



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

Looking Ahead to Ghana's 2012 General Elections

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Summary

- On December 7, 2012, Ghana is scheduled to hold its sixth elections since the return to democracy in 1992. It is considered one of the few countries in Africa where democracy is consolidating, evidenced by its continually improving scores on political rights and civil liberties.
- Yet, despite positive and constantly improving democratic indicators, Ghana has regularly witnessed electoral violence. While the incidents of electoral violence have not risen to levels that threaten the stability of the state, they do point to worrisome institutional weaknesses, poor political party development, and politicization of the security sector.
- So far in 2012, a number of instances of election-related violence have been documented. Most of these incidents took place during the biometric voter registration process, involving clashes between political party supporters, disruption of political rallies, and assaults on politicians.
- Additionally concerning, political parties are sending mixed messages about the use of violence during the elections and politicians are using the media to insult opponents and put forth unsubstantiated allegations, all of which could lead to tension and possibly violence in the lead-up to the elections. The security sector has become politicized; for example, a leaked tape revealed a plan by the ruling National Democratic Congress to infiltrate the Bureau of National Intelligence with its own private security personnel.
- Politicians have been largely to blame for creating a tense pre-election environment, but without sanctions on their behavior and utterances to the media, they have little incentive to change course. Civil society and the National Commission for Civic Education have put forth strategies to reduce the escalation of violence and tension, which could blunt some of the effect that the incidence of electoral violence has overall, if those strategies are well organized and widely disseminated.



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

**GLOBAL COVERAGE ANALYSES PROGRAM – AFRICA
ELECTIONS, REGIME SUCCESSION, AND GOVERNANCE**



**TRENDS IN DEMOCRATIZATION AND
ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN AFRICA**

LOOKING AHEAD TO GHANA'S 2012 GENERAL ELECTIONS

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Looking Ahead to Ghana's 2012 General Elections

Snapshot of Ghanaian Politics and Political Violence

Even though eight political parties are registered for the 2012 polls, Ghana is dominated by two: the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the opposition National Patriotic Party (NPP). On December 7, 2012, the NDC's John Mahama (the incumbent) will face his major challenge from the NPP's Nana Akufo-Addo. While Akufo-Addo lost the 2008 presidential elections by 40,586 votes, he won in only three regions: Ashanti, Eastern and Brong-Ahafo. Figure 1 shows the regions supporting the NDC and the NPP presidential candidates in the 2008 run-off election. The regional cleavages belie strictly ethnic dimensions to political party support in Ghana.

Percent of support in regions won by Nana Akufo-Addo (NPP) and John Atta-Mills (NDC) candidates in the 2008 Presidential Run-off election (December 28)



Figure 1. 2008 Presidential Run-Off Election Results by Region

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana (<http://www.ec.gov.gh/page.php?page=395§ion=51&typ=1>)

After the intense post-election violence that took place in Kenya and Zimbabwe in the first half of 2008, the December 2008 elections in Ghana were seen as Africa's best

hope in affirming the progress of democratization. In comparison to Kenya and Zimbabwe, the Ghanaian elections were peaceful and uncontroversial: there was no large-scale violence that threatened the stability of the state; political power was passed from one party to another in a timely fashion, without any constitutional crisis or need for international mediation; and the international community hailed Ghana as a beacon of democracy.

And yet, there was a great deal of tension in Ghana's 2008 elections – in particular after the December 28 run-off election. Private discussions with civil society activists on the ground revealed real fear that there would be a constitutional succession crisis and that violence might escalate.¹ The NPP, sensing that it was on the verge of losing the election, sought to get the High Court to stop the Electoral Commission (EC) from releasing the final results; the NDC leadership, charging the EC was not impartial, urged its supporters to march to the EC's headquarters with machetes (which they did); and there was a sudden flurry of revised results coming from NPP strongholds, which only inflamed passions and charges of an election about to be stolen. Adding to the tension, Ghana's constitution mandates that the inauguration of a new president should take place on January 7; there were fears that the succession could not take place on time.

