

MALI'S JULY ELECTIONS: BRINGING PEACE OR CONFLICT?

By Dorina Bekoe

The government of Mali [announced](#) on May 15, 2013, that presidential elections will take place on July 28. The organization of elections is at the heart of road map [adopted unanimously](#) on January 29 by Mali's parliament to resolve the country's political and security crises. The United Nations has qualified its endorsement of the road map, stating that the elections should take place as soon as [technically feasible](#), and there are [indications](#) that the United States supports such an approach. These cautionary statements aside, the international community is working on the assumption that elections will take place in July. The push toward elections in Mali is a common feature in the international community's peace-building playbook. Outwardly, elections can present the opportunity of closure and a new, positive beginning. But, elections can also represent the beginning of conflict. For Mali, holding the elections in July, under the present political and security conditions, present exactly this possibility. [more...](#)



People originally from northern Mali carry signs reading, "We support army action to liberate the North," as thousands of Malians, including elected officials, front, marched in support of foreign aid and military intervention to retake Mali's north from Islamist groups in Bamako, Mali, Thursday, Oct. 11, 2012. France has circulated a draft resolution that would give U.N. backing to an international military force to assist the Malian army in ousting Islamic militants who seized the northern half of the country and are turning it into a terrorist hub. (AP Photo/Harouna Traore)

Dr. Dorina Bekoe, a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses, is a specialist in African politics.

MADAGASCAR'S ELECTIONS AND THE POTENTIAL FOR PROLONGED CIVIL CONFLICT

By Stephanie M. Burchard

Madagascar is tentatively scheduled to hold presidential and parliamentary elections on July 24, 2013, in an effort to resolve a four-year-long constitutional crisis that began with a military-backed coup in 2009. The Special Electoral Court, created in May 2012, approved 41 candidates, including former president Didier Ratsiraka, former first lady Lalao Ravalomanana, and current leader Andry Rajoelina. The participation of these three candidates is a troubling development for a country that has been on the brink of collapse for the past several years. The possibility that the campaign could trigger a prolonged conflict looms large, in part because each candidate is allied with a different faction of the military. [more...](#)



The Malagasy military during the electoral crisis in 2002. Source: AP/Karel Prinsloo.

Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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By Amb. (ret.) George F. Ward

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Thursday, Jan. 24, 2013, Chadian soldiers for the African-led international support mission to Mali wait to board an aircraft in N'Djamena, Chad, bound for Bamako, the capital of Mali (AP Photo/ECPAD, Nicolas Vissac)

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Elections in Perspective

Many hold that elections can bring an end to conflict. Some, like Terrence Lyons in a [1998 publication](#), argue that such elections, as in Liberia 1997, can be votes for peace, where citizens essentially co-opt a warlord by providing him with the objective of the war—political power. Elections also capped the end of the peace process in Mozambique; they were widely considered an example of elections representing a new, positive beginning.

But, adhering to an election date without regard to the political and security conditions can spell disaster. As I noted in a [2008](#) book, Angola's September 1992 elections went ahead despite a failure of disarmament and signs that neither the government nor the UNITA rebels were committed to peace. Months after the elections, UNITA's Jonas Savimbi refused to participate in a run-off, asserting that he had been cheated out of a first-round victory, and the country plunged back into civil war. More recently, the 2010 Ivorian elections, which took [place](#) after several failed disarmament efforts and with an unclear protocol for certifying the elections, resulted in a four-month violent stand-off in which nearly [3,000](#) were killed.

These examples show that elections under conditions of political uncertainty and insecurity are ill-advised. In Mali's case, elections will be taking place not only in the context of a divided nation, but under circumstances that have exacerbated the very grievances that led to the conflict. The Mouvement National de Liberation de l'Azawad (MNLA), which sparked the rebellion in January 2012, cited the general disenfranchisement of the Tuareg as its rationale for fighting, echoing the grievances of past Tuareg rebel movements, as Andy Morgan [wrote](#) for *Think Africa Press*. Now, this very population is displaced internally and in neighboring states—the [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees](#) estimates that as many as 457,000 people have fled. Holding elections with great uncertainty about the participation of the current refugees or internally displaced populations will only deepen grievances, planting future seeds of conflict.

Additional impediments to holding credible elections are present as well. As Bruce Whitehouse notes, Mali's government has not begun the necessary administrative tasks -- such as producing new voter IDs - and is not in control of its territory. Moreover, July is the rainy season, which will hinder people's participation. Last, MNLA leaders have [threatened](#) to resume fighting, if elections occur before peace negotiations take place.

Elections entail a significant undertaking by institutions and political stakeholders. In the best of times, they speak to a nation's ability for peaceful political transition. But, in less certain political times and amid insecurity, they can assume a

greater importance—hope for a new beginning or an end to conflict. At present, Mali does not have the time or capacity between now and July for elections to serve as an indicator of peaceful political transition. Elections in July, under the current conditions, may increase the chances of conflict in the future.

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The Malagasy military during the electoral crisis in 2002. Source: AP/Karel Prinsloo.

At first, none of the three candidates were to participate in the polls. Mediation efforts by the Southern African Development Commission (SADC) had succeeded in committing Rajoelina not to run in the election. Lalao Ravalomanana, wife of deposed president Marc Ravalomanana, did not technically dismiss running for office, but her husband did. Didier Ratsiraka has been living in exile in France since 2002 and was not expected to return. Ratsiraka, Ravalomanana, and Rajoelina have all used the military to assist them in their political objectives, and they retain close ties to various factions in the armed services. This is an important point, because access to armed groups increases the chances that disputed elections will end violently.

Didier Ratsiraka ruled Madagascar from 1975 to 1993 and from 1997 to 2002. After massive protests in 1991 led to the [deaths of at least 12](#), he conceded to the opposition and oversaw Madagascar's transition to multiparty elections in 1993. After losing the 1993 election, he fled to France. He returned to participate in the 1997 election and won the presidency again. Ratsiraka ran against Marc Ravalomanana in the 2001 presidential election. The official vote tally provided by the Ministry of the Interior gave Ravalomanana a plurality of the vote, but not the majority needed to avoid a second round run-off. Independent electoral observers, however, claimed that Ravalomanana had won the election with [50.5% of the vote](#). For the next two tense months, Ravalomanana supporters staged [massive daily demonstrations](#) against Ratsiraka. After failing to come to an agreement by the end of February, Ravalomanana declared himself president. The protests and demonstrations turned deadly as both candidates enlisted different factions of the military for support. Two rounds of failed negotiations took place in Dakar while the military conflict continued. In June 2002, after Ravalomanana's forces secured all of Madagascar's key ports, Ratsiraka fled to France.

In March 2009, Andry Rajoelina ousted Ravalomanana in a coup backed by a sizable segment of the military and the [reported support](#) of the exiled Ratsiraka. Despite calls from the international community for a return to constitutional order in Madagascar, Rajoelina insisted that his installation as president was the will of the Malagasy and said that after a transition period, elections would again be held sometime in 2011. Rajoelina, a former DJ by trade and the then-mayor of Antananarivo, dissolved the existing political institutions and established the High Transitional Authority with himself as president. Ravalomanana fled to Swaziland and then settled into exile in South Africa. He was tried in absentia for crimes against the state, including corruption and the use of security forces to kill protesters during the coup.

Since 2009, several rounds of negotiations between all interested parties have been facilitated by SADC leadership. These negotiations have been punctuated by three failed coups by various factions of the military. Elections have been promised, scheduled, and then rescheduled several times. In December, Ravalomanana announced that he would not run for president in 2013. In January, with the announcement that Rajoelina would also [not participate](#) in the 2013 presidential

election, it appeared that SADC had made a significant breakthrough. In April, however, Lalao Ravalomanana announced her intention to run. Many have interpreted her candidacy as a proxy for her husband. Didier Ratsiraka quickly followed suit. Their names were submitted to the Special Electoral Court, along with more than 40 other possible candidates. On May 5, the Special Electoral Court announced the official list of 41 presidential candidates, which now included Andry Rajoelina. These three candidates are the likely frontrunners in July's tentatively scheduled election.

None of these candidates meets the [legal requirements for candidacy](#). Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka have been living in exile for the past several years and thus do not meet the residency requirements. Rajoelina was added to the ballot came after the end of the official registration period and in contravention to the gentleman's agreement that SADC had negotiated in January. All three have demonstrated that they will go to any lengths to stay in, or regain, power. None have voluntarily or peacefully left office. All three have relied on the state's security forces to deal with protesters.

The pressing need to hold elections and restore constitutionality to Madagascar is driving SADC and others to move forward, but there are virtually no safeguards to prevent violent conflict from breaking out. Premature elections could cause more harm than good, as the main political players do not seem to know how to accept defeat graciously, political institutions are weak (or nonexistent) and easily manipulated, and the military is polarized behind the various candidates. More than 70 independent radio and television stations that closed after the 2009 coup have yet to be reopened. [The Union of Malagasy Journalists](#) has implored the international community to pressure the Rajoelina government to allow these media outlets to resume operations ahead of the elections. On May 5, the [Ecumenical Council of Christian Churches](#) issued its opinion that elections should be postponed again and another interim government installed while the country organizes a referendum to approve a new constitution.

A rigged election—or even the perception of electoral impropriety—could be the catalyst that drives any of the main actors in this saga to violent recourse. The recent rulings of the Special Electoral Court—in particular its selective enforcement of electoral rules—do not inspire confidence that the body will be able to effectively or fairly manage this election. In a worst case scenario, the current situation in Madagascar could become reminiscent of Côte d'Ivoire in 2010, where disputed elections led to a four-month-long conflict, 3,000 fatalities, and the extradition of former president Laurent Gbagbo to the International Criminal Court on charges of crimes against humanity. If current conditions prevail, Madagascar could follow a similar path.

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After months of discussion and preparations, on December 20, 2012, the United Nations Security Council, working in close partnership with AU and the Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS), authorized the deployment of an [African Union force](#) in support of the government of Mali. With deployment of that force projected to take several months, the Islamist forces in Mali seized the initiative, advancing on key towns in the nation's south. This offensive provoked [French military intervention in January 2013](#) (“Operation Serval”). The French turned the tide, restored much of the northern portion of Mali to government control, and facilitated the deployment of AU forces.

At a meeting of the Chiefs of African Defense Staffs in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on April 29, 2013, Ramtane Lamamra, the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, [took account of the Mali experience](#), saying “we should acknowledge that the pace of progress has not been commensurate with the challenges at hand, as clearly demonstrated by the slowness of the deployment of the African troops in Mali and the recourse to external forces to deal with the sudden escalation of the crisis. . . .” The AU report prepared for the meeting relegated the ambitious regional rapid deployment capability project to an unspecified longer term and announced its replacement, the AICRC. The latter will be built around the capability to deploy a tactical battle group (reinforced battalion) of 1,500 personnel with 30 days sustainment within 15 days of agreement on a concept of operations.

While more realistic than the African Standby Force concept, which made very limited progress toward fruition in eight years of effort, the AICRC will still be a stretch for African land forces. It is of interest that quite separate from the AU's announcement of the AICRC, the United Nations has decided to form an “Intervention Brigade” within its force in the DRC (MONUSCO). This force, numbering around 3,000 personnel, will be built around [infantry battalions](#) from South Africa, Malawi, and Tanzania. According to press reports, the [South African air force](#) will deploy attack helicopters and fighter aircraft in support of the effort. Targeted against the M23 and other militias operating in the DRC, the Intervention Brigade will require extensive logistical, airlift, and combined-arms support. Its success would be an early indicator of whether African land forces are capable of conducting the sorts of demanding operations inherent in the AICRC concept. If the DRC effort fails to gain traction, it will be a setback for the concept of “African solutions to African problems.”

George F. Ward is the editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at IDA. He is the former U.S. Ambassador to Namibia.

WITHOUT SECURITY REFORMS, VIOLENT ELECTIONS LIKELY IN ZIMBABWE

By Alexander Noyes

In the wake of the peaceful March 2013 constitutional referendum in Zimbabwe, fierce debates have erupted over the long-contested issue of security sector reform. As they have since the formation of Zimbabwe's unity government in 2009, President Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and senior military officials have strongly rebuked recent pledges of security reform from Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T). The vociferous push-back from ZANU-PF indicates the importance the party places on maintaining its symbiotic relationship with the state's security apparatus. Despite progress on the new constitution, without security sector reforms and strict enforcement of the new constitutional dispensation, another chapter of electoral violence carried out by security officials and non-state actors is likely to occur around upcoming elections in Zimbabwe. [more...](#)



Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe inspects the honor guard at a military parade honoring Zimbabwe's armed forces in Harare, Tuesday, Aug. 9, 2011. (AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi)

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RENAMO VS. FRELIMO: COULD THE POLITICAL CRISIS HOLD DEVELOPMENT HOSTAGE?

By Dorina A. Bekoe

Mozambique's former rebel group, RENAMO (*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*), and the ruling party, FRELIMO (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*), have been in the process of negotiating reforms to the electoral commission and other political issues. The talks, which recently broke down, are a bid to defuse the political tensions brought on by RENAMO's retreat to its former stronghold of Gorongosa in October 2012, when RENAMO charged that the government had not enacted meaningful political and electoral reform. Some regarded the move as a precursor to renewed conflict, but others have judged it to be another [negotiating](#) tactic. Few have paid attention to RENAMO's other grievance: that FRELIMO is not sharing the newly found mineral wealth from Mozambique's oil and gas deposits. The political crisis in Mozambique and threats of civil war by RENAMO could hinder the country's prospects of reaping the full benefits of its oil and gas discoveries. With Mozambique ranked 185th out of 187 countries in the Human Development Index, it is imperative that talks resume and meaningful political reform take place to give hope that Mozambicans might be lifted out of poverty. [more...](#)



Main opposition candidate Afonso Dhlakama of RENAMO, a rebel movement turned political party, casts his ballot for presidential, parliamentary and provincial assembly elections in Maputo, Mozambique, Wednesday October 28, 2009. (AP Photo/Ferhat Momade)

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Political squabbling over security sector reform has intensified as election season approaches. Earlier this month, a political storm was ignited by local reports of meetings between MDC Defense and Security Secretary Giles Mutsekwa and high-ranking military commanders, including General Constantine Chiwenga. While such meetings suggest that an opening exists for dialogue between the two groups, the disclosure of these discussions angered ZANU-PF and top security officials, leading to warnings and well-worn proclamations of resistance to the idea of reform. Police Commissioner Augustine Chihuri [threatened](#) any opposition: "I wish to take this opportunity to warn liars and peddlers of falsehoods who dream of talking to us. . . that the law will visit them harshly." Such threats have proved to be more than mere rhetoric, as the police continue to harass and [detain](#) MDC officials and those deemed as MDC supporters. On the heels of these controversies, Tsvangirai unveiled MDC-T's [election platform](#), which included promises to rein in the political influence of the security chiefs. As a result of failure to agree on security sector and other reforms, general elections, originally slated for the end of June, now look likely to take place in September or October, [according](#) to the International Crisis Group.

Although far from a perfect document, the new constitution does contain a few security reforms that, if implemented and fully enforced, could make a real difference in helping to level the political playing field ahead of elections. Taking a sanguine view, MDC-T Spokesperson Douglas Mwonozora [noted](#) after the referendum: "ZANU-PF has already given in to security sector reform. Chapter 11 of the draft constitution provides for security sector reform and says that the security services. . . must not further the partisan interests of any political parties, neither must they campaign for any political party."

Despite this ostensible step forward, current domestic political conditions are highly unfavorable to reform, with Mugabe and ZANU-PF staunchly in command of the security apparatus. The renewed obstinacy of ZANU-PF and security officials regarding security sector reform, combined with their historical disregard for formal institutions and persistent use of political intimidation, suggests that without outside assistance, real progress on this front remains unlikely, at least in the near term. Unfortunately, this lack of reform greatly increases the chances of a rerun of the 2008 electoral violence, in which over 200 were killed.



Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe inspects the honor guard at a military parade honoring Zimbabwe's armed forces in Harare, Tuesday, Aug. 9, 2011. (AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi)

That said, regional pressure, most notably from South Africa and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), could help pry open opportunities for security sector reform ahead of the vote. Such actors could do so by insisting on the implementation and enforcement of security sector reform provisions within the new constitution and by continuing to push for further reforms as part of the “road map” to elections. In addition, as I [outlined](#) in *World Politics Review* in February, the early presence of international election observers, the continuation or threat of resumption of sanctions, and the possibility of amnesty for security officials could all help lessen the risk of violence in upcoming elections.

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Main opposition candidate Afonso Dhlakama of RENAMO, a rebel movement turned political party, casts his ballot for presidential, parliamentary and provincial assemblies elections in Maputo, Mozambique, Wednesday October 28, 2009. (AP Photo/Ferhat Momade)

In justifying its move back to the bush, RENAMO showed its frustration with the government and its inability to gain more political representation. In April 2013, responding to RENAMO's retreat to its former stronghold, the government disrupted RENAMO's meetings in Muxunge (located in Central Mozambique). RENAMO retaliated by [attacking](#) a police station, which resulted in five fatalities—significantly unnerving the local population, many of whom fled the area.

RENAMO's charges are not new. Since the first post-conflict poll in 1994, RENAMO has alleged that FRELIMO has used fraud to win every election, and RENAMO has demanded changes to the electoral commission. RENAMO has also seen its popularity decline from gaining 37.7 percent of the parliamentary seats in 1994 to 17.65 percent in the 2009 polls, according to the [African Elections Database](#). RENAMO's declining popularity aside, [studies](#) point to the uneven political playing field in Mozambique, which has undoubtedly contributed to the dominance of FRELIMO.

The April clashes do not represent a potential for renewed conflict, but they do represent the possibility of continued political disruption. With national elections scheduled for next year and Mozambique on the verge of reaping unprecedented [gains](#) from its oil and gas discoveries, the government is forced to take notice. Indeed, there is a realistic possibility that continued political tension could delay the exploitation of the newly found natural resources. Zanzibar is a case in point. Only after the government of Tanzania [negotiated](#) an agreement that provided the semi-autonomous government of Zanzibar with control over the oil and gas deposits on the island could extractive industries begin their work in earnest.

Mozambique's resource potential may soon place it among the world's [largest](#) producers of natural gas. In this regard, the government is actively [learning lessons](#) from other countries, like Ghana, that have found themselves with unexpected mineral deposits. But reaping their full benefit also entails enacting meaningful reform to reduce the country's political uncertainty. Such reform will go a long way toward ensuring that the country creates a climate conducive to fully benefiting from its minerals and lifting its citizens out of poverty.

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ISLAMIC EXTREMISM AND URANIUM—THE WITCHES' BREW IN NIGER

By Amb. (ret.) George F. Ward

The coordinated attacks by Islamic extremist forces that took place in Niger on May 23, 2013 targeted a French-run uranium mining facility and a Nigerien army base. They made good on extremist threats to retaliate against France for its intervention in Mali. The attackers succeeded in penetrating both installations, killing over 20 and disrupting a mining operation that is of strategic importance to France. A dangerous combination of violent ideologies, ethnic tensions, trained fighters, plentiful weaponry, porous borders, and available sanctuaries exists in northwest Africa. These factors are a direct threat to French interests in the region, and they have arisen at a time when France would rather be drawing down than increasing its military presence. There are implications for the United States as well. [more...](#)



Source: Map adapted from Stratfor.com.

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HOW QUICKLY WE FORGET: THE SAGA OF THE ICC CASES AGAINST KENYATTA AND RUTO

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

The government of Kenya has launched a multi-pronged attack contesting the legality of cases pending at the International Criminal Court (ICC) against President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto, both of whom have been charged with crimes against humanity for their alleged roles in the [2007-8 post-election violence](#). In early May, Macharia Kamau, Kenyan ambassador to the United Nations, requested that the UN intercede on Kenya's behalf to [terminate the ICC's cases](#) against Kenya's top politicians. After the UN declined Kamau's request, the government of Kenya [turned to the African Union \(AU\)](#) in an effort to have the charges dropped altogether or allow a regional tribunal to be established to investigate and try the alleged perpetrators of the 2007–8 post-election violence. The AU is threatening that its member states [will withdraw themselves from ICC jurisdiction](#) if the cases against the Kenyan accused proceed. [more...](#)



Uhuru Kenyatta (left) and William Ruto (right) at a campaign rally in March 2013. Source: AP Photo/Ben Curtis, File.

