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Medical Requirements and Deployments

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
Brandon Gould
2013 WEAI Conference

- **Introduction**
- Total Medical Requirements and Lessons Learned
- Military Essentiality of Medical Requirements
- Specialty Mix of Medical Force
- Conclusion

IDA | Motivation: Medical Cost Growth

- Budget pressure is increasing and medical costs are one of the largest (and fastest growing) components of the defense budget.
- Controlling medical costs (level and growth) requires addressing causes:
 - Demand, e.g., benefit design and total force mix decisions.
 - Supply, e.g., the efficiency with which care is delivered.
- Total medical force management is an element of improving the efficiency of care delivery.

Unified Medical Program Budget



Source: TRICARE Evaluation Reports (multiple years)


IDA | Background: The FY 2011 Medical Force

| Service | Active Duty End Strength | Guard/Reserve End Strength | Civilian End Strength | Mil. + Civ. Medical Force |
|----------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Army | 52,400 | 48,715 | 27,228 | 128,343 |
| Navy | 34,886 | 11,713 | 7,444 | 54,043 |
| Air Force | 31,894 | 19,064 | 3,981 | 54,939 |
| Total | 119,180 | 79,492 | 38,653 | 237,325 |

- Military medical force composed of active, Guard, reserves, civilians, and contractors (contractors not included in table).
- Manpower mix should depend on the mission the manpower performs:
 - Military Essential: Defined in DoD Instruction 1100.22 §4(f).
 - Inherently Governmental, Non-Military Essential: Defined by FAIR Act and Inherently Governmental/Commercial Activity inventory.
 - Commercial Activity: Not inherently governmental, subject to public-private competitive sourcing.


IDA | Introduction: Military Medical Personnel in the Total Force

Active Duty O4-O6 End Strength



■ Medical End Strength ■ Non-Medical End Strength

Army Average Full Manpower Costs by Corps



Full cost of medical manpower excludes Transients, Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees, which would increase divergence from civilian manpower

- Military medical personnel constitute a large and costly portion of the total force
 - Military personnel are generally more expensive than civilian personnel
 - Military officers in some corps consume Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA)-constrained end strength
- Requirements for some medical capabilities are generated separately from line requirements

IDA | Dual Missions of the Military Health System

OPERATIONAL MISSION

BENEFICIARY MISSION

Organic Medical Capability




In-Theater Hospitals



Military Medical Personnel w/ Dual Assignments

Military Treatment Facilities



Purchased Private Care

Trauma Surgery...Anesthesiology ← Demand for Specialties → Pediatrics...Obstetrics

IDA | Military Medical Manpower Issues


- Changes in warfighting and medicine have influenced the practice of military medicine. Are these changes reflected in medical requirements?
- Independent studies have estimated military essential requirements below Service-reported requirements. Is the medical force aligned with and utilized according to military essentiality guidance?
- The medical force has total force mix challenges. Service reported data during Iraq/Afghanistan show mismatch between active duty forces and requirements. Do these imbalances persist in today's medical force?

Medical Specialty Imbalances

| | Readiness Requirement | FY 2004 End Strength | EndStr - Req. |
|-----------------|-----------------------|----------------------|---------------|
| Pediatrics | 286 | 645 | 359 |
| Obstetrics | 208 | 387 | 179 |
| Anesthesiology | 318 | 259 | -59 |
| General Surgery | 685 | 443 | -242 |

Note: FY04 requirement for fully trained providers. Total requirements, including training, transients, prisoners, etc., were Pediatrics 484, Obstetrics 351, Anesthesiology 444, and General Surgery 947.

Total Medical Requirements



2006 data from the Medical Readiness Review
2004 data from Service medical sizing models

- Medical Requirements Data
 - Service-reported sizing model estimates from 2004 and 2011/12
 - Medical Readiness Review (MRR) requirement estimates from 2006
 - Medical end strength for 2001–2011 from Defense Manpower Data Center's (DMDC) Health Manpower Personnel Data System (HMPDS)
- Individual deployments to named contingencies from DMDC's Contingency Tracking System (CTS) (2001-12)
- Interviews with Service representatives on lessons learned during Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF).

- Introduction
- **Total Medical Requirements and Lessons Learned**
- Military Essentiality of Medical Requirements
- Specialty Mix of Medical Force
- Conclusion

- Warfighting and medical practice have changed.
 - Decentralized, mobile battlefield drives a smaller medical footprint with more rapid evacuation of casualties.
 - The range of care delivered in theater is reduced and medicine is more specialized.
- This has implications for medical force requirements.
 - Total requirement goes down as less care is performed in theater.
 - Specialty substitution opportunities decline as medical platforms become smaller with less redundancy – potentially increasing requirements for some specific specialties.
- Changes in the requirements and end strength data are consistent with these implications.
 - Systematic decline in underages across all Services.
 - Increase in Army requirements for deployable medical enlisted personnel in line units.
 - Decrease in Army requirements for deployable medical officers.
 - Navy transitioning away from general physicians to an all-specialist force.
 - Large requirements decreases in general physicians/nurses for Army and Air Force (other than aviation medicine).

