukwu rejected his family’s fortune and pursued a career first as an officer in Nigeria’s colonial-era army; later, as the warlord of the breakaway state of Biafra; and, finally, as a rehabilitated Nigerian elder statesman. Retired Catholic Bishop Ochiagha, called on Nigeria’s young to follow the example of “a man who had the chance to live a glamorous life, but chose to sacrifice his life for his people.”¹⁰⁵ Others lauded him as “probably the only Nigerian who left government much poorer than he was before he went in.” One commentator pointed out the shame Nigerians should feel “that a man of Ojukwu’s caliber should die in a foreign land because there was no good hospital in his fatherland, a land for which he sacrificed all he had.”¹⁰⁶

The darker side of Ojukwu’s legacy is that at his death, “the insecurity that precipitated the civil war pervades the Nigerian Space and his Igbo kinsfolk in the North have, again, become targets of a new violent and murderous onslaught necessitating another forced return to Igboland.”¹⁰⁷ For some, Ojukwu’s death marks the “final burial” of the civil war that set the nation on a path of “permanent attrition – of neither peace nor war.” For these, the hope is to “let the Biafra dream be interred with Ojukwu.”¹⁰⁸ To others, Ojukwu’s death highlights the failure of subsequent generations of Nigerian leaders to fulfill the path of reconciliation he sought. As one commentator wrote, “They had neither a blueprint for Nigeria nor the love and zeal to implement it. That’s why we’re still in this pretty pass. ... For as long as Nigeria isn’t working properly, Biafra will be an issue.”¹⁰⁹

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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

THE AFRICA WATCH

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TO THE READER

IDA's team of Africa researchers welcomes your comments, questions, and feedback on the contents of *The Africa Watch*. If you would like to discuss an article in this issue or provide suggestions for future research, please contact me at (703) 845-4394.

With best regards,

George

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward

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ANALYSES

Nigeria's Looming Demographic Disaster


Researcher: Dr. Caroline F. Ziemke-Dickens

Summary

- The current focus on Boko Haram risks neglecting what may be the most important engine of long-term instability in Nigeria: the coming of age of a generation of often under-educated Nigerian youth who face a future devoid of hope or opportunity. The British Council has characterized the current state of youth in Nigeria as “a looming demographic disaster.”¹
- The majority of Nigerians, especially the young, have lost faith in the ability of their government to provide the services (in particular, education, vocational training, and public infrastructure) that would ensure an economic future and could undermine the appeal of groups like Boko Haram.
- Effective education reform in the north could defuse the appeal of radical movements by creating local public/private partnerships to build educational curriculums that incorporate elements of secular, religious, and traditional education.

Looming Demographic Disaster

The overt symptoms of Nigeria's dysfunction – Boko Haram violence in northern Nigeria, sectarian violence between Muslims and Christians in the country's middle belt, violent militancy in the Niger delta – may mask one of the key threats to the country's long-term stability: the entrance of Nigeria's “baby boom generation” into the workforce, coupled with a growing education crisis across the nation, but particularly in the north. For the foreseeable future, the vast majority of Nigerians will be aged 25 or younger. The current median age in Nigeria is 19.2 years. By 2030, it will have increased only to 22.6 years, and will not top 25 years until roughly 2040.² The overall literacy rate for male youth aged 15-24 in 2007-2010 was 78 percent (65 percent for females). But secondary school participation during the same period was only 29 percent for males and 22 percent for females; of those, fewer than half attended school regularly.³ Then-Minister of Education Kenneth Gbagi caused an uproar in 2010 when he proposed hiking tuition fees in Nigerian universities on the grounds that “if Nigerians can afford to go overseas for education, then they should be ready to pay appropriately for the same in Nigeria” and that the government should no longer have to bear the “heavy burden” of providing education for Nigerians.⁴



Nigerian Population Distribution by Age⁵

The cost of obtaining quality secondary and tertiary education is prohibitive for all but the children of the highest-ranking political, military, and private sector elites. Even junior and mid-level civil servants, small businessmen, and other professionals are finding it increasingly difficult to provide for the higher education of their children. Moreover, the already grim national statistics do not reflect the wide discrepancies in education and literacy levels between the northern, middle belt, and southern regions. In many areas, the only access rural children have to education is through Islamic boarding schools, whose curriculum is generally limited to Koran memorization. Students frequently receive only a few hours a day of schooling and are then sent out to beg to cover their room and board. As a result, many become connected to the petty crime rings often associated with Boko Haram.

The 2010 Nigerian Education Data Survey, released by the Nigerian National Population Council in May 2011, revealed alarming regional inequities: fewer than 40 percent of children have basic literacy in the north (compared with at least 70 percent in Lagos State); basic numerical skill is 14 percent in Sokoto State (compared to 94 percent in Lagos); students in rural areas must travel an average of an hour each way to attend schools that are often understaffed and underequipped – less than \$40 is spent per pupil per annum in the north (compared to \$110 in Lagos).⁶ In announcing that a coalition of stakeholders in Borno State will soon launch a “Marshall Plan” for addressing the root causes of Boko Haram violence, Governor Kashim Shettima noted that, over the past two years, “apart from the children of the elite, *there were no children of ordinary citizens in the whole of Borno North* [emphasis added] who were qualified to secure admission into the Universities.”⁷

Education: From “Boko Haram to Boko Halal”

Nigeria’s regional educational inequities may explain why Boko Haram’s ideology has, thus far, gained little traction among the millions of Muslims who live in the predominantly Christian southern region. As anyone who follows Boko Haram knows, its name is roughly translated from the Hausa language as “Western education is sacrilege,” but this “bumper-sticker” characterization of the group’s ideology and motivation is just the tip of the iceberg. In a recent telephone interview, a Boko Haram spokesman told *The Guardian* newspaper that “it’s the secular state that is responsible for the woes that we are seeing today ... we have been motivated by the stark injustice in the land.”⁸ And the Nigerian government’s failure to provide for the basic educational needs of ordinary people in the country’s northern region is widely seen as one of the greatest injustices of all.

What are the roots of the notion that “Western education is Haram”? Experts on education in northern Nigeria suggest that the problem lies in the outdated, post-colonial public school curriculums that do not teach the skills necessary to compete in the local and national marketplace.⁹ Secular public education, where it is even available, has not brought much positive change in Nigeria’s north. School calendars, designed to accommodate urban realities, do not make allowances for the need for children to work during farming seasons. As a result, girls are often removed from school at an early age to work at home and, often, to marry early. According to one expert, “where parents have agreed to let their children forsake cultural traditional skills, to leave their tools of trade – the hoes, the cutlass, rearing of cows and other domestic animals, etc – to receive a Western education, in many cases these children have returned home void of any practical skill that could yield work.” Moreover, the public education system in the north is closely tied to politics, with teachers – many essentially illiterate – appointed based on their political loyalty rather than their qualifications.¹⁰

The best hope for meaningful educational reform in the predominantly Muslim north is to integrate religious and traditional knowledge into the public education curriculum to neutralize the perception that traditional religious and secular public education is an “either/or” proposition. An education system that is considered “halal” among northern Muslims would enlist religious and traditional indigenous community leaders in a public/private partnership to reform education at the community level. Such efforts to enlist parents and community leaders in the development of curriculums that reflect local social, economic, and religious realities could instill a sense of “ownership” among local communities and convince both parents and local political leaders of the value of investing in the future of their youth.¹¹

A Potential “Hard Landing” in China: What It Might Mean for Africa

Key Judgments

- A significant downturn in the Chinese economy, which some in the financial community believe is a real possibility, is unlikely to alter China’s profile in Africa in major ways.
- A desire to show consistency in its policy toward Africa and the significant financial investments that China has already made there will act as constraints against a major pullback.
- That said, it is possible that the Chinese government – and associated state-owned enterprises (SOE) – could recalibrate the level of risk that they are willing to take on in parts of Africa should significant financial retrenchment be required at home. Industries where this might occur include mining and agriculture. This could have some important consequences for a few countries such as Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
- In a more constrained economic environment, the Chinese government could become even less willing to address such local African concerns as the export of counterfeit goods, but also perhaps less willing to support authoritarian regimes where the financial returns on investment have become less certain.

The Potential for a “Hard Landing”

For a number of years, economists and experts in the financial community have debated the potential that China could suffer a significant economic downturn. Debate is again flaring up about the possibility for such a “hard landing.” For example, a March 2012 survey of 19 investment fund managers and economists indicated that, while nine of the participants regarded an economic shock as unlikely in the next three years, a similarly sized group indicated that the risk of an economic downturn was significant.¹² Although there are diverse views about the specific benchmarks for a “hard landing,” given China’s strong historic record of growth, a frequently referenced standard is growth below 6 percent – not far below the lower growth target of 7.5 percent that Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated in March 2012.

Because of the wide disparity in views about the possibility of a significant downturn, there is no consensus view on what domestic financial turmoil could result from such a downturn or on its broader impact on the world economy. That said, given the impact that Chinese economic growth has had on world commodity prices, it is likely that a major retrenchment would lead to a decline in commodity prices. Given that Africa’s exports have a strong natural resource component, China’s strategy in dealing with such a crisis could have significant implications for the subcontinent.

China’s Africa Strategy

China’s strategy toward Africa blends significant political and economic elements. Building upon the longstanding political and aid relationships that it established with many African countries in the 1960s and 1970s, China has since become a significant economic player as well.

- Chinese aid, trade, and investment have grown significantly since the late 1990s. China is now Africa’s largest trading partner. A particular focus for Chinese investment has been in the area of natural resources, but their financial commitments have included construction, manufacturing, telecommunications, and agriculture as well. The growing

economic role that China has played over the past decade means that even a leveling off in that growth could have local economic consequences.

- China has a track record of tying its financial assistance to its own foreign investments and to contracts implemented by Chinese companies.¹³ This strategy, which is facilitated by significant role of SOEs in foreign investment, helps reduce the political risk for Chinese investment.
- At the political level, to establish a region-wide dialogue, Beijing hosted the first Ministerial Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000. Beijing is scheduled to host the fifth of these events in July 2012. The high public profile of FOCAC provides at least a partial firewall to significant change in Chinese direction on Africa.

African reaction to China's growing economic role has been largely positive. According to an assessment by the Open Source Center,¹⁴ both the African Union and the leaders of the vast majority of African countries have expressed support for growing economic ties between Africa and China. African concern about Chinese investment and trade has been generally muted and focused on such issues as inadequate compensation for African workers in local Chinese enterprises, the transparency of Chinese investments, and the effects of Chinese imports – including counterfeit goods – on local merchants and industries. For example, although he has toned down his criticism of Chinese dealings post-election, the newly elected President of Zambia ran on a strong anti-China platform and has pledged that Chinese firms will adhere to Zambia law and pay adequate wages.

What China Might Do in a Crunch

Given the uncertainties about whether China will indeed experience a “hard landing,” assessments of the Chinese government's possible responses to such a crisis and their impact on its position in Africa are necessarily speculative. That said, China's overall economic strategy and its track record in dealing with Africa provide some reasonable bases for such judgments.

- **Keep their eyes on the energy prize.** A key driver of China's overseas foreign investment has for many years been securing adequate energy supplies. In pursuit of this objective, Beijing and Chinese SOEs have taken a long-term perspective. In this light, it is unlikely that the Chinese would consider any significant changes in its engagement with countries such as Angola, Nigeria, and Sudan.
- **Maintain the aid profile.** Aid has always been an important symbolic component of Beijing's dealings with African countries. While it is difficult to provide precise estimates because of the lack of transparency in Chinese statistics, Chinese aid has grown significantly, and several estimates place it at \$1 billion or more in recent years. While there are certainly many opportunities to adjust the composition of such assistance, its relatively modest size and the high public profile that Chinese officials have given to it suggest major reductions are unlikely.
- **Expand support for the development of smaller businesses.** While much Chinese investment has involved major projects involving large SOEs, China has also supported investment in joint Chinese-African small and medium-sized enterprises (SME). In late 2011, the China Development Bank indicated that it intends to provide an additional \$1 billion infusion into its program that provides loans to SMEs in Africa.¹⁵ A 2007-2009 survey of Chinese private firms operating in Africa found that they are already focused on the potential that Africa has an alternative to competitive pressures at home and as

a venue to develop new markets.¹⁶ Expansion of such assistance would provide a vehicle to assist Beijing in expanding its exports to Africa, which China would certainly try to do during a time of economic stress.

- **Make some adjustments in risk tolerance.** Should a Chinese “hard landing” result in declining commodity prices, Chinese enterprises could become more careful about their investments in African natural resources outside of energy. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, Chinese concerns in mid-2011 about the quality of reserves were already delaying a significant investment in copper and cobalt mining;¹⁷ significant price declines would be provide an additional barrier. Likewise, the hard going that Chinese SOEs have had in implementing large-scale agricultural investments might lead them to pull pack in more difficult times.¹⁸
- **Continue the “slow roll” on African concerns about side effects.** While African government leaders have generally been strong supporters of China’s economic involvement, some leaders have pressed Beijing to address some adverse effects of their economic engagement. In late March, for example, the Kenya government again raised its concerns about the importation of counterfeit goods from China¹⁹ – a phenomenon that likely affects other parts of Africa. There is little reason to believe that in tight economic times the Chinese government will lean forward to address concerns such as these.

The African Response

Given that, even in difficult times, Beijing is unlikely to make significant alterations in its African profile, most African governments will understand China’s position. Potential reductions in Chinese investment in more politically unstable parts of Africa such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo could – if accompanied by even a minor level of political distancing – pose problems for those in power.

Malawi: Prospects for Political Stability after the Transition

Researchers: Dr. Janette Yarwood and Mr. Alexander Noyes

Summary

On April 7, 2012, Malawi's Vice-President Joyce Banda was sworn in as President following the death of 78-year-old Bingu wa Mutharika. The government's two-day public silence on Mutharika's health and the tense relationship between Banda and Mutharika initially stoked fears of a succession crisis. Because Malawi's constitution is clear on the matter of succession – in the event of the president's "incapacity" or death, the first vice-president "shall assume that office for the remainder of the term" – Mutharika hardliners eventually succumbed to pressure from domestic and international actors for a legally mandated Banda succession.²⁰ Banda's presidency provides an opportunity to address the country's growing political and economic crises and rebuild ties with Malawi's main foreign donors – including Britain and the United States – who had been alienated by Mutharika.

Background

Mutharika governed Malawi for eight years, but was recently accused of mismanaging the economy and becoming increasingly autocratic. Mutharika's government recently clamped down on rising political dissent and demonstrations with a surge of arrests that included human rights activists, journalists, and opposition members.²¹ Mutharika's diplomatic isolation and economic plight reached a nadir in July 2011 when the United States put a hold on \$350 million in foreign assistance to the country after police killed 19 people in a crackdown on an unprecedented wave of anti-government protests.²² The country suffered shortages of fuel and foreign currency when the United Kingdom and other donors canceled aid. During this period, Banda fell out with Mutharika, becoming one of his fiercest critics.²³ After being accused of "anti-party" activities, she was expelled from the ruling Democratic People's Party (DPP) in 2010 and formed the People's Party (PP).²⁴

Gaining Support from Former Mutharika Backers

Shortly after Mutharika's death was confirmed, Banda projected an air of authority, addressing journalists accompanied by the heads of the army and police, the attorney general, and other officials formerly aligned with Mutharika.²⁵ Twenty-four hours after 17 DPP Members of Parliament (MPs) from districts of the central region announced their allegiance to the new president, all seven DPP lawmakers from Ntcheu, another Malawi central region district, also announced that they will work with the new government.²⁶ The latter seven lawmakers included the labor minister and the deputy speaker of Parliament.²⁷ The whole of the DPP's Lilongwe District Committee announced that they backed her, as did the party's second vice president, executive members of the national governing council, and 20 other MPs.²⁸ The MPs who vowed to work with President Banda are expected to cross party lines and help make up the new ruling party. As the DPP faces the reality of a drastically altered political landscape, it is highly likely that other members of Parliament will align with the party of the new president.

On the Domestic Front

After just a few days in office, Banda has already made significant changes, starting with the firing of the nation's police chief.²⁹ Banda appointed commissioner Lot Dzonzi as the new inspector general of police, replacing former top cop Peter Mukhito, said a statement from the office of the president and cabinet.³⁰ Mukhito, who rose from being a guard commander of Mutharika's security, has been accused of mishandling the anti-government protests last year in which 19 people were killed, as well as the mysterious death of a university political activist who

published a news sheet highly critical of the government. This personnel shake-up further secured support among the masses and civil society groups, as prominent rights activists welcomed Banda's decision.³¹ Banda has also dismissed Information Minister Patricia Kaliati, a Mutharika ally who initially announced that Banda was unfit to succeed Mutharika.³² The most important appointment Banda has made is of Khumbo Kachali as the country's vice president. Kachali is the VP of President Banda's political party: the People's Party.³³

Rebuilding International Relationships

As noted, Malawi has suffered a budget freeze since last year when key donors withheld support and the IMF suspended its aid program due to concerns over economic mismanagement, governance, and human rights abuses.³⁴ As foreign assistance traditionally accounts for around 40 percent of the budget, Malawi faces a deficit of about \$121 million in revenue in the current financial year.³⁵

To win international and domestic favor, Banda is likely to pursue an agenda of revamping the economy and improving governance. She is expected to implement tough policies such as devaluing the currency, the kwacha, in order to achieve the broader strategic goals such as boosting exports and winning back donor support. It appears this strategy will bear fruit, as the European Union (EU) Ambassador, Alexander Baum, has already pledged support, noting that "it is impressive to see a peaceful transition like this one ... she [Banda] will get tremendous support from us to help the country's economic recovery."³⁶ In addition to the EU, the United Kingdom, United States, and the World Bank have indicated that they will renew support to the country.³⁷

Conclusions

Despite the efforts of a few Mutharika hardliners – including Peter Mutharika, the foreign minister and brother of the late president – it appears that Banda, because she has secured the backing of many political heavyweights and former political foes, will enjoy a favorable political environment in which to implement her agenda. Cabinet ministers who had initially opposed Banda's assumption of power have changed their positions and apologized to the incumbent leader. While it may take some time for the political situation to settle, it is clear that Banda has support from within the government and the Malawian people, who have welcomed the change in leadership. One businessman, Martin Mlenga, noted, "I am yet to see anyone shedding a tear for Bingu, we all wished him dead, sorry to say that."³⁸

Ethiopia: Rebellion and Response

Researcher: Dr. Stephanie Burchard


Summary

- Ethiopia is currently managing a number of domestic conflicts with groups in the Afar, Gambella, Ogaden/Somali, and Oromia regions.
- The government of Meles Zenawi maintains a hardline approach to domestic conflict. It has been accused of engaging in repression, politically motivated arrests, forced relocation, and, in the extreme, genocide against some or all of these groups.
- In 2009 the government enacted a law that prevents international NGOs from working on human rights issues that affect these groups. It also has prevented international NGOs from access to the Ogaden region altogether.
- Food insecurity and future resettlement programs overlap with the regions that pose the highest threat of future domestic unrest. The Meles government is likely to use food supplies as weapons against insurgent elements.

Major Rebel Groups in Ethiopia

Ethiopia is currently managing multiple domestic conflicts with groups in the Afar, Gambella, Ogaden/Somali, and Oromia regions. Each group has a different set of demands for the government of Meles Zenawi; some want more political inclusion, others autonomy or outright independence. Most of Ethiopia's rebel groups are ethnically based. Ethiopia has classified two of these groups as a terrorist threats – the Oromo Liberation Front and the Ogaden National Liberation Front.³⁹

The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) operates out of eastern Ethiopia, near the border with Somalia.⁴⁰ The region is alternately known as Ogaden and Somali. Since the 1940s,



Somali-speaking groups in Ethiopia have been agitating for independence from Ethiopia and inclusion in a greater Somali state. The dispute over the Ogaden region was one of the main triggers behind Somalia's invasion of Ethiopia in 1977.

The ONLF, which was created in 1986 as a guerilla group, fought alongside the current ruling party against the previous Derg regime.

Source: Nazret.com

When the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) overthrew the Derg regime and assumed power in 1991, the ONLF established itself as a formal political party to participate in the new regime. After a falling out with the EPRDF, the ONLF disbanded its political arm and returned to guerilla

tactics.⁴¹ After approximately 20 years of renewed insurgency, a fragile peace was constructed in 2010.⁴²

The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) has agitated for independence from Ethiopia since the 1970s.⁴³ It is considered to be one of the world's oldest insurgent groups.⁴⁴ Recently, the OLF announced that it would no longer continue fighting for independence from Ethiopia. It changed its tactic and now is seeking to align itself with other opposition groups to formally and peacefully oppose the government of Meles Zenawi.

The Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF) took responsibility for an attack on European tourists in Afar region in January 2012 that killed five.^{45,46} Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of funding the ARDUF.⁴⁷ Some have speculated that the ARDUF is actually an Ethiopian government construct meant to shift blame for domestic unrest to Eritrea.⁴⁸

Government Response to Domestic Unrest

After the events of the Arab Spring affected several of its neighbors, Ethiopia responded with an unequivocal message to dissenters and rebel groups. The government arrested more than 200 members of the OLF in the months after the uprising in Tunisia.⁴⁹ In 2011, more than 98 members of Oromo opposition parties were arrested under Ethiopia's 2009 Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, itself the subject international condemnation.⁵⁰ The leader of the Oromo Federal Democratic Movement – an opposition political party the government alleges has ties to the OLF – has been accused of terrorist offenses and is currently awaiting trial.⁵¹ There are also at least three Ethiopian journalists currently on trial for terrorism-related charges.⁵²


In February 2012, the ONLF formally submitted documents to the South African courts in an attempt to initiate an International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation into the alleged genocide occurring in eastern Ethiopia.⁵³ The Zenawi government has repeatedly denied humanitarian groups, including the International Committee for the Red Cross, access to Ogaden.⁵⁴ Given the lack of coverage and access to Ogaden, it is impossible to say what exactly is occurring. Scattered reports from regional news sources claim that Ethiopian forces have attacked and killed rebels in Ogaden on several different occasions this year.⁵⁵ It has also been alleged that the Ethiopian military routinely arrests citizens in Ogaden as a means of intimidation.⁵⁶

In March 2012, Amnesty International released a report critical of the government's regulation of NGOs, arguing that new legislation prevents groups that receive more than 10 percent of their total funding from international sources from working on, among other things, issues related to democracy and human rights.⁵⁷ Not only does the report detail the many restrictions placed upon NGO's working within Ethiopia, but it accuses the government of "widespread human rights violations" and of using the Charities and Societies Proclamation of 2009 as "another vehicle for silencing critical voices."⁵⁸

In early April more than 20,000 ethnic Amhara were forcibly removed from their homes in the Southern Region and resettled to another province in the same region.⁵⁹ This is part of a larger "villagization" scheme in which the government plans to relocate more than 1.5 million residents in Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, and Ogaden/Somali by 2013.⁶⁰ Although the government officially denies it, Human Rights Watch argues that the forced relocations are related to a larger land investment/land leasing scheme the government has undertaken in these areas.⁶¹

The Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWSNET) predicts significant food shortages in Ethiopia in the coming months (see the figure below).⁶² The regions where famine and food

insecurity are predicted to be particularly severe overlap with the regions that pose the highest threat of future domestic conflict and unrest in Ethiopia. Past Ethiopian governments have been accused of using food as a weapon against ethnic groups and insurgent groups. The Meles government would be prone to use that weapon again.



Source: FEWSNET

Predicted Food Insecurity across Ethiopia, April to June 2012

Escalating Uganda-South Sudan Border Dispute

Researchers: Dr. Eliza Johannes and Ms. Ivana Djak

Summary

The March 2012 detention of Ugandan members of parliament (MPs) at the South Sudanese border and the subsequent backlash against South Sudanese citizens in Uganda have drawn attention to the protracted conflict in the West Nile region of Uganda. Although peace talks are ongoing and border demarcation work recently began, there is little proper demarcation of the region and its borders with South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). With the impending forced relocation of South Sudanese by July 1, 2012, local tensions could escalate to the national level, creating political difficulties for the leaders of both Uganda and South Sudan.