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Source: Map adapted from Stratfor.com.

Several Islamist groups active in the area had the capabilities needed for the attacks in Niger. The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (known variously as MUJWA and MUJAO), an offshoot of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), was [quick to take credit](#). Separately, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the militant who [claimed responsibility](#) for the January attack against a natural gas installation in Algeria, stated that his brigade had organized the operation. The Nigerien official news agency, without citing sources, reported that the attacking militants had entered Niger from [southern Libya](#).

These claims of credit illustrate the lethal combination of factors conducive to extremist violence that exists in northwest Africa. First, there are the multiple groups that self-identify as Islamist and have long histories of planning and organizing attacks against political targets and criminal trafficking in drugs, arms, and people. AQIM, MUJWA, and Belmokhtar's organization all fall into that category. Second, the militants, despite defeats inflicted on them by French forces in Mali, still have access to the ample arms and munitions taken from the arsenals of the former Libyan regime. Third, the militants enjoy freedom of movement across borders that are for the most part unguarded. After the French intervention in Mali, Islamic extremist elements fled from that country into Niger, Libya, and perhaps other nearby countries. Finally, the mountainous regions of Libya and Niger could offer valuable sanctuaries to militant forces.

The attack itself exhibited both speed of movement (using infantry weapons mounted on pickup trucks) and suicide tactics. It appears that over 20 Nigerien soldiers were killed by the attackers at the army base in Agadez. At the Somaïr open-pit uranium [mine at Arlit](#), personnel losses were smaller—[one person killed and 14 injured](#). Although not confirmed by the French nuclear power concern Areva, the operator of the mine, Niger government officials stated that [one crushing and grinding unit](#) at the mine by been badly damaged.

Reliable uranium oxide supplies are undeniably of strategic importance to France, a country that derives [75 percent of its electricity](#) from nuclear power. Areva's two mines in Niger are the source of about [one-third of the uranium](#) used by France's nuclear power stations. The Somaïr mine is Areva's largest operation in Niger. Given these facts, it is not surprising that France has made a commitment to the security of the mining operations. Last February, the BBC reported that Nigerien and French sources had confirmed the deployment of a small force of French special operations personnel to Niger for the purpose of protecting [Areva's mines](#).

Despite the success of the attacks, Niger is not at imminent risk of the same sort of destabilization that took place in Mali. In the latter, a successful Tuareg rebellion set the scene for the eventual takeover by Islamist extremists of northern Mali. There is little support among the Tuareg in Niger for violent action. In fact, [Nigerien government efforts](#) to reach out to the Tuareg provide a basis for building goodwill.

Nevertheless, the success of the Islamist attackers in Niger indicates that additional attention to security, both of the mines themselves and of uranium-oxide transport routes, is necessary. Although these tasks are responsibilities of the French and Niger governments, they also may be a cautionary indicator for the United States, which is increasing its [military cooperation with Niger](#).

George F. Ward is the editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at IDA. He is a former U.S. Ambassador to Namibia.

HOW QUICKLY WE FORGET: THE SAGA OF THE ICC CASES AGAINST KENYATTA AND RUTO

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

The government of Kenya has launched a multi-pronged attack contesting the legality of cases pending at the International Criminal Court (ICC) against President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto, both of whom have been charged with crimes against humanity for their alleged roles in the [2007-8 post-election violence](#). In early May, Macharia Kamau, Kenyan ambassador to the United Nations, requested that the UN intercede on Kenya's behalf to [terminate the ICC's cases](#) against Kenya's top politicians. After the UN declined Kamau's request, the government of Kenya [turned to the African Union \(AU\)](#) in an effort to have the charges dropped altogether or allow a regional tribunal to be established to investigate and try the alleged perpetrators of the 2007–8 post-election violence. The AU is threatening that its member states [will withdraw themselves from ICC jurisdiction](#) if the cases against the Kenyan accused proceed.



Uhuru Kenyatta (left) and William Ruto (right) at a campaign rally in March 2013. Source: AP Photo/Ben Curtis, File.

The Kenyan government's most recent attempts to stop the ICC trials are only the latest in a series of attempts by the country's political elites to avoid prosecution for crimes related to the 2007–8 crisis in which more than 1,500 Kenyan died and 600,000 were displaced in the span of one month's time. The Waki Commission, a three-member panel established by the government of Kenya to investigate the causes and major actors of the 2007–8 post-election violence, released its findings in October 2008 and recommended that a local tribunal be created to try the primary instigators of the violence. Recommendations made by other official commissions of inquiry in Kenya have historically been ignored. For example, in 2007, the African Center for Open Governance conducted an [audit of previous official commissions of inquiry](#) and found that major recommendations were rarely and selectively implemented. With this record in mind, the Waki Commission built a fail-safe provision into its official report: if the government of Kenya failed to empanel a special tribunal within 60 days of the report's release, the names of the alleged perpetrators of the violence would be handed over to the ICC.

In July 2009, after giving Kenya several extensions, [Kofi Annan, who led the previous negotiations that ended the 2007-8 conflict, handed over an envelope](#) to the ICC containing a list of the names of the accused. Many Kenyan politicians complained at the time of the unfairness of involving the ICC in Kenya's domestic politics. Nevertheless, despite the explicit backing of then President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga, [Parliament defeated a bill](#) in February 2009 that would have established a special tribunal in Kenya. Both Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta and Minister for Agriculture William Ruto publicly supported the ICC as preferable to a local tribunal and helped defeat the bill. Ruto went so far as to coin the phrase "[Don't Be Vague. Let's Go to the Hague.](#)" They seemed to believe that the process of bringing a case to trial at the ICC would take so long that it would eventually become politically irrelevant or impossible to try.

In March 2010, ICC special prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo initiated proceedings to try the six men accused of playing the largest roles in organizing the 2007–8 violence, including Kenyatta and Ruto. Once it became apparent that the trial was in fact moving forward, a bill was introduced in the Kenyan parliament in December 2010 to [withdraw Kenya from the ICC](#). Although the bill did not pass, in March 2011 the government of [Kenya filed suit challenging the ICC's](#) suitability to hear these cases, arguing that the new constitution now gave Kenya the legal standing to establish a special tribunal. The ICC ruled that because the government of Kenya had made no effort to even investigate the suspects up until that point, the cases would move forward.

While the pending ICC trials against the recently elected president and deputy president of Kenya pose several serious logistical and diplomatic problems, these trials must proceed. It cannot be forgotten that these trials have been years in the making—scheduled long before Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto announced their intentions to run for president and deputy president. Both were ICC indictees at the time their candidacies were approved by the High Court, and the looming ICC trials played a significant role in the March 2013 election in which the Kenyan electorate voted them into office with only a slight majority of the vote (50.08 percent).

The Kenyan government has shown time and time again that it is unwilling to impose consequences upon its own political elite. The [just-released Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission report](#) details how each of Kenya's post-colonial governments (under Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel arap Moi, and Mwai Kibaki) have been responsible for gross human rights violations, political assassinations, and forced displacements. The report also emphasizes that while many of these crimes were widely known, there have been few, if any, punitive repercussions. The ICC cases against Kenyatta and Ruto will have far-reaching and long-lasting effects on the conduct of future Kenyan elections. If there are no consequences for the 2007–8 post-election violence—and thus far there have been none—expect more of the same in Kenya's 2018 election. The gains that were made in the 2013 election—which was [still violent](#), although not as violent as the 2007–8 election—could easily be reversed if Kenyan politicians once again evade prosecution.

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WILL AMNESTY FOR BOKO HARAM STOP THE VIOLENCE?

By Dorina Bekoe

Satellite images released on May 1, 2013, show the aftermath of clashes between Boko Haram and Nigeria's security forces: the village of Baga, in northern Nigeria, was left nearly burnt to the ground. Images show that 2,275 homes were destroyed. According to some reports, more than 180 are dead, although the government claims that 37 people died, the BBC [reported](#). The violence that took place on April 16–17 in Baga is the latest in the ongoing battle that Boko Haram is waging against the state—a conflict that has killed approximately [3,000](#) people thus far. The Baga violence occurred just a day before President Goodluck Jonathan set up a 25-member Amnesty [Commission](#) (formally [inaugurated](#) on April 24) to make recommendations on whether amnesty should be offered to Boko Haram members in exchange for dialogue and disarmament. [more...](#)



Nigeria troops man a checkpoint in Maiduguri, Nigeria, Wednesday, Sept. 28, 2011. (AP Photo/Sunday Alamba).

Dr. Dorina Bekoe, a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses, is a specialist in African politics.

PUNISHING CORRUPTION IN SENEGAL: JUSTICE OR RETRIBUTION?

By Stephanie M. Burchard

On Thursday, May 2, 2013, Karim Wade, the detained son of ex-Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, responded to his April 15 [arrest](#) on serious corruption charges by filing a nearly \$400,000 [lawsuit](#) in the ECOWAS Court of Justice. It accuses the Senegalese government of human rights abuses. It will likely be a fruitless endeavor, but it is yet another indicator of the lack of regard Karim has for the state and its processes. Karim, the so-called super-minister (popularly, “Minister of Earth and sky”) in the presidency of his father, Abdoulaye Wade, from 2000 to 2012, simultaneously held multiple ministerial portfolios that placed him in charge of some of Senegal's largest infrastructure projects. It is alleged that Karim amassed his estimated \$1.4 billion personal fortune in part through illegal business dealings. His arrest resurrects memories of past government corruption in Senegal; it also illustrates the challenges of engineering peaceful transitions of power in fragile African political systems. [more...](#)



Karim Wade waves to supporters on his way to court. Source: Associated Press.

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
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Nigeria troops man a checkpoint in Maiduguri, Nigeria, Wednesday, Sept. 28, 2011. (AP Photo/Sunday Alamba).

The Amnesty Commission marks a dramatic U-turn in Nigeria's policy on Boko Haram. In March, President Jonathan rejected a similar [proposition](#) by Alhaji Sa'ad Abubakar, the Sultan of Sokoto, and other Muslim leaders to encourage Boko Haram members to lay down their arms. In particular, President Jonathan said that amnesty would only take place if Boko Haram would show a willingness to negotiate [directly](#).

Would Boko Haram accept amnesty? Many have declared the government's Amnesty Commission a [failure](#), even before it has started its work. Indeed, it will face many challenges. [Mark Freeman](#), executive director of the Barcelona-based Institute for Integrated Transitions, points out that combatants are more likely to turn in weapons if they do not fear legal or punitive repercussions. But this assumes that a group (1) has demands that may be negotiable and (2) may be ready to offer compromises in return for peace. Boko Haram's official objective to bring Shari'a to all of Nigeria and Nigerians already seems nonnegotiable for it and the government: Shari'a exists in 12 of Nigeria's 36 states, but there are exceptions for Christians. A second difficulty for an amnesty program is Boko Haram's quick rejection of it, insisting that it had not done anything that required amnesty. Rather, Boko Haram claims that the Nigerian government should be asking for [amnesty](#). Finally, as [Jennifer Giroux](#), a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich [points out](#), the more conservative Ansaru faction, which splintered from Boko Haram, could complicate the negotiations. If Boko Haram lays down its arms, how will it respond? Will additional negotiations have to take place?

And yet, there is hope that the call for amnesty may at least weaken Boko Haram. Boko Haram should not be assumed to be a monolithic entity. People join for a variety of reasons, as Jacob Zenn points out in a recent [post](#). Certainly, some may join because they share the same ideology, which may not be negotiable. But others may join for financial reasons, because of kinship with existing members, or out of frustration with existing Christian-Muslim tensions. These grievances may have political or policy solutions. With this in mind, the Amnesty Commission may do well to keep in mind the heterogeneity of Boko Haram and develop different incentives to defuse the variety of grievances held by its members.

Restitution to victims and security sector reform will be key to the eventual resolution of this conflict. Mindful of the suffering endured by victims, the Amnesty Commission is to also consider providing support to the victims of Boko Haram's violence. Such support could prevent planting the seeds for future conflict, if the commission proposes meaningful restitution for their losses. Equally important, the commission must develop a robust plan for the reform of Nigeria's security forces, which, as shown by the Baga violence, have also played a role in the displacement and destruction experienced in the north.

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Karim Wade waves to supporters on his way to court.
Source: Associated Press.

Until his defeat in the second round of Senegal’s 2012 presidential election, Abdoulaye Wade was seemingly grooming his son as his successor—going so far as an aborted attempt to create the position of vice president specifically for Karim. Wade came to power in 2000 after losing the previous four presidential contests. He defeated incumbent Abdou Diouf, Senegal’s second president, who had been in office since 1981. Diouf graciously accepted defeat, and many believed that this peaceful turnover of political power indicated the strengthening and consolidating of Senegalese democracy. Unfortunately, once in office Wade became increasingly [autocratic](#) and personalistic, and he developed a cavalier attitude toward political institutions and the public budget. In one move roundly criticized in Senegal, he spent more than \$27 million on a [160-foot-tall bronze statue](#). Wade’s regime was also notoriously liberal with its issuance of [kickbacks and severance packages](#).

In his bid for a controversial third term as president, Wade was bested by Macky Sall, who won with more than 66 percent of the vote to Wade’s 34 percent. Sall’s lopsided victory underscored Wade’s growing unpopularity. One of Sall’s campaign promises was to tackle corruption, and he has been pursuing an anticorruption agenda since his inauguration in April 2012. Karim Wade is not the only member of the former government currently under indictment for [corruption](#), but he has the highest profile. In general, any attempt to root out corruption in Africa should be championed, but it is unclear exactly what motivates Sall. Some in the opposition are claiming that Karim’s arrest is [retribution](#). During Abdoulaye Wade’s 12 years in office, Sall served as prime minister from 2004 to 2007 until he and the elder Wade had a falling out, reportedly over the younger Wade and his political ambitions. Once a close ally to Abdoulaye, Sall was [accused of fraud in 2009](#), but the charges were quickly dropped due to lack of evidence.

At issue is how to pursue justice in an unbiased fashion, one that denies politicians impunity for state predation without creating disincentives for leaving office. If politicians anticipate retribution after their tenure in office, their relinquishing power becomes significantly less likely. Africa’s recent history is replete with examples of politicians refusing to peacefully leave office (Laurent Gbagbo in Côte d’Ivoire, Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe). Further complicating matters, Sall is in the difficult position of balancing the demands for justice and fairness against a regime (and family) that tried to effectively end his political career. If Sall and the recently recommissioned Anti-Corruption Court do not ensure transparency and impartiality in the prosecution of politicians from the previous regime, they risk sending the message that the justice system can be used to settle political scores. In so doing, it increases the likelihood that Sall will himself face a political vendetta when his time in office expires. In short, it creates incentives for Sall (or any politician) to stay in power indefinitely.

The best way to prevent this scenario would be to prosecute potential offenders equally, not selectively. To assuage concerns that Sall's prosecution of his predecessor's regime is politically motivated, it has been suggested that Sall volunteer to have his personal finances audited. Under Senegalese law a sitting president cannot be [investigated](#). By voluntarily accepting an audit, Sall would surely go a long way toward promoting the peaceful succession of power and protecting the fragility of Senegalese democracy. Allowing the judicial process to be tainted by political manipulation could undermine democratic consolidation in what some consider to be a West African success story.

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ETHIOPIAN PROTEST DEMONSTRATION—GOVERNMENT LIBERALIZATION OR SYMBOLISM?

By George F. Ward

The government of Ethiopia appears to have tentatively dipped its toes into the waters of toleration, only to pull back at least partly. Overall, the government led by Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn [has not improved](#) significantly on the record of its predecessor, the late Meles Zenawi, in terms of respect for freedom of expression and other political rights. Nevertheless, the Hailemariam government last month issued a demonstration permit to the opposition Blue Party. The June 2, 2013, protest unfolded peacefully, drawing thousands into the streets of Addis Ababa for the first mass political protest since 2005. [more...](#)



Ethiopian PM Hailemariam Desalegn (AP Photo)

Amb. (ret.) George F. Ward is the editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at IDA. He is the former U.S. Ambassador to Namibia.

HOW FRAUD MIGHT (INDIRECTLY) PROMOTE DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA

By Dr. Stephanie M Burchard

Seven months after the fact, the validity of Ghana's most recent presidential election is still in dispute. On December 7 and 8, 2012, Ghanaians went to the polls to elect a new president and parliament. According to the [official results](#) released by the Electoral Commission of Ghana, incumbent John Dramani Mahama of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) defeated Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo of the New Patriotic Party (NPP). The election was close—Mahama won by approximately 326,000 votes, less than 3% of valid ballots cast. The election was endorsed by [most international observers](#). John Mahama was inaugurated president in Accra on January 7, 2013. [more...](#)



President Mahama's inauguration, January 7, 2013. Source: AP.

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According to Human Rights Watch, eleven journalists have been [convicted and sentenced](#) since 2011 under Ethiopia's anti-terrorism law. Of these, three remain in prison. Three additional journalists are currently on trial. Given this record of continued repression, it was somewhat surprising that the government issued a permit for a demonstration. The government did not offer an explanation for its decision to grant the permit, but opposition figures noted that it came just before the [African Union \(AU\) summit](#), which took place in Addis Ababa in May. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry attended the summit meeting.



Ethiopian PM Hailemariam Desalegn (AP.Photo)

The organizing force behind the June 2 demonstration was the opposition Semayawi (Blue) Party. Almost unknown before the demonstration, the [Blue Party](#) was formed in January 2012 and claims to have 20,000 members. Its chairman, Yilikal Getinet, espouses moderate views. In his only available interview, Yilikal stated his party's principles: "Our political philosophy is mainly based on individual rights. We believe that we promote a center-right-moderate liberal political outlook. We say rights start with an individual; if individual right is respected, the right of all/everyone shall be respected." In other sections of the [interview](#), Yilikal applauded federalism as an effective governance structure for Ethiopia, but criticized the support by the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) for federalism as "nominal."

Estimates of the size of the June 2 demonstration vary widely, influenced by political perspectives. State-run television said there were 2,000 participants in the protest. The demonstration's organizers and their supporters cited numbers between 15,000 and 20,000. One organization [representing the diaspora](#) even asserted that "an astounding number of Ethiopians came out—estimated at hundred[s] of thousands." From [videos](#) of the protest, it appears that the protest drew a sizable, but not overwhelming, crowd, probably closer to the estimates of the organizers than of the government. Protesters carried banners reading, "Justice! Justice! Justice!" Speakers urged the release of imprisoned political leaders and journalists, and they demanded action to address unemployment, inflation, and corruption.

Both the protesters and the government deserve credit for the fact that the event remained peaceful. The last previous government-authorized protest, in 2005, ended with street violence in which [200 people were reported killed](#). On this occasion, a few police officers stood back and watched the demonstration. The crowd was loud, but orderly, and refrained from provoking the police. Overall, it might be taken as evidence of political maturity on both sides.

The goodwill earned by the government for permitting the protest was probably somewhat diminished by a [statement made by a government spokesman](#), Shimeles Kemal, on the day following the rally. The spokesman asserted that the majority of the protesters were Muslim, and included Islamic extremists. He also implied that the protest organizers had broken the law by demanding the release of those charged under terrorism statutes. For its part, the

Blue Party vowed to return to the streets in three months if its demands have not been met. The government will, it seems, have the opportunity to demonstrate whether its nod toward political tolerance was real or simply opportunistic.

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Akufo-Addo was previously defeated in 2008 in a similarly close contest with Mahama's now deceased predecessor, John Atta Mills of the NDC. In that election, Akufo-Addo lost by fewer than 40,000 votes. Supporters for both the NDC and the [NPP alleged fraud and intimidation](#). Nonetheless, Akufo-Addo accepted defeat. He was re-nominated by the NPP to contest the 2012 election. Before the election, Ghana undertook significant reforms in voter registration [to prevent over-voting, a problem believed to have affected the 2008 election](#).