IDA | Total Medical Requirements 2004 and 2011

| Service | 2004 Req. | 2011/12 Req. | % Change | 2004 End Strength | 2011 End Strength | % Change |
|----------------|------------------|---------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|
| Air Force | 30,802 | 25,175 | -18% | 34,756 | 31,894 | -8.2% |
| Army | 44,004 | 50,068 | +14% | 46,679 | 52,400 | +12% |
| Navy | 32,169 | 41,342 | +29% | 36,997 | 34,886 | -5.7% |
| Total | 106,975 | 116,585 | +9% | 118,432 | 119,180 | +0.6% |

- Air Force requirements and end strength decline, consistent with expectations.
- Army requirements grow, primarily due to two factors:
 - Increased deployable enlisted requirements (~4,000).
 - Increased non-deployable officer requirements (~3,000).
 - Army determines deployable medical requirements with line requirements in the Total Army Analysis process.
 - Non-deployable requirements are determined separately.
- Navy's substantial requirements increase is the outlier.

- Introduction
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IDA | Military Essentiality – Introduction

- DoD Instruction (DoDI) 1100.22 requires a military billet be justified by:
 - Military-unique knowledge or skills
 - Statutory, executive order, or treaty requirement
 - Command and control, risk mitigation, or esprit de corps duties
 - Wartime assignment, rotation base, or career development demands
 - Unusual working conditions or costs not conducive to civilian employment
- All other manpower shall be designated civilian if inherently governmental/critical, or, if not, least-cost civilian or contractor performance

IDA | Elements of the Military Medical Requirement

- **Wartime Requirement**

- Deployable Medical Requirement
- Casualty Reception, R&D, Command & Control, etc.

- **Day-to-Day Requirement**

- Outside Continental US Military Treatment Facilities
- Isolated Continental US Military Treatment Facilities
- Medical Staff Billets

- **Sustainment Requirement**

- Graduate Medical Education Students and Trainers
- Transients, Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees


2004 Service-Estimated Requirements

| Service | Air Force | Army | Navy |
|--------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Wartime Requirement | 15,959 | 28,456 | 22,494 |
| Day-to-Day Requirement | 13,639 | 6,720 | 19,602 |
| Sustainment Requirement | 4,044 | 8,828 | 3,404 |
| Total Requirement | 30,610 | 44,004 | 31,169 |

How well do the elements of the medical requirement align with the military essentiality criteria?


- Deployments of medical personnel serve as a proxy for utilization of the medical force.
 - What fraction of the medical force deploys in support of contingencies?
 - How frequently are medical personnel deployed?
 - How long are medical deployments?
 - Where do medical personnel deploy to?
- Comparison of medical deployments to deployments of non-medical personnel, specialties, and corps provides insight on the military essentiality of medical force elements.

Army Specialties




■ Medical ■ Non-Medical

Air Force Specialties




■ Medical ■ Non-Medical

Navy Specialties




■ Medical ■ Non-Medical

- Medical specialties have fewer deployments per year than non-medical specialties.
 - Divergence between Army medical and non-medical specialties is greater than other Services, driven by higher non-medical deployment rates in the Army than in other Services.
 - Medical deployment rates are similar across the Services.




- Medical corps are among the least-deploying corps in the Army.

IDA | Air Force Medical Deployments Compared to Other Groups




- Medical corps are among the least-deploying corps in the Air Force.




- Medical corps are among the least-deploying corps in the Navy.

Number of Deployments for Army Personnel




Number of Deployments for Navy Personnel



Adding Marines to Navy does not significantly alter distribution


- Medical personnel are significantly less likely to experience deployment than non-medical personnel
- Medical personnel are less likely to experience repeat deployments than non-medical personnel
 - Misalignment of specialty requirements and end strength likely has not caused force stress

Number of Deployments for Air Force Personnel




IDA | Average Deployment Length by Service


Army Average Deployment Length



Navy Average Deployment Length




Air Force Average Deployment Length




- Army medical and non-medical deployments are similar in length and longer than the other Services
- Air Force personnel have the shortest deployment lengths; medical deployments are slightly longer
 - Is joint sourcing an explanation?
- Navy medical deployments are longer than non-medical
 - This difference diminishes when including Marine Corps deployments


Army CTS Deployments by Country



Navy CTS Deployments by Country



Air Force CTS Deployments by Country



- Army medical deployment locations mirror non-medical deployment locations
- Iraq/Afghanistan provide a greater share of Air Force and Navy medical deployments than non-medical deployments
 - Air Force medical locations provide evidence of joint sourcing (e.g., Balad, Bagram)
 - Joint sourcing and medical deployments for Marines deployments explain Navy locations