The Disputed Moyo Area

At the national level, Uganda and South Sudan agree that the disputed land in Moyo district belongs to Uganda, but this understanding is not reflected at the local level. The Kuku, who identify with South Sudan, and the Madi, who identify with Uganda, have lived together and intermingled for years, yet each group claims that the other is encroaching on its land.⁶³ The South Sudanese have for years accused the Madi tribe of Moyo and Yumbe in Uganda of extending its administration into South Sudanese territory and of resettling Madi people in Kuku areas. The South Sudanese are claiming customary boundaries, arguing that colonial era boundaries should not be used to take land from them.⁶⁴ Since the conflict is local, national-level talks such as the 2009 attempt by President Museveni and then Vice President Salva Kiir to bring together local authorities, have largely failed.⁶⁵ In September 2011, a joint ministerial technical team set out on a mission to define the border, but local-level reaction to the effort remains to be seen.⁶⁶



Detention of Ugandan MPs and Backlash Against South Sudanese Citizens

Tensions along the Ugandan and South Sudanese border have been flaring since 2005 when Sudanese authorities stopped Ugandans from building a communication tower and a road in Moyo. Sixty-five Ugandans have been killed in the region since 2007, and numerous clashes have occurred on both sides of the border.⁶⁷ Reports of Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) attacks on Ugandan citizens living along the South Sudan border were on the rise as of October 2011,⁶⁸ and an increased Uganda Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF) presence was reported by officials from South Sudan's Magwi County.⁶⁹

These tensions came to a head when nine Uganda MPs were detained by South Sudanese authorities on March 1, 2012 while on a fact-finding mission in the disputed Moyo district of the West Nile region. Upon reaching the border area, they were apprehended by armed men in

SPLA uniforms who accused them of illegally entering South Sudan. Although the MPs argue they were still in Ugandan territory, the South Sudanese administrator of the disputed area had them detained because he perceived the territory to be under South Sudanese Kajo-Keji jurisdiction. The MPs were eventually released, but the incident highlights that local administrations often have perceptions of boundaries that are not in line with national understanding.⁷⁰

The incident triggered a violent response from Moyo residents on March 3, 2012. They took to the streets to protest the treatment of Ugandan government officials, blocked the road to Kajo-Keji, and attempted to break into hospital and shops associated with South Sudanese.⁷¹ On April 3, Councilors of Moyo approved the expulsion of South Sudanese nationals from the district amid continued claims of mistreatment of Ugandans in South Sudan. The deadline for the departure of the South Sudanese is July 1, 2012.⁷²

A Complex Border History

The insecurity present in the region can be traced to the mismanagement of border demarcation during colonial and post-colonial times. Because of the history of international borders in the region, these arbitrary lines matter little to the local populations who rely on entrenched local networks instead. The current borders were drawn by Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Portugal between 1885 and 1925. While colonial officials attempted to maintain tribal unity, the lack of technical knowledge and limited land surveying resulted in serious errors.⁷³ In the 1890s, Uganda's West Nile and South Sudan's Equatoria province became known as the "Lado Enclave." The area now divided into northern Uganda and southern South Sudan was one unit that shares a colonial history. The history of Lado Enclave is particularly important in that some rebels on the border still claim to be fighting for the "Lado Republic."⁷⁴

The colonial powers fiercely competed for the region because it offers access to the Nile.⁷⁵ The Belgians gained nominal control, but never effectively governed the region. They were noted for their particular cruelty toward the locals and for turning the region into a "white adventurer's playground" for lack of oversight.⁷⁶ After King Leopold's death in 1910, the region was transferred to Sudan. The southern tip was transferred to the Uganda Protectorate before World War I. In 1960, the Uganda-South Sudan boundary was renegotiated, but with both sides admitting ignorance of where the actual international border lay.⁷⁷ The locals learned that they could change nationality and tax code by simply crossing the river. The feebleness of borders solidified their insignificance to the locals.⁷⁸

Frequent population shifts further diminished the relevance of the border. Since the 1960s, the population along the border has been uprooted numerous times. First, the 1970s conflict between Uganda and Tanzania saw nearly the entire population of the West Nile uprooted. President Museveni's rise to power in 1986 led Khartoum to support the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), further displacing large numbers. The 2000s conflict in the DRC led to more Ugandans, South Sudanese, and Congolese seeking refuge in the West Nile area.⁷⁹

The irrelevance of borders also stems from the resilience of traditional African perceptions of land. East African scholars argue the European notion of private ownership was never fully accepted by Africans for whom shared access to land is key.⁸⁰ Attempting to draw lines around people who are historically mobile and who deeply believe in shared land, creates misunderstanding between the national governments and locals, and among locals, especially when borders give advantage to certain groups.

Entrenched indigenous trade and cultural networks that have long operated in the area pay no attention to international borders. The people of the region have been connected for centuries, and several tribes are divided across the Uganda-South Sudan border. Trade between Khartoum and Uganda was well established before colonial times, and, more recently, refugee populations established strong trade networks operating outside of legal frameworks and functioning as indigenous forms of development. These strong historic, ethnic, and trade networks created “*de facto* regional integration.”⁸¹ The imposition of international borders has at time meant the eradication of stabilizing local networks that could prevent conflict.

Implications

Increasing border tensions could add pressure on President Museveni as protests against his government continue. Tensions at the local level could also create fissures between usual allies President Museveni and President Kiir, further increasing the chance that conflict could spread from Moyo to the national level. Some local media have accused President Museveni of taking advantage of South Sudan during its time of need – an additional border dispute would be devastating to the new nation while it attempts to establish its territorial integrity.⁸² The military leadership of four South Sudanese rebel groups opposed to President Kiir, led by the South Sudan Democratic Movement, accused President Museveni of killing their leader George Athor in December 2011.⁸³ President Museveni refuted the charges, accusing the groups of trying to draw Uganda into conflict.⁸⁴

The border dispute could also have serious implications for long-term development in Uganda and South Sudan. South Sudan is one of Uganda’s largest export markets.⁸⁵ Doing business along the border in South Sudan is increasingly dangerous as traders are exposed to harassment, loss of goods, and even death. Uganda needs a secure border in order for trade to flourish.⁸⁶ South Sudan on the other hand needs Ugandan assistance with education, training, investment, and services.⁸⁷ Effective border control is imperative in a region where trafficking and terrorism are on the rise, especially given recent natural resource discoveries that could lead to more frequent border clashes.⁸⁸

ALERTS

Another Coup in Guinea-Bissau Heralds Nothing New

Researcher: Dr. Ashley Bybee

Ambiguous Leadership

- Leadership of the military coup on April 12, 2012 is still unclear, but Lieutenant-Colonel Daha Bana na Walna has been the Junta's primary spokesman; Army Vice Chief of Staff Mamadu Ture Kuruma is also purported to be a major player.
- The role of Chief of Staff General Antonio Indjai is unclear. According to some reports, he was also arrested; military statements, however, claim he was not arrested and he has been involved in the meetings with opposition parties following the coup.

Basis for the Coup

- The Junta claims it learned of a secret deal between Prime Minister (PM) Carlos Gomes, Jr., and the Angolan President, authorizing Angolan troops to carry out drastic military reforms that would "annihilate" its top brass.
- The coup was probably also a tactic to derail Guinea-Bissau's second round of elections slated for April 29, which Gomes – who is very unpopular with the military because of his support for Security Sector Reform (SSR) – was expected to win.

Significant Events

- After PM Gomes and interim President Raimundo Pereira were arrested, their residences, along with those of other government ministers, were shot at and looted. The Junta stated they will be released "as soon as conditions allow."



Residence of Carlos Gomes

(Source: Aly Silva)

- The Transitional National Council (TNC) was formed by the Junta with 22 opposition parties, *excluding* the ruling party – the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC). The TNC has effectively dissolved parliament, suspended the constitution, and will set a date for democratic elections.

- The Junta said on Sunday, April 15, that it was closing all air and sea borders in response to Portugal's announcement that it was sending two navy ships and a military plane for a possible evacuation of its nationals.
- Although the coup was bloodless, Amnesty International has reported the following:⁸⁹
 - Threats to government ministers' families
 - Growing restrictions on protesters (some physical coercion)
 - Establishment of military checkpoints and roadblocks
 - Closure of private radio stations (the national broadcaster is operational but under the army's control)
 - Rumors that Carlos Gomes has not been allowed to take his diabetes medication and has become ill.

Assessment

- The Guinea-Bissauan military will support (i.e., appoint) a politician favorable to their interests as president. This means someone who will let the military continue to operate as it likes, unimpeded by civilian leadership, and who will not pursue SSR. The military has a historical alliance with the Balanta-dominated Social Renovation Party (PRS) and its leader and former Guinea-Bissauan President Kumba Yala.
- An alternative approach to avoid appointing a president with a disastrous track record is to support someone from the Opposition Democratic Collective (COD) platform, which is composed of 15 parties, including the PRS, the Republican Party of Independence for Development, and other minor political forces without parliamentary representation.⁹⁰
- Tensions and internal power plays will persist between the old guard and younger soldiers who want access to power and resources.

Sahel – Drought and Conflict Generate Famine

Researcher: Ms. Betty Boswell

A severe drought and conflict have together generated a food crisis in the Sahel. This combination is reminiscent of the 2010-2011 famine in East Africa, in which the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab interfered with assistance to drought-afflicted populations.⁹¹ The current crisis has been exacerbated by the ongoing conflict between the government and Tuareg rebels in Mali. More than 200,000 people have fled Mali since January, arriving in Niger, Chad, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso – countries that are struggling to provide food and water for their own peoples.

The U.N. estimates that this drought-prone region is experiencing a humanitarian crisis brought on by poverty, high food prices, displacement, and conflict, with 15 million people affected and at least one million children at risk.⁹²

- World Vision has initiated a \$60 million campaign to fund feeding programs, replenish village granaries, and provide more long-term solutions to the problem so the people can help themselves.⁹³
- The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization needs \$65 million more than it has to support its programs for the region.⁹⁴
- Despite the Nigerien government's foresight in detecting a looming food crisis, it needs \$20 million in emergency relief to assist its needy. Families have already begun rationing their daily food intake. The number at risk in Niger at the end of March was 1.9 million; this number could reach 3.5 million in April.⁹⁵
- The Burkinabe government's response to the food crisis affecting more than 2 million of its citizens is to educate them about water conservation, irrigation, fertilization, and livestock management. The \$224 million needed to fund this comprehensive plan is \$108 million short of its goal.⁹⁶

The ongoing conflict and coup last month in Mali has made the situation even worse for the people of the Sahel.

- Mali's land borders were closed due to sanctions by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) from April 3 to 9, disrupting the cross-border food markets.
- Migration routes and livestock herding routes have changed, with pastoralists leading their animals south, where food and water are scarce.⁹⁷
- Humanitarian aid agencies cut off their services in Mali because the rebels have been stealing supplies and ransacking offices.⁹⁸

Mugabe's Declining Health Sparks Succession Tensions in Zimbabwe

Researchers: Mr. Alexander Noyes and Dr. Janette Yarwood

An April 10, 2012 report claiming that President Mugabe was “fighting for his life” in a Singapore hospital sparked a flurry of local and international media attention and heightened inter-party tensions over who would succeed Mugabe if he were to die while in office.⁹⁹ Government and Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) officials disputed the report as “hogwash,” noting that Mugabe is in Singapore on a private holiday and that the reports are “just the wish of our detractors. The president is alive and well.”¹⁰⁰

- The two major players vying to succeed Mugabe are Vice President Joice Mujuru – widow of the late military leader and political powerbroker Solomon Mujuru – and current Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa.¹⁰¹
- Recent reports indicate that Mnangagwa was anointed as Mugabe's eventual successor through a “gentleman's agreement” the two struck in 2008 after Mugabe lost the first round of the presidential election. Mugabe reportedly told Mnangagwa that “the job is yours when I leave” if Mnangagwa assured Mugabe a victory in the second round of elections.¹⁰²
- According to Zimbabwe's constitution, if the president dies while in office, the role is assumed by the vice president “whom the president has designated for such an eventuality” (there are two current vice presidents, Mujuru and John Nkomo). If the president has not designated, it will be the last person to act as president, which was Nkomo. In either case, the constitution states that the vice president will hold office for 90 days until elections can be held.¹⁰³

Although the most recent round of reports on Mugabe's health may turn out to be just rumors, the succession struggle in Zimbabwe remains a persistent flashpoint that has the potential to further destabilize the country and region.

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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

THE AFRICA WATCH

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TO THE READER

IDA's team of Africa researchers welcomes your comments, questions, and feedback on the contents of *The Africa Watch*. If you would like to discuss an article in this issue or provide suggestions for future research, please contact me at (703) 845-4394.

With best regards,

George

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward

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
ANALYSES

Sierra Leone's 2012 Elections: The Candidates and the Issues

Researcher: Dr. Ashley Bybee

Summary

- Presidential elections in Sierra Leone are slated for November 17, 2012. The incumbent, President Ernest Bai Koroma of the All People's Congress (APC), will face Brigadier Julius Maada Bio (Ret.) of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP). Although Bio has a sordid past, he appears to attract significant support, most likely because he is a descendent of a ruling house.
- Politics in Sierra Leone are drawn largely on ethnic and regional lines, as shown on the map. The APC draws its support from the Temne and Limba of the north and the Krio community in the west (predominantly Muslim). The SLPP draws its support from the Mende and other smaller tribes of the south and east (predominantly Christian). The Mende and Temne are the largest ethnic groups, each comprising about 30 percent of Sierra Leone's population.
- Political differences, prominent defections, the government's procurement of assault weapons, large-scale land acquisitions by foreign firms, a corruption scandal within the current administration, and the recent discovery of oil in the Sierra Leone-Liberian basin will provide some interesting fodder for the candidates' campaigns.
- There have already been several incidents of political violence over the past months, and more are likely as the elections draw closer.¹ IDA will monitor the size and significance of such events as the campaign season picks up to provide assessments of their impact on the elections and implications for political instability.



2007 Parliamentary Results

(Source: Sierra Leone National Electoral Commission)

The Candidates

Despite the existence of a number of small opposition parties, President Koroma and Julius Maada, representing Sierra Leone's major political parties, will be the leading candidates in November.

Ernest Bai Koroma (Incumbent), All People's Congress (APC)



President Ernest Bai Koroma
(Source: Reuters)

President Koroma, age 59, is from Makeni, Bombali District. Although an ethnic Temne from the north, Koroma is a devout Christian and spent years teaching Bible school. Before entering politics, Koroma held a number of executive positions in the private sector, most notably in the insurance industry. Koroma started his political career as the opposition candidate challenging President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of the SLPP in 2002. Although Koroma lost in a landslide, he succeeded in making a name for himself and getting elected to represent the Bombali District in parliament. He won the presidency in 2007 in a very close run-off against the incumbent Vice President (VP) Solomon Berewa. His presidency has been known for its anti-corruption efforts, expansion of free healthcare, and

adoption of free market solutions to encourage sustainable growth.

Brigadier Julius Maada Bio (Ret.), Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP)

Bio, age 47, from Tihun, Bonthe District, is the son of the Paramount Chief Charlie Bio II of the Sogbini Chiefdom. An ethnic Mende, Bio is a devout Catholic and, upon completion of his secondary schooling, became a teacher at a Methodist school.² After considering enrollment at Fourah Bay College (where Koroma attended), Bio opted to join the military instead in 1987. Bio is best known as being one of the several young soldiers who ousted President Joseph Momoh in 1992 and installed Valentine Strasser – the 26-year-old captain who was the youngest head of state in the world. Four years later, Bio unseated Strasser and served as head of state himself for a few months before elections took place. He was implicated in a number of atrocities during Sierra Leone's civil war, including the execution of 26 people in 1992 and other brutality by soldiers during his short reign in 1996. After retirement from the military, Bio subsequently attended American University in Washington, DC, where he received a Master's degree in International Relations. He returned to Sierra Leone in 2003 to start a number of business ventures.³ Bio became a member of the SLPP in 2005; although he failed on his first attempt to gain leadership of the party that year, he succeeded in doing so in July 2011.



Retired Brigadier Julius Maada Bio
(Source: www.maadabio.org)

The Issues

The following issues are likely to be hot topics of debate in lead up to the November election:

Prominent Defections

There have been a number of high-profile political defections, most significantly from the SLPP to the APC, which suggest that the APC is perceived as the likely winner. Recently, Lieutenant-Colonel Tom Nyuma, previously a close ally of Bio and currently the Chairman of the Kailahun City Council in the southeast, defected from the SLPP to the APC. Given that Nyuma was from the southeast – an opposition stronghold – this is seen as a major blow to the Bio campaign.⁴

Although it is unclear what prompted this defection, it likely had to do with political maneuvering by President Koroma to gain support in a region where he has relatively little support. Some contend the move will galvanize the opposition who see Nyuma as a traitor, opting to ally with a cabal that had physically beat him, then proceeded to purchase an expensive SUV for him.⁵

Other defections have occurred from the People's Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC) to the SLPP. The PMDC – the third largest political party – acquired 10 percent of the vote in 2007, effectively splitting the SLPP vote. It is not considered to be a viable party this election, which has heightened the polarization of the electorate between APC and SLPP supporters. Recently, the PMDC's founder, Aggrey Albert Aruna, defected to the SLPP along with hundreds of others in an effort to remove divisions in the opposition and present a united front against the APC.⁶

Government Procurement of Assault Weapons

The Koroma administration recently drew criticism when it imported several million dollars' worth of assault weapons, which it claimed were a proactive move to prepare for war in a time of peace.⁷ The opposition claims the arms will be provided to the ethnically imbalanced Operational Services Division (OSD) (a paramilitary wing of the police force seen as loyal to the President) in order to intimidate the opposition ahead of the elections. This follows from allegations made by Bio that Koroma is "exporting" armed ex-combatants to opposition strongholds with the intent of inciting violence.⁸ It is important to recall Sierra Leone's long history of electoral violence, which has been perpetrated by either party loyalists or hired hands in 11 parliamentary and five presidential elections since 1961.⁹ Because several by-elections since 2009 have been characterized by violent confrontations, these allegations do not come as a surprise, but their potential to cause political turbulence should not be underestimated.

Large-Scale Land Acquisition

Large numbers of rural dwellers continue to be vocal opponents of massive foreign investment, which has acquired approximately 1 million hectares, 20 percent of the country's farmland. Activists from the Malen Chiefdom in the southern Pujehun District have received considerable media attention following the arrest last year of 40 locals who impeded the operations of the Belgian company Socfin. Socfin, a large-scale investor in Sierra Leone's palm oil industry, enjoys a high level of government support, but locals claim they are not consulted prior to important negotiations, work in appalling conditions, receive paltry wages, and have been denied medical care. They also maintain that their ancestral lands have been destroyed.¹⁰ According to local NGOs, approximately 20 chiefdoms in nine districts have been affected by these large-scale land acquisitions.¹¹

"Timbergate" Scandal

The Timbergate scandal broke in 2011 following a report from al-Jazeera that associates of Vice President Samuel Sam-Sumana had accepted kickbacks in return for a promise the VP would back an illegal logging project. The Anti-Corruption Commission recently indicted two men for accepting bribes on behalf of the VP, but did not find evidence that he was personally complicit or even aware of these dealings.¹² Nonetheless, this incident will reflect poorly on President Koroma, who has placed anti-corruption at the top of his political agenda.

Recent Oil Discoveries

Recent offshore oil finds in Sierra Leone-Liberian Basin may be a welcome discovery to citizens and politicians alike, but they will undoubtedly feature prominently in presidential politics and contribute to a future of fiery debates. While it is too early for candidates to play the blame

game – either condemning the incumbent for his ineffective management of oil revenues or criticizing the opposition for its lack of a coherent strategy to develop the country's economy – it is certain that oil politics will impact elections well beyond 2012.


Kenya: Pre-Election Political Maneuvering and Ethnic Violence in the Rift Valley

Researchers: Dr. Eliza Johannes and Ms. Ivana Djak

Summary

Recent changes in the political alliances of Kenya's top presidential contenders have left their supporters and the public puzzled over the candidates' platforms. At the same time, the re-emergence of ethnic organizations, which are allying themselves with some of the candidates, is causing unrest in the historically troublesome Rift Valley. In the wake of a major clash between police forces and protesters in early April, the Rift Valley could experience increased violence as election campaigns begin.

Political Maneuvering and Shifting Alliances



Opinion polls show Prime Minister (PM) Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) as the most popular presidential candidate.¹³ Odinga, however, faces opposition from Deputy Prime Minister Musalia Mudavadi, who confirmed he is leaving the ODM.¹⁴ As Mudavadi is the deputy ODM leader, the party asked him to stay and compete with PM Odinga for its nomination, but he declined in favor of competing with a new, still unannounced party.¹⁵

PM Odinga's strongest opposition, the G7 Alliance of former Deputy Premier Uhuru Kenyatta and Eldoret North Member of Parliament (MP) William Ruto, who joined forces in defiance of their International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments, is reportedly falling apart. Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, is being pitted against Ruto, a Kalenjin, along lines similar to the 2007 electoral violence.¹⁶ Controversy surrounds the party allegiances of Kenyatta, who has yet to join a party after leaving the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) Party he formerly chaired,¹⁷ and Ruto, who created the United Republican Party (URP) a week after his ICC indictment, disregarding supporters who believed he should have stayed with the ODM.¹⁸

Ruto, an MP in the Rift Valley, is facing opposition from some of his traditional allies, especially those from the South Rift, because of his involvement in local politics. Nominations for party positions and the upcoming party elections are leading to a bitter battle for control of the URP.¹⁹ Kalenjin ethnic group MPs from Eastern Rift and the Kipsigis across the region have criticized Ruto, accusing him of dictating party politics.²⁰

As the pre-election season intensifies, rumors of an assassination plot against PM Odinga have caused a national outcry and media frenzy.

An MP from Gem, Jakoyo Midiwo, alleged there was a plot and mentioned Foreign Affairs Minister Professor Sam Ogeri by name. The accusations led security forces to interview Ogeri and other government officials.²¹ Public fascination with alliance politics and the alleged assassination plot suggests anxiety among the Kenyan people ahead of elections.

Ethnic Alliances Re-Emerge in the Rift Valley

Even more concerning is the formation of ethnic alliances around Ruto and Kenyatta in the Rift Valley. Kenyatta has garnered the support of the tribal organization Gema (Gikuyu, Embu, and Meru Association), which seeks to advance the interests of its member ethnic groups. Ruto revived Kamatusa (Kalenjin Maasai Turkana and Samburu Association) to counter the strong pro-Kenyatta Gema voice in the Rift Valley.²² The Star reports Ruto has stirred tribal emotions by condemning the ICC and using turbulent rhetoric to urge the alignment of political causes along ethnic lines.²³

Gema and Kamatusa claim to be cultural associations.²⁴ Cherangany MP Joshua Kutuny defends the Gema and Kamatusa groups as peace initiatives between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin ahead of the next election.²⁵ The International Commission of Jurists Kenya, however, argues they are stirring ethnic divisions and inciting violence. The Jurists point to the fact that Gema and Kamatusa are collecting signatures for the deferral of the Kenyan cases at the ICC, which could contribute to further ethnic tension.²⁶ Other groups in the area have expressed anger over Gema and Kamatusa's promotion of ethnic groupings. Meru and Maasai leaders have stated Gema and Kamatusa do not represent entire ethnic groups, and that not all tribal members want to be associated with them.²⁷

PM Odinga's campaign spoke out against the organizations in a press release on April 12, 2012, denouncing Gema and Kamatusa as historically associated with Rift Valley ethnic violence and as dangerous to national stability.²⁸


Limuru Rally Chaos Shakes Nation

The polarizing roles of Gema and Kamatusa were recently highlighted when an anti-Gema and Kamatusa rally was violently broken up by the police on April 18, 2012. The anti-Gema and Kamatusa rally planned for Limuru turned violent when police blocked more than 2,000 youth by throwing teargas canisters and using live ammunition to disperse the crowd. The meeting was organized to counter a meeting held by Gema leaders a few weeks earlier²⁹ in opposition to the ICC and in support of Kenyatta and his co-accused Ruto.³⁰ The youths at the anti-Gema meeting reportedly sang and chanted anti-Kenyatta slogans and condemned Gema for fanning tribalism ahead of the elections.³¹ The organizers of the Limuru meeting accused the police of having an ethnic agenda because they did not stop Gema's meeting, but violently shut down a non-ethnically motivated group meeting.³² Kenyan government officials and civil society leaders condemned the use of force as undemocratic.³³ Police boss Mathew Iteere defended the police, arguing Mungiki sect members were planning to relaunch the outlawed group during the anti-Gema rally. The organizers of the event have dismissed these claims and demand justice.³⁴ Because the police played a key role in the 2007 election violence, the Limuru rally chaos has heightened public concern.

Historical, Current, and Future Instability in the Rift Valley

Ethnic strife has cast a shadow over election politics since KANU, Kenya's ruling party of the early 1990s, was pushed into reintroducing ethnically divisive multiparty politics. Starting with 1991 violence that spread from Nandi District to the rest of the Rift Valley, periodic clashes between groups grew common. Violence came to a head in 2007 with the bloodiest attacks taking place in the Rift Valley.³⁵ Scholars agree that the 2007 violence in the Rift Valley was likely *triggered* by the elections, but was *deeply rooted* in competing territorial claims by the native Kipsigis group and the dislocated Kisii and Kikuyu. Because the Kalenjin, the majority ethnic group, had hoped to reclaim some of their land after the election, they became involved in the conflict.³⁶

Recent clashes and cattle raids in the historically conflicted Nandi District have raised concern about the potential for further election related violence. In February, 29 families were displaced at the border between Nandi and Muhoroni districts in Rift Valley Province as a result of cattle rustling. The Rift Valley is home to many pastoral groups, and periodic violence is familiar, but recent incidents have raised concern among the locals.³⁷ Because the August 2010 constitution allows for decentralization, the 2013 election is likely to be centered on local issues that overlap with ethnic lines, according to Karuti Kanyinga, a political scientist from the University of Nairobi.³⁸



http://www.tourza.com/travel_kenya/kenya_map.htm

Regional Implications of a Third Sudanese War

Researchers: Dr. Stephanie Burchard and Ms. Brittany Gregerson

Summary

- Despite the lack of a formal declaration by either country, Sudan and South Sudan have gone to war.
- The effects of a prolonged interstate conflict in the Horn of Africa would be severe and far-reaching. This war could entangle several other states in the region, most notably Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia. It could also undermine the fragile gains recently made in Somalia.