Almost immediately after the results of the 2012 election were released, [Akufo-Addo and the NPP cried foul](#). They alleged that the NDC, working in concert with the Electoral Commission, had conspired to steal the election. [The NPP filed suit](#) with the Supreme Court on December 28, 2012, to formally challenge the results of the election. According to its petition, irregularities occurred at close to 12,000 polling stations, including duplicate voting, uncertified poll counts, and the participation of unregistered voters. The NPP asserts that these irregularities should lead to the annulment of 4.3 million votes and an outright victory declared for Akufo-Addo. After several delays, [the trial commenced April 16, 2013](#). It is currently ongoing, [with June 12 being the 32nd day of testimony](#). [The trial is being streamed live on Ghanaian television](#) and radio.

The electoral petition currently being deliberated by the Ghanaian Supreme Court is unique in many ways. It is the first legal challenge to Ghana's presidential election since multiparty elections were reinstated in 1992. It is also the first legal proceeding to be [telecast live](#). The trial demonstrates the vibrancy of Ghanaian civil society—the executive director of the Danquah Institute made the case for a live telecast of the proceedings—and the acceptance of the legal system as the proper recourse for electoral disputes. The trial, which is going into painstaking detail over the electoral process in Ghana, also allows citizens and political parties to verify the transparency of the proceedings and perform a post-hoc vetting of the elections.

If the Supreme Court were to find evidence of fraud and overturn the results of the 2012 election, it would signal to other politicians in Ghana (and elsewhere on the continent) that there are significant consequences to engaging in electoral fraud. Since it is no secret that previous Ghanaian elections have [been fraught with irregularities](#), this outcome is not out of the realm of possibility. On the other hand, if the Supreme Court were to certify the results, it would still promote the strengthening of formal and informal democratic institutions, given how involved civil society, the media, and the citizens of Ghana have been. Regardless of the outcome, this court case allows multiple actors to participate in ensuring the accountability of politicians in Ghana.



President Mahama's inauguration, January 7, 2013. Source: AP.

A similar situation recently arose in Kenya. Raila Odinga, the loser of the March 4, 2013, presidential election, filed suit with the Kenyan Supreme Court alleging that his defeat was the result of electoral malpractice and fraud. Court proceedings were conducted quickly but with very little transparency. The Court's initial ruling was released on March 30 and its legal justification released two weeks later. The Kenyan Supreme Court has been criticized for making [an overtly political decision](#) when it decided that, despite irregularities, there [was insufficient evidence](#) to annul the overall electoral results. In contrast, Ghana's decision to deliberate in such an open and public manner is meant to protect the Court from such accusations of bias and undue influence.

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COUP-PROOFING: LESSONS FROM THE REGION FOR THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

By Dorina Bekoe

On Sunday, June 2, the president of the transitional government of the Central African Republic (CAR), Michel Djotodia, [announced](#) his intention form a new, more inclusive government. By most accounts, such a move amounts to coup-proofing; Djotodia fears being ousted in the same manner that he, the leader of the Seleka rebels, ousted former president François Bozizé on March 24, 2013. But, if similar moves in other African states serve as any guide, such an endeavor, while necessary, can be risky to political survival. It may not coup-proof the CAR regime at all. [more...](#)



Michel Djotodia, President of the Transitional Government of the Central African Republic, Thursday, March 28, 2013. (AP Photo)

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POLICING IN KENYA: FROM POLITICIZED TO DEMOCRATIZED?

By Alexander Noyes

In the lead-up to Kenya's March 2013 elections, much [criticism](#) was levied at the pace and extent of the coalition government's efforts to reform the heavily politicized police force, an agenda that featured prominently in both the new constitution and the political agreement that put an end to the 2007-8 post-election violence. While criticism of the sluggish pace and implementation of police reforms since 2008 is warranted, during the March election the Kenyan police acted in an apolitical and—*notwithstanding a few instances*—professional manner, helping to contain tensions after the polls, which were not followed by large-scale violence. Just last week, the debate over police reform in Kenya heated up again, as the new Inspector General of the police, David Kimaiyo, got into a [public spat](#) over the powers of his office with Johnston Kavuludi, the head of the National Police Service Commission, a body tasked with overseeing the police reform process. While worrisome to some observers, such debates over how to operationalize reforms further indicate that substantial progress has been made on establishing the institutional framework for reforming the police, although significant challenges remain. [more...](#)



Kenyan police walk alongside demonstrators, in Nairobi, Kenya, Tuesday, May 14, 2013. (AP Photo/Sayyid Azim)

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COUP-PROOFING: LESSONS FROM THE REGION FOR THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

By Dorina Bekoe

On Sunday, June 2, the president of the transitional government of the Central African Republic (CAR), Michel Djotodia, [announced](#) his intention form a new, more inclusive government. By most accounts, such a move amounts to coup-proofing; Djotodia fears being ousted in the same manner that he, the leader of the Seleka rebels, ousted former president François Bozizé on March 24, 2013. But, if similar moves in other African states serve as any guide, such an endeavor, while necessary, can be risky to political survival. It may not coup-proof the CAR regime at all.



Michel Djotodia, President of the Transitional Government of the Central African Republic, Thursday, March 28, 2013. (AP Photo)

[Tendai Mariwa](#), writing in *Think Africa Press*, reminds us that Djotodia is the CAR's sixth president since independence; of those, four have been ousted by a coup. Djotodia would thus have a strong precedent for fearing that he might not serve out the 18-month long transition. In this regard, as Mariwa argues, forming a more inclusive government is critical, given that many in the country's south fear that Djotodia, a Muslim, will turn the country toward an Islamic dispensation; the Seleka rebels that overthrew ex-President François Bozizé will now put pressure on the new government for positions and compensation; and Bozizé's allies must be co-opted in order for Djotodia to ensure that he is not ousted in a counter-coup.

Is it possible to successfully coup-proof a government? Can Djotodia make things worse? Examples from other African states suggest that coup-proofing is tricky and that Djotodia might make things worse for himself. Specifically, the expanded power-sharing arrangement that Djotodia is attempting might actually end up sharing too much power. [Pierre Atlas and Roy Licklider](#) explore this theme in their 1999 article, "Conflict among Former Allies after Civil War Settlement: Sudan, Zimbabwe, Chad, and Lebanon." Of particular relevance is Chad's experience: as Hissène Habré, who ruled Chad from 1982 to 1990, attempted to expand the government to include former enemies, he isolated his base. He was subsequently overthrown by Idriss Déby in December 1990.

Yet Déby experienced an analogous challenge soon after he assumed the presidency. As Atlas and Licklider detail, in Déby's attempt to reconcile different factions, he isolated the Zaghawa ethnic group, from which he hailed. Déby survived a coup attempt in April 1992 by Zaghawa rebels who felt that their dominance in government would be diminished with multiparty elections. Ironically, a similar dynamic pushed Déby into the war in Darfur, which began in 2003. Fearing retribution from Sudan, which had assisted Déby in ousting Habré, Déby did not take a stand on Darfur, a region that straddled the border of both countries. He began to face [criticism](#) from the Zaghawa, however, that he was not doing enough to assist co-ethnics in Sudan. By 2004, as [Jérôme Tubiana](#) writes for the *Small Arms Survey*, Khartoum began to support anti-Déby movements; in 2005, Déby retaliated by helping the anti-Khartoum armed groups. By 2006, Chad and Sudan were engaged in a proxy war.

Djotodia seems to be caught in a conundrum similar to Déby's. While he needs to placate and reward the Seleka rebels for their assistance, he must forge new networks with the existing political elite. Such an effort can stave off a coup if both groups feel that other is not gaining unfairly. A third group, not always considered, is the citizenry itself. The world was surprised in March 2012 when Captain Amadou Sanogo successfully toppled Mali's president Amadou Toumani Touré, just one month before an election that Touré was not contesting. Even more surprising for Mali, which had been considered a successful democracy, was the support among the people for the coup. [Analyses](#) since the coup have revealed that while Malians supported democracy, they did not hold their own government in high regard. The coup was billed as a means to [start fresh](#). In fact, 64 percent of Malians in a survey by [Sidiki Guindo](#) said they were satisfied that Touré's administration ended before elections. In the CAR, as well, a critical partnership must be made with the people. To avoid another coup, the transition process must include cultivation of the support of the people through earnest efforts at reform, reconciliation, and disarmament.

Dr. Dorina Bekoe, a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses, is a specialist in African politics.

POLICING IN KENYA: FROM POLITICIZED TO DEMOCRATIZED?

By Alexander Noyes

In the lead-up to Kenya's March 2013 elections, much [criticism](#) was levied at the pace and extent of the coalition government's efforts to reform the heavily politicized police force, an agenda that featured prominently in both the new constitution and the political agreement that put an end to the 2007-8 post-election violence. While criticism of the sluggish pace and implementation of police reforms since 2008 is warranted, during the March election the Kenyan police acted in an apolitical and—*notwithstanding a few instances*—professional manner, helping to contain tensions after the polls, which were not followed by large-scale violence. Just last week, the debate over police reform in Kenya heated up again, as the new Inspector General of the police, David Kimaiyo, got into a [public spat](#) over the powers of his office with Johnston Kavuludi, the head of the National Police Service Commission, a body tasked with overseeing the police reform process. While worrisome to some observers, such debates over how to operationalize reforms further indicate that substantial progress has been made on establishing the institutional framework for reforming the police, although significant challenges remain.



Kenyan police walk alongside demonstrators, in Nairobi, Kenya, Tuesday, May 14, 2013. (AP Photo/Sayyid Azim)

Police forces in Africa have long been used by elites to wield political authority. The history of policing in Kenya is no exception. Successive Kenyan presidents—from Jomo Kenyatta to Daniel arap Moi to Mwai Kibaki—maintained firm executive control over Kenya's police and used the force to exercise political control. Kibaki came to power in 2002 on a campaign of renewal, launching a police reform program in 2003. The rhetorical move toward democratic policing achieved little, however, as he continued to use the police for regime security, as evidenced by police involvement in the 2007-8 post-election violence, where the police were [implicated](#) in 36 percent of the officially recorded 1,113 fatalities and the wounding of more than 500 people.

In spite of a halting pace and constant pushback from anti-reform elements, several significant legislative and constitutional police reforms took place during the tenure of the coalition government, including the passage of three key police reform laws in 2011. This legal framework helped depoliticize the force ahead of elections and has set in motion the long process of reshaping police governance in Kenya.

Despite fears about preparedness, during the ultimate test of the fledgling reforms—the March 2013 national elections—police conduct was, overall, commendable, which stands in stark contrast to the 2007-8 election. Police were heavily deployed to areas that saw outbreaks of violence in 2007-8, and reinforcements were quickly sent to areas that did suffer from violence in the days before the March poll. Kimaiyo, the Inspector General, even instituted a ban on public demonstrations during the election period. In a recent [post-mortem](#) on the election, the International Crisis Group concluded that police behavior during the March elections was “greatly improved” from the previous election, characterizing their performance as a “measured response.” The report, however, also highlighted several instances of questionable use of live ammunition and excessive use of force, which are now being investigated by the Independent Policing Oversight Authority. These troublesome incidents, along with recent [charges](#) of major abuses of Somali and other refugees, persistently high levels of [corruption](#), and continuing impunity for previous political violence, highlight the many remaining challenges in translating paper reforms into practice.

That said, a new legal framework and improved police conduct during the March elections suggest real movement on reforms, particularly in depoliticizing the force. Indeed, public debates between the Inspector General and a police oversight mechanism would have been inconceivable just several years ago. As I recently [outlined](#) in *African Studies Quarterly*, pressure on the coalition government from civil society and international actors played a large role in pushing the police reform agenda forward. In order to capitalize on past gains and avoid backsliding, it is incumbent on both domestic and international actors to continue to monitor and push the new government of Uhuru Kenyatta to fully implement and operationalize police reforms.

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ELECTIONS IN TOGO UNLIKELY TO RESOLVE POLITICAL CRISIS

By Alexander Noyes

Behind a backdrop of widespread political protests over the past six months, Togo is set to hold long-postponed legislative elections on July 21, 2013. In late May of this year, President Faure Gnassingbe—who has won two flawed elections since coming to power via the military in 2005 following the death of his father in office—[banned](#) several protests planned by the “Let’s Save Togo” (Collectif Sauvons le Togo) coalition of opposition and civil society groups and used tear gas to disperse other gatherings. The ruling party’s reluctance to embrace real political and electoral reforms, an increasingly violent and polarized political environment, and a relatively unified opposition make it unlikely that elections will help resolve the long-standing political crisis in Togo.




Opposition protestors throw rocks at security forces in Lome, Togo, Thursday, May 23, 2013. (AP Photo/Erick Kaglan)

In 2005, after 38 years in power, Gnassingbe Eyadema died in office, and his son was installed by the military, a highly politicized institution in Togo. Regional and international actors decried the unconstitutional change of government, and presidential elections were organized for April 2005. Faure Gnassingbe subsequently won the election, despite claims of fraud by the opposition. The opposition protested the results, and up to [800](#) people died in the ensuing violence. The violent elections, along with increased pressure from the European Union (EU), led to the Comprehensive Political Accord (CPA) power-sharing agreement between the government and various opposition groups. The CPA aimed to resolve the political crisis and usher in needed institutional reforms.

As Dorina A. Bekoe outlined in her chapter on Togo and Zanzibar in *Voting in Fear*, a [book](#) she also edited, the CPA led to a more cooperative and inclusive political process, which improved the electoral environment in the short term, as evidenced by the peaceful 2007 legislative elections. Bekoe argues, however, that the CPA did not achieve lasting institutional reform, and as a result, in 2010 the opposition withdrew from the inclusive framework before the presidential elections. Gnassingbe’s government and the opposition have had increasingly polarized relations since the end of the CPA. The 2010 elections, although not as violent as past elections, were again viewed as fraudulent, leading to frequent large-scale demonstrations by the opposition.

Protests have persisted since 2010, as the newly unified opposition has continued to call for political and electoral reform and the resignation of Gnassingbe. There has also been an attendant spike in levels of political violence since 2010. The graph below, which outlines incidents of political violence in Togo from 1997 to 2012 using [data](#) from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset, shows that since the end of the CPA in 2010 there has been a sharp increase in levels of political violence.

This rise in political violence has led to a further polarized political environment. Combined with the ruling party's continued recalcitrance to move on credible reforms and an emboldened and unified opposition, this polarization makes it unlikely that the upcoming legislative elections will help resolve the political crisis in Togo. Although legislative elections are lower stakes events than presidential polls, Togo's history of electoral violence unfortunately suggests that elections under prevailing conditions could potentially turn violent, especially if opposition parties view the results as manipulated by the government. Increased EU and regional engagement, from France in particular, could help mitigate this risk by pressuring the parties to participate in a renewed effort at constructive and inclusive dialogue, both before and after elections.



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FRENCH AFRICA POLICY UNDER HOLLANDE—MORE THAN MALI

By George F. Ward

French President François Hollande's decision to intervene with military force against an Islamist extremist offensive in Mali has become the most recent visible symbol of French policy in Africa. As a recent [Chatham House study](#) argues, however, there is more to French policy in Africa than Mali. In fact, Hollande seems to be attempting to fashion a break with the traditional French approach. Although it is too early for him to claim success, Hollande is making more progress than his predecessor, Nicolas Sarkozy, achieved. [more...](#)



French President François Hollande, center, visits Timbuktu, Mali, Saturday, Feb. 2, 2013. The French leader is making a triumphant stop in the town, which French forces had liberated six days ago from the al-Qaida-linked extremists who seized northern Mali last year. (AP Photo/Jerome Delay)

Amb. (ret.) George F. Ward is the editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at IDA. He is a former U.S. Ambassador to Namibia.

AFRICA HEMORRHAGING: ILLICIT CAPITAL FLIGHT THREATENS AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT

By Ashley Bybee

The [recent allegation](#) that several banks in European Union (EU) tax havens facilitated a corrupt deal between Angolan and Russian officials highlights a major problem afflicting sub-Saharan Africa—illicit resource transfers from a continent in desperate need of capital. Last week's [G8 Lough Erne Declaration](#) pledging action on international tax evasion and money laundering demonstrates just how important this issue has become on the world's stage.

Otherwise known as "capital flight," these illicit resource transfers, which result from corruption, kickbacks, tax evasion, criminal activities, the sale of contraband, or even the transfer of legal funds in violation of exchange-control regulations, have cost Africa up to \$1.4 trillion between 1980 and 2009, according to a [joint report](#) from the African Development Bank and the research and advocacy organization Global Financial Integrity. This amount is nearly equal to Africa's current GDP, which demonstrates the magnitude of this problem. [more...](#)

Dr. Ashley Bybee is a Research Staff Member in the Africa program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

NIGER: SAHELIAN DOMINOES?

By Stephanie M. Burchard

Niger is becoming increasingly important in the struggle against terrorism in West Africa. Yet Niger's own fragility is often overlooked because of the focus on immediate security issues in neighboring countries such as Mali (the battleground for an international operation against Islamist radicals) and Nigeria (facing a serious threat to its national integrity from Boko Haram in the North). Niger, however, is currently grappling with a confluence of challenges that deserve attention. [more...](#)

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French President Francois Hollande, center, visits Timbuktu, Mali, Saturday, Feb. 2, 2013. The French leader is making a triumphant stop in the town, which French forces had liberated six days ago from the al-Qaida-linked extremists who seized northern Mali last year. (AP Photo/Jerome Delay)

The contrast between Sarkozy and Hollande is illustrated in two speeches delivered in Dakar, Senegal, the first by the former on July 26, 2007, and the second by the latter on October 12, 2012. Sarkozy, who came into office signaling a reformist tone, made a serious misstep when he observed during his speech in Dakar that “the African has not sufficiently made his mark on history.” An unofficial English translation of that speech, which can be read as a broad indictment of African culture and history, may be found [here](#). Hollande, [addressing](#) the National Assembly of Senegal, took the high road. He focused on the positives, noting, for example, that the proportion of women sitting in the Senegalese National Assembly exceeded that of France. He characterized Africa as “a land of the future for the global economy.” At the same time, Hollande laid out his agenda for French policy on the continent—emphasizing trade, development, and promotion of transparency, good governance, and equality. He explicitly declared, “The age of what was once called ‘*françafrique*’ is over.”

Others, including Sarkozy, have in the past proclaimed the end of the era of *françafrique*, the intertwining of political and business interests between France and its former African colonies. It is too early to tell whether it is indeed as over in practice as it is in rhetoric. Nevertheless, Hollande does seem to have made a start at containing *françafrique*.

Every French President from De Gaulle through Sarkozy installed a “*Monsieur Afrique*” at his side. These individuals cultivated close ties to major French companies, both state-owned and private, and they facilitated contracts with African governments. One such *Monsieur Afrique*, Robert Bourgi, claimed that he had personally carried at least \$20 million in cash as gifts from African leaders to fund the political campaigns of former French President Jacques Chirac and Chirac's prime minister, Dominique de Villepin. Although Bourgi asserted that the flow of money stopped when Sarkozy assumed office, another *Monsieur Afrique*, Jean-Francois Probst, stated that Sarkozy also benefited from payments. In fact, Sarkozy's first Minister for Development Cooperation was reportedly forced out after pressure from three African autocrats.

Without abandoning France's strategic interests in Africa, Hollande has changed at least the style of relations. During his visits to Africa, he has kept his distance from leaders who have poor records in democracy and human rights. He has given the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs a shaping role on French policy toward Africa that heretofore had been reserved for the office of the presidency. Doors at the Elysée Palace have reportedly been closed to the players in the *françafrique* networks. When he was confronted soon after his election with the takeover of the northern half of Mali by Islamist extremist groups, he took a noninterventionist approach, and he campaigned for UN and African backing of an [African-led force](#) for Mali. This record undoubtedly helped Hollande when circumstances—an Islamist offensive that threatened Mali's capital—dictated direct intervention by French forces. The French intervention was welcomed broadly by African leaders and peoples, and Hollande was received like a hero when he visited Mali.