The important part of the story is why the existing violence did not threaten the integrity of the state: what countervailing measures were taken to defuse violence? In the end, robust engagement by civil society leaders, the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE), respected community and national leaders, the perceived independence of the Electoral Commission, and fresh memories of the post-election violence in Kenya and Zimbabwe succeeded in preventing electoral violence from escalating. Outgoing President John A. Kufuor also insisted that his party (the NPP) concede to the NDC – ending the uncertainty surrounding the handover on January 7.²

Predicting Electoral Violence

In electoral violence, the past is often prologue. Thus, more specific predictors of electoral violence, how it will affect the election, and whether it will escalate lie in a country's history. This is due to the tendency of political leaders to exploit pre-existing and unresolved grievances for political gain. For example, chieftaincy, land disputes, and Ghana's northern regions are regular factors fueling clashes between political party supporters during election years.

Ghana adopted multiparty elections in 1992, after decades of military and authoritarian rule. Each of the elections since then, including the first one, has included incidents of electoral violence. These incidents range from bomb explosions following the 1992 presidential election results to clashes between political party operatives. Voters have also experienced intimidation by political-party-hired thugs. Usually, violence has preceded the election, but in 1992 and in the 2008 run-off election, the

violence took place after the results had been announced. Appendix 1 contains a summary of the violence in each of Ghana's five elections.

The data tell us that, although violence is a regular feature in Ghana's election, it does not rise to the level where it threatens the state. Why? Documentation is scanty, but in 2004 and 2008, there was close monitoring of electoral violence in a bid to adopt strategies to stem its escalation. In each case, the security personnel, along with NDC and NPP political party operatives, worked together to defuse tension and effectively reduced the incidence of electoral violence. There was also a reliance on intervention by respected community leaders to defuse tension.³ This holds insights to what can be expected during Ghana's upcoming elections.

Current Incidents of Electoral Violence

Thus far, there have been several incidents of election-related violence in various parts of the country. A significant level of violence was recorded during the March to May biometric registration process.⁴ More recent data show rising levels of indecent language on the airways and an increasingly politicized security sector – which are creating a tense electoral environment. Keys to defusing tension are the strength of conflict-mitigating measures being adopted by civil society, the government, and security services.

Biometric Voters Registration: The Case of Ododiodio Constituency

The biometric voter registration (BVR), which took place from March to May 2012, was meant to reduce the potential for voter fraud and clean up the voters registry by issuing voter registration cards that contained a voter's picture and thumbprint. The process was fraught with confusion, tension, and violence in some instances. Political party supporters in some polling centers harassed voters who they claimed did not meet the residency requirements; some political party operatives were suspected of pushing through voters who did not meet the age requirements; other centers experienced intimidation and harassment by political party operatives who alleged that registration was taking place illegally or being used to rig the election.

Perhaps the most violent BVR exercise occurred in the Greater Accra constituency of Ododiodio. An analysis of the actions by politicians, political party supporters, and Ghanaian institutions highlights serious weaknesses in preventing politicians from urging their supporters to use violence, the capacity of the state to punish electoral offenses, and the high probability of violent clashes between political party supporters in the upcoming December polls.

The BVR process in Ododiodio, an NDC-represented constituency, was marked by three significant incidences of violence: clashes between NPP and NDC supporters

over an NPP meeting; claims between NDC and NPP supporters over whether the NPP was registering legal residents of the constituency; and, in its most serious case, the assault of an aspiring NPP parliamentary candidate of the Ablekuma South constituency (also in Greater Accra), Ursula Owusu, and Abu Jinapor, an aide to the NPP presidential candidate, Nana Akufo-Addo. The assault on Ms. Owusu was justified by Odododiodio's MP, Nii Lantey Vanderpuye (NDC) who said that she was insulting the indigenous Ga people who lived in the constituency. The NDC also claimed that Ms. Owusu had no business in Odododiodio since she was not contesting the parliamentary seat there (the NPP candidate for Odododiodio is Victor Okaikoi). Following the assault, police were summoned to the registration center, but, to date, there has been no arrest or investigation in the assault of Ms. Owusu and Mr. Jinapor.⁵ A meeting between Vanderpuye, the current MP, and Okaikoi, the NPP candidate for the parliamentary seat, seemed to defuse tensions. But constituents claimed that they were still being harassed.⁶


There were national consequences to the violence at Odododiodio. Kennedy Agyapong (NPP), MP for Assin North in the Central Region, lamented the failure of police to protect citizens and warned of violent repercussions for the incidents at Odododiodio.⁷ He allegedly declared war and vowed to lynch any fake security operatives. Agyapong was charged with treason and arrested. Mr. Agyapong's arrest triggered riots in the Ashanti region, an NPP stronghold.⁸