Third Sudanese War

Although the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was understood to be incomplete at the time of its signing, it was hoped that it would end 50 years of conflict in Sudan that included two brutal civil wars. The CPA granted regional autonomy and power-sharing to the south and scheduled the July 2011 referendum that resulted in 99 percent of southern Sudanese voting for independence. Key issues (i.e., the status of Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) rebels in northern territories of South Kordofan and Blue Nile and the demarcation of a final border in five disputed areas), however, remained unsettled.³⁹ Although several rounds of negotiations were held between Juba and Khartoum in early 2012, tensions mounted, and military campaigns resumed. Although neither country has formally declared war, relations have deteriorated to the point that Sudan and South Sudan are in a *de facto* state of war.

Regional Alliances

During the current conflict, both Sudan and South Sudan have worked to rally like-minded actors to their respective causes. This has taken many forms, from funneling support to militant groups with shared enemies to attempting to recruit officials from sympathetic countries as eventual mediators. In the event that hostilities continue, further – and more significant – utilization of regional allies will be crucial to the strategies of both sides.

Sudan

Sudan boasts a large number of ideologically aligned regional actors, but few are likely to be able to provide tangible, meaningful assistance. Although Sudan has aggressively pursued positive relationships with the post-Arab Spring regimes in Egypt and Libya, neither of the latter wants to be seen as a conflict participant. Egypt has been eager to engage with Sudan on infrastructure and trade issues,⁴⁰ but it has extended many of the same offers to South Sudan. Indeed, Egypt has put itself forth as a potential mediator, with high-level visits to both Khartoum and Juba in recent weeks.⁴¹ The political and social challenges currently facing Egypt and Libya are more than sufficient to limit their willingness to engage with their southern neighbors much beyond their current position.

Looking east to Eritrea, Sudan finds an ally with few other friends in the region eager to engage. Eritrea has supplied Sudanese proxy fighters with weapons and ammunition for some time.⁴² It is unlikely, however, that Eritrean capability will extend far beyond the assistance already being provided. Looking to the southeast, al-Shabaab and Sudan have some ideological overlap, and al-Shabaab would likely welcome an opportunity to expand its reach in the region. Absent a shared border, however, providing material support would prove difficult.

To Sudan's southwest is the Central African Republic (CAR), a country with which Sudan has enjoyed markedly improved relations in recent years.⁴³ CAR, however, is almost certainly materially unable to assist Sudan in any meaningful way, even if so inclined.⁴⁴ The relationship is new and largely untested, and the April 20 killing of 11 CAR troops by rebels who were targeting the Sudanese army⁴⁵ provides a visible disincentive.

Perhaps more willing and able to help – and perhaps from CAR territory – is the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Ugandan officials have accused Sudan of reaching out to the LRA in an attempt to revive their relationship and gain assistance in the current conflict.⁴⁶

Another potential supporter of Sudan in the region may be neighboring Chad. After Sudan nearly captured N'Djamena in 2008, the two countries had a rapprochement and have been on good terms since 2010.⁴⁷ Sudanese media sources laud the countries' working relationship, which includes frequent military and diplomatic exchanges.⁴⁸ Chad and Sudan are close enough that an outright rejection of a Sudanese request is unlikely. Unconfirmed reports state that Chad has already provided upwards of 2,000 troops to fight alongside the Sudanese, with more to come.⁴⁹ Chad, however, has also made an effort in recent years to bolster its standing in the international community, participating, for example, in the AU-brokered Sudan-South Sudan Consultative Forum meetings.⁵⁰

South Sudan


Juba may have fewer regional allies, but, in terms of their willingness and capacity to act, they more than make up the disparity. Uganda's defense chief publicly stated on April 20 at an IDA-sponsored conference that the country "will not sit by and do nothing. We will be involved having suffered a proxy war by Khartoum."⁵¹ This sentiment was later expanded upon by a UPDF spokesperson.⁵² Uganda has the resources, including recently acquired modern combat aircraft, and history to make these statements credible. Further, Uganda stands to lose significant revenue in the event of intensified conflict, since South Sudan and Uganda are major trade partners.⁵³ Even more, Uganda – already host to more than 370,450 refugees, asylum-seekers, and IDPs – has an interest in not seeing that number expand further.⁵⁴

South Sudan may also look to Kenya, another regional heavyweight with significant economic interests at stake and an ongoing refugee crisis it does not wish to see further exacerbated. Kenya has a pattern of providing South Sudan with important, although passive, support – e.g., allowing the transit of armored vehicles from China through Mombasa to their final destination⁵⁵ – but it is not clear whether Kenya might get more directly involved.

Similar to Kenya and Uganda, Ethiopia has economic and energy interests in South Sudan and a significant refugee population. Ethiopia has also supplied South Sudan with arms, but it is unclear whether it would be prepared to go further. The April 20 announcement that Ethiopia is pulling its troops out of Somalia,⁵⁶ however, may make greater involvement in South Sudan more feasible.

Significant Potential to Destabilize East Africa

A prolonged conflict between Sudan and South Sudan has the potential to cause significant



Source: Government of Canada

problems well beyond the two countries' borders. If refugee patterns resemble routes traversed during the Second Sudanese Civil War, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda will be particularly affected. All three countries already face challenges. Ethiopia is dealing with a moderate level of domestic unrest; Kenya is preparing itself for contentious elections in late 2012 or early 2013; and Uganda is still dealing with unrest in its northern region. Additional refugees and proliferation of weapons could exacerbate these countries' problems.

Further, if the conflict in Blue Nile persists or spreads to Upper Nile, Ethiopia might consider disengaging further from Somalia in order to protect its own border with Sudan. Kenya, already stressed by the situation in the Dadaab refugee camp,⁵⁷ may also rethink its commitment to Somalia.

Lesotho: Election Outlook

Researchers: Dr. Janette Yarwood and Mr. Alexander Noyes

Summary

Several developments have escalated tensions in Lesotho in the lead-up to polls scheduled for May 26, 2012. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted in March that the political situation was “worrying.”⁵⁸ On February 28, Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili defected from the ruling party, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), and formed the Democratic Congress (DC). Forty-four LDC members also crossed the floor and joined the DC, relegating the LDC, which had been in power for 15 years, to the opposition.⁵⁹ While Mosisili remains Prime Minister, his defection has caused considerable acrimony, with the LDC and other opposition groups filing a case with the High Court arguing that the defection was unconstitutional and challenging the legitimacy of Mosisili’s continued rule.⁶⁰ Since Lesotho has experienced several bouts of electoral conflict over the last two decades, the situation is in need of close monitoring.

Background

Lesotho has a long history of political infighting preceding elections, a practice that has contributed to political instability and led to limited electoral violence. Lesotho is a parliamentary constitutional monarchy headed by the king, a hereditary monarch who, according to the Constitution of 1993, is a “living symbol of national unity” with no executive or legislative powers. The national legislature consists of a bicameral Parliament made up of a 120-member National Assembly and a 33-member Senate. The leader of the majority party in the National Assembly becomes prime minister and heads the government.

The political history of post-colonial Lesotho is closely linked to electoral conflict. Most, if not all, of Lesotho’s elections since 1965 have been marred by allegations of fraud, followed by a period of political instability.⁶¹ Following the elections in 1998, the LCD took 78 of the 79 contested seats with just over 60 percent of the total valid votes cast. The opposition took only 1.3 percent of the seats, with about 40 percent of the votes.⁶² These results were not acceptable to segments of the population, although the majority of observer groups declared that the elections had been free and fair. Political tension resulted in demonstrations outside the king’s palace because the king had not responded to the public’s plea to dissolve Parliament. In reaction to the military’s attempt to control these demonstrations, armed opposition supporters took control of the capital, Maseru. Violence broke out, accompanied by rioting and looting. Seventy-five Basotho lost their lives. Law and order were restored only after Southern African Development Community (SADC) intervention.

The 2007 elections in the kingdom of Lesotho again produced deep grievances between political parties after the electoral system – widely seen as unfair and favoring the ruling party – gave Prime Minister Mosisili’s LCD party a larger parliamentary majority than represented by the votes.⁶³ In 2007, violence was avoided, but the opposition strengthened its calls for electoral reforms and more credible polls.⁶⁴

The current concern ahead of the May 26 elections is due to the recent defection by Mosisili and his allies from the ruling LCD to the newly created DC party. Internal feuding within the ruling party reportedly aggrieved Mosisili.⁶⁵ The move effectively relegated the LCD, which had won a narrow majority of 62 seats in the 2007 parliamentary elections, to opposition status. The Prime Minister’s defection and the creation of the DC reflect the country’s historical trend of party formation resulting from struggles between parties and intra-party factions.⁶⁶ The fear is

that Lesotho may be reverting to previous electoral behavior, with the potential for similar results – political instability and limited violence requiring outside intervention.

Conflict Mitigation Efforts

SADC has taken an active role in resolving conflicts in Lesotho since 1996.⁶⁷ In 2007, a delegation from the SADC Ministerial Troika of the Organ for Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation visited Lesotho to assess the situation in the country ahead of the February elections and encouraged all the stakeholders to commit themselves to the electoral process and make the elections a success. The most recent SADC efforts took place in 2011 and paved the way for the May 2012 elections. Stakeholders in the mediation process included the Independent Electoral Commission of Lesotho, the former ruling LCD, opposition parties, and the government.⁶⁸ The agreement led to the introduction of several reforms in preparation for the upcoming elections.⁶⁹ With Lesotho's elections set for May 26, an SADC delegation was sent to the country in March in what the government said was a routine visit.⁷⁰ External mediation in Lesotho has proven effective in the past, and SADC reportedly views the elections as important given recent developments.⁷¹

Military Component

Since the Prime Minister also serves as the Minister of Defence, there has been concern that the DC and Mosisili will launch a coup if the election does not go their way.⁷² Reports that Mosisili has recently increased the military presence around the country and scaled up security surrounding his home, along with the recent replacement of the powerful Army Commander, have added fuel to the fears of a DC-backed coup.⁷³ The Lesotho Defense Force (LDF) has a history of intervening in politics. The government that was installed after a military coup in 1986 lasted until multiparty elections were held in 1993.⁷⁴ In 1998, an army mutiny broke out in Masaru, and junior LDF officers and other ranks arrested their senior officers and demanded that the head of the army resign.⁷⁵ This inflamed the fragile situation in the country and possibly signaled a military coup. SADC again intervened with the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) entering Lesotho.⁷⁶ Most recently, the army stated it would not tolerate any attempt to destabilize the peace in Lesotho.⁷⁷ The statement came just after clashes between opposition members and supporters of Mosisili's new DC party.⁷⁸ The violence left 10 people injured.⁷⁹

Conclusion

Given these recent developments and Lesotho's long history electoral conflict, the potential for the May 26 vote to heighten tensions and trigger unrest remains high. The conflict mitigation mechanisms implemented over the last several years will be put to the test and may help defuse such tensions.

Arms Availability in Eastern Africa Magnifying Violence

Researcher: Ms. Andrea Pongo

Summary

As fighting between Sudan and South Sudan intensifies, increased numbers of conventional weapons and small arms and light weapons (SALW) will flow into the region and will likely exacerbate simmering disputes not only in both Sudans, but also in neighboring states.


Disputes detailed in recent IDA reporting (See “Escalating Uganda-South Sudan Border Dispute,” *The Africa Watch*, April 18, 2012) demonstrate the precarious circumstances in unstable regional border areas. These conditions are likely to deteriorate as armed refugees seek shelter from fighting in Sudan and South Sudan and contribute to destabilization.⁸⁰ In other cases, arms circulate along trafficking routes that include major refugee camps.⁸¹

Current Situation

The governments in both Khartoum and Juba are drawing from stores of conventional weapons built up since 2005 using networks of semi-licit arms transfers and state partners.⁸² Khartoum has accomplished its build-up of heavy weapons and SALW with continued imports from Russia and Belarus, as well as from China and Iran.⁸³ Juba receives supplies of SALW from Ukraine and through existing regional relationships with Ethiopia and Kenya.⁸⁴ The government of South Sudan (GoSS) has also been the beneficiary of post-independence programs to support its military transformation, receiving material and training from the UK, U.S., and Swiss governments.⁸⁵

Supplies of SALW have flowed in large numbers to Unity and Upper Nile states along the Sudan-South Sudan border, but they have also made their way to Darfur, South Kordofan state, and Blue Nile state, where Khartoum has fought to put down active insurgencies.⁸⁶ Before official independence, the Juba-sponsored Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) sent SALW, tanks, howitzers, and mortars into South Kordofan and Blue Nile states to support the SPLA-North, which fights Khartoum’s Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in those areas.⁸⁷

Non-state actors in the region already have access to arms from government stores; evidence shows that militaries and law enforcement agencies help to arm ethnic groups engaged in violence at the local level. For example, the SPLA and the Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS)



are alleged to be supplying weapons and ammunition to the Luo-Nuer White Army, the group currently engaged with the rival ethnic Murle in South Sudan's Jonglei state. Weapons from Khartoum made their way to the Murle through the anti-SPLA South Sudan Army, led by the late George Athor, who was killed in December 2011.⁸⁸

Implications for the Region

Ethnic violence in regions bordering Sudan and South Sudan will likely be exacerbated by the expected migration of thousands of people fleeing the fighting and carrying weapons and ammunition. For example, for years the SPLA operated from and influenced events in the Kakuma refugee camp in northern Kenya.⁸⁹ Reports from the area now indicate that Sudanese refugees are filling the Kakuma camp and are likely a conduit for SALW that will further destabilize the precarious security conditions there.⁹⁰

Although current press reports warn that a regional arms race could be unfolding as the governments of Uganda and Kenya join Sudan and South Sudan in stepping up conventional arms purchases, IDA analysis is that the governments of Kenya, Uganda, and South Sudan are unlikely to use these arms against one another. Ethiopia is likely to continue its existing relationship with Juba by openly providing the GoSS with additional light and heavy weapons, while also cooperating on economic projects with Khartoum.⁹¹ (See separate Analysis of the "Regional Implications of a Third Sudanese War" in this issue of *The Africa Watch*.) There are incentives for regional governments to unite against the influence of Khartoum and its international sponsors. For example, it will be necessary to work together on oil pipeline development, refinery construction, and port facilities if the regional governments want to benefit from potential oil export revenues.

International Partners

Because there is minimal indigenous production of SALW in eastern Africa, governments procure SALW, along with conventional weapons, tanks, and aircraft from foreign government-sponsored providers. Non-state actors rely on illicit transfers along established trafficking networks that supply the region, as well as transfers from government and law enforcement entities.⁹²

Exports to sub-Saharan Africa reportedly made up 11 percent of Chinese and 17 percent of Ukrainian exports of major arms from 2006 to 2010, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).⁹³ That said, it is unlikely that the government-sponsored exporters of arms to eastern Africa – primarily Russian, Chinese, and Ukrainian suppliers – are motivated solely by the revenue earned. Major arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa are a small percentage of world trade.⁹⁴ According to SIPRI, Russian officials have cited relatively small military budgets in Africa as an impediment to arms sales, making it necessary to offer flexible financing or terms of trade, including barter arrangements and access to natural resources.⁹⁵



It is more likely that state-level suppliers seek to influence politics in the region and to improve the security of their vested interests.⁹⁶ The most notable case is China, whose large oil sector investments in Sudan provide an incentive for arms sales to the government in Khartoum. Oil resources now lying south of the new border (see map above) and under the jurisdiction of Juba, however, already provide new incentives for Chinese arms sales to the GoSS. Among other deliveries, the GoSS received a shipment of 34 military trucks, trailers, and wagons from China in April 2012, according to local reporters with sources at the port of Mombasa.⁹⁷

ALERTS

Niger Delta Groups Threaten Boko Haram

Researcher: Dr. Caroline F. Ziemke-Dickens

Concern over possible operational cooperation between Boko Haram and insurgent and separatist groups in the Niger Delta may be fading in the wake of an internet video in which Boko Haram leader Abubaker Shekau warns the Nigerian president that “we will devour you in three months.” The statement has been widely interpreted as a threat to assassinate Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan.⁹⁸ The video was released on the heels of an Easter Sunday suicide attack near a church in Kaduna that killed 39 people and rumors that Boko Haram was taking steps to expand its terror campaign into River, Bayelsa, Warri, Benin, and Cross River states.⁹⁹ Spokesmen for the Niger Delta Liberation Force (NDLF), the Ijaw Council for Human Rights (ICHR), and the South-South Element Progressives Union (SSEPU) all issued statements to the effect that threatening the President was a bridge too far. The NDLF’s statement, “Boko Haram, Mind Your Utterances,” is representative of the reaction of a number of Niger Delta groups:

We viewed this statement as an affront on the sensibilities of Niger Delta ex-militants who have had several face-to-face gun confrontations with the Nigerian army under the Joint Task Force over ten years.

We are warning the entire northern leaders to advise their children to be mindful of their actions and utterances as any attempt on President Goodluck Jonathan’s life shall spell doom for the entire nation. We will resist violently because we have said it over again and again that the Presidency for the South-South was a sympathy vote by the entire country to appease Niger Delta ex-militants and the region over federal government criminal abandonment of region’s oil and gas wealth being exploited over 50 years.¹⁰⁰

The statement concluded by the warning: “That the Niger Delta youths agreed to embrace amnesty in the interest of the larger Nigerian nation does not mean that we are pushovers. ENOUGH IS ENOUGH. Boko Haram has drawn the battle line.”

A coalition of youth leaders from Rivers, Delta, Cross River, Bayelsa, Edo, and Akwo-Ibom states – the South-South Leadership Forum (SSLF) – also strongly criticized the threat as “empty and an exercise in futility.” While also criticizing what they see as a lukewarm security response that handles Boko Haram “with kid gloves,” they denounced the silence of northern leaders and Islamic religious, youth, and women’s groups, and pledged to “vehemently and violently resist any attempt to harm Mr. President or ridicule his regime.”¹⁰¹ Their defense of Jonathan is not, however, entirely in the spirit of selfless national pride. The SSLF’s statement also pledged to unleash its own terror campaign and seize control of the South’s oil wealth “in order to deny the North of access to it.”¹⁰²

Reverse Brain Drain in Africa

Researcher: Dr. Caroline F. Ziemke-Dickens

In the same week that the Pew Hispanic Center reported that, for the first time in four decades, more Mexican nationals are leaving than are entering the United States (legally or illegally), CNN International has aired a report citing anecdotal evidence that expatriate African professionals are returning to the continent in the wake of protracted economic crises in Europe and the U.S. Since 2008, while economic growth in the West has been stagnant at best, many African economies are expanding rapidly.¹⁰³

The reverse brain drain is not limited to African expatriates. For example, young Portuguese professionals are migrating by the thousands to seek employment in Mozambique in hopes of earning remittances to send back to their families in Portugal.¹⁰⁴ Funto Akinkugbe, managing director of www.findajobinafrica.com, told CNN that, while the trend of African professionals repatriating has been picking up for several years, “you now also have Europeans looking at exploring opportunities in Africa because Africa is an emerging market, the next destination.” Overall, services like www.findajobinafrica.com have seen a 35 to 40 percent increase in the number of applications over the past two years.¹⁰⁵

The exodus of the continent’s science and technology graduates continues to be a concern. As many as a third of Africans with advanced degrees in science and technology still work outside the continent. But increasingly, African nations are seeing the benefits of “brain circulation” – the return of expatriates to work or establish businesses in their home countries, drawing on the skills and knowledge base they gained in the diaspora.¹⁰⁶

There are, so far, several brakes on the trend. Life can be difficult in infrastructure-poor African countries for those used to life in the West. In some countries, notably Nigeria, the quality of secondary and tertiary education remains poor, and affluent families continue to send their children abroad – to the UK and the U.S. – for education.¹⁰⁷ Few African countries have institutional cultures to encourage innovation: property rights are weak or non-existent, corruption makes the creation of new enterprises a risky and painstaking ordeal, and investment in basic research and development remains low, about 0.3 percent of GDP – a fraction of what is devoted to R&D in the West and Asia.¹⁰⁸

The trend has some downsides. Many African economies are heavily dependent on remittances as a source of hard currency. The World Bank estimated that such remittances were worth more than \$380 billion and rising by 2008. Ecobank Nigeria recent launched a new product designed specifically to facilitate remittances, the Ecobank Africa Diaspora Account.¹⁰⁹ Ruling regimes may not be eager to see large numbers of westernized, educated, articulate, and politically savvy expatriates return to demand political and economic reform. Finally, the influx of foreign expertise is making competition for local jobs too keen in some urban areas and is leading to an increase in the cost of living in major cities. As one observer described the situation that is playing out in Mozambique, “if the return of the colonial master [in the form of Portuguese expatriate workers] has energized business in the African country, it has also made life too much of a chore for the average Mozambican, who is not only compelled to be his brother’s keeper, but also forced to extend a hand to his foreign brother who was once his master.”¹¹⁰

Guinea Bissau – Military Coup Puts Key Harvest in Jeopardy

Researcher: Ms. Ashton Callahan

The April 12, 2012 coup in Guinea Bissau is threatening the country's main legitimate export – the cashew nut. The market had only recently recovered after government pricing and commercialization blunders in 2007 triggered a collapse in local producer prices that led to a disastrous cashew harvest for farmers.¹¹¹ The cashew nut is the country's principal crop, accounting for 80 to 85 percent of declared exports. Its harvest dominates the lives and welfare of more than 250,000 families.¹¹² Traders are typically foreigners who buy the raw product from individual farmers, and then upload it to containers at the port of Bissau. Although the political crisis seems to have halted the cashew trade for now, it will likely resume when prices have stabilized and banks reopen.¹¹³

- As a result of the instability in Bissau, there has been an “abnormal exodus” of people to rural areas. Families have tripled in size, but the amount of food and profit to be made from cashew trade remains the same.¹¹⁴
- Sellers report vastly reduced trade, and several labor unions associated with the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) went on strike beginning April 16. This has led to the closure of major banks and money transfer agencies. Lack of access to money has restricted trade between Bissauan farmers and foreign traders from Mauritania and Senegal.¹¹⁵
- Farmers who are able to sell their cashews are reluctant to do so because of low prices. At the beginning of April, the state fixed the price at 250 CFA francs per kilogram (kilo). Following the coup, 1 kilo now sells for between 100 and 150 CFA. Many farmers are holding out for the political situation to improve and the market to stabilize.¹¹⁶
- Bartering is not a profitable option either. Cashews are typically traded for rice, but due to declining cashew prices, the exchange ratio is no longer equal. Now a farmer needs two kilos of cashews to get one kilo of rice.¹¹⁷

In the past two weeks, Guinea Bissau has been suspended by the African Union (AU); the World Bank and the African Development Bank have stopped the flow of developmental aid. Both the European Union and United Nations have threatened to impose sanctions. The country's military chiefs recently closed air and sea space.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, a spokesman for the military junta told reporters that any peacekeepers or foreign troops would be considered an invasion force. While all of this has severe *political* implications for Guinea Bissau, the country could be on the verge of an economic and humanitarian crisis if the cashew market is not soon restored.

Burkina Faso: December Election to Increase Size of Parliament

Researchers: Dr. Dorina Bekoe and Ms. Betty Boswell

Originally scheduled for May 2012, Burkina Faso has postponed municipal and parliamentary elections until December 2012. The delay is due to the introduction of biometric voter identification – a move to increase voter turnout and perhaps restrict election fraud.¹¹⁹ Furthermore, a new law promulgated on April 5, 2012 will add 16 parliamentarians; this will increase the number of seats from 111 to 127. Opinion is divided on the merits of increasing the number of parliamentarians:

- The Executive Director of the Center for Democratic Governance, Augustine Loada, says the addition of new members does not necessarily add quality to parliament. Loada believes the increase of parliamentarians is not in line with the ratio of population to representatives. Instead, an increase in parliamentary assistants would be more useful.
- Opposition leader Benewende Sankara favors the increase because it allows districts that only had one member of parliament now to elect two. Moreover, the opposition feels that this provides an opportunity to increase its representation. Still, Sankara emphasized that discussions should be on the effectiveness of those elected, not their numbers.¹²⁰

The electoral reform, following a politically difficult year for President Blaise Compaoré, mirrors reforms undertaken in July 2001 when he also faced stiff political resistance and questions of legitimacy. The reforms at that time increased the proportional representation of political groups and their presence in parliament: of 108 parliamentary seats, the ruling party obtained 57 (a decrease from 101), while the opposition occupied 54 (an increase from 7).¹²¹

Mombasa Republican Council Destabilizing Kenyan Coast

Researchers: Dr. Eliza Johannes and Ms. Ivana Djak

Summary

Violent clashes between the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) and police on April 24, 2012 suggest increased potential for violence in the region ahead of elections. The government refuses to talk to the group despite civil society organizations' call to officials to consider the group's legitimate grievances, before more serious conflicts erupt.