This is not to say that the road ahead for Hollande in Africa is clear. The renewed military role that France is playing in Africa is probably not what Hollande imagined when he articulated a noninterventionist approach during his presidential campaign. His recent defense and security [White Paper](#) makes clear that he understands that the stakes are high in security

terms. He declared that “the Sahel, from Mauritania to the Horn of Africa, [is] of primary interest for France.” He connected the dots between terrorism, narcotics smuggling, and other forms of trafficking, and he underlined the importance of the eight defense partnership agreements and 16 technical cooperation agreements that bolster France’s security posture in Africa. Even while announcing the drawdown of French forces in Mali, Hollande has authorized a substantial continued presence there, and he has also reinforced his commitment to the security of Niger, which supplies France with strategically important quantities of uranium. These and other commitments to existing regimes may limit Hollande’s ability to move away from the norms of *françafrique*. Also, the costs of France’s African policies could contribute to Hollande’s unpopularity at home. In particular, the drawdown of French forces in Africa, begun under Sarkozy, may hit a pause as France comes to grips with the new security realities in the Sahel.

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The [recent allegation](#) that several banks in European Union (EU) tax havens facilitated a corrupt deal between Angolan and Russian officials highlights a major problem afflicting sub-Saharan Africa—illicit resource transfers from a continent in desperate need of capital. Last week's [G8 Lough Erne Declaration](#) pledging action on international tax evasion and money laundering demonstrates just how important this issue has become on the world's stage.

Otherwise known as “capital flight,” these illicit resource transfers, which result from corruption, kickbacks, tax evasion, criminal activities, the sale of contraband, or even the transfer of legal funds in violation of exchange-control regulations, have cost Africa up to \$1.4 trillion between 1980 and 2009, according to a [joint report](#) from the African Development Bank and the research and advocacy organization Global Financial Integrity. This amount is nearly equal to Africa's current GDP, which demonstrates the magnitude of this problem.

These resource transfers can occur through several vehicles: tax havens, secrecy jurisdictions, front or shell companies, trade mispricing, and money laundering. The aforementioned scandal purportedly involving the Angolan president and several Russian and French arms dealers employed several of these vehicles. That the president of Angola allegedly might be personally involved is disturbing. That tax havens and front companies play a major role in facilitating many of these corrupt deals is a concern, since developing countries are losing to tax havens as much as [three times](#) what they receive in aid, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. That major [European banks](#) might be used by criminals is perhaps most disconcerting of all and could seriously tarnish their reputations.

Yet it is not just corrupt government officials that stash their fortunes outside of Africa. Large multinational companies with operations in poor but resource-rich African countries are notorious for registering themselves in countries with low tax rates. This is entirely legal, but contributes to the problem of Africa's dwindling tax base. Many African countries' tax codes are based on [antiquated colonial ordinances](#). They are out of step with modern business practices, lacking the capacity or legal structures to hold companies to account. It is therefore up to these countries to strengthen their tax codes to remove these loopholes. Likewise, transfer mispricing, also known as “profit-laundering,” is a common practice in Africa. Here, goods from Africa are sold to corporations (typically based in a tax haven) at a price manipulated to incur the lowest possible taxes. Because those profits remain offshore, Africa once again misses out on revenue.

Resource-rich African countries have enough difficulty harnessing the revenues generated by their vast exports for development purposes that they cannot afford to lose even more tax revenues to offshore tax havens. Such revenues ought to be used for development projects and investment in their own human resources.

Enacting and enforcing transparency laws, promoting public oversight of the extractive sectors, reforming laws to criminalize mispricing, and continuing anti-money-laundering efforts are just a few ways in which African governments can fight capital flight. Genuine political will to undertake such measures, however, may be hard to come by as long as so many government officials benefit from these loopholes.

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NIGER: SAHELIAN DOMINOES?

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Niger is becoming increasingly important in the struggle against terrorism in West Africa. Yet Niger's own fragility is often overlooked because of the focus on immediate security issues in neighboring countries such as Mali (the battleground for an international operation against Islamist radicals) and Nigeria (facing a serious threat to its national integrity from Boko Haram in the North). Niger, however, is currently grappling with a confluence of challenges that deserve attention.

Niger has now experienced two Tuareg rebellions, in 1990 and 2007, both of which arose due to Tuareg claims of economic and political marginalization by the central government in Niamey. The 1990 and 2007 rebellions concluded with peace agreements that promised more Tuareg inclusion in the Nigerien government and a more equitable distribution of income derived from uranium mines in the North. The current peace agreement, signed in 2009, granted Tuareg rebels amnesty and [incorporated Tuareg leaders](#) into several high-profile positions in the government. The current prime minister of Niger, Brigi Rafini, is of Tuareg ethnicity and hails from the Agadez region in northern Niger.

Despite the progress that has been made and the relative political calm that currently prevails, several significant challenges threaten to destabilize Niger. First are concerns that Tuaregs could be [inspired by events in Mali](#) and take up arms again. Second is a possibility that anti-Western forces may decide to [target Nigerien interests](#) based on the country's decision to sign a Status of Forces Agreement with the United States and to permit the stationing of U.S. military personnel. Third, multiple waves of refugees have been crossing into Niger from both Mali and [Nigeria](#). Each of these possibilities is worrisome. Taken together, they accentuate the possibility of increased insecurity in Niger.

In terms of economic and social development, Niger has consistently been one of the [worst performing countries](#). It routinely ranks either last or second-to-last in the world and currently is ranked 186th out of 187 countries on the Human Development Index, trailing the Democratic Republic of Congo (also ranked 186th) by a small margin. Niger is currently experiencing [widespread electricity outages](#) that have brought the economy to a virtual standstill, and some are concerned that the central government will be unable to pay civil servant salaries.

This level of underdevelopment, if not adequately addressed, could be used to mobilize support against the current regime. The current president, Mahamadou Issoufou, has been in power since April 2011, winning the second round of presidential elections organized after a [military coup took control of the country in 2010](#). The previous president, Mamadou Tandja, was ousted in February 2010 after attempting to circumvent the constitution to seek a third term of office. Tandja was also accused of harassing journalists and civil society organizations. Journalists from [Al Jazeera reporting on Nigerian refugees in Niger](#) were recently detained in June. The government of Niger accused them of not having the proper permits, but their brief detention raises questions about the new government's relationship to the media.

Although Issoufou, a long-time opposition politician, has promised to protect Niger's nascent democracy at all costs, it will be difficult for a new president in a new democracy to promote development while addressing Niger's mounting security concerns.



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ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN AFRICA: CRITICAL LESSONS AND NEW DIRECTIONS

On July 11, 2013, the Africa Program at IDA will host a one-day conference in Washington, DC on “Electoral Violence in Africa: Critical Elections and New Directions.” The conference, a follow up to last year’s “Electoral Violence in Africa: Challenges, Causes, and Responses,” will bring together academics, policymakers, and practitioners to discuss several specific cases where electoral violence has occurred or could occur and new directions for the study of electoral violence. Specific attention will be paid to past elections in Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire and upcoming elections in Zimbabwe, Madagascar, and Nigeria. A limited number of spaces are still available at this conference. To attend, [click here](#).

AFRICA’S EVER-EXPANDING DRUG SCOURGE

By Ashley Bybee

The [2013 World Drug Report](#) of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has reported that Africa is becoming increasingly vulnerable to the drug trade and organized crime, although data from the region is scarce. Cocaine transiting West Africa en route to its final market in Europe has drawn significant attention in recent years. This flow is, however, just the beginning. Heroin seizures have risen sharply since 2009, especially in East Africa, where they increased almost tenfold. Methamphetamine production for East Asian markets is the latest scourge, with labs discovered in Nigeria, South Africa, Liberia, and, allegedly, Guinea. These synthetic drugs have proven to be extremely popular in South Africa. In fact, Cape Town now has the [highest methamphetamine prevalence in the world](#), with 2 percent of the adult population consuming the drug. [more...](#)



Nigerian Olajide Olatun Adepaju, who was allegedly trying to carry 41 kilograms (90 pounds) of cocaine to Johannesburg, is seen inside the Federal Police station at the Sao Paulo’s Guarulhos International Airport, Brazil. (AP Photo/Sergio Castro/AE).

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RETURN TO CONFLICT UNLIKELY DESPITE UPSURGE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN MOZAMBIQUE

By Alexander Noyes

A recent uptick in political violence has again spurred [fears](#) of a return to civil war in Mozambique. According to [Reuters](#), 11 state security officials and five civilians have been killed since April of this year in alleged clashes between the state and ruling party, FRELIMO (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*), led by President Armando Guebuza, and RENAMO (*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*), which is headed by Afonso Dhlakama. The two parties fought a decades-long civil war that came to an end in 1992. Despite these worrying incidents, which suggest a continuing upward trend in levels of political violence since 2012, large-scale violence remains unlikely in Mozambique, as RENAMO’s violent turn appears to be an effort to remain politically relevant and extract concessions from the government. [more...](#)



Afonso Dhlakama of Renamo casts his ballot for presidential, parliamentary and provincial elections in Maputo, Mozambique, Wednesday Oct. 28, 2009. (AP Photo/Ferhat Womade).

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The volume of cocaine transiting West Africa is the one flow that appears to be in decline, with current estimates indicating that approximately [18 tons passed through the region last year](#), down from a high of 47 tons in 2007. One must not, however, view this decline as a major success. While U.S.- and European-supported improvements to law enforcement and regional intelligence-sharing efforts have undoubtedly resulted in more effective detection and seizure actions, they have also encouraged traffickers to seek new routes and methods of conveyance. Given the nature of seizure data (which captures the number of times traffickers *fail* to evade law enforcement, not the number of times they succeed) and the extremely limited capacity of most African governments to collect such data, it is nearly impossible to state with high confidence the volume of narcotics transiting the region without relying on some anecdotal evidence as well.

It is quite likely this decline is attributable to traffickers diversifying their modus operandi. The [UNODC reported](#) that drug-trafficking organizations have begun using containerized consignments and maritime shipping conveyances, as well as their more traditional methods of air couriers and postal shipments. Traffickers can be expected to continue to change their tactics, at least as fast as law enforcement detects them, if not faster.

The UN has also observed some changes in the source of cocaine transiting West Africa, with Venezuela declining in importance and Brazil increasing. It can be speculated that the linguistic and cultural ties that bind Brazil, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique could facilitate all manner of illicit activity. There is also a large Nigerian community in Sao Paulo. Given the tendency of Nigerian organized crime groups to operate very effectively within its diaspora communities around the world (e.g., Thailand, Europe, Jamaica, and the United States), it is plausible that Nigerians are becoming increasingly involved in cocaine trafficking. The UNODC has already noted West Africans playing an increasingly independent role in moving drugs into their region, as evidenced by the smaller size of shipments detected in recent years.

Looking forward, African countries and international stakeholders must be prepared for the deleterious effects of drug trafficking to become increasingly destabilizing. Already, [researchers in Ghana](#) have observed the use of crack and heroin in certain neighborhoods around Accra. Political instability in countries such as Guinea-Bissau is exacerbated by drug revenues, which increase the financial value of political power. Drug-related violence has thus far been relatively rare, in part because traffickers have been able to achieve their ends through corruption. Yet as indigenous African organized crime groups grow in importance and take on more responsibility in the supply chain (the Nigerians and Ghanaians being the most likely culprits due to their relative sophistication), violent outbreaks can be expected to occur between them and the Latin Americans, similar to that occurring between Mexico's domestic drug cartels, although hopefully not on the same scale.



Nigerian Olajide Olarun Adepaju, who was allegedly trying to carry 41 kilograms (90 pounds) of cocaine to Johannesburg, is seen inside the Federal Police station at the Sao Paulo's Guarulhos International Airport, Brazil. (AP Photo/Sergio Castro/AE).

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RETURN TO CONFLICT UNLIKELY DESPITE UPSURGE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN MOZAMBIQUE

By Alexander Noyes


A recent uptick in political violence has again spurred [fears](#) of a return to civil war in Mozambique. According to [Reuters](#), 11 state security officials and five civilians have been killed since April of this year in alleged clashes between the state and ruling party, FRELIMO (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*), led by President Armando Guebuza, and RENAMO (*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*), which is headed by Afonso Dhlakama. The two parties fought a decades-long civil war that came to an end in 1992. Despite these worrying incidents, which suggest a continuing upward trend in levels of political violence since 2012, large-scale violence remains unlikely in Mozambique, as RENAMO's violent turn appears to be an effort to remain politically relevant and extract concessions from the government.



Afonso Dhlakama of Renamo casts his ballot for presidential, parliamentary and provincial elections in Maputo, Mozambique, Wednesday Oct. 28, 2009. (AP Photo/Ferhat Momade).

In addition to April 2013 clashes with police and a violent confrontation with soldiers in mid-June, on June 21 it was [reported](#) that two civilians had been killed in an ambush on vehicles in Sofala, a central region where RENAMO has enjoyed support. In an attempt to apply further pressure on the government, RENAMO also threatened in late June to disrupt the Sena railway, which major international mining companies use to transport coal from the northwest to the Mozambican coast. These threats have had an immediate impact, with Rio Tinto [suspending](#) exports from the northwest on June 26 due to security concerns. These recent incidents and threats follow a rise in political violence in Mozambique of late, as depicted in the graph.

Incidents of Political Violence, 1997-2012



Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED).

The graph highlights levels of political violence in Mozambique from 1997 through 2012 using [data](#) from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset. Incidents of political violence have seen an uptick recently, with 2012 the second most violent year during this 16-year period. Although the data for 2013 are not yet available, the recent events just noted suggest that the upward trend from 2011 to 2012 is continuing.

In spite of this increase in levels of political violence, the prospect of a return to prolonged and widespread civil conflict in Mozambique seems unlikely, as Dhlakama's recent attacks and heated rhetoric appear to be an attempt to reverse RENAMO's shrinking political popularity and force the government to concede on political reforms. Other factors further reduce the risk of civil war, including a paucity of regional support for the former guerrillas and the limited capability of Dhlakama's men. That said, as Dorina Bekoe noted in the May 23, 2013 [edition](#) of *The Africa Watch*, RENAMO's capacity for political and economic disruption should not be underestimated, a point that has been underscored by recent events.

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JAPAN IN AFRICA—DEALING WITH CHINA'S LEAD

By George F. Ward

The [Fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development \(TICAD V\)](#), which took place in Yokohama from June 1 to 3, 2013, was the largest international meeting ever hosted by Japan, with around 4,500 participants. The United Nations, the African Union, the World Bank, and the UN Development Program were co-sponsors. The headline news from the conference was Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's pledge of a [\\$32 billion assistance package](#) over five years for Africa. This Japanese pledge has been interpreted as signaling a renewed commitment to Africa. It has also been characterized as an attempt by the Japanese government to compete with China in the growing African market. If that is the case, Japan faces an uphill battle, given China's substantial lead.

The Japanese aid package is a typical mix of project assistance, training and education, and trade incentives. Its emphases are on development of the private sector and human capacity building in areas such as natural-resource management, business, science and technology, and agriculture. There is a security component, unusual for Japan, which includes counter-piracy measures by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Japan Coast Guard in waters off Somalia. The Japanese aid package contrasts fairly sharply with the pattern of Chinese development assistance in Africa, which is focused on large-scale infrastructure projects. Chinese aid often comes in the shape of financing packages that include grants and concessional and non-concessional loan components.

In presenting the aid package, Prime Minister [Abe emphasized](#) that "Japan will not simply bring natural resources from Africa to Japan. We want to realize industrialization in Africa that will generate employment and growth." Although Abe was making a thinly veiled attempt to contrast the Japanese and Chinese approaches to Africa, [other reports](#) indicated that Japanese business interests are in fact principally interested in mimicking the Chinese approach to securing access to natural resources. In the wake of the shutdown of most nuclear power plants in Japan, there is a need for new sources of carbon-based energy. Japanese business is also reportedly unhappy with its current reliance on China for the rare-earth materials needed for electronic manufacturing.

Whatever its motivations, which are quite probably a mix of self-interest and commitment to Africa's development, Japan is at a disadvantage to China in several areas. According to the World Trade Organization, Japan's two-way (exports and imports) merchandise [trade with Africa](#) averaged \$22 billion annually in the years 2009–2011.



Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, right, shakes hands with Ethiopian Prime Minister and African Union Chairperson Hailemariam Desalegn, center, after their joint press conference concluding the three-day Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in Yokohama, near Tokyo, Monday, June 3, 2013. African Union Commission Chairperson Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma of South Africa is seen at left. (AP Photo/Koji Sasahara).

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The comparable figure for China was \$125 billion. Investment flows present a similar picture. In the period 2007–2011, [Japanese annual investment flows to sub-Saharan Africa](#) averaged only \$460 million. Even subtracting the two worst years of the worldwide recession, the average would still have been just short of \$1 billion annually, or less than 1 percent of Japan's outward investments. [Chinese investments](#) are difficult to measure because up to 80 percent may go through tax haven countries. Taking only the visible flow into account, China's outward investments in Africa amounted to around \$1.7 billion in 2011, or around 2.2 percent of China's total. In sum, China holds a substantial trade and investment advantage over Japan in Africa.

Much the same is true if one looks at noneconomic factors. China has a larger political footprint in sub-Saharan Africa, with [41 embassies](#) compared with [Japan's 29](#). China participates with 1296 troops and civilian police in six [UN peacekeeping missions in sub-Saharan Africa](#), while Japan participates in only one mission, in South Sudan, with 269 troops. In addition, China benefits from an extensive web of bilateral military relationships in Africa. Japan is not a player in that sphere. Taken together, these factors mean that China is able to be a relevant factor in more African situations and settings than is Japan. China possesses a wider political/security base from which to promote its economic and commercial interests. Paradoxically, Japan arguably has a more urgent political agenda in Africa—it needs African votes to reach its goal of permanent membership on the UN Security Council—than China, which secured its status as the “one China” years ago.

In summary, China enjoys sizable economic and political advantages over Japan in sub-Saharan Africa. Japan probably will not be able to close the gap, but might be able to narrow it through its softer approach and increased extensive investment, aid, and political commitments sustained over time.

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DEMOCRACY BY COUP?

Dr. Stephanie M Burchard

The ouster of Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi by the military on July 3, 2013, raises a question: Can an undemocratic action lead to a democratic outcome? To adequately address this question, it is important to examine the historical record regarding the aftermath of coups. How often do coups repeat themselves? The answer: more often than not. How often do coups initiate democratic transitions? The answer: not as often as we might hope. [more...](#)



Egyptians celebrating outside the presidential palace, Cairo, July 3, 2013. (Source: AP).

Dr. Stephanie Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

POLITICAL AGREEMENT IMPROVES ELECTORAL ENVIRONMENT IN TOGO

By Alexander Noyes

Long-delayed legislative elections in Togo, most recently set for July 21, 2013, were again [pushed back](#) last week and are now scheduled to be held four days later on July 25. The most recent delay was part of a negotiated political [agreement](#) between Faure Gnassingbe's government and several opposition groups, namely the Let's Save Togo Collective (CST, Collectif Sauvons le Togo) and the Rainbow Coalition (CAEC, Coalition Arc-en-Ciel). While certainly not a panacea for Togo—which has seen near-constant protests since the contested 2010 presidential elections and a rise in levels of [political violence](#)—the most recent deal improves the electoral environment in Togo and will hopefully decrease the risk of electoral violence surrounding the July 25 polls. [more...](#)



Opposition supporters react to announcement that parliamentary elections will be pushed back, during an opposition rally in Lome, Togo, Saturday, July 6, 2013. (AP Photo/Erick Kaglan).

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Egyptians celebrating outside the presidential palace, Cairo, July 3, 2013. (Source: AP).

The political situation in Egypt has sparked a vigorous debate over the meaning of coups, in particular, whether there should be a [distinction between a good coup and a bad coup](#), [if a coup can ever be considered an act of democracy](#), and [whether a coup can produce a democratic outcome](#).

Although anecdotal evidence abounds to support the contention that a coup could theoretically lead to a more democratic outcome—some invoke the example of [Honduras](#) in 2009 or [Niger](#) in 2010—the jury is still out on the quality and durability of the resultant democracy. To take the example of Niger further, while the 2010 coup may have led to the election of Mahamadou Issoufou and the purported restoration of democratic governance, the 2010 coup was also the fourth to occur since 1974 and the third in support of democracy.