Media Monitoring

Moderating the media is of particular concern in many of Africa's elections because they are often unregulated and politicized, and have played critical roles in inciting violence. Salient examples of the key role played by the media in inciting violence include Radio Milles Collines in Rwanda's genocide and community radios in Kenya's 2007/2008 post-election violence. In a bid to monitor Ghana's media in the lead-up to the elections and promote peace, the Media Foundation of West Africa (MFWA), based in Accra, launched the project on *Promoting Issues-based and Decent Language Campaigning for a Peaceful, Free and Fair Elections [sic] in Ghana in 2012*. The MFWA is funded by Star-Ghana, which is in turn funded by the UK's Department for International Development; Denmark's development agency, DANIDA; the European Union; and the U.S. Agency for International Development.⁹


Since April, MFWA has regularly released reports detailing which political parties or groups used indecent language, which radio stations aired such language, and the politicians who made the offensive remarks. Of the 203 indecent expressions recorded, the main opposition party, the NPP, leads with 91 (45 percent) indecent expressions. The ruling NDC follows with 61 (30 percent). Figure 2 shows the number of indecent remarks attributed to political parties from April to October 2012.

Figure 2. Ghana: Number of Indecent Remarks by Political Party Representative, April – October 2010



The MFWA groups indecent remarks into eight categories: insulting/offensive, unsubstantiated allegations, provocative/inflammatory, divisive comments, violent comments, gender-specific comments, innuendo, and tribal slur/prejudice. Figure 3 shows that, of the 203 comments documented, most were insulting/offensive (80, or 39 percent), followed by unsubstantiated (65, or 32 percent), and then provocative (34, or 17 percent). Notably, only one comment has been categorized as being a tribal slur or prejudice – indicating that inciting ethnic hatred is not a popular strategy in Ghana at this time (even though President John Mahama, who hails from Northern Ghana recently extolled his co-ethnics that it was time for a Northerner to be president).¹⁰ It also underscores the findings in several studies that Ghanaian voters do not necessarily vote on ethnicity alone. Nonetheless, political parties do carry ethnic voting blocks, and appeals to specific groups were used in the 2008 run-off election.¹¹


Figure 3. Ghana: Types of Indecent Expressions on the Radio, April – October 2012 Radio



Source: Media Foundation of West Africa

Equally important, the MFWA documents the radio stations on which these expressions are made (see Figure 4). The data show that the radio stations with the most indecent expressions (six out of eight cited) are affiliated with either the NPP or the NDC.

Figure 4. Ghana: Percent Indecent Expressions, by Radio Station, April – October 2012



Oman FM, owned by Kennedy Agyapong, the NPP representative for Assin North in the Central Region is responsible for the most indecent expressions. Not surprisingly, Mr. Agyapong leads as the personality having received the most citations for indecent expressions. See Table 1. As noted above, Mr. Agyapong was arrested (and subsequently released) for his remarks following the violence during the BVR in Odododiodio.


Table 1. Indecent Expressions by Media Personality

Mr. Kennedy Agyapong, NPP	16
Mr. Ernest Owusu Bempah, NDP	13
Mr. David Osei, NPP	7
Mr. Ken Kuranchie, Editor Daily Searchlight Newspaper	7
Mr. Gideon Boako, NPP	4
Mr. Eric Bawah, NPP	3
Mr. Chris Dugan, NDC	3
Mr. Nii Kwartei Titus Glover, NPP	3
Mr. Kojo Owusu, NPP	3
Mr. Kobby Onassis, NDC	3

Source: Media Foundation of West Africa

Even with the well-publicized reports issued by the MFWA, the rate in indecent expressions has not abated (see Figure 5). The persistence of indecent expressions is likely due to the absence of sanctions imposed for such transgressions. To date, there have been no penalties imposed against either the radio stations or politicians – sending a message of impunity to the offenders and weakening the messages being delivered by civil society, highly respected community leaders, and even the President, that the elections must be peaceful, and language with the potential to incite violence will not be tolerated.

Figure 5. Ghana: Trends in Indecent Expressions over Radio, April 1 – October 13, 2012



Source: Media Foundation of West Africa. Note: The intervals of the MFWA reports represents the dates they were submitted.