Grievances of the MRC

The MRC is a separatist movement on the mainly Muslim Kenyan Coast formed to liberate the coastal people from marginalization by the government. The group was declared an illegal criminal organization by the Kenyan government in October 2010.¹²² Violent incidents involving the MRC have become more common over the past months as the group has grown vocal with its demands for secession.¹²³



<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6047348.stm>

The MRC, which says it does not support violence, complains of marginalization, exploitation, and discrimination – pointing to the fact that the coast is a major contributor to the national economy through its strong tourism industry and the critical Port of Mombasa, while the coast people are neglected by the government and have become squatters on their own land.¹²⁴ The group has threatened to repossess land occupied by people from other communities, evict non-native people who live and work in the region, and boycott the next General Election.¹²⁵

The contested territory was originally ruled by Zanzibar's Sultan Seyyed Said, who leased the 10-mile-wide coastal strip to the Imperial British East Africa Company in 1887. In 1895, Sultan Seyyid Hemed Bin Twain signed an agreement with the British Government that maintained Mombasa as a British protectorate but kept the Sultan's sovereignty intact. In 1963, the British, the Kenyan Government, and the Sultan signed a deal that gave full ownership of the land to Kenya, with the caveat that religious freedom for Muslims would be preserved. The deal crushed the coastal people's hope for autonomy despite opposition from groups like the Mwambao United Front. Historical context is relevant to the MRC today as the group's officials claim there was another agreement signed in 1963 by Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta and Zanzibar's Mohmed Shante – a 50-year lease, after which the land would be returned to the indigenous people of Mombasa in 2013.¹²⁶ With that date approaching, violent clashes could occur more frequently.

Violent Clashes with the Police

The MRC is currently involved in a court case to overturn the government's designation of it as an illegal group. Lawyer Steven Kithi, who is representing the group in Mombasa High Court, is arguing that the government was mistaken in listing the MRC as a criminal group, and that the new Constitution allows people to assemble and advocate their causes, which in the MRC's case is self-determination.¹²⁷

On April 24, Kenyan police blocked more than 100 members of the MRC from entering the courthouse in Mombasa to hear this case. The protest, in which one person died, turned violent after the police threw teargas at protesters attempting to enter the court.¹²⁸ For several months

before this incident, the police had been conducting searches in an attempt to track down and charge MRC members.¹²⁹ The Mombasa police chief told *L'Agence France-Presse* (AFP): "We are going to deal with members of the MRC ruthlessly."¹³⁰ Clashes are likely as the police continue to target and track down MRC members. The court case has been adjourned until June 19 and 20, at which point violence could re-erupt.¹³¹

Government Reaction

After the incident, Prime Minister Raila Odinga stated it is impossible for the government to negotiate with people who claim they are not Kenyans and ruled out talks with the MRC unless it drops its secessionist agenda. He also pointed to government investment in the region, including roads, power supplies, and the planned Lamu Port, which outstrip investments in more marginalized regions such as Turkana or North Eastern.¹³² President Mwai Kibaki spoke out strongly against the MRC in his State of the Nation address, stating that calls for secession will not be tolerated.¹³³ Several Coastal Members of Parliament and the Mayor of Mombasa backed President Kibaki's stand, stating that, while the group's grievances are genuine, the government should talk to it only once the call for secession is dropped.¹³⁴

Some civil society organizations, however, criticize the government's unwillingness to talk with the MRC. One opinion piece in *The Standard* argued that the government is vilifying groups with valid grievances, while allowing other sects to emerge and operate freely. The MRC is composed of young people who are unemployed and uneducated, and whose families have been dispossessed of their land.¹³⁵ The Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya have said that MRC grievances are genuine and that the government needs to give them a hearing to ensure a peaceful election period.¹³⁶

Growing Pro-Democracy Protests Suppressed in Swaziland

Researcher: Mr. Alexander Noyes

On April 12, 2012, security forces violently suppressed large pro-democracy protests led by labor union leaders and other civil society groups in the economic hub of Manzini, Swaziland. The planned four-day demonstrations were organized to protest the 1973 ban on political parties that allows King Mswati III, Africa's last absolute monarch, to rule by decree.¹³⁷ Police used tear gas, beatings, and widespread arrests to disperse the demonstrations.¹³⁸ A subsequent prayer meeting planned by pro-democracy activists on April 14 was circumvented by riot police who set up road blocks in Manzini and arrested the organizers.¹³⁹

- An unprecedented number of pro-democracy protests have been staged recently in Swaziland, with more than 60 demonstrations held during the past year.¹⁴⁰
- Protesters' main grievances are the closed political system and a severe financial crisis that has led to slashed social services, public wages, and student scholarships. In March, more than 3,000 students staged street protests decrying the cancellation of scholarships.¹⁴¹
- Signaling the coming crackdown, in early April the state banned the only labor union, the Trade Union Congress of Swaziland (TUCOSWA), when the organization threatened protests.¹⁴²
- The pro-democracy activists in Swaziland receive support from South Africa's Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).¹⁴³

King Mswati III will continue to violently suppress political dissent in order to maintain his firm grip on power. The pro-democracy movement, however, is gaining momentum and will play an increasingly prominent role in Swaziland's political landscape.

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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

THE AFRICA WATCH

MAY 16, 2012



TO THE READER

IDA's team of Africa researchers welcomes your comments, questions, and feedback on the contents of *The Africa Watch*. If you would like to discuss an article in this issue or provide suggestions for future research, please contact me at (703) 845-4394.

With best regards,

George

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward

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ANALYSES

African Responses to Piracy: Reasonable First Steps, But a Hard Slog Ahead

Summary

- With international assistance, African governments are beginning to build their maritime capabilities and have initiated some counter-piracy operations.
- Funding, training, and the uneven development of anti-piracy legislation constitute the principal obstacles to further advances.
- While significant improvement is likely to take time, success in building regional counter-piracy capabilities and networks will improve African government capacity to deal with the broad array of criminal threats that they face and could help nudge regional militaries to be less political and more professional.

In recent months, it has become apparent that a major increase in global commitment to countering the problem of piracy around the African continent is unlikely.

- European countries, under severe budgetary pressure from Europe's financial crisis, have signaled an inability to increase their commitment to Operation Atalanta, the EU's counter-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia.
- While the EU was finally able to move forward on limited operations against pirate facilities in Somalia, the political debates within EU member countries on that decision suggest that further expansion of the mission is unlikely.

In this context, the focus is now turning toward steps African nations can take to build their own capabilities to tackle piracy. While these efforts are just beginning, they provide a foundation for addressing the much more difficult challenges ahead. If these efforts mature, they could have benefits well beyond the counter-piracy mission.

Regional Assessment of the Threat of Piracy

With countries such as Benin, Seychelles, and South Africa aggressively pushing the issue, awareness of the costs of piracy for the economies of Africa is fairly widespread.

- In recent months, the topic of piracy has come up repeatedly at meetings of the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) and its various sub-groups. In March 2012, for example, the ECOWAS Chiefs of Defense Staff agreed to set up a committee to monitor the steps being taken to address the issue of piracy.
- The naval chiefs of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) met in February 2012 to discuss what to do about the movement of pirate activities into the southern African sub-region.
- At the April meeting of the Gulf of Guinea Commission Council of Ministers, the Commission approved a Nigerian proposal for the development of a regional framework for maritime security in the wake of increasing attacks.

The private sector in Africa has also been raising the alarm. A shipping firm in East Africa has estimated that the annual costs to the shipping industry in Kenya alone are between \$300 million and \$400 million. Illustrative of the effects of piracy on tourism, the number of cruise lines operating in Kenyan waters has dropped from 35 to zero.¹ Earlier this month, the CEO of the South African shipping line Safmarine went on record to state that the combination of the European crisis, oil prices, and piracy was putting extreme strain on the shipping industry.

Initial Efforts to Build Up Maritime Capacity

With support from a diverse group of international partners, several African countries are beginning to build some minimal capabilities in their historically underfunded naval forces (see table below). Although the Seychelles has been the most successful – having obtained a mix of patrol boats, maritime patrol aircraft, and radar capabilities – several other African countries have been able to augment their coastal patrol capabilities.

**Recently Acquired Maritime Capabilities
(compiled from press sources)**

Country	Capabilities
Benin	Receiving one patrol boat from China
Benin	As of fall 2011 constructing, with French aid, a new radar surveillance center in Grand-popo
Benin	As of fall 2011 had purchased 3 French patrol boats and 2 aircraft for maritime patrol
Ghana	In February 2012 commissioned 4 patrol boats that it received from China
Kenya	Received one patrol boat from France
Mozambique	Receiving one patrol boat from Spain
Nigeria	Purchased 3 patrol boats from Vietnam in May 2011
Nigeria	In 2012 awarded a contract in which the firm Global West Vessel Specialist Nigeria Limited would provide patrol boats, surveillance equipment, and associated maintenance
Nigeria	Received a former US Coast Guard Cutter from the United States
Senegal	Scheduled to receive one patrol boat from Spain
Seychelles	Acquired 5 patrol boats from the UAE in January 2011
Seychelles	Received funding in February 2011 from INTERPOL for forensic tools and training
Seychelles	Signed agreement with India in February 2012 for a radar system to cover its southern exclusive economic zone
Seychelles	Signed agreement with India in December 2011 to receive a Dornier maritime patrol aircraft (India previously provided an aircraft and crew on loan)
Seychelles	In June 2011 received one Y12 aircraft from China for maritime patrol
Seychelles	Received funding from the UAE for a coastal radar system and construction of a coast guard base

These modest acquisitions have been complemented by efforts to gain some initial anti-piracy training. One pathway for such assistance has been leveraging longstanding navy-to-navy relationships. For example, this year's joint naval exercise between South Africa and Germany focused on anti-piracy operations, while last fall a French frigate conducted three months of

surveillance off the coast of the Gulf of Guinea and provided training in maritime surveillance in a port stop in Guinea. Looking toward the future, the EU will begin this year a two-year regional training mission aimed at strengthening the maritime capabilities of Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Mauritius, and the Seychelles.²

Building Coalitions to Attack the Problem

Some of the African countries affected by piracy have begun joint operations.

- Since the beginning of 2011, the South African Navy has been patrolling the northern coastline of Mozambique as part of “Operation Copper.” This mission has been supported by surface vessels, maritime patrol aircraft, and possibly a submarine. In February 2012, the governments of Tanzania, Mozambique, and South Africa signed an agreement to work collectively against piracy; the agreement commits to joint surveillance, joint military exercises, and information-sharing.
- In October 2011, Nigeria and Benin launched “Operation Prosperity” to jointly patrol the territorial waters of Benin. The mission was initially scheduled to continue for six months.

While the impact on pirate activities of these two operations is uncertain, South African press reported that, in April, a South African replenishment ship helped facilitate the capture of a pirate mother ship in the Mozambique Channel. Such claims aside, probably the most important impact of these activities is the establishment of frameworks for operational cooperation in the future.

The Challenges Ahead

While greater African engagement in the counter-piracy mission is a necessary part of a longer term solution, several challenges lie ahead.

The most significant of these challenges involves finding the financial resources to continue to build African maritime capabilities. As has been the case in the past, some assistance from partner militaries can be expected, but, since most of them face declining military budgets, increased levels of military assistance are unlikely. This means that the African governments will need to commit additional resources, which will be difficult.

- The South African government has indicated that it will give budget priority to counter-piracy operations and enhancing the maritime capabilities of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The ongoing Defence Review has highlighted “immediate requirements” for maritime patrol aircraft, patrol vessels, shipborne helicopters, and a second combat support ship. The challenge will be that, according to the Defence Review, the SANDF also has immediate requirements for other missions – special forces, border protection, and air surveillance – as well as a long list of requirements to replace vehicles and other equipment that are obsolete.³
- As it faces the growing threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, the Gulf of Guinea Commission’s ability to work the policy issues associated with piracy has been hampered by funding problems resulting from the fact that only three of the participating eight nations have paid their dues.⁴
- The Nigerian navy – the key player in Operation Prosperity – needs to overcome years of neglect and underfunding that led the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Navy to comment in late 2011 that she was “saddened that the Navy has become a burial

ground for vessels.”⁵ The recent Nigerian government decision to award a contract for maritime surveillance and security to a private company will not facilitate progress toward this goal, according to a Nigerian expert speaking at a recent IDA conference.⁶

- Improved training in counter-piracy operations is also a priority. Much of the training that African navies and coast guards receive from counterpart navies tends to be aperiodic and limited in duration and scope. While some African militaries – for example, from the East Africa Community – have begun to incorporate counter-piracy into their own regional exercise activities,⁷ these programs will need to incorporate more field exercise elements.

Finally, while some countries such as the Seychelles have been aggressive in putting in place the legal frameworks and judicial systems that facilitate criminal prosecution and detention of those captured in counter-piracy operations, implementation of new legal regimes has been uneven.

- The EU, for example, recently urged Tanzania to accelerate approval of a pirates transfer agreement as the Seychelles, Kenya, and Mauritius have done.

There is also a requirement to adjust national laws to permit some of the measures that shipping companies would like to implement to protect their vessels.

- Nigeria is currently preparing legislation to allow the use of private armed security personnel on vessels transiting high risk areas.
- Similarly, the South African Defence Minister announced in April that the government was considering changes in law that would permit the use of armed guards on commercial ships.

What If They Achieve Some Measure of Success?

While building African counter-piracy capabilities is likely to be a long-term process, success could have some beneficial second-order consequences. A number of African governments, such as Ghana, are concerned about the threats that piracy poses to the long-term development of off-shore oil production. As these production streams come on line, they may be in a better position to fund capabilities that enable them to secure their maritime borders from an array of threats. As African governments try to build collaborative regional networks to tackle cross-border criminal activity, the capabilities they build for counter-piracy missions can also aid the fight against such other threats as arms trafficking and drug smuggling. Moreover, because naval forces tend to be among the least politicized elements of the military, enhancing their capabilities and professionalism could also have some positive benefits in nudging regional militaries to become less involved in politics.

Recent African Coups – Not a Trend


Researcher: Dr. Stephanie Burchard

Summary

- Due to the recent coups in Mali and Guinea Bissau, many have expressed concern that Africa is exhibiting a significant uptick in political upheaval, and a new trend of adverse regime change may be emerging.
- Analysis of coup trends over time and across regions suggests that there is no cause for immediate alarm.

Global: Trends in Coups

In March, 2012 disgruntled mid-level military personnel spontaneously revolted in Mali, ending 20 years of peaceful democratic development. In April, Guinea Bissau experienced its third coup attempt in as many years. Even though the two events are dissimilar, some have expressed concern that Africa may be exhibiting a significant uptick in political upheaval and that a new trend of adverse regime change may be emerging.⁸ In order to assess whether coups are on the upswing in Africa, it is important to put recent events in a historical context. The figure below tracks coup attempts around the world since the end of World War II.



Source: Center for Systemic Peace

Coups: Global Trends, 1946 to 2012 (April)

Two significant trends emerge. First, there was a steady increase in the number of coup attempts from 1946 until the early 1990s, after which the numbers began to steadily decline. Since a high of 25 attempted coups in 1991, there has been an overall consistent decline in both the number of attempted coups and how successful they have been. In 2011, only four coups were attempted, none of which were successful.

In the first four months of 2012, there have been four coup attempts in the world, three of which have been successful (Mali, Guinea Bissau, and Maldives). An attempted coup in Papua,

New Guinea in January proved unsuccessful. Even if this rate of coup attempts were to continue throughout the year – and a total of 12 coups have been attempted in 2012 –this number could be viewed as consistent with the overall global trend, which is declining.

Second, the most active periods for coup attempts have been during the 1960s and the early 1990s. These two periods coincide with decolonization and the end of the Cold War. Major systemic disruptions experienced during these periods created and fostered massive instability. During the 1960s, there was a proliferation of new and very economically disadvantaged countries; the end of the Cold War saw a large and influential political actor topple and take with it other regimes. We are currently experiencing no similar major change in the international system, or any other such large exogenous shock.

Africa: Trends in Coups

Since 1946, there has been a significant downward trend in coups in Africa.⁹ Some attribute this to the strengthening of the African Union – which prohibited unconstitutional changes of government in its 2000 Constitutive Act. Since then, the African Union has routinely suspended member states when there has been a coup.¹⁰ Others, who directly link economic development to political instability, would predict that economic growth would decrease the likelihood of coup attempts.¹¹ Given that Africa has several of the world’s fastest growing economies, it would make sense that economic growth would bring some measure of political stability. Still others suggest that a decline in coups in Africa may be connected to increased political liberalization.¹²

Africa Compared to the World: Coups, 1946 to 2012

	World (excepting Africa)	Africa	Total
Total Coup Attempts, 1946-2012	377 (50.3%)	373 (49.7%)	750
Total Coup Attempts, 1990-1999	62 (37%)	85 (63%)	147
Total Coup Attempts, 2000-2012	34 (35%)	64 (65%)	98

Given, however, that Africa comprises approximately 27 percent of all countries in the world,¹³ it does experience more than its fair share of coups. This is a trend that is holding steady. For example, of the 98 coup attempts that occurred from 2000 to 2012, 64 (65 percent) occurred in Africa. West Africa’s 15 states – comprising 28 percent of the continent – have yet another disproportionate number of coup attempts. Of the 64 coup attempts in Africa, 30 (47 percent) occurred in West Africa; 9 of the 30 were attempted in Guinea Bissau alone. Thus, although the total number of coups globally has been declining since the 1990s, they have been disproportionately concentrated on the African continent and in West Africa, specifically.

Do the two coups in Mali and Guinea-Bissau indicate that there is a rise in coup attempts in Africa? The data do not suggest so. On average from 2000 to 2012, there were 5.3 coups annually in Africa. Thus, even if the two coup attempts in West Africa in the first four months of 2012 were to indicate a trend for the year to come, projecting six attempted coups for 2012 would not indicate a sharp increase in the number of coups in Africa.

Mali: Who's Who in the Transitional Government?

Researcher: Dr. Dorina A. Bekoe

Summary

- Following the March 21, 2012 *coup d'état*, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) persuaded Captain Amadou Haya Sanongo and members of the junta to step down by negotiating the resignation of President Amadou Toumani Touré.
- A transitional government of national unity was put in place, led by Dioncounda Traoré, as interim president, and Cheick Modibo Diarra, as interim prime minister. The 24-person transitional cabinet is tasked with rescheduling the presidential elections, regaining control over northern Mali, and fostering political and social reconciliation.
- The transitional cabinet includes technocrats, military leaders, and political outsiders.

Mali's Transitional Government

Cheick Modibo Diarra, the interim prime minister, nominated a 24-person cabinet on April 25 to govern during Mali's transition back to constitutional rule following the March 21 coup. To many analysts and Mali's political elite, the transitional cabinet is notable for the absence of representatives of existing political parties (save for the interim president and prime minister) and the fact that many members have not served in government before.¹⁴ Indeed, even Diarra was not considered a major presidential contender before the coup. Some also criticize that those with government experience served before the 1991 transition to democracy.¹⁵ Furthermore, some worry about the continuing tie the transitional government has with Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, who led the coup. While Sanogo himself is not part of the transitional government, three military leaders close to Sanogo hold the important ministries of defense, territorial administration, and internal security.¹⁶ It is an indication that while Sanogo agreed to hand over power to a civilian government, he intends to maintain his influence.

Below are the profiles of the interim president and prime minister; the ministers of defense, territorial administration, and internal security, who are deemed close to Sanogo; and the ministers of foreign affairs and communication, whose close ties to the sub-region's leaders may prove critical in the coming months.

Interim President: Dioncounda Traoré

Traoré was the president of the National Assembly prior to the coup. As the presidential candidate of *l'Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali - Parti Africain pour la Solidarité et la Justice* (Adéma-PASJ), he was considered a leading contender for the presidency. With 46 out of 147 seats, Adéma-PASJ has the strongest representation in parliament.¹⁷ Traoré, president of Adéma-PASJ since 2001, has served the party in many capacities: as vice-president and vice-president of training (1990-1991); 2nd vice-president (1992); and 1st vice-president (1994).¹⁸

Interim Prime Minister: Cheick Modibo Diarra

Diarra, a relative newcomer on the political scene, represented the *Rassemblement pour le Développement du Mali*, a new party, created in 2010. Diarra is best known as chairman for Africa at Microsoft Corporation (2006-2011). He obtained a bachelor's degree in mathematics, physics, and analytical mechanics from Pierre and Marie Curie University in Paris (1976); a master's degree in mechanical and aerospace engineering from Howard University in Washington, D.C. (1982); and a Ph.D. in aerospace engineering from Howard University (1987). He returned to Mali in 2003 to work on the challenges of food insecurity and nutrition.¹⁹

Minister of Defense and Veterans Affairs: Major Colonel Yamoussa Camara

Major Colonel Camara was most recently the chief of army staff for the national guard, a position he had held since May 2011. In the past, he also served as the director of Mali's National Service training center, a program for Mali's youth; commander of the 133rd nomadic company; and a division chief in the army. He is highly decorated with several medals of merit.²⁰

Minister of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Planning: Major Colonel Moussa Sinko Coulibaly

Prior to assuming the helm of the ministry of territorial administration, Major Colonel Coulibaly served the junta as the office director for Captain Amadou Sanogo.²¹ He received most of his military training in France. He has also benefited from training programs in Yaoundé (2009-2010) and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (2006). He was an instructor at Mali's Military School, *l'Ecole militaire interarmes (EMIA)*, at Koulikoro, from 1996 to 1998. He was the academic director at *l'Ecole de Maintien de la Paix* in Bamako, one of ECOWAS' three regional peacekeeping training centers, from 2010 until he assumed his former position in Sanogo's office. He speaks French, English, and Bambara, and has some facility in German and Russian.²²

Minister of Internal Security and Civil Protection: Brigadier General Tiéféng Konaté

Prior to his nomination as minister of internal security, Brigadier General Tiéféng Konaté was office director in the same ministry. He received military training in Mali and France: diplomas from EMIA (Mali); *L'Ecole officiers de gendarmerie de Melun* (France); and *d'Etat major de la gendarmerie de Maison Alfort* (France). He also has a certificate in criminology from *l'Université de Droit, d'Economie et des Sciences Sociales* (Paris II) and a certificate from *l'Université des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale de Paris*, among other degrees. From 1994 to 2000, General Tiéféng Konaté was chief of staff for the national Gendarmerie; technical adviser to the ministry of internal security and civil protection (2000-2008), and office director from 2011; and director of the national Gendarmerie from 2008 to 2011. He is highly decorated and speaks Bamanankan, French, and English.²³

Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation: Sadio Lamine Sow

Prior to his nomination as minister of foreign affairs, Sow served as the personal advisor to the Burkinabè President, Blaise Campaoré.²⁴ He is well known professionally as a writer, journalist, and editor.²⁵ His closeness to Campaoré, who has been designated by ECOWAS as the mediator in resolving the crisis in Mali, may help in relations both with ECOWAS as well as with the Tuaregs in northern Mali. Notably, Campaoré's successful negotiation with Ansar Dine for the release of a Swiss hostage²⁶ could be prove to be an important confidence-building measure in resolving the crisis.

Minister of Communications, Post, and New Technologies: Hamadoun Touré

Prior to his nomination as minister, Touré was the spokesperson for the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire. He served in other UN missions in the last decade, notably Angola from 1998 to 2000; the Democratic Republic of Congo from 2000 to 2004; and Guinea Bissau in 2004. Touré speaks French, English, and four African languages, and understands Portuguese.²⁷ Currently, President Alassane Ouattara of Côte d'Ivoire is the president of ECOWAS. Touré's familiarity with Ivorian leadership may prove helpful as the junta, transitional government, and ECOWAS work out the details of the return to constitutional rule. Already it is proving to be an uneasy process as the leadership of the junta and ECOWAS have failed to agree on the length of the transitional government.²⁸

Kenya in Somalia – New Approach Taking Shape

Researcher: Amb. (ret.) George F. Ward

Summary

- With success in Somalia remaining elusive, the Kenyan government is seeking to reduce its military exposure and limit expenditures.
 - Kenyan forces in Somalia have made few gains in months, and the cumulative costs of the war are rising.
 - While popular support for the Kenyan military remains high, debate over the conduct of the war is picking up in the media.
 - The Kenyan police and army have come under criticism for alleged violations of the human rights of Somali refugees and Kenyan citizens in the border area.
- In response, the Kenyan government has successfully sought multilateral cover from both the African Union (AU) and the United Nations and has been able to withdraw some of its troops from Somalia.
 - UN support may help contain the costs of the conflict for Kenya.
- Recognizing that clear-cut success in Somalia may be beyond its reach, Kenya's strategy increasingly focuses on recruiting proxies and surrogates to share the burden.

More than *Sitzkrieg*, Less than *Blitzkrieg*

Kenya brought to the conflict in Somalia a force that had benefited from decades of training and investment. With a defense budget larger than that of Ethiopia and Uganda combined, Kenya fielded a force with capabilities that were advanced in the regional context. After making rapid, initial gains, that force has remained relatively static for several months. The anticipated offensive to take the key port of Kismayo has not begun. Photos from the front indicate that the force is settling into static defensive positions (see below).



Photos courtesy of Major E. Chirchir, Kenyan Military Spokesman
<http://twitpic.com/9jrukx>

<http://twitpic.com/9jsl1a>

Costs Are Rising

According to Nairobi's *Business Daily*, Kenya's seven-month long incursion into Somalia has widened the government's budget gap. On April 16, the government indicated that it would seek approximately \$150 million in additional resources "to meet increasing administration and planning expenses of Kenya Defence Forces," directly linking the request to the war in Somalia.²⁹ A well-informed observer of Kenyan affairs told IDA the Kenyan military is making a concerted effort to contain costs in Somalia, but is spending \$8 million monthly to keep its force in the field.³⁰ With the incorporation of Kenya's contingent in Somalia into AMISOM, the African Union mission in the country, support from the United Nations may be forthcoming, but has apparently not yet arrived.