The 2012 coup in Mali also serves as a cautionary tale. It occurred, seemingly by accident, a little more than one month before scheduled elections in which the incumbent president had already confirmed that he would not participate. By all accounts the coup, although unexpected, was [popularly supported](#) by Malians because of the ineffectiveness and corruption of the previous regime. Some considered it a “democratic reset” that would restore Malian democracy. One year and one military insurgency later, it is hard to predict how democracy will fare in Mali, but elections are slated to be held at the end of July.

Empirically, the record is much less ambiguous. According to Andrew C. Miller, of the 217 successful coups that took place in the world between 1940 and 2008, [fewer than 6 percent led to substantial or durable democratic gains](#). This is not to say that in the absence of a coup any such country would have inevitably transitioned to democracy, but that a coup does not often initiate a meaningful democratic transition. For the record, the four African countries that transitioned to democracy as a direct result of a coup are Sierra Leone (1968), Ghana (1978), Sudan (1985), and Niger (1999). In each case, the transition to democracy was transitory; all reverted to autocratic rule within a few years.

There is a disconnect between democratic procedures, which are meant to reflect the will of the people, and coup d'états undertaken with the support of the masses but in contravention of the accepted rules of the game. The situation in Egypt brings this issue into focus, but it underscores the fact that elections are just one (albeit the most visible) feature of democracy. If the political institutions are so weak that the executive (Morsi in Egypt; Tandja in Niger in the 2000s) can concentrate power and alienate citizens to the degree that military action becomes attractive to the population, was the country really a democracy to begin with? There are institutional alternatives to coups that may prevent the hypocrisy of resorting to nondemocratic means to remove democratically elected officials, such as an impeachment process and the ability of the executive or legislature to call snap elections, to name but two.

In hindsight, the transition period after the initial military removal of former president Hosni Mubarak in 2011 may have been too brief and the rush to elections too quick. Recent research by Flores and Nooruddin ([2012](#)) and Brancati and Snyder ([2012](#)) suggests that post-conflict elections held before significant reform and institution-building take place often lead to the resumption of conflict, especially when previous actors have not been disarmed or demobilized. Egyptian elections were held in 2012 before a new constitution could be adopted and according to an [“ambiguous and problematic roadmap.”](#) In addition to the debate over what a coup can and cannot do, there is an important lesson to be learned from the crisis in Egypt: elections by themselves are not democracy. Furthermore, the quality of elections and the overall conditions under which they are held affect long-term political development.

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Opposition supporters react to announcement that parliamentary elections will be pushed back, during an opposition rally in Lome, Togo, Saturday, July 6, 2013. (AP Photo/Erick Kaglan).

As outlined in the June 21, 2013 edition of Africa Watch, Togo has an extended history of violent elections. Gnassingbe was installed by the military in 2005 after his father died in office—up to [800](#) fatalities were recorded during violence around the 2005 polls—and since coming to power, he has won two flawed elections. Despite repeated attempts at dialogue, including a promising period of inclusive government from 2006 to 2010 ushered in by the Comprehensive Political Accord (CPA) power-sharing agreement, Gnassingbe and the opposition have had increasingly tense relations since 2010. In the run-up to the 2010 presidential elections many factions of the opposition pulled out of the CPA and subsequently launched regular demonstrations to protest the results of the election and demand reforms.

Before the present agreement, the electoral environment in Togo was again looking volatile, as Gnassingbe [banned](#) a number of protests and opposition groups threatened to boycott the vote. Held in June and early July, the most recent round of negotiations was brokered by Bishop Nicodeme Anani Barrigah-Benissan, who headed Togo's Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission, with the United States Ambassador to Togo, Robert Whitehead, also participating in the talks. The agreement, announced on July 10, [addresses a number](#) of contentious issues between the government and the opposition, including opposition representation in the electoral commission and at polling stations, the [release](#) of several opposition figures that had been detained, the extension of nomination deadlines for candidates, the release of funds to opposition parties to fund campaigns, and the pushing back of the legislative elections themselves.

Although far from a comprehensive deal, the agreement does include several concessions from the government, which hopefully represents a renewed willingness to negotiate with the opposition in good faith. That the often fractured opposition was able to negotiate in a relatively unified manner is also a good sign. Last week, on a research trip to Lome, the capital of Togo, I interviewed a handful of stakeholders and officials who all noted that this agreement, while not a cure-all, does unequivocally signal an improvement to the electoral situation. This sentiment was [echoed](#) by a number of international actors, including the United States, France, Germany, the United Nations, and the European Union, which issued a joint statement noting that there is now "a good base" for peaceful elections in Togo.

While the agreement does suggest an improved electoral environment, the last-minute deal leaves the opposition with very limited time to organize a cohesive campaign, and these steps in the right direction will matter little if election results are viewed as fraudulent by the opposition. In this scenario, opposition parties would almost certainly again organize large-scale protests, which would increase the likelihood of electoral violence. Regional and international actors therefore would be wise to carefully monitor and keep up the pressure on the government to deliver credible results in the upcoming polls. Moreover, real and lasting institutional reforms will not be possible without continued pressure on the government to participate in inclusive dialogue, which must continue after the electoral spotlight has passed.

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ZIMBABWE'S ELECTION—ONE WEEK TO GO

By George F. Ward

With the July 31 elections in Zimbabwe one week away, the adage attributed variously to baseball great Yogi Berra, nuclear physicist Neils Bohr, and movie mogul Samuel Goldwyn applies: "It's tough to make predictions, especially about the future." Prognostications aside, it is worthwhile to review some of the facts of the campaign so far and to think about their implications for the future of Zimbabwe, one of Africa's most promising and yet most troubled nations. [more...](#)



Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and his wife Grace, right, at the launch of his party election campaign in Harare, Friday, July, 5, 2013. Mugabe, who is set to contest against his main rival Morgan Tsvangirai in an election set for July 31, urged his party supporters to vote for him in the crucial election. (AP Photo).

Amb. (ret.) George F. Ward is the editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at IDA. He is a former U.S. Ambassador to Namibia.

AFTER THE DUST HAS SETTLED: KENYA'S 2013 ELECTIONS

By Dr. Stephanie M Burchard

The government of Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, the victor in a close and contentious election in March of this year, has now been in office more than 100 days. The official results of the elections from March 4, 2013, however, have only just been become available. After months of delays and excuses, the electoral commission released the official tally on July 18, in a heated session of Parliament that saw the chairman of the electoral commission, Issack Hassan, storm out of the chamber. [more...](#)



IEBC Chairman Issack Hassan (Source: AP).

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First, outside pressures from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Britain, and the United States seem up to now to have had little effect. In June, SADC urged a [delay](#) in the elections by at least two weeks to provide time for putting improved procedures into place. Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe ignored the advice, threatened to withdraw from SADC, and issued a decree on June 13 that set the six-week campaign in motion. Subsequent cautions from within SADC, including from Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete and Lindiwe Zulu, advisor to South African President and SADC mediator Jacob Zuma, were curtly dismissed by Mugabe. In the end, the statement on Zimbabwe that emerged from the July 20 Summit meeting of the Troika of SADC's Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation was meek in tone. The [Summit](#) was "pleased to note" the general commitment of the parties in Zimbabwe to a "peaceful environment," "commended" the government of Zimbabwe for inviting SADC election observers, and "noted" problems that arose during early voting. Concerns expressed by the United States about the abbreviated election schedule got short shrift. "Americans must be mad and absolutely insane," Mugabe said during a [campaign address](#). Election observers from the European Union and the U.S. are barred from entering Zimbabwe.

Second, perhaps in part because of the rushed campaign schedule, a rumored [grand coalition](#) of opposition parties has failed to emerge. Morgan Tsvangirai, the leader of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and prime minister in the current national unity government, had apparently hoped for an electoral pact with former finance minister Simba Makoni, Dumiso Dabengwa (Zimbabwe African People's Union), and Welshman Ncube, leader of another MDC faction. Minutes before the planned launch of the coalition on July 7, word came that Dabengwa and Ncube had decided not to join forces with Tsvangirai.

Third, fears that the compressed election schedule would lead to a flawed poll are becoming reality. The early voting period on July 14–15 for police, soldiers, and officials who will be on duty during the regular July 31 poll provided a test of election procedures and mechanisms. All parties seem to agree that the early voting turned into a fiasco. The [government website](#) stated that only 29,000 of the 69,000 citizens who applied for early voting actually cast their ballots. Another estimate, attributed to the Election Resource Center (ERC), a monitoring group that leans toward the opposition, stated that only [10 percent of those eligible actually voted](#). In the wake of the flawed voting, the Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC) issued an [apology](#) and pledged that those unable to vote early would be accorded an opportunity to cast ballots during the regular voting. The government alleged [sabotage](#) and threatened prosecutions against unidentified perpetrators. The ERC demanded that the ZEC [postpone](#) the election.

Fourth, Robert Mugabe appears to remain in control. Despite his advanced age and alleged illness, he has orchestrated an election scenario that maximizes the advantages of incumbency. The press turns out in force to cover his campaign appearances. He commands Zimbabwe's massive security apparatus. Although one report had Mugabe unable to walk 200 meters at a campaign rally, he has confounded speculation that his health is failing by [delivering addresses](#) lasting



Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and his wife Grace, right, at the launch of his party election campaign in Harare, Friday, July 5, 2013. Mugabe, who is set to contest against his main rival Morgan Tsvangirai in an election set for July 31, urged his party supporters to vote for him in the crucial election. (AP Photo).

more than 2-1/2 hours. One observer [commented](#), “Mugabe is looking good to win these elections—and if he does have to cheat, he doesn’t have to cheat by all that much.”

In this scenario of a rushed and inevitably flawed election, held amid considerable popular discontent with an aged autocrat who nevertheless retains advantages over a divided opposition, there is clear danger of electoral violence. This is the case no matter the outcome. A victory by Mugabe, the aged autocrat, could touch off clashes between rival aspirants within the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) to succeed him. If the election proves to be a repeat of the 2008 poll, with Tsvangirai winning a plurality of votes, leaders of the security establishment loyal to ZANU-PF would likely be tempted to intervene to protect their own privileged positions and the dominant role of the ruling party. Making predictions is tough, but a difficult and turbulent period for Zimbabwe appears likely.

Amb. (ret.) George F. Ward is the editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at IDA. He is a former U.S. Ambassador to Namibia.

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IEBC Chairman Issack Hassan (Source: AP).

The 2013 elections were the first general elections to take place since the post-election violence of 2007–2008, in which more than 1,300 Kenyans lost their lives, and the first to be conducted under the newly adopted 2010 constitution. The official winners of the elections, in which voters were asked to cast six ballots for various offices including the presidency, were announced in waves due to a series of [technical errors](#) and malfunctions over the course of several days. The outcome of the highest profile contest—for the presidency—was announced by Issack Hassan, chairman of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), on March 9, almost a week after elections had been held. President Kenyatta surpassed the minimum electoral threshold and won the presidential election by a margin of [approximately 9,000 votes](#). The opposition mounted a legal challenge to the results, but the Kenyan Supreme Court, while [conceding some irregularities](#), ultimately concluded that the overall results were [credible](#).

The official results of all six races, however, were not publicly released until July 18. Despite being legally required to publish the official results within two weeks of their announcement, Chairman Hassan repeatedly delayed their release. In the interim, there were many allegations of fraud and impropriety, concerns the delay did nothing to assuage. Many speculated that the delay was caused by [discrepancies](#) in vote totals across the six races that could undermine the validity of the results of the presidential contest.

The IEBC Commissioners appeared in Parliament on July 16 to present the official results but told the members of the Justice and Legal Affairs Committee that they were unable to, [claiming the final tally was still not ready](#). It was rumored that there was dissent within the nine-member commission over the final tally and that some members of the commission were refusing to sign off on the results. When the IEBC returned again to Parliament on July 18, the commissioners were asked to swear an oath prior to releasing the official results. Chairman Hassan [refused](#) and led other commissioners out of the meeting, complaining that the requirement of swearing under oath was an insult to the commission. After a brief consultation, the commissioners returned to Parliament, took the oath, and [released the results](#).

While the 2013 elections were a significant improvement over the 2007–2008 contest, violence still took place [before](#) and [after](#) the elections—just to a much lesser degree. Nonetheless, the reduction in violence led many commentators to conclude that the elections were a success. But the controversy surrounding the official tally of the vote may be endangering this success. The belief in fair and just electoral procedures contributed greatly to the peaceful acceptance of the outcome of the elections in March both by voters and by politicians. Before the March general elections, confidence in Kenya's newly reformed political institutions was high, and many believed that this time there would not be the same opportunities for fraud and mismanagement that had accompanied all of Kenya's previous four general elections. Upon the declaration that Kenyatta had won the elections, presidential runner-up Raila Odinga called on his supporters to respect the new institutions and allow his electoral coalition CORD (the Coalition for Reform and Democracy) to dispute the results through the proper legal channels.

Unfortunately, after all that has happened since, it is unclear how much respect or trust Kenyans continue to have in their political institutions. Politicians seem wary of Kenya's political institutions. Raila Odinga promised that he and CORD would [boycott future elections](#) until changes within the IEBC take place. Even more troubling, public trust in Kenya's new institutions appears to be eroding. In early July a national survey conducted by Ipsos Synovate revealed that confidence in Kenya's new political institutions, including the Supreme Court and the electoral commission, had fallen precipitously over the course of the past few months. In particular, [confidence in the IEBC](#) had fallen by 30 percentage points—from a high of 62 percent in February to 32 percent less than five months later.

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ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS TO EASE GUINEA'S POLITICAL PARALYSIS?

Dr. Ashley Bybee

After six years of delays and bloody, violent protests, Guinea's Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) recently announced that the government and opposition parties had reached a U.N.-brokered agreement in which legislative elections would take place on September 24, 2013. Guinea's last legislative elections were held in 2002 under the previous regime of longtime autocrat Lansana Conté, who died in 2008. In December 2010, Alpha Condé came to power in Guinea's first presidential election and immediately found himself in the midst of the ongoing saga over the country's legislative elections. [more...](#)



Boys carry a teenager suffering from gunshot wounds, after security forces fired live rounds during an opposition protest in Conakry, Guinea, Thursday, April 25, 2013. (Source: AP).

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DIVIDED MILITARY REMAINS THREAT TO STABILITY IN MADAGASCAR AHEAD OF ELECTIONS

By Alexander Noyes

Citing a plot to "create a blood bath" and unseat transitional President Andry Rajoelina, security forces in Madagascar last week [warned](#) citizens against attending political rallies planned by aspiring presidential candidates. Earlier in the week, police dispersed a crowd of up to a [thousand](#) protesters with tear gas and arrested eight, including a presidential candidate, Laza Razafiarison, for holding unauthorized demonstrations. While the coup rumors may be just that, they provide Rajoelina with a convenient pretext to harass those opposed to his rule. Coup rumors and attempts are nothing new in Madagascar, with a number of plots suppressed over the past several years. Indeed, Rajoelina himself came to power in 2009 on the back of the military. Despite a pledge by the military to remain [neutral](#) during the oft-delayed upcoming elections—now tentatively scheduled for August 23, 2013—the security environment in Madagascar remains fragile, with myriad divides, competing interests, and rivalries within the security sector, which are likely to become more pronounced in the lead-up and aftermath of elections. [more...](#)



Malagasy policemen drag presidential hopeful Laza Razafiarison during his arrest on July 23, 2013. (FILE/NATION MEDIA GROUP).

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ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS TO EASE GUINEA'S POLITICAL PARALYSIS?

Dr. Ashley Bybee

After six years of delays and bloody, violent protests, Guinea's Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) recently announced that the government and opposition parties had reached a U.N.-brokered agreement in which legislative elections would take place on September 24, 2013. Guinea's last legislative elections were held in 2002 under the previous regime of longtime autocrat Lansana Conté, who died in 2008. In December 2010, Alpha Condé came to power in Guinea's first presidential election and immediately found himself in the midst of the ongoing saga over the country's legislative elections.



Boys carry a teenager suffering from gunshot wounds, after security forces fired live rounds during an opposition protest in Conakry, Guinea, Thursday, April 25, 2013. (Source: AP).

The 155-member National Transition Council appointed by the military junta that seized power in 2008 has since been acting as the country's parliament. Legislative elections have been repeatedly scheduled and then postponed for various reasons, among them difficulties with biometric voter registration, security concerns, and lack of organization.

CENI most recently stated that elections will take place on September 24, 2013. During negotiations leading to the U.N.-brokered agreement for elections in September, the government and opposition (ostensibly led by Cellou Dalein Diallo, who finished second to Condé in 2010 presidential elections) agreed to several previously disputed points, which bodes well for the future. The [right of Guineans living overseas to vote](#) was granted, and the controversy over the use of the South African company, Waymark, to prepare electoral lists was addressed by accepting the opposition position that two independent experts be allowed to review the electoral list. (The opposition previously asserted that Waymark had been [handpicked by Condé](#) and that the resulting list would expand his voting base.) The [10 concessions](#) granted to the opposition might allow the country to proceed with elections in September.

The perpetual delays have frustrated citizens who want parliamentary governance in Guinea, and the numerous resulting protests have brought the capital, Conakry, to a standstill on multiple occasions. Anti-government protests throughout 2012 resulted in dozens of injuries. The aggressive response of the police perpetuated the perception that security forces had been co-opted by the Condé regime to suppress his opposition. This political impasse has continued throughout 2013, with violent protests in Conakry, where at least [50 people have been killed](#) and close to a hundred injured since May. [Young, unemployed men](#) constitute the overwhelming majority of opposition protesters, as well as of the demonstrators who support Condé. On the surface, opposition rhetoric reflects anger over the violence and perceived fraud associated with the 2010 elections and the corruption and ineptness of the current regime. Under the surface, however, [deeper grievances exist](#).

The importance of ethnicity in Guinean politics is difficult to overstate. Although the 2010 presidential election was deemed by international observers to be free and fair, a closer look reveals it was marred by ethnic tensions between the Malinké (Condé's ethnic group) and Peul/Fulani (Diallo's ethnic group), which constitute 35 percent and 40 percent of the population, respectively. Diallo's supporters alleged that Condé's supporters organized riots in traditionally Peul strongholds of northern Guinea. To escape the riots, thousands of Peul voters fled their homes and were not able to cast their votes for Diallo. This has resulted in potentially inflammatory rhetoric from the opposition, which asserts it will [never again allow an election to be stolen](#) by the ruling party.

Ethnic conflict has also played out in Guinea's mining sector, where a protest on August 3, 2012, quickly [turned violent](#). Residents of the town of Zogota, where the Brazilian mining giant Vale has a large operation, vandalized the company's

facilities to protest its recruitment of outside workers at the expense of the local Guerzes and Tomas ethnic groups. The country's security forces opened fire on the protestors, killing five. Because the security forces are drawn largely from the same ethnic group as President Condé, this action reinforced perceptions of ethnic violence and tribal politics.

As recently as July 18, 2013, [98 people died and 160 were injured](#) following three days of ethnic violence in N'Zerekore (350 miles southeast of the capital). Conflict erupted when gas station guards from the Guerze ethnic group killed a man from the rival Konianke group whom they accused of theft. During the subsequent melee, some were burned alive while others were attacked with machetes, highlighting the long and violent history of ethnic tension between the two groups. Security forces have since been deployed and imposed a curfew in an attempt to restore order.

Condé is presiding over an unwieldy and fragile situation in Guinea, with a population growing increasingly frustrated with the delay of legislative elections, oppression at the hands of the security forces, and the continued use of divisive ethnic rhetoric. Moreover, the commonly held belief of opposition supporters that Condé is corrupt and personally benefiting from Guinea's mining sector while failing to develop the country for the economic benefit of the population may well be enough to provoke more public outcry and further protests. Although the recent agreement to hold legislative elections in September provides some hope for peace and political stability in Guinea, the increasingly evident ethnic tensions are a countervailing cause for despair.

Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

DIVIDED MILITARY REMAINS THREAT TO STABILITY IN MADAGASCAR AHEAD OF ELECTIONS

By Alexander Noyes

Citing a plot to “create a blood bath” and unseat transitional President Andry Rajoelina, security forces in Madagascar last week [warned](#) citizens against attending political rallies planned by aspiring presidential candidates. Earlier in the week, police dispersed a crowd of up to a [thousand](#) protesters with tear gas and arrested eight, including a presidential candidate, Laza Razafiarison, for holding unauthorized demonstrations. While the coup rumors may be just that, they provide Rajoelina with a convenient pretext to harass those opposed to his rule. Coup rumors and attempts are nothing new in Madagascar, with a number of plots suppressed over the past several years. Indeed, Rajoelina himself came to power in 2009 on the back of the military. Despite a pledge by the military to remain [neutral](#) during the oft-delayed upcoming elections—now tentatively scheduled for August 23, 2013—the security environment in Madagascar remains fragile, with myriad divides, competing interests, and rivalries within the security sector, which are likely to become more pronounced in the lead-up and aftermath of elections.



Malagasy policemen drag presidential hopeful Laza Razafiarison during his arrest on July 23, 2013. (FILE/NATION MEDIA GROUP).

As highlighted by Stephanie Burchard in the May 16 [edition](#) of Africa Watch, Madagascar’s four-year political crisis reached new heights in May this year when a promising political agreement—which secured pledges from both former president Marc Ravalomanana and Rajoelina not to run in the presidential election—collapsed after former first lady Lalao Ravalomanana (ostensibly representing Marc Ravalomanana’s camp) announced her candidacy. Rajoelina asserted that her candidacy nullified the pact and subsequently added his name to the list of candidates ultimately approved in May by the Special Electoral Court, which also unexpectedly included another former president, Didier Ratsiraka. In response to the candidacies of these three, the international community has withdrawn its support of elections until a new agreement can be reached. Worryingly, as noted by Burchard, each one of these candidates retains support from different factions within the security sector.

Madagascar has a tense history of civil-military relations, with a long record of security-sector involvement in the political process. Three major mutinies have occurred in just the last four years. After hearing whispers of a possible coup in April 2010, Rajoelina sacked the minister of the armed forces. A month later, a [mutiny](#) staged by elements within the gendarmerie that were rumored to [support](#) deposed president Ravalomanana was put down by loyal security forces. In November 2010, Colonel Charles Andrianasoavina, the architect of the March 2009 intervention that brought Rajoelina to power, [launched](#) an attempted coup with 20 other officers. Although the mutiny was suppressed, this extraordinary reversal reveals the tenuous and shifting nature of political allegiances within the military.

Another attempted mutiny was put down in [July](#) 2012. Although the demands of the mutineers were unclear, there was speculation that the coup attempt was intended to disrupt South African Development Community (SADC) talks between Ravalomanana and Rajoelina on the former president’s return to the island, as associates close to Rajoelina feared losing access to informal illicit networks if Ravalomanana were allowed to return. Reports have [alleged](#) that elements of the security services are involved in such illegal networks, including trafficking in drugs and natural resources.

In addition to granting his supporters access to lucrative patronage networks, Rajoelina appears to have retained the backing of several security factions through promotion and by granting them a high degree of influence in the political sphere, as evidenced by the inclusion of a number of top military leaders in Rajoelina’s official SADC delegations. Signaling the political power of certain elements of the security sector, Gal Désiré Ramakavelo, a former defense minister, [argued](#) that the military is the most important factor in Madagascar’s prolonged crisis: “resolution will come from neither President Rajoelina nor his predecessor Marc Ravalomanana, but from the army.”

Unfortunately, the security sector in Madagascar is far from a monolithic actor, as it is believed that Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka both enjoy continued support from various military factions. The formation of a new security grouping in 2009, the Special Intervention Forces, comprising military and gendarmerie officers loyal to Rajoelina, further complicates an already complex security environment. Regardless of how the current political impasse plays out, without significant reforms aimed at depoliticizing the military, the island's troubled civil-military relations and divided military are likely to continue to be major drivers of political instability, both in the short and medium term. If Rajoelina, Lalao Ravalomanana, and Ratsiraka are allowed to run in upcoming elections, these divides will only become more pronounced, raising the risk of widespread electoral violence, as seen in 2001–2002.

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ZIMBABWE: HEGEMONIC PEACE—AT LEAST FOR NOW

By Dr. Stephanie M Burchard

Despite concerns of a repeat of the violence associated with previous contests, voting in Zimbabwe's general elections on July 31, 2013, was conducted in a largely peaceful manner. According to the official results released by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), incumbent Robert Mugabe, 89, was reelected for the seventh time. His party, Zanu-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front), won a supermajority of parliamentary seats (160 of 210). Although there is posturing and bluster emanating from both sides, it appears that, for now, the immediate political future of Zimbabwe has been decided and it looks very similar to its past. What accounts for the relatively peaceful resurgence of Mugabe and Zanu-PF hegemony? [more...](#)



Robert Mugabe (Source: AP).

Dr. Stephanie Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

DRC—UN'S INTERVENTION FORCE OFF TO A SLOW START

By George F. Ward

More than four months have passed since the United Nations Security Council authorized the inclusion within the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) of an ["Intervention Brigade"](#) consisting of three infantry battalions, one artillery company, and one special force and reconnaissance company. The brigade, to be based in Goma, was given the challenging mission of conducting offensive operations to neutralize and disarm armed groups in the Eastern Congo. Two of the brigade's battalions have deployed to Goma, but operations so far seem to be limited to patrols in conjunction with other MONUSCO units and Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) army units. [more...](#)



In this file photo taken on Tuesday, October 23, 2012, M23 rebels conduct training exercises in Rumangabo, eastern Congo. (AP Photo/Stephen Wandera, File Photo).

Amb. (ret.) George F. Ward is the editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at IDA. He is a former U.S. Ambassador to Namibia.

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Robert Mugabe (Source: AP).

Two main complementary factors contributed to the peaceful but lopsided victory of Mugabe and Zanu-PF in the general elections: one, the maneuvering and politicking that took place well before the election provided Zanu-PF with several competitive advantages over the opposition, and two, the maneuvering and politicking, which took place out in the open and with the repeated approval of Zimbabwe's institutions, signaled to all actors that victory was all but assured for Zanu-PF. Ahead of the election, President Mugabe, in power since 1980, seemed quite [confident](#) of his chances against opposition challenger and former prime minister Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC (Movement for Democratic Change). As George Ward noted in the July 25 issue of *Africa Watch*, there were several indications prior to the election that Mugabe was poised for victory, among them that Mugabe and his party remained firmly in control of most political institutions, the press, and Zimbabwe's expansive security sector.

Furthermore, at each phase of the electoral process, there was evidence of incumbent pressure being exerted and successfully overriding objections from the opposition. After the volatile 2008 election—one of the closest in Zimbabwean history—and the political impasse that followed, Mugabe and Tsvangirai were forced to enter into an [uneasy alliance](#) as part of a unity government negotiated by the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The ruling party and opposition also agreed to approve a new constitution before subsequent elections could take place.

After four years of staunch [disagreement](#) and multiple efforts to stall the process, a new constitution was approved in March. The constitution was approved over the objections of many from the opposition but with the seemingly [reluctant endorsement of the MDC](#). Shortly after the signing of the new constitution in May, Mugabe began [lobbying for elections](#) to be held as soon as possible, perhaps as early as the end of June. The MDC objected to the holding of elections on such an abbreviated schedule, complaining that there [was insufficient time](#) to enact the political reforms obligated by the new constitution and to conduct a thorough and complete registration of voters. Again, the concerns of the MDC were overridden when at the end of May the Constitutional Court, using reasoning that ["defied logic,"](#) ruled that elections must be held by the end of July 2013. On June 13, Mugabe issued a [presidential decree](#) that set elections for July 31, giving Zimbabwe approximately six weeks to prepare. The voter registration effort took place in June and July but was reportedly incomplete because it resulted in the [exclusion of approximately 2 million eligible voters](#) and the inclusion of more than 1 million persons who were ineligible to vote. There were also accusations that the new voter role was biased in favor of Zanu-PF supporters.

In sum, the will of Zanu-PF prevailed at every phase of the process that led Zimbabwe toward the 2013 elections. While the opposition claims surprise at the lopsided outcome, given how the ruling party was able to impose its will over the constitutional and electoral processes, it seems there was little actual chance of dislodging Mugabe and Zanu-PF from power. With this knowledge and the relative ease with which the ruling party was able to secure victory after victory, resort

to violence was apparently unnecessary. Perhaps if Zanu-PF had perceived a credible threat to its power, violence akin to what took place between elections in 2008 would have occurred again this year. But from the position of Zanu-PF, what would violence have accomplished that steam-rolling the negotiating process and stacking the electoral landscape in its favor early and often could not? The previous violence was a direct product of waning support for the ruling party and the uncertainty surrounding the 2008 elections—the closest in Zimbabwe's history. As Zanu-PF regrouped and consolidated power through repeated political victories, it became obvious who held a preponderance of power in Zimbabwe and who was going to win the 2013 election. Peace, for now, has been achieved through political hegemony.

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More than four months have passed since the United Nations Security Council authorized the inclusion within the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) of an [“Intervention Brigade”](#) consisting of three infantry battalions, one artillery company, and one special force and reconnaissance company. The brigade, to be based in Goma, was given the challenging mission of conducting offensive operations to neutralize and disarm armed groups in the Eastern Congo. Two of the brigade’s battalions have deployed to Goma, but operations so far seem to be limited to patrols in conjunction with other MONUSCO units and Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) army units.



In this file photo taken on Tuesday, October 23, 2012, M23 rebels conduct training exercises in Rumangabo, eastern Congo. (AP Photo/Stephen Wandera, File Photo).

The creation of the Intervention Brigade was more of a re-set than a new mission for MONUSCO. The UN force already had the authority under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations “to use [all necessary means](#) . . . [to] ensure the effective protection of civilians.” MONUSCO’s image and reputation had been tarnished, however, when forces of the March 23 Movement (M23) captured the city of Goma (population over 1 million) in November 2012 while UN peacekeepers stood by. Although the UN Security Council’s resolution condemns the actions of all of the armed groups present in the Eastern DRC, the principal target of the Intervention Brigade has been understood to be the M23 group, which is widely believed to have received support from the governments of Uganda and Rwanda.

Without rushing to judgment on the question of whether the Intervention Brigade will ultimately succeed in achieving its ambitious objectives, it seems that progress has been slow. At the end of July, in his first [encounter with the press](#), Brigadier General James Mwakilobwa, the Tanzanian officer serving as brigade commander, faced questions about when the force would become fully operational. He responded that the brigade was already active in training, terrain familiarization, and carrying out patrols alongside other MONUSCO units. He admitted that the brigade had not yet encountered M23 forces, but he asserted, “Goma will never fall again as long as the [Intervention Brigade] is on the ground.” The brigade is now at 75 percent strength, and the arrival of the remaining battalion from Malawi is said to be imminent. The two other battalions are from South Africa and Tanzania.

It is quite likely that the brigade, along with other elements of MONUSCO, will be able to defend Goma and provide more breathing room for the DRC’s army (FARDC), which is conducting operations against M23. If the brigade is to achieve its larger mission of neutralizing and disarming the M23 and other armed groups in the Eastern DRC, however, it will have to overcome a number of obstacles:

- [Geographical Challenges](#)—MONUSCO’s 17,000 soldiers have responsibility for an area the size of Western Europe. In the strife-torn eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, there is only one blue helmet per 10–15 square kilometers. For the brigade to operate over these distances, it would need mobility assets (helicopters) and surveillance assets. So far, the UN has procured one unarmed Italian surveillance [unmanned aerial vehicle](#) for use in the Eastern DRC. This action is a start, but much more will need to be done if the brigade is to go beyond the defense of Goma.
- [Protection of Civilians](#)—Innocent civilians have been the victims of the wars in the Eastern Congo, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are concerned that offensive actions by the Intervention Brigade could result in rebel retaliation against other MONUSCO forces, which have as their primary mission the protection of civilians. NGOs fear that aid workers could end up being caught in the middle. Nineteen international NGOs, led by World Vision, expressed these concerns in a [joint letter](#) to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. These concerns need to be taken seriously.

- Opposition from Rwanda—Both Rwanda and Uganda claim to have withdrawn their material support of M23 in late 2012. What remains is rather intense Rwandan criticism of MONUSCO and the FARDC. On July 15, 2013, the Rwandan government released an official statement accusing the FARDC and MONUSCO of “[bombing](#)” [Rwandan territory](#). At the same time, the Rwandan Ambassador to the United Nations sent a [letter](#) to U.S. Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo, in her role as president of the UN Security Council for the month, accusing the Intervention Brigade of discussing collaboration with Hutu rebels linked to the Rwandan genocide of 1994. [Rwandan media](#) feature sensational reports of alleged MONUSCO participation in war crimes and collaboration with those guilty of genocide. As long as the 2,000-strong M23 can rely on Rwandan political protection and, quite possibly, physical sanctuary, the Intervention Brigade’s task may amount to Mission Impossible.

Amb. (ret.) George F. Ward is the editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at IDA. He is a former U.S. Ambassador to Namibia.

SATA FACES RENEWED CRITICISM AMID INCREASING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN ZAMBIA

By Alexander Noyes

Following a troubling pattern of low-level political violence in Zambia over the past year, clashes were [reported](#) between supporters of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) opposition party and the ruling Patriotic Front (PF) in the run-up to parliamentary by-elections in Chipata on July 25, 2013. This incident follows previous violence surrounding other by-elections in November 2012 and February 2013. Taken together, these instances of election-related violence mark a departure from previous elections in Zambia, which historically have been relatively peaceful. Zambian President Michael Sata used the November 2012 and February 2013 violence as convenient pretexts to harshly clamp down on opposition parties and other groups opposed to his rule. Just last week, Sata faced renewed [criticism](#) of his human rights record, as MMD leader Nevers Mumba accused Sata of tarnishing the image of Zambia since coming into office in 2011. [more...](#)



Zambia's President Michael Sata speaks to journalists at the 18th African Union summit in Addis Ababa, January 30, 2012. (Reuters).

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UGANDA'S OIL SECTOR: ON THE RIGHT TRACK?

By Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee

The discovery of oil in Uganda's western region has raised hopes that this lucrative natural resource will boost the country's economy and provide opportunities for citizens to participate in its economic development. Production isn't expected to commence until 2015, however, so it will be some time before the international community will be able to assess Uganda's progress toward capitalizing on this discovery for the benefit of the population. [more...](#)



In this 2010 photo, an oil well undergoes testing in the Lake Albertine region of western Uganda. Even before the first drops flow, Uganda's oil sector is beset by bribery allegations against officials, tax-related cases abroad that cost the government millions in legal fees, and the alleged interference of a president whose firm control of the sector worries transparency campaigners. (AP Photo/Monitor Publications Ltd, File).

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Zambia's President Michael Sata speaks to journalists at the 18th African Union summit in Addis Ababa, January 30, 2012. (Reuters).

Mumba has a good deal of evidence on which to base his case. The leaders of the two main opposition parties, Mumba of MMD and Hakainde Hichilema of the United Party for National Development (UPND), have both been [arrested](#) numerous times in the last year on charges including defamation, corruption, and unlawful assembly. Hichilema has already been arrested twice in 2013. In addition, media figures who have voiced dissent and former officials have been [detained](#) on various charges. At the end of July, other members of the media were arrested and several critical websites [blocked](#). Such hard-line tactics from Sata have led to a chorus of domestic and international criticisms, with some warning of an increasingly authoritarian government in Zambia. Earlier this year, Hichilema [asserted](#), "This country is deteriorating by the day and being run like a dictatorship. . . We are not being allowed to exercise our human rights of freedom of assembly, association or expression. The police are working against us and we are being taken in and out of detention on flimsy charges."

Sata has pushed back at his domestic and international critics, defending his government's actions as not politically motivated. Kennedy Sakeni, Sata's spokesman, responded to Mumba's criticism last week, [saying](#), "The human rights record of our government is above board." Although the evidence suggests otherwise, he went on to claim: "The opposition criticizes the government and they criticize the president and none of them is ever arrested or detained for criticizing the president." Sakeni expressed similar sentiments earlier this year, [asserting](#), "This perception that the government is authoritarian and is persecuting opposition leaders is neither here nor there. . . The police are working independently and there is no political persecution...we will not allow citizens to violate the laws and think they will get away with it." Regardless of which party is ultimately responsible for recent bouts of electoral violence, such incidents provide Sata and the PF with a pretext to continue their suppression of the opposition and frame their response as a law-and-order operation.

Recent incidents of poll violence in July and February of this year and in November 2012 mark a significant departure from previous elections in Zambia, which have been more or less peaceful. This violence, combined with the ensuing strong-arm reaction of Sata's government, will further escalate political divisions in Zambia. A factor that has played a role in leading to these heightened political divisions is Sata's use of a polarizing political strategy, which, as [outlined](#) by Nic Cheeseman and Marja Hinfelaar, was used to distinguish the PF from the MMD in past elections. In Zambia's tense political climate, limited outbreaks of political violence are likely to persist in the near to medium term, although violence is likely to be contained at the local level. If opposition groups were to band together and protest Sata's clampdown, however, they could pose a threat to Sata and the PF's political fortunes, especially as the opposition gains traction with international actors concerned about Sata's increasingly hard-line tendencies.

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The discovery of oil in Uganda's western region has raised hopes that this lucrative natural resource will boost the country's economy and provide opportunities for citizens to participate in its economic development. Production isn't expected to commence until 2015, however, so it will be some time before the international community will be able to assess Uganda's progress toward capitalizing on this discovery for the benefit of the population.

Early indications are not encouraging. There are [reports](#) that senior government officials and military personnel are taking advantage of a [moratorium on land titles](#) in the western region to acquire large swaths of land where oil has been discovered. This is viewed by local residents as an egregious misuse of power to secure resources that are rightly theirs. That traditional chiefs are condoning this behavior is perceived as a betrayal by local residents, who accuse chiefs of collaborating with government officials to sell their ancestral lands.

The decision to construct an oil refinery in Uganda has also generated significant concern. Under the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) several communities are slated to be "relocated" (evicted) from their land to make way for the proposed refinery. While many commend the government for its commitment to a local refinery and maximizing its benefits to the local population, it is unclear whether the government plans to provide sufficient compensation for affected families. Reports from angry residents in Hoima have already surfaced. They maintain that the government is not only failing to provide fair compensation for their property, but also that government agents are [coercing landowners](#) into signing consent forms. Local residents are also concerned about whether their new homes will be located on fertile soil with ample rainfall or in remote, arid locations that are not conducive to farming.

Uganda's subsistence farmers, whose families number around [4.2 million, or 79 percent of all households](#), are the country's most vulnerable population. History indicates that oil-producing nations tend to neglect their non-oil sectors, particularly agriculture, to the detriment of local farmers. Even prior to oil production coming on line, the growth of Uganda's agriculture sector has lagged the rest of the economy. According to the [Uganda Bureau of Statistics](#), total GDP at constant prices grew 25 percent from fiscal year 2007/2008 to 2011/2012. The agricultural sector grew only 9 percent in the same period. Agriculture's share in national GDP has actually decreased, from [16.6 percent in 2007/2008 to 13.8 percent in 2011/2012](#). Although the government invests only 4 percent of its national budget in agriculture, 66 percent of employment is in that sector.

Once production begins, the oil sector will be important for Uganda's economy. With an estimated [2.5 billion barrels in reserves](#), Uganda has the capacity to join the ranks of mid-sized oil producers. Revenues from oil will be considerable, but not transformative. To avoid a scenario in which Uganda would be overly dependent on a single and exhaustible resource, it must not neglect investment in the non-oil sector.

Focusing on agriculture would not only help create a diversified economy, but also would support the majority of Ugandans, who are farmers. The Ugandan government has already signed the [Maputo Declaration](#), which commits it to allocating 10 percent of its national budget to agricultural development. Investments in tourism, infrastructure, and



In this 2010 photo, an oil well undergoes testing in the Lake Albertine region of western Uganda. Even before the first drops flow, Uganda's oil sector is beset by bribery allegations against officials, tax-related cases abroad that cost the government millions in legal fees, and the alleged interference of a president whose firm control of the sector worries transparency campaigners. (AP Photo/Monitor Publications Ltd, File).

education to build the technical expertise of Uganda's human resources are also necessary. Moreover, to counteract currency appreciation (typically associated with "[Dutch disease](#)"), Uganda will have to increase non-oil exports and local demand for domestic produce. Tariffs may help to protect local farmers from less expensive food imports.