Politicization of Security Personnel

In September 2012, a secret tape revealed a plan by the NDC National Organizer, Mr. Yaw Boateng Gyan, to train 100 security personnel who would infiltrate the Bureau of National Investigation (BNI). According to the tape, which Mr. Gyan did not deny, the BNI would announce a need for additional security personnel, at which point Mr. Gyan would present the NDC-trained security forces. These special forces would then monitor the work of the National Democratic Party (NDP), which split from the NDC earlier in 2012. Any violence, Mr. Gyan is heard saying, would be blamed on Nana Akufo-Addo's proclamation in 2009 that "All-die-be-die" – loosely translated as any death is acceptable. The NPP presidential candidate at the time explained his statement as not a call to violence, but a call to rally the troops. Nonetheless, "All-die-be-die" has been criticized as inciting violence.¹² With the NDC tape, it is evident that the expression has the potential to justify violence by various political parties.

The National Security Coordinator, Lt. Col. Larry Gbevlo Lartey, at first pledged to investigate the BNI infiltration plan. He was immediately criticized as not being independent, presumably because it is difficult to believe he would not have been party to Mr. Gyan's plan.¹³ So far, there has been no investigation into the tape and no consequences for Mr. Gyan. In similar fashion, Lt. Col. Lartey has also not investigated whether the NPP's National Youth Organizer, Anthony Karbo, is recruiting mercenaries for the elections, as alleged in another secretly recorded tape.

Conflict Mitigating Factors

The threats to peaceful elections outlined above – the use of political party organizations, the unregulated media, and the security breaches – have the potential to mar Ghana’s election with confusion, tension, and even violence. Their potential to do so should be measured against the actions being taken by civil society organizations, the National Commission for Civic Education, and the security services to help counter the impunity around using divisive language in the campaign and media and politicizing the security sector.

Civil Society Initiatives

The Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) is one of the leading civil society organizations working to ensure peaceful elections in Ghana. Among its efforts are its leadership in the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO); regular reporting of the electoral process and campaign; and the establishment of peace committees in Tamale and Yendi (Northern region), the site of many politicized chieftaincy and land disputes.¹⁴ Of these, CODEO is arguably the most visible effort to provide transparency and credibility to the voting process.

With respect to electoral violence specifically, CODEO is training observers to monitor 65 constituencies facing a high risk of violence (in addition to plans to deploy 4,000 election observers).¹⁵ Appendix 2 lists the at-risk constituencies. A similar effort in 2008 demonstrated that the presence of the monitors, coupled with the timely intervention by nongovernmental institutions, the state, and security services to reports of impending violence succeeded in progressively reducing the level of electoral violence.¹⁶ Thus, it is likely that CODEO’s program will help to defuse tension and prevent the escalation of conflict.

National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE)

The National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) is mandated by the 1993 Ghanaian constitution to serve as an independent body to promote understanding of the constitution, democratization, and the understanding of citizens’ rights and responsibilities.¹⁷ In the last several weeks, the NCCE has organized a number of workshops on voter education, educating communities on electoral violence, and organized inter-party dialogue committees to defuse political tension.¹⁸ The NCCE has established inter-party dialogue committees in a number of regions, including Ashanti, Greater Accra, and the Northern Region¹⁹ – areas of high levels of electoral violence in the past due to ethnic cleavages, chieftaincy and land disputes, and tight political races. The NCCE was an important partner to CODEO in 2008.

Security Services

The Ghana Police Service (GPS) has launched a campaign to assure the public that it is prepared to protect the citizenry during the election. Their campaign has singled out the use of “macho men” by political parties (heavily built men hired to intimidate the opposition’s supporters). In addition, the GPS has identified potential flashpoints and indicated their preparedness to attend to the communities’ security needs. The GPS have been provided with workshops and training courses to ensure that their interventions respect democratic norms and human rights, as well as succeed in reducing conflict.²⁰ These are promising efforts, but the ability of the GPS to ensure public safety and the security of the election is unproven.

Security, however, does not rest on the GPS alone; the National Election Security Task Force (NESTF) will play an important part in providing the security for the election – a role it has had since 2004. Led by the GPS, the NESTF will draw representatives from the armed forces; the prison, fire, and immigration services; the Ghana Revenue Authority’s Customs Division; the BNI; the National Security Secretariat; the Electoral Commission; and the Research Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²¹ The size of the NESTF has not been published yet, but in 2008, the NESTF numbered 36,000. In 2008, it was credited with helping to defuse tension before and after the elections.²²

Assessment

Clashes between NDC and the NPP supporters and political leaders have quieted down in recent weeks.²³ More prevalent is the use of the media to transmit intimidating language and the threats to undermine the security of the poll.