Seeking Friends and Allies

At a recent IDA conference in East Africa, a retired senior Kenyan Army general officer commented privately that the conflict in Somalia is "unwinnable" for Kenya, and that the best solution would be to set up a network of friendly Somali clans along the border.³¹ The Kenyan government has been seeking to recruit support from both other African countries and Somali clans. The imminent arrival of a battalion from Sierra Leone was announced in the Kenyan press in mid-April.³² According to a "tweet" by Major H. Chirchir, the Kenyan military spokesman, on May 11, 2012, officers from Sierra Leone have completed a reconnaissance mission on the ground and are ready to deploy their force.

Recruiting reliable Somali allies has been more difficult for Kenya. The Kenyan government has wavered between two Somali allies – Mohamed Abdi Mohamed "Gandhi," the leader of the rump administration of "Jubaland" or "Azania," and Ahmed Madobe, the leader of the Ras Kamboni Brigade, a militia.³³ Each has been supported by different elements within the Kenyan government, but neither has been particularly reliable or effective in military terms. Although the Kenyan military continues periodically to claim that combined operations with Somali militias have been effective against al-Shabaab forces, it will clearly take more time to build the sort of coalition force that Kenya feels it needs to make an effort against Kismayo.

Reaction to the Internal Threat

Despite warnings, terror attacks by al-Shabaab inside Kenya have not escalated significantly. Many grenade and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks have taken place in northeastern Kenya; only a handful have occurred in Nairobi and other urban areas. The deadliest blast was at a bus terminal in Nairobi on March 10, in which nine people were killed and 60 others injured. On May 4, there was a grenade attack on a church in Nairobi in which one person was killed and 15 wounded.³⁴ Although the Kenyan government and western embassies have issued multiple warnings of impending, larger-scale terrorist attacks, daily business activities in Nairobi have not been significantly affected to date.

The terrorist attacks have nonetheless created a climate of fear, especially in northeastern Kenya. In response, the Kenyan police and military have taken forceful actions, and have succeeded in thwarting some al-Shabaab plans.³⁵ Kenyan security forces have also been accused of committing significant abuses of ethnic Somalis. Allegations have included rape and attempted sexual assault, beatings, arbitrary detention, extortion, looting and destruction of property, and other forms of physical mistreatment. These charges have been detailed by Human Rights Watch in a report issued in May 2012.³⁶

The Debate at Home

Kenyan popular support for the operation in Somalia remains high. Although many believe that the government has under-reported casualties, informed observers believe that the actual number has not been as high as the hundreds that had been feared.³⁷ Observers also believe that the Kenyan media has in effect censored itself, reporting mainly on the positive aspects of operations. The government has done well at managing the issue, stressing that Kenya is part of an international effort and underlining the expected support from the United Nations and other countries. Behind the scenes, knowledgeable Kenyans are realizing that the road ahead in Somalia will be long. A recent article in *The East African*, entitled "War and Peace in Somalia: Seven Lessons Burundi and Uganda Can Teach Kenya's Soldiers,"³⁸ was perhaps indicative of a more critical debate that is emerging. Ominously, the second lesson cited was that "the Shabaab are much tougher, better than you think."

Ghana 2012: Civil Society Takes Activist Role

Researcher: Dr. Caroline F. Ziemke-Dickens

Summary

- Coalitions of civil society organizations and NGOs are joining forces to counter Ghana's tradition of rough-and-tumble politics by closely monitoring political processes to enhance transparency and ensure a free and fair election in December 2012.
- Strengthening Transparency, Accountability and Responsiveness in Ghana (STAR-Ghana), a multi-donor financed funding mechanism, has distributed 4.8 million cedis (roughly \$2.5 million) in grants to election-related civil society initiatives.
- Civil society-driven accountability movements are moving aggressively on three fronts: holding politicians accountable for running a serious, issue-focused campaign; holding media accountable for maintaining civil and responsible public discourse; and holding the process accountable for ensuring fair and transparent voter registration and polling.

Holding Politicians Accountable

In the lead-up to the December 2012 presidential elections in Ghana, increasing numbers of civil society leaders have been calling for a move away from decades of political campaigns that are "high on form and very low on substance." In the words of one commentator, "After 55 years of independence, the easiest route Ghana can take to become a great nation, i.e., to have the ability to influence nations across the world, would largely depend on the quality of political leadership in this country."³⁹ This, in turn, requires the voters of Ghana to demand an issue-based and development-focused campaign from the political parties vying to run the country at a time when oil wealth will test the strength of Ghana's political, economic, and social institutions.⁴⁰ Instead of "the usual insults and highfalutin' promises the political actors shove down our throats,"⁴¹ Ghanaian influencers are demanding that political parties focus on their plans for realistic and sustainable economic development and education reform.

Since late 2011, the Integrated Social Development Center (ISODEC), a network of NGOs and civil society groups, has been forcefully campaigning for a "social pact" between Ghanaian leaders and citizens on the governance of the country's natural resources. "The rationale basically is to force some kind of national approach to doing things in this country." According to Steve Manteaw, the campaign's coordinator, the underlying rationale is that "resource management and development has always been governed by a 'winner-takes-all' approach, where one party decides how resources should be managed. We cannot leave the management of this country's destiny entirely in the hands of politicians."⁴² The campaign has, so far, focused its efforts on the two largest parties – the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP). Since the lack of consensus and continuity on resource management and development strategies is widely recognized as a brake on Ghana's developmental promise, the campaign is calling on all the major parties to incorporate an agreement on the governance of natural resources into their party manifestos before the 2012 election. Those that refuse could face "stiff consequences," including voter boycotts.⁴³

STAR-Ghana describes itself as "a multi-donor pooled funding mechanism (funded by DFID, DANIDA, EU, and USAID) to increase the influence of civil society and Parliament in the governance of public goods and service delivery, with the ultimate goal of improving the accountability and responsiveness of Ghana's government, traditional authorities, and the private sector."⁴⁴ As part of that mission, STAR-Ghana has invested 4.8 million cedis

(approximately \$2.6 million) in a series of election-related initiatives through grants to civil society groups, including the following:

- Organizing voter participation of persons with disabilities
- A Ghana Alert Program to mitigate electoral violence
- Initiatives to promote responsible political reporting by Ghanaian media
- Presidential debates
- Programs to sustain credible and peaceful elections and national cohesion
- Political party consensus building on education
- Initiatives to use media to enhance electoral transparency and credibility.⁴⁵

Holding the Media Accountable

The coverage by the Ghanaian media of the 2008 general elections has been severely criticized. Many media outlets were seen as heavily biased and politicized.⁴⁶ Aiming for a better performance this year, the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA), a regional independent, non-profit, non-governmental organization based in Accra, Ghana, has launched a project on “Promoting Issues-based and Decent Language Campaigning for Free and Fair Elections in Ghana in 2012.” The MFWA was established in 1997 to “defend and promote the rights and freedoms of the media, and generally to help expand the boundaries of freedom of speech and expression in West Africa.” Its election project, funded by a STAR-Ghana grant, involves daily monitoring of 31 radio stations across the country and calls out, by name, instances of provocative, confrontational, divisive, or violent political speech by politicians, activists, and talk radio personalities. The project also tracks provocative speech by callers to talk radio who announce their party affiliation. Of those, the majority identify with the two major parties – the NDC and NPP. The goal of the project is to raise public awareness of those political parties, candidates, and radio stations that are the most provocative and abusive in their language and, hence, are failing to focus their attention on the issues that are of the most importance to Ghanaian citizens.⁴⁷ Ultimately, the project will lead to a ratings system for political speech.

In the first month of monitoring (April 2012), among the expressions monitored, roughly 75 percent were deemed provocative, insulting and offensive, calling for confrontation and violence, promoting divisiveness, or spreading innuendo. Of those comments calling for violence, nearly half were related to threats against those participating in biometric voter registration. The remaining 25 percent of monitored expressions were classified as pacifist, conciliatory, and non-provocative. Language calling for confrontation and violence was most common in morning programming while evening programming was more likely to contain insult and innuendo.⁴⁸

Holding the Process Accountable

The Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO), a coalition of 39 secular and religious organizations of teachers, doctors, midwives, nurses, trade unions, students, lawyers, women’s groups, and industrialists, launched its long-term election monitoring in March 2012, hoping to build on its success as the country’s leading domestic election observers.⁴⁹ In its first report, CODEO found that the majority of eligible Ghanaian voters are peacefully participating in the biometric voter registration process, and most of the registration centers are following proper registration procedures. The report did, however, note some important irregularities. These generally fell into three broad categories: inappropriate behavior on the part of party activists in

and around registration centers, including sporadic instances of violence in urban areas; capacity problems involving equipment failures, power outages, and inclement weather; and police and election officials who failed to follow proper procedure.⁵⁰

The CODEO report made a series of recommendations to improve the process. First, officials must, as quickly as possible, prosecute individuals who attempt to register more than once and clarify the procedure for challenging registrations. The Electoral Commission must also step up public education on residency and eligibility to reduce the possibilities for confrontation. Police and security forces must monitor registration centers for signs of intimidation and violence and urge citizens to report intimidation and assault cases to the police rather than taking matters into their own hands. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, "CODEO calls on all political parties, particularly the NPP and NDC and their supporters, to take the numerous incidents of inter-party violence as an early warning signal. CODEO further calls on the political parties, together with the government, EC, and Police Service and in fact all Ghanaians to reflect soberly on those unsavory incidents and what could be done to avoid a recurrence."⁵¹

ALERTS

Somaliland: Stalling a Federal Somali State?

Researchers: Dr. Stephanie Burchard and Ms. Brittany Gregerson

While Somalia is one of the globe's only "failed states," Somaliland has successfully governed itself as a semi-autonomous region since 1993 and has held free and fair elections since the early 2000s. As the Horn of Africa prepares for yet another attempted transition to a sovereign state in the greater Somali territory in August, Somaliland leadership seems to be responding in an uncharacteristically severe manner. Over the past six weeks, the government of Somaliland has escalated its attempts to consolidate its authority and to promote its independence in several troubling ways. It may also be signaling its resistance to participation in any new national arrangements for Somalia.

Crackdown on Political and Electoral Matters

Somaliland has begun cracking down on internal political and electoral matters. This has taken several forms, including refusing to allow the registration of political parties;⁵² surveilling, arresting, and removing from office party leaders;⁵³ banning and violently disbanding political demonstrations and protest rallies – both through legal means and "brutal force";⁵⁴ and making "engaging with Somalia," whether at the group, tribal, or individual level, a treasonous offense.⁵⁵ Somaliland authorities have also restricted press freedom, denying licensing requests for radio stations beyond the single state-owned option currently in existence;⁵⁶ cracking down on privately owned print media operations, which already suffer from low circulation, obsolescent equipment, underdeveloped distribution networks, a lack of an economic base to purchase their product, under- or untrained reporters, and other challenges;⁵⁷ and censoring, harassing, and arresting local journalists.⁵⁸ Since summer 2001, more than 50 journalists have been arrested by the Somaliland government.⁵⁹ These actions follow the failure of official attempts to pass legislation formally restricting the country's press.⁶⁰

Tightened Security and Law Enforcement

Somaliland authorities have also drafted new security and law enforcement legislation⁶¹ and escalated their campaign of sponsored violence. A notable flashpoint has been Khatumo, a microstate in Somaliland that recently declared its independence, only to be met with clashes between Somaliland troops and local militias⁶² as well as state police "firing bullets recklessly" into crowds of protesters.⁶³ Somaliland has brushed off persistent Ethiopian overtures to mediate, and there have been unconfirmed allegations of mass killings as well as the incarceration of local children who participated in protests against state forces in the area.⁶⁴

Expansion of Foreign Relationships

Somaliland officials have endeavored to reinforce and expand relationships in and outside the African continent. In its neighborhood, the state has turned to Djibouti, Kenya, and South Sudan. China, Egypt, and the Gulf states have been targeted anew in the context of their energy resources and savvy.⁶⁵ Elsewhere on the continent, Somaliland and Namibia have invigorated their partnership, with multiple bilateral visits resulting in proclamations of enhanced cooperation in multiple areas and promises of additional visits to come.⁶⁶ A blossoming ally farther from home is Turkey, which – despite recent diplomatic disagreements with Somaliland – has embarked on multiple high level visits;⁶⁷ pledged and begun to deliver increased medical,

agricultural, infrastructure, and educational aid;⁶⁸ and initialized new flights to Hargeisa by Turkish Airlines – making it the only foreign carrier on the route.⁶⁹

Encouragement of Foreign Investment

In order to encourage foreign investment in Somaliland, officials have instituted a new two-tiered national banking regime, mixing Islamic and western commercial banking practices.⁷⁰ The new system is designed to allow Somaliland to participate in the international banking system while lowering foreign investors' barriers to entry.⁷¹ Parallel with the implementation of this change, the regime has established ties with international banks based in Djibouti, Yemen, and Switzerland.⁷² The African Development Bank is making its first forays into Somaliland as well.⁷³ Meanwhile, although the recent London conference on August's transition to a new federal Somalia was plagued with disagreements, it produced a renewed commitment from Britain on aid to and investment in Somaliland – around £63 million a year, thanks to Somaliland's successful billing of itself as uniquely convenient for access to markets in East Africa, the Middle East, and Asia and providing significant incentives, including tax holidays and the absence of a minimum wage.⁷⁴

Potential Implications

Several conclusions can be drawn from these recent trends, as well as several potential implications for stability in the Horn of Africa. Full independence for Somaliland appears increasingly less likely with the passage of time, despite its successful development of many of the trappings of statehood over the past two decades. Momentum is not on the government's side. No state formally recognizes Somaliland, and four of Somaliland's five major clans do not support full independence.⁷⁵

In addition, the movement toward a new federal Somali state bears some promise. In response, the government of Somaliland seems to be making clear that it wishes to stand aside from the process. Despite overall healthy relations with Turkey and participation in the early stages of the process, Somaliland refused Turkey's invitation to the upcoming Istanbul conference on the Roadmap, declaring that it "does not concern" Somaliland.⁷⁶ Further, Somaliland officials have asked their traditional sultans to boycott the upcoming draft federal constitution process in Mogadishu.⁷⁷

Court Ruling Threatens to Further Sour South Africa-Zimbabwe Relations

Researcher: Mr. Alexander Noyes

On May 8, 2012, a Pretoria high court ruled that South Africa's courts can be used to prosecute Zimbabwean officials accused of torture and crimes against humanity committed against Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) opposition members during the 2008 election crisis in Zimbabwe.⁷⁸ Following a complaint filed by the Southern Africa Litigation Centre and the Zimbabwean Exiles Forum, Judge Hans Fabricius stated: "I hereby hand down a mandatory order, with costs, which obliges the respondents (National Directorate of Public Prosecutions and South Africa Police Service) to investigate the docket before them."⁷⁹ The complaint dossier reportedly accuses 18 Zimbabweans, including six unnamed military chiefs and Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) officials, of abuse.⁸⁰ The ruling could have significant political and diplomatic ramifications in the region.

- Judge Fabricius ruled that South Africa was bound by international law to investigate and prosecute crimes against humanity, including torture.
- The ruling could prevent Zimbabwean officials from traveling to South Africa for fear of prosecution. A number of the accused reportedly travel "regularly" to South Africa for personal and official reasons.⁸¹
- ZANU-PF officials dismissed the ruling as irrelevant. Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa said that the ruling "brings the South African justice system into disrepute," and is "a wish by the South African judge pushing an agenda of former Rhodesians."⁸²
- The South African prosecuting authority is considering appealing the ruling. They have two weeks to do so.⁸³

While welcomed by human rights groups, if the ruling stands and is acted upon, investigations would further aggravate the already fraying South Africa-Zimbabwe bilateral relationship. This development could potentially impair for the ongoing South African Development Community's (SADC) mediation efforts on Zimbabwe led by South African President Jacob Zuma and his staff.

Guinea: Opposition Protests Begin After Delay of Legislative Elections

Researcher: Ms. Ashton Callahan

Guinea's opposition leaders protested on May 10, 2012 demanding a dialogue with the government regarding the postponed legislative elections. The Alliance of Democratic Parties (ADP) opposition spokesman, Aboubacar Sylla, says protests will continue until the government takes the Alliance's demands into account, in particular equal and fair representation in the Independent National Election Commission (CENI); the resignation of Louceny Camara, the Commission's president; and an audit of the voters register to ensure legitimate elections.⁸⁴ The demonstration follows several others in recent months. In March, security forces clashed with opposition protesters when more than a thousand demonstrators rallied in Conakry.⁸⁵ In April, opposition women organized demonstrations in *La Camayenne* District and at the *Palais du Peuple*. Shouting "Down with CENI," the rallies were forcefully dispersed by law enforcement officers.⁸⁶

On May 10, more than two thousand protesters marched to the 28 September Stadium in Conakry.⁸⁷ Despite an announcement from Chief of Defense Staff that soldiers had been confined to their barracks, security forces intervened with guns and tear gas. Protesters were also attacked by youth who supported President Conde.⁸⁸ At least 41 people, including protesters and police, were injured. "Today Guineans are speaking out against President Alpha Conde's desire to rig the legislative elections," said Cellou Dalein Diallo, a main opposition leader.⁸⁹ The Interior Minister, Alhassane Conde, banned more protests following Thursday's demonstration. In response, opposition parties called for a "*journee ville morte*" (nationwide strike) beginning Monday. According to local news, the strike has only had a small following outside of the capital, where several stores and schools remain closed, taxis are fewer in number, and traffic has been disrupted by youths in the street.⁹⁰



Supporters of Guinean opposition parties clashed with police as they protested for electoral reform. Source : <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/05/20125115338101955.html>

Legislative elections should have been held within six months after the inauguration of President Alpha Conde, or no later than May 2011, but were not scheduled until December 2011 and were then canceled. In March, the polls were rescheduled for July 8, 2012, but were indefinitely postponed in April 2012 due to "technical" problems.⁹¹ The postponement of legislations and continued protests will likely heighten political and economic tensions in Guinea. International investors, wary of investing in the mining sector due to a business-unfriendly revision of the mining code, will be further discouraged by the continued political volatility of the country.⁹² This will put more pressure on Guinea's iron ore and bauxite industry and could lead to clashes between mining companies and Guinean labor unions. In addition, the European Union will resume developmental aid only once credible legislative elections have been held in Guinea.⁹³

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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

THE AFRICA WATCH

JUNE 6, 2012



TO THE READER

IDA's team of Africa researchers welcomes your comments, questions, and feedback on the contents of *The Africa Watch*. If you would like to discuss an article in this issue or provide suggestions for future research, please contact me at (703) 845-4394.

With best regards,

George

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward

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ANALYSES

Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa

Researchers: Dr. Stephanie Burchard and Ms. Andrea Pongo

Summary

- Over the past 10 years, Turkey has made a concerted effort to court African countries through increased trade, investment, and aid.
- Turkey seems likely to continue engaging with African countries as part of an overall diplomatic strategy intended to increase its international profile.
- Turkey's highest profile engagement has been in Somalia, where the country has provided humanitarian assistance and infrastructure development when other countries have been unable or unwilling.

Overview of Turkish Economic Ties to Sub-Saharan Africa

Since the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan began its formal "Africa Strategy" in 2003, leaders of Turkish private-sector institutions and government officials, working cooperatively to expand Turkish influence, have been promoting trade, diplomacy, culture, education, and tourism as key areas where Turkish-African relations can benefit.¹ Between 2000 and 2009, trade between Turkey and its main African trading partners increased dramatically – from \$4 billion annually to \$16 billion in 2009.² More than 46 percent of Turkish exports to Africa are manufactured goods, and more than 20 percent are machinery and transport equipment.³

Unlike Chinese or other emerging market investments, Turkish projects focus more on traditional sectors of African economies – especially agriculture and low-tech manufacturing – and much less on extractive industries such as oil, gas, or minerals. As one Turkish trade official recently stated during a conference, "Turkey does not want to take your raw materials out and sell them back to you as manufactured goods. We ... [prefer] to partner with you in converting these materials into finished goods."⁴

Turkish investors may be helped by the religious and cultural affinity of Islam that Western and Chinese investors lack when entering Islamic African markets such as Sudan, Nigeria, or Mauritania.⁵ According to one Islamic cleric in Cameroon, Turkey's moderate brand of Islam is appealing to African countries with large Muslim populations.⁶ Many new faith-based projects are currently underway; as a gesture of good will, mosques and madrassas are being built or restored by Sunni Turks across the continent.⁷ Turkey's largest Islamic fraternity – led by Fetullah Gulen – currently operates 60 schools in 30 African countries.⁸ In February, Tanzanian President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete traveled to Turkey where he praised the functioning of the Turkish *Feza* schools in Tanzania, which include several primary and secondary schools with plans to open a university in 2013.⁹


Cultural and religious ties may also facilitate Turkey's humanitarian outreach to Somalia, where it is fast emerging as the largest and most visible aid actor. According to a Turkish commentator, a primary motivation for Ankara's engagement is to counter increased Iranian activity in Somalia.¹⁰ The Turkish Red Crescent is operating a refugee camp in Mogadishu, and aid workers are living among Somalis in the capital city.¹¹ Turkey is rebuilding the national airport and repairing the Somali National Assembly.¹² Turkey was also the first country in more than 20

years to re-establish an embassy in Somalia. As a possible sign of its success, Turkey has drawn the ire of al-Shabaab, which warned Somalis against accepting Turkish food aid, claiming it to be expired and an attempt to poison Somalis.¹³ In addition to its high-profile aid work in Somalia, Turkey is currently funding projects in 37 African countries, including Ethiopia, Sudan, and Senegal.¹⁴

The Diplomatic Angle

The Turkish efforts in sub-Saharan Africa reflect the desire of the government of Recep Erdogan – first inaugurated in 2003 – to spread the country’s diplomatic influence. Since 2009, Turkey

has opened 22 new embassies across sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁵ In 2010, President Abdullah Gul became the first Turkish president to visit Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo.¹⁶ Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu announced in April 2012 that Turkey had received an official request from Khartoum to mediate between the governments of Sudan and South Sudan. Davutoglu was even invited to broker a territorial agreement between Botswana and Namibia in 2010.¹⁷ Turkish diplomacy is most active and pronounced in Somalia,



where Erdogan has pledged to help broker a peace agreement to end the decades-old conflict. Istanbul hosted conferences on the future of Somalia¹⁸ and the role of civil society in Somalia¹⁹ in May/June 2012. Participants from the autonomous regions of Puntland and Galmudug registered their opposition to Turkish interference in the Somali peace process by withdrawing from conference participation.²⁰ This response is likely the result of internal political rivalries and less a reflection of Turkish partiality.

Conclusions

Turkey’s strategy of targeting investment and aid to Africa is paying dividends. Its understated soft-power approach in sub-Saharan Africa is an alternative to the high-level engagement traditionally pursued by Western and Chinese investors that has sometimes alienated local populations. Due in part to its activities in Africa, Turkey’s aid profile is rapidly changing from that of recipient to emerging donor.²¹ Furthermore, a large and continued role in Africa may give Turkey additional options for international influence and diplomacy as an alternative to EU ascension, as talks on EU membership have stalled.²² Some have claimed that Turkey declared 2005 the “year of Africa” as part of an effort to gain a UN Security Council seat. This strategy may have worked, as it was elected to the Security Council in 2008. According to reports, only one African country failed to vote for it.²³ Turkey intends to run again 2014.²⁴

Turkey’s highest profile engagement is Somalia, where it has filled a void with humanitarian assistance and infrastructure development. As a moderate Islamic country with a light colonial footprint, Turkey is uniquely poised to continue developing stronger ties across the sub-continent.

Growing Political and Social Tension in Mauritania

Researcher: Dr. Dorina A. Bekoe

Summary

- Tension has been mounting in Mauritania since mid-2011.
- In September, the government opened a dialogue with the opposition, which has coalesced into two distinct groups: the *Coordination de l'Opposition Démocratique* (COD) and the *Convention pour l'Alternance Pacifique* (CAP).
- The COD has been openly calling for President Abdel Azziz to step down, employing ever more confrontational tactics, while the CAP has called for a more measured approach.
- Mauritania has also been beset by demonstrations by marginalized groups and students who, inspired by the Arab Spring, are demanding greater and more equitable recognition.
- The next few months, especially in the lead-up to the legislative elections, the date of which has not yet been set, will likely bring further restiveness.

Political Tension

Mauritania has experienced political unrest and uncertainty since the 2005 coup d'état by Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall that deposed long-serving President Maaouya Ould Sidi Ahmed Taya. In 2008, General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, overthrew Colonel Vall. Attempts to return the country to constitutional rule and hold presidential elections in 2009 were derailed by the opposition's boycott, amid charges of electoral fraud and inequity.²⁵ The political tension was resolved through the mediation of Senegal's President, Abdoulaye Wade; the resulting Dakar Accord envisioned a national unity government until presidential elections in July 2009, continuing political dialogue, and reforms to the electoral code.²⁶ The presidential elections were held as planned in July 2009.