There are also structural reasons to doubt Uganda will avoid the afflictions typically associated with the "[resource curse](#)." Uganda, widely regarded as being under the firm control of President Museveni, has a poor track record in political and human rights, civil liberties, and other measures of democracy. The [lack of information dissemination](#)—a hallmark of Museveni's autocratic style—significantly impedes the ability of civil society to demand government accountability of the oil sector. Furthermore, Uganda lacks legislation to ensure effective regulation of the petroleum sector. Assuming that President Museveni approaches the petroleum sector in the same secretive way that he approaches other aspects of governance, he will probably not tolerate calls from civil society or pressure from the international community for increased transparency. Rather, Museveni and those close to him will likely manage the country's oil sector in the same corrupt manner with which they control other aspects of Ugandan society.

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MADAGASCAR, ZIMBABWE, AND THE POLITICS OF ELECTION OBSERVATION

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

After four years of false starts, Madagascar is scheduled to hold elections on October 25, 2013. A newly appointed Special Electoral Court (CES) reviewed the previous slate of presidential candidates and removed several highly controversial figures, including current transitional president [Andry Rajoelina](#) and the wife of Marc Ravalomanana, the president that Rajoelina deposed in 2009. It is hoped that these elections will end the Malagasy crisis by restoring a legitimate government to power and lead to the lifting of economic and political sanctions. [more...](#)




Transitional President Andry Rajoelina speaks to a crowd in Antananarivo in 2009. (Source: AP.)

Dr. Stephanie Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

KENYATTA'S VISIT TO CHINA—LESS THAN MEETS THE EYE?

By George F. Ward

Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, under indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged offenses committed during the 2008 post-election violence and shunned by most western nations, recently made his first extended foray outside Africa. He visited Russia, China, and the United Arab Emirates from August 15 to August 27, 2013. The advance media focus within Kenya was on the China visit, which produced headline-grabbing expectations. The aid agreements that Kenyatta won in Beijing may be less significant than the Kenyan side might have hoped, however, and some of the subsequent questioning reactions in Kenya may illustrate the maturation of the African connection to China. [more...](#)



Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping shake hands during a signing ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, Monday, August 19, 2013. (AP Photo/How Hwee Young, Pool.)

Amb. (ret.) George F. Ward is the editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at IDA. He is a former U.S. Ambassador to Namibia.

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MADAGASCAR, ZIMBABWE, AND THE POLITICS OF ELECTION OBSERVATION

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

After four years of false starts, Madagascar is scheduled to hold elections on October 25, 2013. A newly appointed Special Electoral Court (CES) reviewed the previous slate of presidential candidates and removed several highly controversial figures, including current transitional president [Andry Rajoelina](#) and the wife of Marc Ravalomanana, the president that Rajoelina deposed in 2009. It is hoped that these elections will end the Malagasy crisis by restoring a legitimate government to power and lead to the lifting of economic and political sanctions.



Transitional President Andry Rajoelina speaks to a crowd in Antananarivo in 2009. (Source: AP.)

[Recent developments](#) in Madagascar have renewed hope that there may be an end to its [political crisis](#). The first round of a presidential election is scheduled to be held on October 25, 2013. Legislative elections and a possible second round presidential election are scheduled to be held on December 20. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been participating in a [several-years'-long negotiation](#) with the various parties involved in the Malagasy political stalemate. This past year alone has seen a gentleman's agreement abrogated by most political stakeholders; the suspension of international electoral assistance by several organizations; months of debate and deliberation among a variety of political actors, including at least four former Malagasy chief executives; and a renewed agreement for elections to take place, based on the consent of some—but not all—of the relevant political stakeholders. While transitional president Andry [Rajoelina](#) has agreed not to participate (again), there has been some indication from the [Ravalomanana camp that it is not satisfied with the new agreement](#). In addition, on August 27, the CES determined that the [deadline had passed](#) for the Ravalomananas to nominate a replacement candidate. Rajoelina, meanwhile, has been free to [campaign](#) on behalf of his preferred candidate(s). The court's decision may create problems in the lead-up to the election if the Ravalomananas and their supporters continue to feel that their interests are not being represented and that the electoral landscape is tilted in favor of Rajoelina's interests.

Because it has become the norm, international observers likely will participate in some fashion in the upcoming Malagasy elections. Given that SADC and the African Union (AU) were observers in Madagascar's last elections held in 2006, it is also likely that they will observe this election. In 2002, the AU adopted a set of principles intended to outline the functioning and conduct of democratic elections in Africa. These principles underwrote SADC's "Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections in the SADC region," which were adopted in 2004. Effectively, [both documents](#) establish that democratic elections require full participation and a level playing field for all political parties to contest office.

Despite the protestations of the opposition and the presence of circumstantial evidence of fraud, both bodies endorsed the July 31 Zimbabwean election as peaceful and free—although there was some dissension within the [SADC observer mission itself](#). The Zimbabwean election was the 30th election that SADC has observed since 1999; it was also the 30th election that SADC has endorsed. SADC has never condemned an election—the most it has done is release [ambiguous](#) statements on questionable election conduct. If SADC dispatches an observer mission to Madagascar, barring extreme violence that no one could overlook, SADC will most certainly certify the next Malagasy election as free and fair.

According to Judith Kelley, professor at Duke University and one of the foremost experts on international electoral observation, oftentimes [election observers base their electoral judgments](#) on factors other than the integrity of elections. This is especially true of intergovernmental organizations, such as the AU and SADC, where there is very little degree of separation between the decision-making body and the heads of state. Thus, individual members or countries can exert significant pressure based on their own domestic political or diplomatic concerns. This criticism has also been leveled at the [European Union \(EU\)](#) with respect to several of its observer missions. There is further evidence that the locus of decision-making for SADC and other regional bodies in Africa specifically lies within [national capitals](#) of member states and not primarily within the bodies themselves.


The certification of elections, regardless of quality, does not promote democracy. In fact, it may undermine democratic growth and development, because fraudulent, compromised elections promote democratic stagnation. That it can be predicted months in advance how SADC will respond to the quality of a tentatively scheduled election in Madagascar suggests that the politics behind election observation may overshadow the election itself. The newly appointed [vice chair of SADC](#), Robert Mugabe, is unlikely to participate in any critical oversight of a significant election, lest he open future or past Zimbabwean elections to closer scrutiny.

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Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping shake hands during a signing ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, Monday, August 19, 2013. (AP Photo/How Hwee Young, Pool).

Kenyan government sources placed Kenyatta's trip in the context of a new policy to "[look East](#)." In fact, the Kenyan relationship with China is not new. The two countries have enjoyed 50 years of close political and economic relations since Kenyan independence (and Chinese trading relationships with East Africa date at least to the 15th century). Over the past decade, China has made significant investments in Kenya and provided debt financing for infrastructure projects.

The real new element is that the trip was, as one Nairobi news website characterized it, "[a coded message to the 'cold' West](#)." President Obama's decision to visit neighboring Tanzania, and not Kenya, during his recent Africa trip had been interpreted as related to the ICC indictment. The same had been true of the lack of warmth in the UK government's welcome to Kenyatta when he traveled to London for the recent conference on Somalia. China, in contrast, emphasized its commitment to establishing "[a comprehensive and cooperative partnership featuring equality, mutual trust and mutual benefit](#)."

Over the past decade, China has invested significantly, but not massively, in Kenya. According to the Chinese Ambassador to Kenya, China, with [\\$474 million invested](#), is Kenya's largest source of foreign direct investment. In addition, Chinese companies have completed several important infrastructure projects, including a superhighway. But what some Kenyans were looking for in the Kenyatta visit was a [game-changer](#), a massive project that would symbolize Beijing's decision to cultivate a deep relationship with Kenya. China was seen to have already made that sort of commitment to Tanzania, where it is involved in financing and building a [\\$10 billion seaport](#), and in Ethiopia, where a Chinese shoemaker is expected to create 100,000 jobs in seven years. Many Kenyans hoped that the Chinese would make a large-scale commitment to the development of a new port at Lamu and the related transportation corridor to South Sudan and Ethiopia.

Apart from demonstrating that Kenya has alternatives to partnership with the West, what did Kenyatta's trip accomplish in concrete terms? The answer is quite a bit, but perhaps less than had been expected. Kenyatta came home with a big deal, but perhaps not a game-changer. The central result of the visit was a [\\$5 billion package](#) of Chinese loans for a standard-gauge railway linking the port of Mombasa to the border town of Malaba, energy-related projects, wildlife protection, and other unspecified economic partnerships. In addition, China has promised assistance to Kenya in combating the poaching of valuable wildlife. There was no Chinese commitment, however, to curbing demand for rhino horn or elephant ivory, which provides incentives to poaching. No specific mention was made of a Chinese commitment to the Lamu port/transportation corridor, but there was a pledge of continued dialogue and consultation on investment opportunities.

The Kenyan public reaction to the trip was positive, but not without constructive criticism. The influential Daily Nation lauded the \$5 billion loan package, but noted that few details on the deals had been made public. In an editorial [it said](#) that the government “has a duty to release all of the details disclosing the conditions set which will help the public gauge how China will benefit.” [David Owiro](#) of the prestigious Institute for Economic Affairs in Nairobi noted that China could not easily take over the roles played by western countries in Kenya’s economic development and trade. He stressed the importance of European markets; revenue from American tourists; and the roles of western nongovernmental organizations, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Owiro also emphasized that Kenya needs to be careful about increasing its debt load. The Chinese loans will increase Kenya’s debt by almost 50 percent, adding significantly to the \$2.6 billion annually that the country already pays in debt service.

The net result is that President Kenyatta made the political point that he has alternatives to partnership with the West, but he failed to demonstrate that the relationship with China will unlock the massive resources needed to realize Kenya’s ambitious infrastructure dreams.

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SOUTH AFRICA: STRIKES ARE NOT THE MAIN PROBLEM—SLOW GROWTH IS

By George F. Ward

Miners in South Africa's important gold sector put down their tools on September 3, 2013, joining [120,000 other striking workers](#) in the country's auto manufacturing and construction industries. These strikes are a serious challenge. They are costly and damage South Africa's reputation among investors. They are not, however, the main problem for South Africa's economy. Slow economic growth is, and there does not appear to be an easy solution. [more...](#)



A view of Doornkop Gold Mine, about 30 km west of Johannesburg, South Africa Wednesday, September 4, 2013. A strike by tens of thousands of South African gold miners severely affected production in the struggling industry on Wednesday. There were no reports of violence, and two mining companies reached a settlement with their workers. (AP Photo/Themba Hadebe).

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GHANA AND CHINA: A BILATERAL BALANCING ACT

Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee

Ghana and China have a long history of excellent diplomatic and economic relations, dating back more than half a century, when the two countries signed a Friendship Treaty. Since that time, relations have generally continued to thrive. Some recent incidents involving Chinese workers in Ghana have, however, prompted considerable backlash against the Asian superpower, even though trade between the two countries and Chinese investment in Ghana are flourishing. In 2010, for example, the Ghanaian government signed a total of [\\$13 billion in loan agreements](#) with Chinese state entities. [more...](#)

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As sub-Saharan Africa's most advanced economy, South Africa is in a unique position. It is a member of the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) of emerging economies. It is also the economic leader of a continent otherwise composed of entities that have yet to develop even to "frontier" status.

The other countries in both groups have been growing more rapidly than the South African economy for at least the past decade. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) [economic growth](#) in the other BRICS ranged from 11 percent to 5.5 percent annually in the period 2007–2012. In the same period, South African economic growth lagged, exceeding 6 percent annually only in one calendar quarter and dropped as low as –2 percent. A similar picture emerges when comparing South Africa to other sub-Saharan African economies. The [World Bank](#) reports that sub-Saharan Africa enjoyed robust growth of 4.7 percent in 2012. Without South Africa, which [grew only 2.5 percent in 2012](#), the continent would have grown much more—5.8 percent.

Unfortunately for South Africa, the comparisons for the immediate future are not much better. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that the BRIC group (excluding South Africa) will slow down a bit, but still will grow [6.6 percent annually](#) through 2020. Continued growth of around 5 percent annually is also projected for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. South Africa is projected to continue to lag, with [growth not exceeding 4 percent](#) until 2015.

In terms of South Africa's security and stability, the most serious impact of slow growth is a continuing high level of unemployment. David Lipton, the First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF pointed out in a [recent speech in South Africa](#) that one in two young South Africans is unemployed. At the same time, Lipton stressed, real wage growth has outstripped productivity growth, resulting in a significant competitiveness problem for South African industry. The sizable wage increases demanded by striking workers would, under South Africa's labor laws, apply to entire sectors, including small employers that can ill afford to pay more, and therefore would promote continued economic stagnation.

Ending this pernicious cycle will require both economic acumen and political courage. Given the track record of President Zuma's government, which reflects the entanglement of politics with special economic interests of powerful labor unions and state-controlled enterprises, the former is in greater supply than the latter. Nevertheless, some senior figures in the South African ruling establishment recognize that prompt and decisive action is necessary.



A view of Doornkop Gold Mine, about 30 km west of Johannesburg, South Africa Wednesday, September 4, 2013. A strike by tens of thousands of South African gold miners severely affected production in the struggling industry on Wednesday. There were no reports of violence, and two mining companies reached a settlement with their workers. (AP Photo/Themba Hadebe).

What might a program to increase employment and stimulate growth look like? In its recent economic survey of South Africa, the [OECD made several recommendations](#) for increasing employment, among them:

- Curtailing the extension of collective bargaining agreements to entire economic sectors.
- Implementing a broad package of measures to reduce youth unemployment, including wage subsidies, training, and age-differentiated minimum wages.
- Protecting the flexibility of temporary employment.
- Reducing barriers to entrepreneurship by simplifying regulations.
- Strengthening competition and liberalizing the foreign trade and investment regimes.
- Fostering greater competition, including by unbundling the functions of state-controlled communications and transport monopolies.

In addition, South Africa is going to need to invest in infrastructure, especially electrical generating capacity. Doing that without increasing the tax burden on the pressured middle class will require a willingness by the government to focus on efficiency and take on entrenched interests. Unless the government acts decisively, forecasts for the South African economy will continue to be gloomy.

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Ghana and China recently [reaffirmed their deep and historic friendship](#) on the 52nd anniversary of the signing of the Friendship Treaty between the two countries. Government officials acknowledged that there have been challenges in recent years, but recognize that this mutually beneficial relationship is too important to allow it to suffer.

Over the last few years, illegal gold mining in Ghana by Chinese immigrants has sparked significant debate over the economic benefit derived from the Chinese presence. The South China Morning Post estimates that approximately [50,000 prospectors](#) have left China for Ghana since 2005, entering Ghana on tourist visas from neighboring countries. Ghanaians complain that illegal gold miners threaten the livelihoods of small-scale Ghanaian miners, depriving them of possible sources of income and reducing the economic benefit of the resource for the country. Many have expressed concern about [violence](#) breaking out at mining sites. Also, the Chinese have been accused of damaging local environments through the use of heavy machinery that contributes to deforestation and water pollution, and ignoring local laws. That these accusations are becoming more common is exacerbating tensions between local populations and the Chinese.

This practice of illegal gold mining led to the June 2013 [arrest, alleged mistreatment](#), and deportation of 169 Chinese miners in Ghana's Ashanti region. Several sources have reported that prior to their repatriation to China, the departing Chinese [auctioned their personal weapons](#) to local Ghanaians, including police personnel. The existence and potential proliferation of weapons among Chinese workers and local Ghanaians poses a threat to stability in these areas.

Sensitivity surrounding the Chinese presence was manifested in early August when Chinese-manufactured [tanks](#) driven by Chinese military personnel caused some commotion. Some media reports speculated that the Ghanaian armed forces were employing Chinese military personnel in anticipation of unrest following the Supreme Court's verdict on the contested presidential election. Although it appears that the tanks were in reality part of a legitimate military equipment transfer, the incident nonetheless reveals the high level of suspicion surrounding the Chinese presence.

These examples demonstrate the balancing act that both parties must consider if they wish to preserve the mutually advantageous relationship that they have enjoyed for the last 52 years. Chinese government officials must balance their obligation to scold illegal miners for failing to abide by local norms while continuing to urge the Ghanaian government to respect the miners' legitimate rights. They must also consider the large loans Chinese workers have taken out in China to establish mining operations in Ghana. Some miners deported from Ghana might never see a return on their investment, leaving them potentially [bankrupt and indebted](#) to friends, relatives, and other lenders.

From the Ghanaian perspective, government officials must weigh the political, economic, and other benefits received from this strategic partnership, such as the granting of [111 scholarships](#) to Ghanaian students to study in China, against the potential economic and security threat illegal Chinese miners pose to locals. For now, both sides seem [committed](#) to resolving the issue of illegal mining to cultivate a mutually beneficial relationship and share prosperity. The future trajectory of this relationship, however, is not so certain.

Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

POLITICAL REFORM IN BURKINA FASO: CONCESSION OR CONSOLIDATION?

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

Blaise Compaoré, president of Burkina Faso since leading a military coup in 1987, has been facing mounting pressure over the past few years to liberalize his regime. After significant [protests](#) broke out in 2011 and the military reportedly [mutinied](#), the Burkinabé president agreed to enact political reforms to quell dissent and opposition. The constituting of a Senate (how many senators, how they will be selected, who will appoint them, etc.) is one proposed reform that has been discussed, but the specifics of its creation have sparked renewed protests across Burkina Faso by those who argue that the Senate itself is unnecessary. Critics worry that this new Senate will only serve to further entrench Compaoré, who is scheduled to step down from power in 2015. Amid protest and complaint, an [assassination attempt](#) on the President's life reportedly took place at the end of August 2013. [more...](#)



Burkina Faso and surrounding area.
(Source: CIA.)

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EAST AFRICAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION—NO EASY TASK

George F. Ward

Regional Economic Communities (RECs) play an important role in the political and economic architecture of Africa. Although most were formed originally to promote subregional economic integration, they are now seen as the political and economic building blocks of the African Union. In the Southern African and West African subregions, REC alignments are mostly logical and straightforward. This is not the case in East Africa, where overlapping memberships reflect competing interests, differing national aspirations, and historical evolution. Recent developments within the East African Community point to tensions within the organization. [more...](#)

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Burkina Faso and surrounding area.
(Source: CIA.)

In late August, a former member of Compaoré's presidential guard was shot to death after he broke into the Presidential palace, reportedly intending to assassinate the president. Compaoré, a former captain in the Burkinabé military, came to power as the result of a military coup in 1987 in which then-president Thomas Sankara was assassinated. During his first few years in power, Compaoré faced challenges from within the military and was accused of [politically motivated executions](#). In 1991, voters in Burkina Faso passed a constitutional referendum to restore multiparty elections. Compaoré and his political party, the Congress for Democracy and Progress, have won all the elections that have since been held. In 2000, executive [term limits were adopted](#) that would restrict the president to serving only two 5-year terms. The constitutional court later determined that term limits could not be applied retroactively, and thus, Compaoré's previous stints in office did not count toward his term limits. He won presidential elections again in 2005 and 2010. He is currently not eligible to run for president in 2015.

After months of student protests and army rebellions, President Compaoré's government announced in June 2011 that it had created a commission to examine political reform and [constitutional change](#). In May 2013 a bill creating a Senate was passed. The [opposition alleges](#) that Compaoré intends to use the non-elected Senate, to which he will appoint many members, as a way to amend the constitution again to remove executive term limits. Despite winning the 2012 parliamentary elections, Compaoré's party only controls 55 percent of the seats in the National Assembly.