Still, Ghana’s electoral violence history suggests that there will be an increase in the number of incidents of violence leading up to the December 2012 elections. Based on its history, the violence will likely consist of clashes between political party supporters, harassment, and intimidation. Thus the persistence of inflammatory remarks by politicians at rallies and through the media, the impunity being enjoyed by the perpetrators, and the poor management of potential breaches in security are troubling.

Therefore, the onus on keeping the peace rests on civil society’s initiatives and the independence of national institutions. Certainly, at this time, there are encouraging signs that the violence will likely not escalate beyond what Ghana has experienced in the past. Moreover, the presidential candidates have all issued repeated calls for peaceful elections. As the election approaches, however, the effectiveness with which the CODEO electoral violence reports are treated by the security, media, and nongovernmental organizations will determine whether tension escalates or is defused. Similarly, transparent and independent actions by the Electoral Commission will be

critical in reducing the start of rumors and allegations of bias that can fuel existing regional cleavages and political divisions.

Appendix 1. Ghana's History with Electoral Violence, 1992 – 2008

Year	Description of violence																																	
1992	<p><i>Post-election violence:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Demonstrations to protest the election results, with riots in Kumasi, Ghana's second largest city;²⁴ and in Accra • Alleged damage to Rawlings' house by protesters²⁵ • Bombs in Accra and Tema detonated by the Alliance of Democratic Forces and the Forces Fighting Against Rawlings Dictatorship²⁶ • The burning to death of the ruling NDC chair of the Western region²⁷ 																																	
1996	<p><i>Pre-election violence:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clashes between youth members of the NDC and NPP • Harassment and intimidation of opposition supporters by the security services. • Anti-NDC violence in Kumasi: Emmanuel Yao Gruponi, a member of the NDC youth wing, was lynched days before the elections, the NDC office was set on fire, and a house was attacked.²⁸ 																																	
2000	<p><i>Pre-election violence:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State security services intimidated and harassed perceived supporters of the NPP. • Clashes between NDC and NPP militants in Accra. • NDC and NPP strongholds were declared 'no-go' areas for the other party. • The day before the second round and on election day, plain clothes and uniformed soldiers appeared at polling stations, intimidating the public. • Clashes between in the Northern region between the Mamprusis (NPP supporters) and Kusasis (NDC supporters) killed scores.²⁹ 																																	
2004	<p><i>Pre-election violence</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitoring of nine constituencies in the Northern, Upper East and Upper West constituencies record 27 incidents of violence, including the following:³⁰ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Physical injuries, property loss, loss of life(7) - Intra-NDC fighting (3) - Independent candidates clash (2) <p><i>Post-election violence: 23 incidents.</i>³¹</p>																																	
2008	<p><i>Pre-election violence</i></p> <p>CODEO's electoral violence observation missions reported 90 incidents of violence in the pre-election period (from October 5 – November 23). The number and types of incidents are in the table below:</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th><i>Type of incident</i></th> <th><i>Number</i></th> <th><i>Pct</i></th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Defacement of posters</td> <td>43</td> <td>47.8%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Physical Harm</td> <td>13</td> <td>14.4%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Group clash</td> <td>9</td> <td>10.0%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Verbal Harassment</td> <td>7</td> <td>7.8%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Intimidation</td> <td>4</td> <td>4.4%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Threat of violence</td> <td>4</td> <td>4.4%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Disruption of Rallies</td> <td>4</td> <td>4.4%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Rumors and allegations</td> <td>4</td> <td>4.4%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Property damage</td> <td>2</td> <td>2.2%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total</td> <td>90</td> <td>100.0%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	<i>Type of incident</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Pct</i>	Defacement of posters	43	47.8%	Physical Harm	13	14.4%	Group clash	9	10.0%	Verbal Harassment	7	7.8%	Intimidation	4	4.4%	Threat of violence	4	4.4%	Disruption of Rallies	4	4.4%	Rumors and allegations	4	4.4%	Property damage	2	2.2%	Total	90	100.0%
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Total	90	100.0%																																

Appendix 2. Ghana 2012: Constituencies Selected for Electoral Violence Monitoring by CODEO