The opposition again refused to take part during the October 2011 legislative elections, citing that they would not be free and fair. Thus, in August 2011, with pressure from opposition groups, legislative elections were postponed until a number of reforms were adopted.²⁷ While new members of the Independent National Election Commission (CENI) have been selected, a new date for the polls is yet to be set. The government engaged the political opposition in a dialogue in September and October 2011 to try to resolve some outstanding issues. This dialogue, however, was not successful. COD, a coalition of ten political parties, boycotted the dialogue, while CAP, a coalition of three parties, participated.²⁸

The political opposition remains divided over its engagement with the government. COD aims to force President Abdel Azziz from office, citing the high cost of living and unemployment as the source of their grievances. Its protests have drawn thousands into the streets.²⁹ Beginning with a sit-in on May 2, COD escalated its demonstrations in Nouakchott.³⁰ The demonstrations turned violent; on May 16 police dispersed a crowd with tear gas, injuring many.³¹ Frustrated with police tactics and their inability to make headway, COD met on May 25 – under the theme “Aziz Resign” – in the interior town of Tidjikja to decide on a final strategy.³² In Tidjikja, the parties agreed that they would launch a more concerted effort to oust the President. They reserved June 23 for the “march of the decade.” This march in Nouakchott would be preceded by a number of sit-ins and culminate in a “grand meeting” in Nouakchott and smaller ones in its nine departments (Moughataas).³³ While the COD were meeting in Tidjika, its youth wing was

demonstrating in Nouakchott. The government quashed the protests with tear gas, sound bombs, and batons. Several protesters were arrested and injured.³⁴ In response to the increased demonstrations, the government has offered to undertake a second dialogue. This time, CAP is rejecting the government's invitation to participate, claiming that most of the issues were addressed in the first dialogue. CAP is particularly critical of COD's difficult negotiating stances and the dangers they pose to the nation.³⁵ Still other members of the opposition are calling for a revolution.³⁶

Social Tension

The confrontational political atmosphere mirrors the restiveness at the civil society level. The past year in general has brought bolder and more vocal demands from a wide swath of civil society. Increasingly frequent demonstrations have featured students marching against university policies, incurring the wrath of state security forces; teachers rallying against low salaries;³⁷ unemployed graduates protesting against the lack of jobs; youth, primarily the February 25 movement (which is the date of Mauritania's first significant anti-government demonstration), voicing their frustrations over a range of issues;³⁸ and women against electricity cuts, the government's confiscation of land, and a general need for greater women's rights.³⁹ In fact, on International Women's Day (March 8), four different women's organizations held demonstrations in Nouakchott. Later in that month, Salafi women demonstrated in favor of Shari'a, in the belief that their husband and family members would be released from jail under such a legal system.⁴⁰ More recently, a fatwa saying that women could seek the presidency, but not win it, raised the ire of the Association of Female Heads of Families, a well-respected women's rights organization, which raised the illegality of such a fatwa.⁴¹

Movements that reflect longstanding grievances and racial divisions within Mauritania have also formed. In March 2011, "*Touche pas a ma nationalité* (TPMN)" formed in response to the government's proposed national registration program.⁴² TPMN is opposed to the census, which it argues would result only in further discrimination against black Mauritians.⁴³ Many black Mauritians feel that they would be asked to prove their nationality and, as in 1989, subsequently face deportation.⁴⁴ Demonstrations have been regular, as have aggressive retaliatory actions by the security services.

The grievances of black Mauritians are closely tied to the anti-slavery movement's demonstrations, which have been gaining ground. The anti-slavery movement, led by the Initiative for the Resurgence of Abolitionism in Mauritania (IRA) took an ominous turn when one of its representatives, Biram Ould Obeidi, burned Islamic texts, which he said condoned slavery. Obeidi and nine other IRA members were arrested. Demonstrations in support of Obeidi ensued, although the IRA apologized quickly for the book burnings.⁴⁵ The state, especially the Azziz administration, has been taking steps to recognize the grievances of black Mauritians – such as criminalizing slavery and passing legislation to recognize the multiethnic nature of the country – but these have been deemed insufficient.⁴⁶

What Lies Ahead?

The past year has seen regular demonstrations in Nouakchott and other cities in Mauritania. Some have taken their cues from the Arab Spring movements.⁴⁷ Others reflect the political opening that developed with the ouster of longstanding President Ould Taya. While the government has taken some steps to resolve these differences, these seem to be insufficient. The criticism of the government continues to grow. In responding to unrest, the security forces have failed to exercise restraint. The combination of these factors portends an uncertain path toward legislative elections over the next several months.

Electing a New Chairman of the African Union Commission: Egos Impeding Progress

Researcher: Dr. Ashley Bybee

Executive Summary

- The African Union's (AU) failure to elect a Commission Chairman has exposed major divisions on the continent and reflects a lack of enthusiasm for either candidate.
- Besides the embarrassment this saga will cause the AU, South Africa stands to lose diplomatic capital by breaking a "gentlemen's agreement" that allows smaller countries to occupy the Chairmanship. Its motivations are unclear, but thanks to close trade ties, South Africa's relationships with its smaller counterparts are unlikely to be soured in the long-term.

Background

In January 2012 at the 18th AU summit in Addis Ababa, the election for the AU Commission's next Chairman failed to produce a winner. Neither the incumbent, Jean Ping of Gabon, who has held the position since 2008, nor Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, South Africa's Home Affairs Minister and ex-wife of President Jacob Zuma, secured the required two-thirds of the votes. According to AU statutes, Ping's Deputy, Erastus Mwencha, a Kenyan economist should assume the position until a new election can be held. Ping, however, negotiated a deal to stay on for the interim period.⁴⁸ On May 14, the AU's eight-member *ad hoc* Committee of Heads of State and Government (Committee of Eight) met in Cotonou, Benin, in an attempt to break the deadlock, but failed to overcome the impasse. The election was subsequently postponed until the AU convenes again in Malawi in July.

Apathy toward Ping, Hostility toward Dlamini-Zuma

Although the election was tight, with Ping holding a slender lead in three rounds of voting, this should not be construed as enthusiastic support for either candidate. On the contrary, although each has several influential supporters, neither have enough to secure the votes of two-thirds of the member states. In fact, even after Dlamini-Zuma was forced to withdraw after the third round of voting in January, Ping *still* could not muster enough support among the member states. Thus, Dlamini-Zuma cannot be labeled a spoiler, since she did not split the vote with Ping. It does, however, reveal genuine disapproval of Ping, but even greater disapproval of South Africa's bid for the Chairmanship.

Jean Ping

Ping, 69, a Gabonese diplomat with close ties to the ruling Bongo family, has a reputation as an able technocrat who is unlikely to rock the boat in the AU.⁴⁹



(Source: www.presstv.ir)

He has historically received considerable support from West and Central African countries. Apparently confident of his reelection, it appears Ping was overly complacent and failed to campaign and lobby for the support. In light of the harsh criticism he has received for the AU's ineffective role in several international crises in 2011, this was a mistake. In particular, the AU's support for NATO intervention in Libya concerned many Africans who were uncomfortable with a bombing campaign on African territory. Many view Ping's

failure to win reelection as a vote of no confidence in his leadership of the AU.⁵⁰ There has also been the assertion that interference by the French Ambassador to Ethiopia, who was lobbying in support of Ping, backfired and induced enough African leaders to remove their support from Ping's camp.⁵¹ In the context of the AU, any external meddling – particularly that of former colonial powers – is automatically perceived in a negative light.

Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma



(Source: www. timeslive.co.za)

Dlamini-Zuma, 63, is one of South African President Jacob Zuma's ex-wives and a popular politician in her own right. She has been the Minister of Health, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and now leads South Africa's Home Ministry. She is known for her management of government resources with what has been characterized as "something approaching efficiency."⁵² As such, she is a logical candidate to revitalize the continent's most complex institution, and her win would also be a victory for gender equality in Africa.⁵³ The 14 members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as well as non-governmental groups such as the Pan-

African Business Forum, a network of West African business leaders with some political influence, are united in their support for her.⁵⁴ Yet even with these supporters, Dlamini-Zuma would need considerable support from Francophone countries to win the election. She currently lacks that support and is unlikely to attain it.

Anti-South Africa Sentiment

Widespread disapproval of South Africa's bid for the AU's Chairmanship exists among most non-SADC member states. This stems from the unwritten but largely accepted rule that precludes regional hegemon – such as South Africa – from occupying the position of Chairman. Rather, many see the Chairmanship as an opportunity for smaller states to have influence at the continental level. Therefore, most perceive South Africa's move as an attempt either to advance its own national interests or to serve as the collective voice of Africa, and in doing so reinforcing its reputation as the African hegemon. This had been the position of Nigeria, which was initially offended by South Africa's failing to consult it, the continent's "other" hegemon.⁵⁵ (Recent reports that Nigeria has changed its position and will now support Dlamini-Zuma's candidacy may have been the result of a deal reached between the two countries whereby South Africa supported Nigeria's Finance Minister in the recent selection of the World Bank's next president in return for Nigeria's support of South Africa in the AU.⁵⁶) Kenya also disapproves but on different grounds. Because AU leadership operates on the principle that the Chairman and their Deputy cannot both come from Anglophone or Francophone states, Dlamini-Zuma's ascendancy to Chairman would result in the forced withdrawal of the current Deputy – Erastus Mwencha, a Kenyan economist.⁵⁷ Additional anti-South African sentiment stems from its unpopular support of the International Criminal Court and its arrest warrants against African politicians. There is also the feeling that South Africa's foreign policy has too often been of the "go it alone" mindset, and would not generate the unity and consensus that so many Africans desire in a world they perceive to be dominated by the West. In other words, if Dlamini-Zuma were to win, many Africans would view the Chairmanship as a tool of South Africa's foreign policy.⁵⁸

So What Is South Africa Thinking?

The anti-South African sentiment prevalent throughout Africa raises the question: why alienate so many AU members and risk diplomatic capital when success is far from certain? South

African government officials have acknowledged that neither the northern or southern regions have had an opportunity to lead the AU yet, which in turns prompts the question: why not nominate a non-South African whose nationality would not be a liability in a process largely hostile to the southern hegemon?

There are a multitude of explanations, ranging from President Zuma's alleged desire to get rid of his ex-wife, who is more popular than he is,⁵⁹ to the calculated move by Foreign Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane to expand her influence into the halls of the AU.⁶⁰ Others speculate it is Zuma's last chance to make a legacy for himself. Others argue that it is a blatant power grab by South Africa from the continent's French-speaking countries.⁶¹

Assessment

There are four possible trajectories this saga could follow. First, Ping could actively lobby those who initially declined to support him and ultimately secure a two-thirds majority. Second, the AU may permit a candidate to win with less than the two-thirds majority in July, avoiding another embarrassing failed election. Although this is not technically allowed, the AU has already demonstrated it is willing to override its own rules. Allowing Ping to stay on as Chairman and permitting two candidates – neither of whom secured a two-thirds majority – to run again in July was itself a new precedent.⁶² Third, assuming Nigeria does indeed support Dlamini-Zuma's candidacy, it could be expected to pressure other ECOWAS states to follow suit, which may well place her ahead of Ping in July. Fourth, in the event of another stalemate in July, the decision could be deferred, yet again, until someone yields or offers a compromise.

Unfortunately, this saga reveals that AU members continue to be fixated on ideological differences and the battle for "control" of the organization rather than on the substantive issues that concern the majority of Africans. This reflects the reality that member states are still extremely sensitive to perceived "power grabs" and especially wary of attempts by potential hegemon to speak for the whole continent.

Despite assurances that Dlamini-Zuma would not pursue South African interests at the expense of pan-African ones, her candidacy cost South Africa some diplomatic capital. There could be spillover into non-AU issues. Although relations between South Africa and some other African states might sour in the near term, economic and trade factors should ultimately prevail over AU politics.

Proactive SADC Tackles Elections in Southern Africa

Researcher: Dr. Janette Yarwood

Summary

In an effort to maintain peace and political stability in the region, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has stepped up its mediation initiatives in countries scheduled for elections in 2012 or early 2013 – namely Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and Madagascar, and, to a lesser extent, Angola.

- Overall, SADC's performance has exceeded the expectations of outside observers.
- The organization's proactive engagement in Lesotho and sustained commitment to managing the political crisis in Zimbabwe signals the bloc's growing political importance in the region.
- SADC is not yet able, however, to influence its true heavyweights, such as Angola.

Lesotho

Past elections in Lesotho were marked by extreme violence. In both 1998 and 2007, post-election conflicts were contained only with diplomatic and military intervention. In preparation for the May 26, 2012 elections, SADC launched an Electoral Observer Mission (SEOM).⁶³ SEOM observation was scheduled to take place in three phases: pre-election, election-day, and post-election. SEOM's presence was meant to ensure that the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections were followed. The SEOM also conveyed a message of solidarity to the people of Lesotho regarding support for the ongoing democratic process.⁶⁴ By May 12, 63 SADC Observers from the SADC Secretariat, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe were already on the ground in Lesotho.⁶⁵ During the campaign, SEOM observers attended political events.⁶⁶

Despite scattered reports of pre-election violence and intense partisan bickering, Lesotho remained calm during the two days it took to complete the vote count.⁶⁷ Turnout was high, and observers praised the voting as largely free and fair.⁶⁸ Previous elections had produced dominant party rule after giving the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) wide margins of victory and the vast majority of seats; this election, however, could result in a coalition government – a first for Lesotho – since no party achieved an outright majority in parliament. Incumbent Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili's newly formed Democracy Congress (DC) finished with a plurality of seats, but opposition parties that, when combined, hold a majority of seats, have indicated that they intend to form a government.⁶⁹ SADC's proactive engagement in Lesotho might have helped prevent election day violence but it remains to be seen if the peace will hold during the transfer of power from incumbent to opposition.⁷⁰

Zimbabwe

Building on its instrumental role in negotiating the power-sharing government in 2009, SADC has taken a tough stance toward Zimbabwe in order to prevent a repeat of the violent, disputed elections of 2008. In June 2011, former SADC secretary-general Prega Ramsamy made clear that SADC would no longer tolerate flouting of its guiding principles on elections and democracy by rogue members such as Zimbabwe.⁷¹ Echoing the sentiment, in December 2011 South African President Jacob Zuma adopted a firm stance, noting in a report to the SADC Troika Summit: "It is time that SADC must speak with one voice in impressing to all the parties concerned that this situation can no longer be tolerated."⁷² Further, Zuma maintained, in direct conflict with

Zimbabwean President Mugabe's position, that there could be no elections until conditions for free and fair polls had been created.⁷³

While Mugabe has publically continued his recalcitrant stance, SADC has worked to shape the political environment. Over the past few weeks, Mugabe and Zimbabwean opposition leader and Prime Minister Tsvangirai sent representatives to meet with heads of state throughout the region to lobby for their varying positions ahead of the SADC Troika meetings that took place from May 31 to June 1 in Angola.⁷⁴ While Zimbabwe was not officially on the agenda, SADC executive secretary Dr. Tomz Augusto Salamao said the summit would likely review the political situation in the country.⁷⁵ SADC leaders are expected to oppose Mugabe's call for elections before the completion of major reforms.

Madagascar

After halting progress over the last several years, elections are expected to take place in Madagascar sometime between late 2012 and early 2013. Madagascar slid into political turmoil in March 2009 after opposition leader Andre Rajoelina, backed by the military, seized power from Marc Ravalomanana. Madagascar was suspended from both SADC and the African Union (AU) in 2009 on the basis that Rajoelina came to power through unconstitutional means.⁷⁶ For more than two years SADC and AU negotiators have been trying to bring the various Malagasy factions together and return the country to constitutional rule.

Malagasy leaders agreed to set up a transitional government to run the country until fresh elections are held. Implementation of the agreement, however, continues to be a challenge. Former President Marc Ravalomanana has twice been barred from returning to the country from exile in South Africa. SADC, together with other partners, has pledged to intensify efforts to ensure the resolution of political disputes in Madagascar.⁷⁷

The SADC Mediation team led by former President of Mozambique Joaquim A. Chissano developed a roadmap for ending the crisis in the country, signed by Malagasy stakeholders in September 2011.⁷⁸ A SADC liaison office was also established in November 2011 to support the implementation process.⁷⁹ Further, at the recent SADC summit of Heads of State and their representatives in Luanda, the summit mandated the SADC mediator and the Troika to facilitate dialogue and convene a meeting between Rajoelina and Ravalomanana in order to ensure full implementation of the roadmap and create an enabling environment for holding credible, free, and fair elections.⁸⁰ Overall, SADC's mediation in Madagascar has not been as sustained or successful as the organization's efforts in Lesotho and Zimbabwe.

Angola

Angola will hold parliamentary elections in late 2012. President Dos Santos and his Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA) party are expected to win. There is a growing opposition movement in the country. In March, police violently cracked down on journalists and protestors. Despite the fact that the ruling party has demonstrated that it is willing to suppress the opposition with force, SADC intervention is not expected, primarily because of Angola's influence in the region and within SADC.

Conclusion

SADC exhibited a strong effort in Lesotho and is a surprisingly powerful player in Zimbabwe. Although progress in Madagascar has been limited, SADC is committed to bringing constitutional order to the country. SADC will continue to be an important player in the region, especially in crisis situations. The situation in Angola, however, indicates that the bloc may have limited influence with regional heavyweights.

ALERTS

Eritrea: An End to the Authoritarian Lockdown?

Researcher: Ms. Brittany Gregerson

Second only to North Korea in terms of secrecy and isolation from the international community, Eritrea in recent weeks has taken steps that suggest it might be opening up to the African continent and the world. Although a true liberalization drive remains unlikely, it is possible that the events of the past month are early indicators that the regime's thinking has changed – with President Isaias Afewerki now believing that the benefits of interacting with the global system outweigh those of maintaining his decades-long authoritarian lockdown.

Change is evident in three areas: political ties, business development (including tourism), and government interaction with international media.

Political Ties

- Eritrea is establishing new and strengthening existing bilateral relationships; notable partners include Turkey, Egypt, Sudan, and South Africa.
- Eritrea is engaging with international organizations.
 - For example, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) – Eritrea hosted a SADC delegation led by the Zimbabwean Foreign Minister on May 19. Talks were said to focus on how to strengthen the African Union (AU); state media reported that President Afewerki noted “the need for exerting strenuous efforts to overcome lost opportunities.”⁸¹ Afewerki also called for member states “to appoint a competent person”⁸² as President of the AU Commission, an apparent criticism of current AU Commission President Jean Ping, who has been opposed by most southern African states since his candidacy in 2008.⁸³
- In addition to its efforts to build and strengthen these relationships, the Eritrean government also appears to be working on its international image.
 - This heightened sensitivity to how Eritrea is viewed by other states can be seen in official coverage of the country's recent 21st independence anniversary. Though state media has boasted of well-wishes from heads of state on this occasion since at least 2010, this year's online coverage is the most intense yet, with separate articles devoted solely to recounting “messages of congratulation” from various countries appearing every day from May 20 to 25 and again on May 28.⁸⁴

Business Development and Tourism

- Mining and resource development
 - Recent discovery and mining of gold, silver, copper, and zinc reserves have brought companies from the United Kingdom, Australia, China, South Africa, and Canada to Eritrea.⁸⁵
 - This represents many of these countries' first ventures into the reclusive state, which in the past has refused to make such deals.

- The benefit to the country is clear; “strong mineral export, agricultural output and infrastructural development” are credited with making Eritrea the fastest-growing economy in the Horn of Africa in 2012.⁸⁶
- Tourism
 - State-owned Eritrean Airlines began flying to South Africa four times a week on May 7, a move that government representatives explicitly characterized as part of an effort to bolster the mining industry and develop Asmara’s tourism sector.⁸⁷
 - Tourism has been targeted by Asmara for growth due to its potential to create jobs and bolster the country’s foreign currency holdings.⁸⁸
 - Eritrean Airlines commercial director David James believes that the slump in Egyptian Red Sea tourism post-Arab Spring provides a unique opening in the market for Eritrea.⁸⁹
 - In mid-May, Egypt and Eritrea signed a new agreement to increase air traffic to “seven roundtrip flights per week for passengers and goods.”⁹⁰

State Engagement of International Media

- On May 24, Eritrean Information Minister Ali Abdu provided an interview to Voice of America.⁹¹
- On May 18, President Afewerki gave an uncharacteristically long and wide-ranging interview to Voice of America, covering issues relating to development, aid, security, democracy, press freedom, and his country’s role and relationships within and outside of the region.⁹²
 - Afewerki used the interview as a platform to defend Eritrea against criticism on humanitarian grounds; laud his country’s progress in creating “an environment for sustainable development”; blame Eritrea’s problems on “continuous external interventions” and “a foreign intelligence agency ... buying hearts with money”; and dispute claims of press censorship.⁹³

Sierra Leone: Return of the RUF and November's Presidential Elections

Researcher: Ms. Ashton Callahan

The Revolutionary United Front Party (RUF), formed by elements of the notorious RUF militia, has returned after a 5-year hiatus from politics and indicates it will participate in November's presidential and parliamentary elections. The revival of the party is believed to be sponsored by the All People's Congress (APC) in an effort to sway voters in the east, Kailahun district in particular, a present stronghold for the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP).⁹⁴

The RUF last participated in the 2002 presidential elections when its candidate received 1.7 percent of the vote with strongest support in Kailahun district. In 2007, the party disbanded prior to elections, claiming bankruptcy, and shifted its allegiance from the SLPP to the APC.⁹⁵ In March 2010, Eldred Collins, leader of the RUF, announced a membership campaign to rejuvenate the party ahead of the 2012 elections.⁹⁶ One year later, the RUF opened political offices in Freetown and Kailahun.

It is strongly suspected that the APC is providing financial support to the RUF.⁹⁷ While a formal alliance between the APC and RUF is unlikely, the APC stands to benefit from its sponsorship of the RUF. Given recent events, the APC appears to be exploiting the organization's historical and ethnic ties in order to siphon votes from the SLPP:

- The APC is allegedly courting SLPP-supporting former Kamajors (Mende warriors with whom the RUF share a strong geographical association). It is believed that the APC wants to bring the RUF and the Kamajors together to garner votes in favor of the APC.⁹⁸
- Statements from the RUF leader also suggest they are mobilizing discontented former rebels. Collins recently said the party will be a force to be reckoned with as the party is very strong with the returning support of "RUF children" from all over the country.⁹⁹
- Several high profile defections from the SLPP to the APC have occurred in past few months. Lieutenant-Colonel Tom Nyuma, previously a close ally of SLPP presidential candidate Julius Maada Bio and currently the Chairman of the Kailahun City Council, defected to the APC in March 2012. In addition, Kailahun Councilor Salim Ndomawa defected to the RUF.¹⁰⁰
- Sheku James, who was captured by the RUF and then became a loyal enthusiast, is now the RUF District Chairman in Kailahun. He claims strong support in the region.¹⁰¹ Loyal supporters like James will likely try to recruit many of the unemployed youth in the area.

While the APC has much to gain, some contend that the party is playing a dangerous game. Expectations of RUF party officials are high, distrust between the SLPP and the APC is intense, and there have been several incidents of political violence over the past months. Given Sierra Leone's past experiences with violent elections, if RUF promises come to fruition the result will likely be further violence between the APC and the SLPP as the election draws closer.¹⁰² In addition, the government's recent \$4.5 million arms purchase for the police's paramilitary increases the likelihood of violence.

Riots in Zanzibar Threaten Tanzanian Stability

Researchers: Dr. Eliza Johannes and Ivana Djak

Summary

Rioting by the Islamist separatist group Uamsho (Swahili acronym for the Association for Islamic Mobilization and Propagation), or Awakening, in late May left several churches, stores, bars, and town squares in Zanzibar destroyed. Tanzanian stability is threatened by the increasing popularity of the group, growing calls for the severance of the Union with Tanzania, and looming continuation of the trial of the 30 arrested group members.

Chaos and Anti-Unionisms

Hundreds of supporters of Uamsho rioted on May 26 and 27, 2012, setting fire to two churches and destroying numerous shops in the historic commercial and tourist center of Stone Town, Zanzibar.¹⁰³ Rioters threw stones at police officers who responded by firing teargas and using water cannons. Witnesses claim protesters were armed with iron bars and machetes.¹⁰⁴ Property belonging to Tanzanians of mainland origin, or Wabara, seems to have been particularly targeted.¹⁰⁵ Uamsho incited chaos by holding an illegal march, which culminated in the torching of the Assembly of God Church at Kariakoo and the St. Theresa Church at Bububu.¹⁰⁶



<http://www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/africa/tanzania/zanzibar/>

Uamsho was allegedly protesting the arrests of some of its senior members. The group has drawn support from disillusioned supporters of Zanzibar's opposition Civic United Front (CUF) party, which joined a government of national unity with the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party.¹⁰⁷ Uamsho has also called for Zanzibar to end its union with mainland Tanzania so that Islamic custom and law can be preserved.¹⁰⁸ The secretary of Uamsho, Abdallah Said, condemned the arbitrary arrests of the group's leaders.¹⁰⁹



<http://www.kigalikonnnect.com/article/govt-well-restore-calm-in-zanzibar.html>

Anti-unionism, the opposition to the continuation of the 48-year-old Union between Tanzania and Zanzibar, has been on the rise on the island.¹¹⁰ The Islamic Lectures and Revival Community of Zanzibar, for example, launched a campaign in early May 2012 for a

referendum on the union. The Tanzanian government promised a new constitution by 2014, and the Presidential Constitutional Review Commission should begin its work soon.¹¹¹

Frustration is mounting among Zanzibar residents who blame the government for failing to control non-governmental organizations and Muslim leaders who incite followers to violence. Similar riots took place in Zanzibar last year and no one was held accountable.¹¹²

Arrests and Further Violence

Thirty people were arraigned in Mwanakwerekwe District Court on Monday May 28, 2012 as a result of the violence. The suspects were accused of illegally assembling and causing unrest. The case is set to resume on June 11. Several of the suspects posted bail and were welcomed in the streets by cheers from their supporters. Anti-riot police again used tear gas to disperse the gatherings.