Compaoré, still in his early 60s, would not be the first African president to attempt to change the rules mid-game. Abdoulaye Wade in Senegal and Olusegun Obasanjo in Nigeria were both unsuccessful in their attempts to manipulate the laws to allow them to serve longer in office. Yoweri Museveni in Uganda was successful in removing term limits, and there has been speculation that neighboring Rwanda will overturn its term limits to allow Paul Kagame to run for a third term as president. [Chad, Gabon, Guinea, and Togo](#) have all amended their constitutions to change executive term limits. Because term limits can promote the [deepening of democracy](#), the attempt to subvert them is a signal that the quality of democracy is in jeopardy.

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The [website of the African Union](#) lists no fewer than five RECs that have East African states as members. Except for Somalia and South Sudan, every East African state is a member of at least two RECs, and three countries are members of three (see Table 1). Some overlapping memberships have historical origins. SADC (see table for identification of organizations), for example, has its roots in the front-line coalition against apartheid, of which Tanzania was an important member. Hence, Tanzania's continued membership in the southern group. Others, such as Burundi's membership in the mostly francophone ECCAS, may reflect linguistic affinities. The others—the EAC, IGAD, and COMESA—represent different approaches to subregional development at various periods in the subregion's history.

Table 1. East African Membership in RECs

Country	EAC	IGAD	COMESA	ECCAS	SADC
Burundi	X		X	X	
Djibouti		X	X		
Eritrea		X	X		
Ethiopia		X	X		
Kenya	X	X	X		
Rwanda	X		X		
Somalia	*	X			
South Sudan	*				
Sudan		X	X		
Tanzania	X				X
Uganda	X	X	X		

Source: African Union website: <http://www.au.int/en/>

*Prospective member

EAC=East African Community

IGAD= Intergovernmental Authority for Development

COMESA= Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

ECCAS= Economic Community of Central African States

SADC= Southern African Development Community

Because no single REC unites the countries of East Africa, it is difficult to build consensus on a program for subregional integration. The East African REC that seems to have the most momentum currently is the EAC. The grouping [credits itself](#) with establishing a Customs Union in 2005 and a Common Market in 2010. Its goals include a monetary union and a political federation. In reality, the Customs Union and Common Market exist on paper but are mostly aspirational. At an IDA-sponsored conference in late 2012 in Nairobi, East African business leaders indicated that the EAC was primarily a pet project of government leaders and of little practical significance.

This may be changing. Recently, the leaders of Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda seem to have formed a bloc within the EAC that aims to complete key infrastructure projects (with Burundi and South Sudan potentially joining in) and to fast-track a federal political arrangement within the EAC. The presidents of the three countries highlighted these goals during a [joint visit](#) to new port facilities in Mombasa, Kenya, on August 28, 2013. They have tasked their officials to provide by September 15 a roadmap to achieve the above goals, perhaps as early as at an EAC summit in November.

In leading this group, Kenya is motivated in part by its desire to maintain its status as the subregion's largest trading economy and to complete ambitious road, rail, pipeline, and port projects. Tanzania's ports are rivals to Kenya's. Both Uganda and Rwanda are landlocked and need more efficient access to ports, and Uganda needs an outlet for its emerging oil resources. Rwanda, frequently [at odds with Tanzania](#) over issues related to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, doubtless covets solidarity with both Uganda and Kenya.

Left out of this is Tanzania, which hosts the headquarters of the EAC in Arusha. One Kenyan commentator spoke of a "[southward drift](#)" by Tanzania and a preference to focus interest on SADC rather than the EAC. The view from Dar es Salaam is different, with an influential [Tanzanian newspaper opining](#), "An ambitious dream of the East African Community... to forge a political union is hanging in the balance as a result of member states flexing their muscles." In response to the emergence of these tensions, the EAC's executive organ, its [Council of Ministers](#), directed the chairperson of the Council, who happens to be a Ugandan, to prepare a report explaining any economic or diplomatic realignments that have sidelined Tanzania.

The EAC will survive these strains. The ambitious political integration agenda announced by the group of three will likely be pared down. At the same time, the probable accession of both South Sudan and Somalia to the EAC will reinforce the northern orientation of the group and could further strengthen Kenya's hand. Tanzania will quite probably want to preserve its SADC option as a useful lifeline.

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SOMALIA—PERSPECTIVES ON THE JUBA AGREEMENT

George F. Ward

The agreement signed on August 27, 2013, between the Somali federal government and the Juba interim administration was welcomed by Somalia's international and African partners. The accord, which places the slice of southern Somalia around the port city of Kismayo under the control of a clan leader linked to Kenya, is certainly significant, and the enthusiasm for it exhibited by both Kenya and Ethiopia is well justified. It is less clear that the Somali government has reason to be pleased. [more...](#)

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In this photo released by the African Union-United Nations Information Support Team, Sheik Ahmed Madobe, Commander of the Ras Kamboni Militia Brigade which is allied to the Somali National Army (SNA), is seen in Saa'moja, around 7 km northwest of the port city of Kismayo, in southern Somalia, Monday, Oct. 1, 2012. (AP Photo/AU-UN IST, Stuart Price).

GUINEA-BISSAU: LITTLE DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS DESPITE SMALL WINS

By Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee

On September 10, 2013, the parliament of Guinea-Bissau [rejected a bill](#) that would have granted amnesty to the military and civilian leaders of an April 2012 coup. The bill, proposed by the transitional government led by President Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo, required majority support for passage. It came close, gaining 40 of the 100 lawmakers' votes. Perhaps just as disconcerting was that 25 legislators were absent from the vote, according to the acting speaker, Braima Sori Djalo. [more...](#)

Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.



In this Saturday, Oct. 27, 2012 photo, Pansau Ntchama, center, accused of leading a failed Oct. 21 coup attempt, is restrained by soldiers as he is brought to Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, following his arrest. Gunmen led by Ntchama allegedly attacked a military base near the airport in Bissau last week, and six soldiers were killed in the clash. The apparent attempted coup was against the military junta that itself seized power in April. (AP Photo).

About IDA

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SOMALIA—PERSPECTIVES ON THE JUBA AGREEMENT

George F. Ward

The agreement signed on August 27, 2013, between the Somali federal government and the Juba interim administration was welcomed by Somalia's international and African partners. The accord, which places the slice of southern Somalia around the port city of Kismayo under the control of a clan leader linked to Kenya, is certainly significant, and the enthusiasm for it exhibited by both Kenya and Ethiopia is well justified. It is less clear that the Somali government has reason to be pleased.

After Kenya's army, operating as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), seized control of the port of Kismayo almost one year ago, Kenya faced three main challenges in southern Somalia:

- Continuing the fight against al-Shabaab.
- Managing its fractious Somali clan-based allies.
- Dealing with the new Somali government on a range of issues, including the status of the port of Kismayo and its revenues.

Although al-Shabaab's military fortunes have continued to decline, Kenya's other two challenges persisted. In addition to frictions with the government in Mogadishu over port issues, there were periodic outbreaks of fighting between clan-based militias in the area of Kismayo. In June, [dozens of people were killed](#) in fighting between forces loyal to Sheik Ahmed Mohamed Islaan "Madobe," leader of the Ras Kamboni militia and an ally of Kenya, and those of his rival, Barre Hirale, regarded as backed by the government in Mogadishu.

The [August 27 agreement](#), which was signed in Addis Ababa after a week of difficult negotiations under the watchful eye of the Ethiopian foreign minister, recognizes Madobe as leader of the interim Juba Administration for a period of two years. Madobe's administration will manage the port of Kismayo for six months, after which control will shift to the federal government. Port revenues, however, will continue to be used to pay for services in the Juba region. These provisions of the agreement neatly align with Kenya's interests by elevating the status of its militia ally and, indirectly, giving Kenya continued control of Kismayo, at least for now.

The agreement serves Ethiopian interests in a less direct manner. On the surface, the agreement might be seen as promoting the interests of its former enemy. Madobe had been a member of the short-lived Union of Islamic Courts, which was [ousted by an Ethiopian incursion in 2006](#). In addition, Ethiopia has long been seen as Kenya's rival in the contest for influence in the troubled southern region of Somalia. Even though these factors are real, Ethiopia may have gained something more important through the agreement—the further fragmentation of Somalia and the institutionalization of a loose form of federalism. Ethiopia, which has long feared Somali irredentism in the Ogaden region, hopes to avoid creation of a centralized Somali state.

Somali reactions to the Juba Agreement have been less positive and decidedly mixed. The Somali Current is a new website focused on Somali political affairs that portrays itself as independent and nonpartisan. On September 6, it [asserted](#) that the August 27 agreement "perpetuates the usual pattern of creating the false impression of incremental progress while practically weakening the foundation for establishing a credible and sustainable government in Somalia." The article also noted that even the provision for transfer of the port of Kismayo to central government control after six months is undermined by another provision that states the interim arrangement will continue until there is a final agreement on revenue sharing.



In this photo released by the African Union-United Nations Information Support Team, Sheik Ahmed Madobe, Commander of the Ras Kamboni Militia Brigade which is allied to the Somali National Army (SNA), is seen in Saa'moja, around 7 km northwest of the port city of Kismayo, in southern Somalia, Monday, Oct. 1, 2012. (AP Photo/AU-UN IST, Stuart Price).

A [commentary](#) by the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, a new Mogadishu-based think tank that also claims to be independent and nonpartisan, is less condemnatory. While concerned about the agreement's vague terms, the Heritage Institute sees it as offering some hope if the parties are able to work out an implementation roadmap with clear timelines. It gives the leaders of the federal government and of the Juba region credit for compromising for the sake of the nation: "The objectives of the Agreement, despite its flaws, are positive. The commitment to addressing the problems associated with a multitude of armed groups operating in the region is particularly positive."

Predictably, [al-Shabaab's reaction](#) to the new arrangements was more pointed. On September 12, the extremist group made Madobe's motorcade the target of an improvised-explosive device attack. The warlord escaped unhurt, but at least four in his party were killed. Al-Shabaab has been weakened, but not eliminated, and the group will continue to contest efforts by Kenya, Ethiopia, their surrogates, and the Somali federal government to bring order to the troubled southern region of Somalia.

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In reference to the vote, Djalo went on to say, "That's democracy. Every member voted according to his conscience." That statement is itself a sad commentary on the state of democracy in Guinea-Bissau. That the bill was not passed is commendable, but that 40 percent of the country's lawmakers voted to support granting immunity to the perpetrators of a military coup is not a positive indicator for a democracy, even a weak one. The large number of legislators absent for the vote is another negative indicator.

There were likely two sorts of motivations for those legislators who supported amnesty. One was personal interest—such as involvement in Guinea-Bissau's thriving drug trade—in protecting the coup leaders, who are often also involved. Other legislators may have been influenced or even intimidated by the transitional government, which is widely viewed as a puppet of General Antonio Indjai, Guinea-Bissau's powerful army chief of staff. One can speculate that the no-shows were opponents of the bill who were afraid to vote against the powerful military leaders.

The military is by far the most powerful institution in Guinea-Bissau, and its leaders effectively rule the country through their control over politicians. Opposing the military leadership is dangerous business, as [Justino Sa](#), a well-known political commentator recently found out. Speaking on a private radio station, he questioned why the military was so top heavy with older officers and relatively few young, enlisted soldiers. He was immediately interrogated by authorities following these comments, and he may face criminal charges for allegedly providing false information.

Despite this disturbing development, the United Nations Special Representative for Guinea-Bissau, [Jose Ramos Horta](#), [said on September 5](#), "the situation remains peaceful and we are on track to continuing the efforts on return to constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau." Moreover, he praised the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries, and the United Nations for helping to ensure that the country remains stable during this volatile period of transition back to constitutional rule. Although elections are currently scheduled to occur on November 24, Horta stated that a short delay due to lack of financing and logistical reasons is quite possible and would not destabilize the political situation. He admitted, however, that a longer delay would undermine what progress has been made in recent months and could result in significant instability.

Although Guinea-Bissau is one of the most coup-prone countries in the world, it is noteworthy that widespread physical violence rarely results from these seizures of power. This can be attributed partly to the extremely low expectations that the population has of its government. Perhaps best described as being in a perpetual state of "[stable instability](#)," Guinea-Bissau is plagued by frequent rebellions that rarely produce significant political change. One should not, however, mistake stability for democracy. In Guinea-Bissau, it is rather only a symptom of the failure of the state.



In this Saturday, Oct. 27, 2012 photo, Pansau Ntchama, center, accused of leading a failed Oct. 21 coup attempt, is restrained by soldiers as he is brought to Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, following his arrest. Gunmen led by Ntchama allegedly attacked a military base near the airport in Bissau last week, and six soldiers were killed in the clash. The apparent attempted coup was against the military junta that itself seized power in April. (AP Photo).

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WESTGATE: THE VIEW FROM NAKURU, NAIROBI, AND WASHINGTON, D.C.

By Stephanie M Burchard

As my Kenyan and American colleagues and I sat down to a late lunch in Nakuru, Kenya, after a full morning of interviews, we heard the news. On both televisions in the restaurant, Kenyan presenters were reporting that the Westgate mall was under attack. Initial reports suggested a botched robbery, but as the three of us around the table discussed what was known at the time—grenades and automatic weapons were used in tandem; an unknown number of masked assailants had stormed the mall—we agreed that things did not add up. “This doesn’t sound like typical Kenyan crime.” “Do robbers typically use grenades?” “You know who uses grenades. . . .” “Al Shabaab.” *more...*



People gather in Uhuru Park, Nairobi, Kenya, on Monday 23 September to donate blood. (Source: Author)

Dr. Stephanie Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

MALI—TOO EARLY TO PROCLAIM VICTORY

By George F. Ward

In a brief address on September 19, 2013, to the crowd assembled in Bamako for the inauguration of Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, French President Francois Hollande declared, “We have won this war; we have chased out the terrorists; we have secured the north. . . .” Although each of Hollande’s assertions is defensible in the short term, the outcome of the longer term effort to rid Mali of Islamic extremists and to unite the country politically, economically, and socially remains in doubt. *more...*



A French soldier stands alongside African troops who helped France take back Mali’s north earlier in the year, as they participate in a ceremony formally transforming the force into a United Nations peacekeeping mission, in Bamako, Mali, Monday, July 1, 2013. (AP Photo/Harouna Traore)

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At our table, we stated matter-of-factly that this was an act of terrorism. The three of us—two Americans and a Kenyan—came to this conclusion almost immediately, despite conflicting reports from the government of Kenya and its security forces that the attack on the posh Westgate mall was an attempted robbery gone wrong. “Al Shabaab.” We all grimly nodded. We knew it to be true.

It was late Saturday afternoon, September 21, in Nakuru, Kenya, deep in the heart of Rift Valley. We were some 100 miles northeast of Nairobi, where the siege was taking place. Earlier that morning, we had been visiting an informal settlement that housed between 5,000 and 6,000 [internally displaced persons](#) (IDPs) who had been victims of the 2007–2008 post-election violence. The purpose of our trip was to better understand the long-term effects of election violence. To that end, we had been talking to residents of some of Nakuru’s several IDP camps. In Rift Valley, one of the most profoundly affected areas of the post-election violence, some 60,000 IDPs remain in camps, waiting to be resettled. The government has made many promises since 2008 that the victims of the electoral violence will be compensated with land or money, but progress on this front has been slow.

The majority of the residents of the IDP camps that we talked to said they had voted in 2013 and would be voting in the next election, currently scheduled for 2017. The most common response—“It is my right as a Kenyan to vote”—speaks directly to the resilience of Kenyans. Many lost their homes and possessions—even family members and friends—and yet they still continue to believe in a democratic Kenya, one in which their vote and their voice matters.

Coming back to Nairobi on day two of what was ultimately a four-day siege was surreal for us. The city was simultaneously calm and hectic. We could hear the helicopters whirring above head, we saw the plumes of smoke rising from Westgate, and we could smell the fire. Amid this visceral chaos, many continued going about their business. People we encountered would start a conversation with, “Have you heard?” and then shake their heads slowly. And everyone knew someone who was affected by the attack. Although Nairobi is a city of over four million, it is a tight-knit community. This terrorist attack shook Kenya to the core.

There will be time in the coming weeks to assess the government’s response to the terrorist attack. There is still much not known about what took place, and the citizens of Kenya have more questions than answers. But the government should be commended for its emphasis on unity. Press conferences featured both President Kenyatta and opposition leader Raila Odinga appealing for calm and reassuring Kenyans that justice will be served. And it needs to be said again: the Kenyan people, who have faced many challenges in recent years, are resilient. It was apparent to me Saturday in Nakuru. It was apparent to me Sunday in Nairobi. And it is apparent to me today in Washington, D.C.



People gather in Uhuru Park, Nairobi, Kenya, on Monday 23 September to donate blood. (Source: Author)

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Hollande promised his Malian audience that France would retain sufficient forces in the region to thwart any threat, but his main emphasis was on nonmilitary support for Mali’s fragile democracy and on development assistance. As most French forces withdraw from Mali, moving to bases within the region or returning to France, the military burden will shift to Mali’s army and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

There are pockets of [good leadership and military competence](#) within Mali’s army, but many of the force’s 7,000 soldiers have little or no training for combat roles. Malian forces will need continuing support and training if they are to play an effective role in the north of the country.

[MINUSMA](#) is authorized 11,200 military personnel and 1,440 police. [According to the UN](#), only 5,201 soldiers and 809 police were on hand as of August 31, 2013, four months after the UN authorized the mission. MINUSMA personnel hail from 30 different countries, but only nine countries, all sub-Saharan African, have contributed more than 100 troops. Several of the troop contingents are unlikely to be able to play effective military roles in the demanding environment of northern Mali. The heavy lifting within MINUSMA may fall to the sizable contingents from Chad, Niger, and Senegal.

The UN’s challenge is to move quickly to bring MINUSMA up to its authorized strength and to deploy the force in a manner that takes into account the strengths and limitations of the various contingents. MINUSMA has already suffered a couple of setbacks. In July, [Nigeria withdrew](#) all but 115 of its 1,200 soldiers in MINUSMA. The Nigerian government stated that the troops were needed to combat Islamic militants at home. More recently, MINUSMA has been plagued by [allegations](#) that its troops have been involved in sexual abuse and other forms of serious misconduct.

Of the many challenges that the government of Mali and MINUSMA face, two are most important. First, the government needs to reach an accommodation with the Tuareg minority. Past efforts to achieve an accommodation have not been successful. The [cease-fire agreement](#) signed on June 19 in Burkina Faso by the government of Mali and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the principal Tuareg resistance group, was certainly a hopeful sign. That agreement will not, however, paper over the deep differences and ethnic animosities that exist between the Tuareg in northern Mali and the ethnic groups in the south. Historical differences and grievances deepened over the past two years of conflict as each side accused the other of committing atrocities.

Two developments since the signature of the cease-fire in June are cause for concern. In September, [Tuareg rebels and the Malian army clashed](#) outside the town of Lere. Three Malian soldiers were wounded. This incident and other sightings of armed Tuaregs indicate that the rebel groups are not adhering completely to the cease-fire agreement, which required them to remain in garrisons. Perhaps more important, there have been reports that [Islamic extremist groups](#) are attempting to re-establish ties with the Tuareg rebels. The Chinese news service Xinhua carried a report in July attributed to local sources



A French soldier stands alongside African troops who helped France take back Mali’s north earlier in the year, as they participate in a ceremony formally transforming the force into a United Nations peacekeeping mission, in Bamako, Mali, Monday, July 1, 2013. (AP Photo/Harouna Traore)

that 30 members of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar Dine, led by the notorious Iyad Ag Ghaly, were seen in the northern town of Kidal. Their mission was reportedly to assist the MNLA in transporting heavy weapons and establishing munitions caches.

Alliances between Tuareg and Islamic extremist groups were major factors in Mali's recent civil war. Most of those alliances broke down when the extremists seized the upper hand. Any rekindling of Tuareg-Islamic extremist ties would make the tasks of MINUSMA and the government of Mali much more difficult. The first priority needs to be a settlement with the Tuareg groups. That would permit MINUSMA and the Malian army, hopefully still supported by French special operations forces, to concentrate on AQIM and other Islamic extremist groups that have left the towns of northern Mali, but remain present in the desert and around Mali's periphery, posing an existential threat to Mali's fragile democracy.

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