Ashanti Region
Ahafo -Ano South
Amansie West
Asante Akim South
Asawase
Asokwa
Bekwai
Offinso North (Akomadan)
Oforikrom
Suame
Brong-Ahafo Region
Asunafo North
Asunafo South
Brekum
Sene
Sunyani West
Tain
Techiman North (Tanoboase/ Tuobodom)
Techiman South
Wenchi
Central Region
Cape Coast
Effutu
Eastern Region
Afram Plains North
Afram Plains South
Asuogyaman
Atiwa
Lower Manya Krobo
Greater Accra Region
Ablekuma Central (Abossey Okai)
Ablekuma North
Ablekuma South (Chorkor)
Ashaiman
Ayawaso Central
East Ayawaso (Nima)
Korley Klottey (Odawna)
Ledzokuku
Okaikoi North
Weija (Bortianor/Ngleshie/Amanfrom)

Northern Region
Bimbilla
Bole/ Bamboi
Buipe
Chereponi
Kumbungu
Mion
Tamale Central
Tolon
Yendi
Zabzugu/ Tatale
Upper East Region
Bawku Central
Bongo
Chiana-Paga
Zebilla
Bolgatanga
Upper West Region
Wa
Jirapa
Volta Region
Akan
Biakoye (Nkonya)
Ho West (Tsito)
Hohoe
Kete Krachie
Ketu South
Ketu South (Aflao)
Nkwanta North
North Tongu
North Tongu, Central Tongu
South Dayi (Peki)
Western Region
Afigya Sekyere East

Source: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre

Endnotes

- ¹ An excellent accounting of the tension is also conveyed in the documentary by Jarreth Metz, *An African Election* (2012) (<http://anafricanelection.com>).
- ² Good reports on the 2008 election include: Franklin Oduro, "Preventing Electoral Violence: Lessons from Ghana," in Dorina A. Bekoe, editor, *Voting in Fear: Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa* (USIP Press, 2012); Heinz Jockers, Dirk Kohnert, and Paul Nugent, "The Successful Ghana Election of 2008: A Convenient Myth? Ethnicity in Ghana's elections revisited," German Institute of Global and Area Studies and University of Edinburgh, July 2009 (http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/wp109_jockers-kohnert-nugent.pdf); Jesse Salah Ovadia, "Stepping back from the Brink: A Review of the 2008 Ghanaian Election from the Capital of the Northern Region," *Candaian Journal of African Studies*, vol 45, no. 2 (2011): 310-340; E. Gyimah-Boadi, "Another Step Forward for Ghana," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 20, no. 2 (April 2009): 138-152.
- ³ CDD-Ghana and Institute for Policy Alternatives (IPA), "Election Violence Monitoring of the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, Ghana, 2004," Election Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) Project, Ghana. February 15, 2005, p. 2-3; CDD-Ghana and CODEO, "Preventing and Managing Conflict in Election 2008, Final Draft Report, January 2009.
- ⁴ Ghana Votes 2012 (<http://ghvotes2012.com>); This information has also been confirmed by IDA staff present in Ghana during the BVR.
- ⁵ CODEO, "CODEO Statement on the Pre-election Environment for September 2012" October 9, 2012 (<http://www.cddghana.org/newsarticles/CODEO-Statement-on-the-Pre-Election-Environment-for-September-2012>)
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14. ABSTRACT On December 7, 2012, Ghana is scheduled to hold its sixth elections since the return to democracy in 1992. It is considered one of the few countries in Africa where democracy is consolidating, evidenced by its continually improving scores on political rights and civil liberties. Yet, despite positive and constantly improving democratic indicators, Ghana has regularly witnessed electoral violence. While the incidents of electoral violence have not risen to levels that threaten the stability of the state, they do point to worrisome institutional weaknesses, poor political party development, and politicization of the security sector. So far in 2012, a number of instances of election-related violence have been documented. Most of these incidents took place during the biometric voter registration process, involving clashes between political party supporters, disruption of political rallies, and assaults on politicians. Additionally concerning, political parties are sending mixed messages about the use of violence during the elections and politicians are using the media to insult opponents and put forth unsubstantiated allegations, all of which could lead to tension and possibly violence in the lead-up to the elections. The security sector has become politicized; for example, a leaked tape revealed a plan by the ruling National Democratic Congress to infiltrate the Bureau of National Intelligence with its own private security personnel.						
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