<http://thecitizen.co.tz/component/content/article/37-tanzania-top-news-story/22687-destruction-as-rioters-run-amok-in-zanzibar.html>

A joint meeting was also held on Monday, May 28, at Police headquarters at Ziwani, Zanzibar to call for peace on the island. The meeting was attended by Home Affairs Minister, the Inspector General of Police, leaders of Islamic groups, officers from the Zanzibar tourism institutions, and foreign embassy officers.¹¹³ Since the meeting, riots again erupted, and a Roman Catholic Church was torched.¹¹⁴

Zanzibar's government subsequently banned religious forums and lectures from addressing political issues.¹¹⁵ Whether and how long the government can restrain tensions given the growth of anti-unionism and the approaching court date is uncertain.

African Central Bankers and Finance Ministers Concerned About Effects of a Global Downturn

In recent weeks, central bankers and finance ministers from somewhat less than a dozen African countries have expressed concern about the potential impact on Africa of the financial crisis in Europe and an economic slowdown in China. The IMF recently forecast only a somewhat slower regional growth rate, down to 5.4 percent growth from an earlier forecast of 5.9,¹¹⁶ but financial leaders in Botswana, Cape Verde, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tanzania, as well as members of the Monetary Affairs Committee of the five-nation East African Community went on public record to highlight the potential challenges to their economies in the months ahead.

- South Africa's Minister of Finance in mid-May noted that the "main risks to the economy remain external" and stated that the risk of a deeper contraction in the Eurozone had grown since the government's budget had been prepared.¹¹⁷ Employment in South Africa declined in the first quarter of 2012, and the IMF's lower estimate for Africa as a whole was predicated on a weaker economic outlook for South Africa.
- The Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) also in May stated that the slowdown in global economic activities "will impact the domestic economy through the trade and financial flows channels, weakening the external and fiscal positions."¹¹⁸ Subsequently, the CBN announced that it would be monitoring the euro crisis closely with a view toward reducing its euro holdings if necessary.

While South Africa and Nigeria have the financial resources to manage their way through a downturn, financial leaders in some other African countries are contemplating the possibility of reductions in donor support and declines in foreign exchange reserves that could present more politically challenging problems in the future.

- The Cape Verde Central Bank Governor observed that growth was decelerating and the country's liquid international reserves had declined to a level where they now guaranteed only somewhat more than three months of import coverage.¹¹⁹
- In presenting the draft budget to Parliament in late May, Rwanda's Finance Minister noted its reliance on projections of increased external donor support. He also stated that the country has foreign reserves to cover only five months of imports.¹²⁰
- In the wake of a drought that severely affected Gambian agriculture, the IMF announced on May 28 an immediate disbursement of roughly \$14 million to help that country address an acute balance of payments need.

Iran Reaching Out to African Leaders for Support for NAM Summit in Tehran

Tehran is gearing up to maximize the public diplomacy gains from its hosting of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Tehran, from August 16 to 31, 2012. Iranian Foreign Minister Salehi signaled at the NAM ministerial meeting in Egypt in early May that Tehran regards the event as an opportunity to promote its views, specifically noting the prevention of pre-emptive attacks as a major NAM objective.¹²¹

Facing pressure from the West and its Persian Gulf neighbors about its nuclear ambitions and other issues, Tehran hopes to use the summit, and its later three-year NAM presidency, to demonstrate that it has international support. Statements in January from the NAM Coordinating Bureau that criticized the violation of Iranian air space by an “American unmanned spy plane” and the assassination of an Iranian scientist illustrate the sort of rhetoric that Tehran will encourage. Iranian invitations to such figures as Raul Castro of Cuba and Hugo Chavez of Venezuela guarantee they will receive at least some level of rhetorical support.

Given that African representation constitutes more than one-third of the NAM’s composition, Tehran has been actively engaged in soliciting African participation in the summit.

- During visits to Kenya, Namibia, and South Africa in May, the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab and African Affairs delivered invitations from President Ahmadinejad. Iranian press noted that both sanctions and the nuclear issue were topics of discussion in South Africa.¹²²
- In May, Iran’s Vice-President for International Affairs gave a similar invitation to Sudanese President Bashir; according to Tehran, Zimbabwe has already committed to send a “high-ranking” delegation.
- Tehran may also be highlighting the possibility of future economic assistance to encourage African support. The Iranian Ambassador accredited to Sao Tome and Principe recently announced that Iran was providing a \$50 million line of credit, despite the absence of any significant bilateral cooperation previously.¹²³ Iran’s First Vice President Rahimi visited Kenya and Tanzania in late May for discussions that included agreements on trade and economic assistance.

Beyond asserting their opposition to pre-emptive military action and “unilateral” economic sanctions, how far major African countries will go in supporting Iran on the nuclear issue is unclear. At the same time, we doubt that Tehran will use the summit to signal its interest in a South African proposal to Iran, made public in February, to help any country that wants to follow its lead and give up nuclear weapons.¹²⁴

The Gambia: Jammeh Fires Close Military Aide, Others

Researcher: Ms. Ashton Callahan

On May 6, 2012, Gambian President Yahyah Jammeh fired his presidential guard chief, General Alhagie Martin, along with several other State Guard officers. Martin, one of Jammeh's closest military aides, is suspected in the December 2004 murder of Deyda Hydara, editor of *The Point* (a tabloid mildly critical of the Jammeh regime). The firing is part of a pattern of similar developments in recent weeks:

- On May 4, Jammeh discharged four top military officers: Major General Saikou Seckan, chair of the Joint Operation Centre; Brigadier General Lamin Bojang, chief of the Army Staff; Brigadier General Ebrima Bah, Inspector General; and Commodore Madani Senghore, Chief of the Naval Staff. They will reportedly join former top military officers "redeployed" to the foreign ministry some time back, including Serign Modou Njie, former State Guard Commander, and brigadier-general Yankuba Drammeh, former Deputy Chief of Defence staff.¹²⁵
- On May 6, President Jammeh assaulted and dismissed his wife's bodyguard, Bajerreh Manneh, for "sleeping on the job." Manneh has reportedly fled to Senegal. It is believed that the incident may be connected to the firing of General Martin, the presidential guard chief.¹²⁶
- On May 10, Jammeh reappointed Ousman Sonko as his Interior Minister. Sonko replaces Lamin Kaba Bajo, who held the position for less than one month. Sonko previously served as Interior Minister from 2007 to February 2012.¹²⁷ It is unclear why he had been dismissed in February.
- On May 18, Jammeh fired Lieutenant Colonel Salieu Bojang, who was assigned to a peacekeeping mission in Darfur.¹²⁸

While Jammeh's reshuffling of the government is not uncharacteristic, the dismissal of several senior officials in a short period is noteworthy. According to the government-bashing *Freedom* newspaper, some of the firings came after the revelation that President Jammeh allegedly welcomed Malian Tuareg rebels as his guests. The article claims that his association with the rebels was either an effort to protect the security of his regime or that he was negotiating arms deals.¹²⁹ These accusations have not been substantiated in other sources, but the firings reflect Jammeh's paranoia and distrust of the army and those closest to him. As in past, at the most recent graduation of soldiers from the Gambian Armed Forces School, Jammeh reminded the new recruits of their duty to display loyalty to him.¹³⁰

Kenya: Grenade Attacks at Dadaab and Wajir

Researchers: Dr. Eliza Johannes and Ms. Ivana Djak

A series of grenade attacks near the Dadaab refugee camp in May 2012 left dozens wounded and one police officer dead. Increased insecurity in the North Eastern province points to mounting tension between Kenyans of Somali origin and locals as well as increased al-Shabaab influence in the camps. Security force abuse of refugees is also fueling support for militants among the population. Combined with recent incidents in Mombasa and Nairobi, the recent attacks in the northeast highlight the gravity of the al-Shabaab threat in Kenya.

Series of Grenade Attacks in North-Eastern Region

Two grenade attacks occurred in northern Kenya on May 26, according to North Eastern provincial police chief Leo Nyongesa. Five Kenyans were wounded at Dadaab refugee camp, the world's largest such camp with more than 450,000 inhabitants, when a grenade was thrown at a school construction site in the Ifo II section of the camp.¹³¹ One report claimed the injured construction workers were Kenyans of Somali origin.¹³² On the same day, attackers in the eastern town of Wajir threw a grenade into a local restaurant, Dubai Lodge,¹³³ wounding between one¹³⁴ and three¹³⁵ Kenyans according to varying reports.

Police chief Nyongesa blamed the Dadaab attacks on the rivalry between non-Somalis and Kenyan Somalis in the camp, noting, "We don't think the al-Shabaab militia group is behind this incident because we believe it is mere business rivalry where the locals want to be the ones being given the contracts."¹³⁶ Another officer, speaking on condition of anonymity to radio station Capital FM, however, stated the attacks were committed by al-Shabaab or their sympathizers who increasingly target and harass security forces.¹³⁷

These attacks are part of a pattern of bombings near Dadaab. On May 24, three people were wounded at a hotel in Hagadera in the Dadaab refugee camp after a grenade was thrown into the hotel restaurant.¹³⁸ Nine days earlier, on May 15, a police officer was killed and three officers were injured when their vehicle was hit by an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) in Lagdera near Dadaab. The officers were escorting United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) staff when the explosion took place. Other officers on the ground blamed al-Shabaab and expressed concern that the group is successfully obtaining more IEDs.¹³⁹

On May 27, four Somali suspects were arrested in Hagadera, one of the three refugee complexes in Dadaab District of Garissa County, for the attacks in North Eastern province.¹⁴⁰



<http://old.engagemagazine.com/Magazine-Content/Articles/August-2011/Dadaab--The-veil-fell-off.html>

Abuse and Conditions in Dadaab

Abdifatah Ahmed Ismail, a refugee camp representative, spoke to the media after the May 15 explosion, alleging, "After the explosion, officers were firing indiscriminately at civilians who were trying to escape the explosion.



<http://sites.duke.edu/dukepsf/2011/11/08/dadaab-the-saga-of-a-refugee-crisis/>

Then the officers began raiding and looting businesses near the scene of the explosion." A Human Rights Watch Report published in early May echoed Ismail's claims as it reported on the abuse, rape, and mistreatment of refugees in Dadaab by Kenyan police.¹⁴¹

Residents of the Hagadera refugee camp told reporters that children, women, and men alike are beaten, searched, robbed, and detained for days. Abusive police behavior is alienating the camp population,

making residents easier targets for al-Shabaab recruiters who exploit their fear and frustration.¹⁴²

Renewed Chadian Rebel Attacks in the Central African Republic

Researchers: Dr. Eliza Johannes and Ms. Ivana Djak

A renewed attack in the unstable Batangafo region of the Central African Republic (CAR) raises concerns that Chadian rebel activities could lead to a crisis of governance and further humanitarian devastation. On May 20, 2012 assailants believed to be from Chad burned down the villages of Gogo, killing one person, and Bafondo, killing two people. The Catholic chapels and granaries were destroyed. The attackers included Chadian herders known as “Mbarara” and Chadian rebels.¹⁴³



In a March 7, 2012 Analysis, *The Africa Watch* explained that Chadian rebel clashes with Central African rebel groups¹⁴⁴ and the subsequent establishment of the joint Central African-Chadian military operation to capture FPR (*Front Populaire Pour le Redressement* [Popular Front for Recovery]) leader Baba Ladde¹⁴⁵ had led to mass displacement in the Batangafo region.¹⁴⁶ These clashes are a continued destabilizing force for the weak CAR state.

<http://www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/africa/central-african-republic/>

Sahel – Update on Food Crisis

Researcher: Ms. Betty Boswell

The April 18, 2012 edition of *The Africa Watch* included an Alert on the drought and famine in the Sahel. In the months since that report, the situation has continued to deteriorate despite the efforts of international relief organizations and humanitarian agencies.

- As of the end of May 2012, the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs predicts that 18 million people across the Sahel will be affected by the hunger crisis.¹⁴⁷
- In Burkina Faso, where 60,000 Malian refugees have fled, the food shortage has intensified. Adding to the problem is the government’s increase in price of basic food items and petrol. Thousands of people marched toward Ougadougou and other major cities in the country to protest the “anarchic rise in prices.”¹⁴⁸
 - Chad, Mali, and Niger are also experiencing sharp price hikes in basic foods.¹⁴⁹
 - USAID expects prices to continue rising until August.¹⁵⁰
- Niger’s planting season has begun and farmers need help so they are not compelled to repeat last year’s situation: selling seeds rather than planting them to survive for the short term or eating immature grains because they have nothing else.¹⁵¹
 - Lutheran World Relief has intervened in response to this crisis by distributing tons of millet and bean seeds, as well as fertilizer, to more than 14,000 vulnerable households.¹⁵²

The United Nations’ refugee agency UNHCR has more than quadrupled its estimate for funds needed to help the refugees from Mali, and its other operations across the Sahel. They now seek more than \$150 million, but to date have received only 13 percent of that total. If adequate funds are not received ahead of the rainy season beginning in June, the fear is that many areas where refugees have settled will be cut off from food and other basic necessities due to flooding.¹⁵³

Zambia Threatens to Ban Raw Copper Exports

Researcher: Mr. Alexander Noyes

On April 10, 2012, President Michael Sata's cabinet in Zambia – Africa's top producer of copper – proposed a ban on raw copper exports in order to compel mining companies to process raw copper in Zambia and boost industrial development.¹⁵⁴ “We are considering banning all exports of raw copper as well as other minerals as a way of encouraging value addition to the commodities and to help improve the economy,” stated Robert Sichinga, Zambia's Industry and Commerce Minister.¹⁵⁵ The following week, however, Mines Minister Christopher Yaluma contradicted Sichinga, stating that, due to insufficient smelting capacity, “it is not true that we have banned or are going to ban exports of copper.”¹⁵⁶ The export ban discussions have angered copper mining interests and represent another point of contention between Sata and the mining industry since he took office in September 2011.

- As outlined in the December 7, 2011 edition of *The Africa Watch*, Sata has a contentious relationship with the mining industry. Since taking office, he has carried out campaign pledges to reform the mining sector by increasing Zambia's ownership stakes in foreign-owned copper mines and doubling royalties from 3 to 6 percent.¹⁵⁷
- While copper exports make up 75 percent of Zambia's export revenues, mining companies account for only 10 percent of Zambia's total tax revenues.¹⁵⁸
- In October 2011, Sata announced a 10-day suspension of metal exports to implement new tax guidelines, sort out irregularities, and provide more transparency. The ban was lifted after only two days. Although no official reason was given for ending the ban early, the Chamber of Mines of Zambia (CMZ) believes it was due to the detrimental impact on the mining companies.¹⁵⁹
- On May 4, 2012, the CMZ and the Association of Zambian Mineral Exploration Trade and Industry expressed deep concern over the proposed export ban, warning that it would harm the mining industry and discourage investment.¹⁶⁰

As noted by Minister Yaluma, Zambia does not have the smelting capacity to process the large amount of raw copper the country extracts, rendering an export ban untenable. Zambia currently has fewer than 10 functioning copper smelters, not nearly enough to refine the 870,000 metric tons of raw copper extracted last year.¹⁶¹ Because of insufficient smelting capabilities and the substantial economic and political fallout that would follow an embargo, it is highly unlikely that Sata will implement a sustained ban on raw copper exports. The export ban discussion, however, signals that the relationship between Sata and the mining industry will remain tense.

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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

THE AFRICA WATCH

JUNE 20, 2012



TO THE READER

IDA's team of Africa researchers welcomes your comments, questions, and feedback on the contents of *The Africa Watch*. If you would like to discuss an article in this issue or provide suggestions for future research, please contact me at (703) 845-4394.

With best regards,

George

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward

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ANALYSES

***Françafrique* in 2012: Will the Election of François Hollande Change France's Foreign Policy in Africa?**

Researcher: Dr. Stephanie M Burchard

Summary


- On the campaign trail, François Holland promised to change the nature of France's relationship with Africa. While commentators are calling Hollande's election the death knell for "*Françafrique*," this is at least the fifth pronouncement of the death of *Françafrique* in recent years.
- Hollande's domestic supporters are most concerned about issues closer to home in terms of the economy and issues surrounding EU policy; Africa seems a low priority for the time being.
- Despite cosmetic changes and a new face for French foreign policy, it is unlikely that substantive changes are going to take place.

Françafrique

Since the end of colonialism in Africa, former French colonies (and a few other African countries) have enjoyed a special relationship with France, known by many as "*Françafrique*." Benefits include political and military support to protect the ruling elite, special trade relations, and foreign aid. France has a considerable military presence in Africa. There are French military bases in Djibouti and Gabon, and approximately 50 percent of its forces deployed worldwide are on the African continent.¹ Moreover, France's defense pacts with several African states have been activated in many cases to prevent a regime from falling, as occurred in Chad in 2009, when Idris Deby was nearly toppled by insurgents. Sources also accuse France of having undisclosed security compacts with a number of African countries to provide military support in cases of serious domestic conflict.² In fact, since 1960, France has participated in more than 40 military interventions in sub-Saharan Africa,³ the most recent of which was Côte d'Ivoire in 2011. Despite protestations otherwise, the deployment of French troops to Côte d'Ivoire was heavily criticized as being too "personal" and part of a lingering strategy of protecting French interests in Africa at the expense of African interests.⁴ France, under the leadership of Jacques Chirac, chose sides in several contentious elections, including Togo in 2005.⁵ Nicolas Sarkozy, while claiming to want to change French-African relations, oversaw military interventions in Chad, CAR, Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, among others.⁶

Françafrique, in its most egregious form, has been seen as fostering endemic corruption among political elites and French complicity in serious human rights abuses, including the genocide in Rwanda.⁷ Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, son of former president François Mitterrand and former chief presidential advisor for African Affairs, was accused and convicted of profiting from illegal arms transfers to Angola in the 1990s.⁸ He was one of 42 members of France's elite, including a former interior minister and an *ex-préfect*, accused of profiteering in what has been termed "Angolagate."⁹ France also exports significant amounts of military materials to sub-Saharan

Africa, sometimes ignoring recipients' human rights records. For example, from 2000 to 2009, France exported \$154 million in arms to Chad, \$190 million to the DRC, and \$117 to Côte d'Ivoire;¹⁰ notably, Chad and Côte d'Ivoire were subjected to UN arms embargoes during that time.



<http://www.cfr.org/france/french-military-africa/p12578>

France counts Africa as one of its most important sources of oils and metals.¹¹ While French aid and development assistance to Africa are significant (\$3.9 billion in 2009 and 2010),¹² this economic relationship is not one sided. The 14 countries that have adopted the CFA franc – which is pegged to the Euro at a fixed rate – are statutorily required to keep a minimum of 65 percent of their foreign exchange reserves in the French Treasury and an additional 20 percent for financial liabilities.¹³ There are no indications that this particular policy is under review or will be subject to change.

President Hollande's Policies

On May 6, 2012, French voters went to the polls and gave a narrow victory to Socialist Party (PS) candidate François Hollande over conservative incumbent Nicolas Sarkozy. On the campaign trail, Hollande stated that he intended to change the nature of France's Africa policy.¹⁴ Specifically, Hollande stated that he would withdraw France's military presence in Africa and work to facilitate economic immigration to France.¹⁵ Second, Hollande has stated that he would prioritize democratic development and the protection of human rights over France's economic interests.¹⁶ Hollande's new foreign minister has talked of re-establishing France's relationship with Africa as partnerships with equals with a focus on development.¹⁷

According to some, however, Hollande's promises amount to campaign rhetoric. Those of this view believe that the new president's ability to effect changes will be constrained.¹⁸ Others insist that the Socialist Party president will renew the French focus on democratic practices and respect for human rights in Africa.¹⁹ What changes, if any, can we expect to see?

First, Hollande's domestic supporters are most concerned about issues closer to home in terms of the economy and the issues surrounding the EU; Africa seems a low priority for the time being. Second, the Socialist Party supported Sarkozy's interventions in Libya and Côte d'Ivoire.²⁰

It remains to be seen how PS legislators and their allies, who will most likely have a majority in the National Assembly and Senate, will respond to Hollande's proposed changes. Finally, this represents at least the fifth pronouncement of the "death" of *Françafrique* in recent years.²¹ Perhaps the fifth time is the charm; however, there are those who claim France's relationship to its former colonies provides France with international influence and leverage,²² which France would be loath to give up. Further, African heads of states see French involvement as a form of "life insurance" that can help perpetuate rule in an era of renewed emphasis on democracy and electoral regimes.²³ Despite cosmetic changes and a new face for French foreign policy, it is unlikely that substantive changes are going to take place.

South Africa: Land Expropriation Unlikely

Researchers: Mr. Alexander Noyes and Dr. Janette Yarwood

Summary

On June 5, 2012, Ronald Lamola, deputy president of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL), warned that Zimbabwe-style land invasions are “inevitable” unless white South African farmers voluntarily transfer land to the government for redistribution.²⁴

- The ANCYL has not shied away from land reform controversies in the past, with former ANCYL president Julius Malema having called for the expropriation of white-owned land with no compensation.²⁵
- While the South African government’s land-reform efforts have not been successful, the ANC, due to various political and economic realities, is highly unlikely to embark on a radical, Zimbabwe-like land reform program.
- The repeated calls by the ANCYL for more drastic land reform, however, signal that the issue remains politically charged.

Negligible Land Reform in South Africa

South Africa has a long and contentious history regarding land. Under apartheid, white settlers appropriated 87 percent of the land, leaving a mere 13 percent for the black African majority. During this process of dispossession, more than 3.5 million black Africans were forcibly relocated.²⁶ Redressing such land injustices was a central tenet of the liberation struggle, and supporters of the ANC continue to feel that the land question must be resolved in order to bring about a just society and stimulate rural development. After the transition to nonracial democracy in 1994, the ANC announced a gradualist land reform program, consisting of a willing-seller/willing-buyer model that respected the right to private property and ensured fair compensation to land owners. The program focused on restitution of rights to land for those victimized by forced removals, land redistribution, and the securing of land tenure.²⁷

Since its inception, the South African land reform program has been painstakingly slow and, overall, highly unsuccessful, with little land redistributed over the past two decades. Speaking in 2012, Rural Development and Land Reform Minister Gugile Nkwinti stated that the government has achieved only a quarter of its goal of redistributing 30 percent of agricultural land by 2014.²⁸ Criticisms have also been leveled at the program’s lack of follow-up support after transfers have taken place.

ANC Unlikely to Adopt Radical Land Reform

Despite these failures, South Africa is unlikely to embrace radical, Zimbabwe-style “fast track” land policies mainly due to three structural and political factors: first, the limited amount of arable land in South Africa; second, the high rate of population growth and urbanization; and third, the low political prioritization of land reform for the majority of the population.

South Africa’s environment is overwhelmingly arid and inhospitable to agriculture, with a mere 12.1 percent of land deemed as arable.²⁹ This constrains the role of agriculture in the overall economy – agriculture accounts for only 2.5 percent of GDP³⁰ – and, more importantly, places considerable limitations on the transformational potential of land reform and redistribution in South Africa. A further structural factor that helps explain South Africa’s gradualist approach to land reform is demographic change: i.e., rapid population growth and increased urbanization.

South Africa's population grew from about 5 million in 1904 to more than 48 million in 2012.³¹ Such population growth, when combined with a small amount of arable land, means that there simply is not enough land to be redistributed to more than a small proportion of the population. Furthermore, rapid urbanization has accompanied this population growth, with more than 60 percent of the population classified as urban in 2010.³² This increasingly urbanized population puts considerable pressure on the government to ensure urban food security and low food prices, which, in turn, places additional constraints on large-scale land redistribution efforts. These demographic forces have further tied the hands of the ANC regarding land reform.

These structural factors prevent land from being a particularly important issue in the day-to-day lives of the majority of South Africans. Although many are supportive of land redistribution as symbolic redress of past injustices, a survey found "only 1.3 percent of South African respondents listing land among the top three problems that the government should address."³³ This lack of urgency among the general public translates into a lack of significant political pressure on the land question, allowing reform to feature low on the ANC's list of priorities.

ANCYL Remains Relevant with Controversial Positions

While land invasions in South Africa are highly unlikely, the continued ANCYL-driven debate about radical land reform indicates that the League is strategically using language to tap into popular discontent. Their calls for land expropriation, mine nationalization, and access to quality education and healthcare continue to give League leaders support among certain segments of the youth population and workers in a country with high poverty and unemployment rates.³⁴ The ANCYL has consistently challenged the status quo within the ANC by taking the current leadership to task on these contentious issues. In this manner, the ANCYL has remained relevant by continually reminding the deeply divided ANC leadership that the League can mobilize and influence the youth and working class vote.