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IDA | Active Duty Specialty Underages (2004/11)

- Services report fewer underages against operational requirements.
 - In general, requirements have decreased for wartime specialties and end strength for these same specialties has increased.

| Service | Total Specialties 2004/2011 | Underage* Specialties 2004 | Underage* Specialties 2011 | Personnel* Shortfall 2004 | Personnel* Shortfall 2011 |
|-----------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| Army | 90/93 | 21 | 41 | 3,720 | 3,661 |
| Navy | 92/91 | 16 | 25 | 1,601 | 4,404 |
| Air Force | 91/92 | 24 | 15 | 3,762 | 1,905 |

* Underage defined as end strength greater than 20% below requirement.

- Army underages decreased 1.6% due to two offsetting trends.
 - Large decrease in deployable requirements for 2004 underage specialties.
 - Large increase in non-deployable requirements for new 2011 underage specialties.
- Navy increased end strength in 2004 underage specialties (+15%) despite overall end strength decreases. Requirements for 2012 underages have grown by 64% over 2004.
- Air Force underages cut in half due to large increases in underage specialty end strength (+222%) despite overall end strength decreases.

IDA | Causes and Consequences of Specialty Underages

- Underages have been reduced from FY04 to FY11.
 - Deployable requirements are now generally fully covered.
 - Consistent with OEF/OIF lessons learned, underages concentrated in generalist or substitutable specialties.
 - Low deployment levels suggest that underages caused minimal force stress during OIF and OEF.
 - Through substitution, recruitment, and skill maintenance partnerships with civilian facilities, the Services appear to be managing their underages.
- Two causes of underages were identified by the Services:
 - Insufficient beneficiary care workload to support the required personnel was the main cause of underages identified.
 - A secondary factor cited was challenges to recruit/retain wartime specialties.

IDA | Active Duty Specialty Overages 2004/11

- Services continue to report overages against many specialties.
 - Overages are generally seen in beneficiary care specialties with little to no wartime requirement and are larger than can be explained by substitutions.

| Service | Total Specialties 2004/2011 | Overage* Specialties 2004 | Overage* Specialties 2011 | Personnel* Excess 2004 | Personnel* Excess 2011 |
|-----------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Army | 90/93 | 40 | 11 | 4,594 | 1,130 |
| Navy | 92/91 | 38 | 24 | 3,512 | 853 |
| Air Force | 91/92 | 45 | 53 | 4,284 | 7,080 |

* Overage defined as end strength greater than 20% above requirement.

- Army overages go down, but that is driven by large (70%) increases in non-deployable requirements and small (17%) end strength declines.
- Navy has decreased end strength in 2004 overage specialties by 27% and increased requirements by 18%.
- Air Force increase in overages driven by both reduction in requirements and increases in end strength in specialties becoming overage specialties in 2011.

IDA | Causes and Consequences of Specialty Overages

- Overages remain a consistent problem with the medical force.
- A cause discussed in Service meetings is the lack of visibility into full cost of military personnel in total force decisions in beneficiary care mission.
 - Local commanders and Military Departments only bear a fraction of the cost of military personnel, but bear most of the cost of civilians and contractors.
- Two additional factors discussed with the Services include:
 - Constraints on the ability to manage the force such as:
 - Legislative restrictions, e.g., conversion ban and mental health requirements.
 - Policy restrictions, e.g., civilian personnel cap.
 - Service choices in provision of beneficiary care, e.g., Air Force “blue-on-blue.”

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
IDA | Conclusion on Military Medical Requirements

- Military medical requirements have partially incorporated lessons from OEF/OIF.
 - Deployable requirements have fallen.
 - Specialization has increased.
 - Navy medicine is a significant outlier.
- Specialty mix is more aligned with operational requirements but significant overages remain.
- Large portions of medical requirements may not be military essential.
 - Deployment levels uniformly low compared to other occupations.
 - Some elements of the medical requirement may not be consistent with military essentiality guidance.
 - Line participation in medical requirement generation may help to align the medical force with its military essential operational mission.


BACKUP

IDA | Explanations for Medical Deployment Levels


- **Uniformly low deployment rates may be explained by:**
 - Joint sourcing and substitution smoothing deployment levels across high and low deploying specialties and services.
 - Insufficient workload during deployments to maintain clinical skills constrains rotation of medical personnel.
 - Negative recruitment and retention consequences from deployment may discourage greater utilization of medical assets.
- **Large elements of medical requirements are not deployable**



- Medical corps are among the least-deploying corps in the Army.



- Medical corps are among the least-deploying corps in the Air Force.



- Medical corps are among the least-deploying corps in the Navy.

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