Conclusion

Could South Africa end up following the example of Zimbabwe on the question of land reform? The likelihood of this occurring is low. Several of the structural economic and demographic factors discussed in the South African context were opposite to those that applied in Zimbabwe over the last decade, and the political circumstances were entirely different. The limited transformational potential of land reform, combined with the institutional strength of the country's political system and a diversified economy based primarily on manufacturing, mining, and services, make the prospect of South Africa following in the footsteps of Zimbabwe exceedingly unlikely.

Zimbabwe: A Tale of Two Bishops

Researcher: Caroline F. Ziemke-Dickens

Summary:

- In the run-up to the Presidential election, Zimbabwean security forces have intensified their harassment of churches and church leaders who are seen as hostile to Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF. As the elections draw near, the pace and scale of the attacks are likely to increase in an effort to silence the criticism of Mugabe and his policies that he and his supporters will interpret as implicit, if not explicit, endorsement of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).
- The Anglican Church of the Province of Central Africa (CPCA) and the dioceses of Harare and Manicaland have been singled out for particular pressure because of a continuing schism between the mainstream Anglican churches in Zimbabwe and the pro-ZANU-PF, breakaway “Anglican Church in Zimbabwe” headed by Mugabe loyalist Bishop Nolbert Kunonga.
- The schism is, in part, an attempt by Kunonga to seize control of more than 3,000 Anglican Church properties in the CPCA, which include 15 dioceses in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, and Malawi in an expansion of Mugabe’s campaign of redistribution of land and properties from “British imperialists.”
- At the center of the resistance to the asset-grab is Bishop Chad Gandiya, who was elected and consecrated as the Bishop of the Anglican Diocese of Harare in May 2009. The previous Bishop of Harare, Kunonga, was excommunicated by the worldwide Anglican Communion and the CPCA in 2007 for inciting violence in pro-Mugabe sermons. Gandiya’s leadership of his “church in exile” and his message of non-violence and reconciliation have made him a *de facto* leader of all the Christian communities.³⁵

A Campaign of Harassment

Incidents of violence against overtly apolitical churches that have refused to align with President Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF began in 2011, but have become more frequent and more violent in recent months. Riot police have attacked churches of various denominations, particularly those whose clergy have been outspoken in their condemnation of the violence associated with Mugabe’s land reform program. Mugabe supporters see organized prayer and memorial services for those killed during political unrest in Zimbabwe or participation in demonstrations and prayer gathering for peace or reconciliation as signs of defiance and, hence, a political threat.

Mugabe has denounced black bishops in the Roman Catholic and Anglican churches as “pawns of whites and the West” who, he charges, “have a nauseating habit of unnecessarily attacking his person.”³⁶ Clergy of various denominations have been arrested and physically assaulted, had their homes invaded and church properties confiscated, and received death threats.³⁷ Worship services – often conducted in the open by congregations that have been forced out of their churches – are regularly broken up by police, in some cases, wielding tear gas.³⁸ Mainstream Anglican bishops in the CPCA also charge that Kunonga loyalists “raped, mutilated, and strangled” 80 year-old Jessica Mandeya, a lay minister who headed a one-room church in rural Mashonaland, after she refused to surrender her parish in the face of repeated death threats.³⁹

The most intense intimidation has been reserved for the Anglican Church of the Province of Central Africa and its “Bishop of Harare in exile,” the Reverend Chad Gandiya. The dispute between the mainstream Anglican Church and the Mugabe regime dates back to May 2007 when the CPCA and the worldwide Anglican community excommunicated the then-Bishop of Harare, the Reverend Nolbert Kunonga, on charges that his sermons in support of Mugabe’s violent land reform campaigns incited violence and violated the church’s traditional apolitical stance.⁴⁰ Bishop Gandiya was elected to replace Kunonga in 2009 and was consecrated in May of that year.

Bishop Kunonga responded by asserting that it was he who initiated the break from the worldwide Anglican communion on the grounds that it had fallen under the control of homosexual and female bishops and that mainstream Anglican clergy in Zimbabwe had embraced gay marriage – a blatant untruth. He then declared himself the leader of a breakaway “Anglican Church in Zimbabwe” and refused to hand back Anglican Church assets, including the Cathedral in Harare, church offices, buildings, bank accounts, and vehicles – with the backing of Chief Justice of the Zimbabwe Supreme Court, Godfrey Chidyausiku, another overt Mugabe supporter.⁴¹ Kunonga has denied corruption in the court order validating his claim to church properties, asserting that it was due the brilliance of his legal argument. “I’m superior intellectually and from a legal point of view ... I’m very superior to them.”⁴² A similar schism has played out in the Anglican Diocese of Manicaland where another breakaway bishop, the Reverend Elson Jakazi, has refused to surrender church properties after the CPCA elected Bishop Julius Makoni in late 2009.⁴³

The Anglican Asset Grab

Bishop Kunonga has openly declared the aim of seeing his breakaway church gain control of the more than 3,000 churches, schools, missions, hospitals, and other properties of the CPCA, not just in Zimbabwe but throughout the province, which also includes Zambia, Botswana, and Malawi. Kunonga portrays himself as a selfless nationalist leader who is seeking to Africanize a church that has too long been associated with British colonialism. He justifies the asset grab on the grounds that he and his breakaway church are simply reclaiming the treasure accumulated by Anglican missionaries on the backs of Zimbabweans since the 19th century. As he preached in the sermons that led to his excommunication, Kunonga – who benefited mightily from the violent confiscation of white-owned commercial farms in the early 2000s – claims his goal is to liberate Zimbabwe from manipulation by the West. “Politics can only help us take what we cannot take by ourselves,” he has said in justification of violent land reform. “That’s what Mugabe did. That’s why he’s so dear.”⁴⁴ Kunonga denounced the CPCA and Bishop Gandiya as “professional beggars” who have sold out human dignity and African values for the love of British pounds.⁴⁵

Bishop-in-Exile Chad Gandiya

In the face of police harassment, regular death threats, and the physical hardships of worshipping in *ad hoc* spaces, Bishop Gandiya has preached a message of peace and reconciliation, constantly reinforcing in his message that “we will return, the hand of God is guiding us, there is to be no violence as the elections approach, and we must plan now for a ministry of healing and reconciliation once we are back in our churches.” The vast majority of Zimbabwean Anglicans have chosen to remain within the official Anglican Communion, despite being chased – and occasionally tear-gassed – out of churches that, in many cases, they built with their own hands. In rural areas, people travel long distances, often on foot, to attend services in tents and under trees. The “Cathedral in Exile” is currently a large tent in the garden

of an Anglican layman's house near the Harare Cathedral. The few remaining white Anglican congregations have forged closer relationships with Shona parishes, sharing priests and joining together for study groups and pastoral care.⁴⁶ Parishes of other denominations have allowed Anglican congregations to worship in their facilities even after being threatened with government retaliation.

Bishop Gandiya has emerged as a leader of all the country's Christian communities because of his consistently principled stand in defense of the constitutional right of all Zimbabweans to worship freely, without police sanction or harassment. Kunonga's attempt to sow suspicion of the mainstream Anglican church as a fifth column of agitators for regime change seems to have backfired and created a quiet mass movement against the politicization of religion. Loyal priests, nuns, and lay ministers continue to carry out their religious and charitable activities, often in appalling conditions and usually without pay. The Mothers Union, the Anglican lay religious order for women, remains a loyal powerhouse and "rapid reaction" force for pastoral care and education. At a recent "Lady Day" rally, at which Bishop Gandiya preached, 6,000 Mothers Union members stared down the riot police sent to break up the event.

In the near term, the violence against these churches and their leaders is bound to escalate as the elections draw near. Regardless of their proclamations of political neutrality, their criticism of violent land reform and their message of peace and reconciliation are unlikely to lead Mugabe and ZANU-PF to see these churches as anything but a pro-opposition force to be neutralized. In the longer term and assuming he survives – Kunonga has been ominously quoted as telling the press that "if I want to pick on people to kill, Gandiya would not survive here" – Bishop Gandiya is widely regarded as likely to become the Desmond Tutu of post-Mugabe Zimbabwe. He is one of the few public figures in the country with the moral standing and force of personality to lead Zimbabwe toward healing and reconciliation.⁴⁷

Mounting Political Volatility in Burundi

Researchers: Dr. Eliza Johannes and Ms. Ivana Djak

Summary

Potential for instability in Burundi is growing:

- Reports of political killings in 2011 and early 2012 have emerged.
- Journalists and civil society are being increasingly pressured by the government.
- New party registration laws and a party registration deadline of July 1, 2012 threaten opposition parties.

These destabilizing elements are exacerbated by a recent strike and rampant corruption.

A Vicious Cycle of Political Assassinations

A May 2012 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report details increased political violence in Burundi through 2011 and early 2012. The report concedes that some positive human rights developments took place in Burundi during that period, including the establishment of the National Independent Human Rights Commission, the perseverance of a robust civil society in the face of persecution, and the readmission of HRW after its expulsion in 2010. HRW, however, found that political killings escalated in a vicious cycle of assassinations and reprisals between members of the ruling party and opposition parties. In most cases, the perpetrators were allegedly linked to security forces or the ruling party, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (*Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie-Forces pour la defense de la democratie* [CNDD-FDD]). Most of the victims were members or former members of the National Liberation Forces (*Forces nationales de liberation* [FNL]), and occasionally members of other opposition parties, such as the Front for Democracy in Burundi (*Front pour la democratie au Burundi* [FRODEBU]) and the Movement for Solidarity and Democracy (*Mouvement pour la solidarite et la democratie* [MSD]). The Burundian government took no significant steps to prevent the assassinations, fostering impunity in their wake.⁴⁸

HRW's claims are substantiated in part by developments over the past several months. In November 2011, former police officer Col. Pierre Claver Kabirigi announced the formation of new armed group, the Front for the Restoration of Democracy (*Le front de restauration de la democratie*), in response to corruption and the extrajudicial killings perpetrated by the government. Kabirigi stated in an interview that his group would continue to fight to overthrow a government complicit in the murder of its citizens.⁴⁹

Army chief Maj. Gen. Godefroid Niyombare dismissed Kabirigi's supporters as criminals, denying the government's involvement in extrajudicial killings. Burundi's human rights and civil society community has echoed Kabirigi's claims. The Observatory of Government Action (*Observatoire de l'Action Gouvernementale*), a watchdog group composed of 18 organizations, journalists, and members of parliament, agreed that more than 300 opposition party members and former National Liberation Forced rebels were killed by security forces and the youth wing of the CNDD-FDD from June to November 2011. The wave of killings raised concerns among Burundians that hostilities similar to the civil war were surfacing.⁵⁰

Even those who try to protect citizens are themselves at risk. On May 10, 2012, Burundi's independent ombudsman, Mohamed Rukara, revealed that he uncovered an assassination plot

against him. Rukara investigates violations and corruption by state officials. Some of the latter, his spokesman says, are now attempting to kill him.⁵¹

Burundian civil society is increasingly vocal against the rampant impunity. The May 22, 2012 verdict in the trial of those accused of killing Ernest Manirumva, an anti-corruption activist who died in 2009, gained much negative media attention. The Higher Instance Court of Bujumbura sentenced 14 individuals to prison but failed to consider important leads pointing toward the involvement of state security forces.⁵² Twenty Burundian and international nongovernmental organizations said the verdict was a missed opportunity for justice.

Repression of the Media and Civil Society

The media are also under increasing pressure. In November, Reporters Without Borders and HRW warned that journalists were subject to “abduction style arrests” and harassment. After a notorious massacre in September 2011, the National Council for Communication banned reporting on rebel groups and political killings.⁵³ Reporters and civil society leaders were summoned and detained by state prosecuting authorities on accusations of reporting on human rights abuses.⁵⁴

The issue of media persecution gained additional attention on May 8, 2012 when state prosecutors requested a life sentence for journalist Hassan Ruvakiki, who was jailed in November 2011 for interviewing an alleged rebel leader, thereby allegedly committing “acts of terrorism.” In February 2012, his defense team raised concerns about the fairness of the legal proceedings but has never been informed of a decision regarding their February appeal.⁵⁵

Repression extended beyond local journalists when on May 2, 2012 Interior Minister Edouard Nduwimana blocked an HRW news conference and the distribution of the report on political violence in the country. An HRW spokesperson expressed concern about this turn of events since international and local organizations frequently hold news conferences in Burundi without seeking prior authorization. This incident suggests Burundi’s tradition of a strong civil society and vocal independent media may be in peril.⁵⁶

Political Parties in Turmoil

After the 2010 election, in which president Pierre Nkurunziza won re-election, the government placed restrictions on opposition party members’ freedom and arrested dozens of them. Some opposition leaders fled into exile. Opposition parties nevertheless continued to contest CNDD-FDD rule, surviving despite internal divisions, financial instability, and prosecution.⁵⁷

That very survival is now threatened by new party registration requirements. A series of laws passed in 2011 required all parties to register by March 10, 2012, but only 24 of 44 existing parties were able to do so successfully. Interior Minister Edouard Nduwimana extended the deadline until July 1, 2012 but warned that cases of non-compliance would be taken to the Supreme Court. Opposition parties argue the laws make it nearly impossible for current opposition parties to register.⁵⁸ The legislation requires parties to have a large number of members, representative of all regions of the country. It prohibits the status of founding members from being transferred, requiring accounting for the first 100 founding members (a difficult requirement for parties whose founders have been killed or exiled). The law gives government increased oversight over internal organization of parties,⁵⁹ and bans certain alliances, virtually outlawing coalition organizations such as the Alliance for Democratic Change, which emerged during the 2010 election campaign, during non-election periods.⁶⁰ Political tensions could escalate as the July 1 deadline approaches.

Strikes and Corruption Contribute to Instability

Concerns about political killings, repression, and the party registration deadline are augmented by recent strikes and rampant corruption. The Confederation of Trade Unions successfully shut down public offices and shops during a strike on March 27, 2012. The strike demonstrated Burundians' ability to effectively organize.⁶¹

In October 2011, Transparency International again ranked Burundi the most corrupt nation in East Africa. Corruption not only has damaged Burundi's relationship with donors and reduced its appeal to foreigners, it also undermines the credibility of post-conflict institutions, increases tension between the former Tutsi and new Hutu elites, and fuels political and social resentment. When the CNDD-FDD came to power in 2005, it promised to transfer power from the Tutsi to the Hutu and to improve governance. Instead, subsequent corruption scandals involving CNDD-FDD state officials suffocated hopes of effective state structures and equitable wealth distribution, fueled discontent, and intensified ethnic and socioeconomic cleavages.⁶² Economic tensions coupled with political persecution could spiral into pervasive violence.

ALERTS

Martha Karua: Kenya's "Iron Lady"

Researchers: Dr. Eliza Johannes and Ms. Ivana Djak

Martha Karua is a Kenyan politician who serves as the Member of Parliament (MP) from Gichugu, the Chairman of the Narc-Kenya political coalition, and an advocate in the High Court of Kenya.⁶³ Karua began her political career at the local level. Upon graduating from the University of Nairobi in 1980, she joined the Kenyan public service and worked as a District Magistrate until 1987. During the 1990s, Karua was a member of the opposition political movement that successfully demanded the reintroduction of multi-party democracy in Kenya. She joined the Democratic Party of Kenya (DP) in 1992 and was elected the Gichugu MP as a member of the DP the same year.

She was a founding member of the Narc-Kenya political coalition that won the 2003 general election, ending the KANU party's four-decade domination of Kenyan politics. From 2003 to 2005, she served as the Minister of Water Resources Management and Development. Following the violent December 2007 election, she was appointed Justice and Constitutional Affairs Minister in January 2008. She served as Minister until her April 2009 resignation over frustrations in fulfilling her obligations. Her resignation was a break with President Mwai Kibaki, whom she now frequently criticizes. Upon being appointed the national chairperson of Narc-Kenya, she declared she would run for president in 2012.⁶⁴ In addition to receiving numerous national and international awards for human rights advocacy, Karua served as a council member of the Law Society of Kenya, the Kenyan Federation of Women Lawyers, and chairperson of the Kenyan League of Women Voters.⁶⁵

Karua is nicknamed the "Iron Lady of Kenya" because she is widely recognized, even by her opponents, for her discipline and integrity.⁶⁶ While respected, she is also a polarizing figure. One *Daily Nation* opinion piece explains:

To her supporters and reluctant admirers, she is the iron lady – fearless, bold, and plain spoken. To her detractors, she is a feminazi – a fire-eating feminist who chews men and spits them out. To former President Daniel arap Moi, she was perhaps the devil incarnate. To some wealthy snobs, she is the peasant from Gichugu, uncouth and unrefined. Some Kenyans may think of her as a Kikuyu chauvinist. But a large majority regards her as a tenacious, principled, and unbending champion of reform. She is Martha Karua. The civil society doyen turned politician.⁶⁷

Karua, a constant presence in the Kenyan media, persistently criticizes practices and events she perceives as undemocratic. Her most recent critique of President Kibaki came on May 15, 2012, when she asked him to revoke appointments of County Commissioners to make the hiring open and competitive and thereby more democratic.⁶⁸ Karua is particularly vocal about the



<http://www.kenyanmagazines.com/martha-karua-kenya-woman-presidential/>

Executive's failure in initiating civic education courses to enable Kenyans to understand the new constitution. She blames the lack of civic education for electoral violence and the emergence of secession groups such as the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC).⁶⁹ Her commentary can be expected on all matters. Following the helicopter crash that killed Internal Security Minister George Saitoti in early June 2012, Karua was among MPs who questioned how the investigation would be run, warning the executive not to interfere with the work of the legislature.⁷⁰

Karua has campaigned heavily for the past few months. She expressed confidence in her electoral viability, stating she plans to win by more than a 60 percent margin. She denies she is being recruited as Prime Minister Raila Odinga's running-mate as rumors swirl about which candidates are seeking her support.⁷¹ Several political commentators have dismissed her candidacy, arguing the campaign will likely be a two-man race between Odinga and another viable opponent such as Uhuru Kenyatta. These commentators claim Karua is running to communicate her message of justice to the Kenyan people.⁷²

There are several factors working to her advantage as a presidential contender. Karua is popular in the diaspora, frequently having addressed Kenyan communities in the U.S. and other nations. The approximately 3 million strong Diaspora vote would constitute 15 percent of the total vote, giving it the ability to tilt the scales in a contested election.⁷³ Karua has also campaigned heavily in the Rift Valley, which will be one of the key battle grounds during the upcoming elections. The candidates currently most popular in the Rift Valley are Uhuru Kenyatta, Karua, and Gatanga's Peter Kenneth, who were all staunch Kibaki supporters in the last election. Local leaders believe Uhuru Kenyatta has the most influence in the Rift Valley, but are watching Karua closely because they believe she "leads when it comes to having the right ideas and policies that take the country to greater levels."⁷⁴ Karua is also the most technologically savvy candidate in that she frequently uses Twitter and Facebook to communicate with supporters. She recently held Kenya's first Twitter press conference.⁷⁵ Her track record indicates that she has succeeded in standing up to Kenyatta before – she was "roaring in Uhuru Kenyatta's backyard" when her chosen candidates won 2010 elections in Juja and Makadara, counties in which Kenyatta should have more influence.⁷⁶

As Kenyans brace for elections, which after much contention over the date have been scheduled for March 2013, Martha Karua's role in shaping the campaigns and electoral discourse is important to observe because she could have a stabilizing but also dynamic impact. Karua has said of her mission:

I am here to challenge the status quo, dynasties, those who think leadership in this country is for a certain club ... I am here to challenge that and unless in society people do that, be it in business, education, politics, we will be a stagnant society.⁷⁷


Côte d'Ivoire: Cross-Border Attacks Continue, Child Soldiers Suspected

Researcher: Ms. Ashton Callahan

Since the capture of ex-Ivorian president Laurent Gbagbo in April 2011, his loyalists have been perpetuating attacks against the civilian population in villages along the Liberian border. On June 8, 2012, 16 were killed in an ambush by suspected pro-Gbagbo militants in Para village, Tai region of Côte d'Ivoire. Seven of the casualties were UN peacekeepers who had been patrolling the area following rumors of an "imminent attack" near Tai. This was the deadliest attack on a UN force since its deployment to Côte d'Ivoire in 2004. According to a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, 40 people have been killed and thousands displaced since July 2011 in cross-border attacks attributed to Gbagbo loyalists and suspected child soldiers.⁷⁸

Timeline, June 2011 – Present

- **July 18, 2011:** Ponan, Côte d'Ivoire: eight killed by local youths that supported Gbagbo during the election.⁷⁹
- **September 15, 2011:** Zriglo and Nigre, Côte d'Ivoire: 23 killed by suspected Ivorian youth who served as pro-Gbagbo militiamen during the post-election conflict.⁸⁰
- **February 20, 2012:** Konankro, Côte d'Ivoire: six killed.⁸¹
- **April 24, 2012:** Sakre, Côte d'Ivoire: eight killed.⁸²
- **June 8, 2012:** Para, Nigre, and Saho, Côte d'Ivoire: 16 killed by 50 attackers based in Liberia.
- **June 12, 2012:** Gohouin, Côte d'Ivoire: 14 killed by militias supported by Liberian mercenaries.⁸³



Source: Original map from WFP with modifications by IDA

The HRW report states that training camps are operating in the Liberian county of Grand Gedeh and that children are being recruited to fight, but noted "the scale of child recruitment was unclear."⁸⁴ Although this is the first specific mention of child soldiers, past media reporting has identified the perpetrators of attacks as "armed youth." According to local reports, Liberian mercenary Augustine Vleyee (aka "Bush Dog") is behind the recruitment and training of child soldiers.⁸⁵ Arms funding for the attacks is believed to be coming from Ghana (where a number of high-ranking Gbagbo supporters are residing in exile), Liberia, and Côte d'Ivoire (profits from gold mining).⁸⁶ In June and August 2011, Liberian security forces discovered two significant arms caches along the border with Côte d'Ivoire. In January 2012, Liberian security forces arrested 70 pro-Gbagbo militants and Liberian mercenaries involved in training and recruiting fighters.

Following the most recent attack, the Liberian government announced the immediate closure of its 435-mile border with Côte d'Ivoire; deployed soldiers, additional police, and immigration personnel; suspended mineral mining operations along the border; and relocated several refugee camps.⁸⁷ The June attack coincides with the discovery of an alleged coup plot against the Ivorian President Ouattara by Gbagbo loyalists in Ghana.⁸⁸ There is no evidence, however, that the alleged coup plot and the recent attack on civilians were directly connected.⁸⁹

Togo: Protests over Electoral Reform

Researcher: Ms. Ashton Callahan

HALTE À LA FORFAITURE !



Source: liberte-togo.com

The *Collectif «Sauvons Le Togo»* (Collective “Let’s Save Togo” [CST]), a coalition of six opposition parties, nine civil society organizations, and several thousand opposition supporters, began a three-day protest in Lome on June 12, 2012. The movement has gained traction since its formation on April 5⁹⁰ through the use of social media, specifically via the #OccupyLome feed on Twitter.⁹¹ The first protest on May 24 was triggered by a unilateral adoption of new electoral code perceived to favor the ruling party, Rally of the Togolese People (RPT);⁹² the government’s rejection of a human rights report on torture; an increase in the number of deputies in the next legislature by 10 to 91; and redrawing the boundaries of constituencies.⁹³ Without a compromise between the government

and CST, protests and violence will likely continue.

During the June 12-14 protests, police arrested 56, including leader Me Zeus Ajavon, and 119 demonstrators were wounded in clashes with security forces.⁹⁴ Former prime minister and opposition figure, Agbeyome Kodjo, was also arrested on June 19, and briefly detained for questioning regarding the violence and vandalism committed during the protest.⁹⁵



Source: mondoblo.org via twitter post

CST said they will continue demonstrating until President Faure Gnassingbe agrees to hold talks on the electoral code and proposed electoral reforms, particularly the return to Togo’s 1992 constitution, which limited the president to two terms.⁹⁶ Following the protests, the territorial administration minister, Pascal Bodjona, said dialogue is possible. “The fact that past dialogues have not succeeded does not mean that future ones will not succeed.”⁹⁷

Political protest and violence in Togo have existed since the country’s adoption of multiparty politics. In 2005, the most intense political violence occurred when the parliament named Gnassingbe president after the death of his father, Gnassingbe Eyadema. ECOWAS forced Gnassingbe to step down and contest the presidential election. The violence continued, however, resulting in 800 deaths. The unrest led to a Government of National Unity, which resulted in relatively peaceful legislative elections in 2007. Political violence, however, returned following the 2010 presidential elections when Jean-Pierre Fabre, presidential candidate representing the *Front Republicaine pour l’Alternance et Changement* (FRAC), staged weekly demonstrations protesting Gnassingbe’s re-election, which Fabre claimed was fraudulent.

The next legislative elections are slated for October 2012, although no official date has been announced by the government. The latest demonstrations differ from the past in their level of organization and consistency. Given the past incidents of electoral violence, it is likely that protests and additional violence will occur if the government does not address the grievances of CST and opposition supporters.

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